R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME THREE

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

FROM THE PRINCE AND TREASURE OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

JAN. 5, 1548 – SEP. 25, 1617

MACHINE TRANSLATION
CLAUDE SONNET 4

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METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME THREE

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UNIVERSITY OF COIMBRA, PORTUGAL

AT THE REQUEST OF HIS MAJESTY
KING PHILIP II OF SPAIN

DISPUTATIONS 15-20

ORIGINAL LATIN PUBLISHED IN PARIS,
BY LOUIS VIVÈS, BOOKSELLER AND PUBLISHER,
ON THE STREET DELAMBRE, 13

MDCCCLXXVII

SANCTA MARIA, MATER DEI, ORA
PRO NOBIS PECCATORIBUS, NUNC ET IN HORA
MORTIS NOSTRAE. AMEN.

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DISPUTATION XV

ON THE FORMAL SUBSTANTIAL CAUSE

Since the material and formal causes express a mutual relationship between themselves, we shall therefore speak about substantial form first, and then about accidental form, using the same method we employed when we discussed matter. For those things which might be desired concerning form in general have either been touched upon in the disputation on causes in general, or will be explained more distinctly in the individual members, which agree in that common notion only analogically. Moreover, in treating substantial form, we shall complete those things which we deferred to this place concerning prime matter, because of the intrinsic connection between it and form. It must be assumed here, however, that there is no discussion of extrinsic form, which they call exemplar, concerning which we shall speak below, because as such it has more the character of an efficient cause than of a form. Nor is there discussion of separated form, as angelic or immaterial nature is customarily named, not because of causality, but because of actuality or beauty; but we treat only of informing form or form received in matter, because that is what has the proper and special character of a cause. Again, form is customarily divided into physical and metaphysical: the former is that which exercises true and real formal causality, and therefore it is about this that we must speak principally.

For although it is called physical form, either because it principally constitutes the nature of a thing, or because it is principally investigated through physical motion and considered first in physical science, nevertheless it is not outside metaphysical consideration, both because the notion of form is common and abstract, and also because form constitutes essence, and finally because it is one of the principal causes. What is signified by metaphysical form and how it participates in this character of cause, we shall add at the end of this disputation.

SECTION I

WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL FORMS ARE GIVEN IN MATERIAL THINGS

1. Reasons for doubt. The reason for doubting is first because substantial forms cannot be known by any experiment, nor are they necessary for all the actions and differences of things which we experience; therefore they should not be introduced without cause. The antecedent is clear, because fire, for example, is sufficiently understood to be constituted in its being if we conceive some substance having perfect and highest heat joined with dryness, even if the substance underlying these accidents is simple; and this is also sufficient for every action of fire which we experience and for the distinction between fire and water and for the transmutation of one into the other, which seems to consist in this: that substance passes from highest cold to highest heat, and conversely. This therefore is sufficient for the constitution, distinction and action of the elements; the same thing therefore will proportionally suffice for the composition of mixed things, for these are produced from the mixture of elements.

2. Second, a contradiction seems to be involved when something is called an informing and substantial form; for either it is a

subsisting thing and needs no supporting subject, or it needs one; if it has the first, it cannot be an informing form, because it is contradictory for that which is subsisting to be received in another. If it has the second, it is an inherent form; therefore accidental; therefore no substantial form is given.

3. Third, because, with substantial forms posited, it cannot be understood how transmutations and generations of things occur unless something is made from nothing, which cannot be according to natural principles. The consequence is clear, because either the substantial form pre-exists generation, or something of it does, or nothing does. The first cannot be said, otherwise infinite forms would pre-exist in matter, and nothing would really be made anew, but would appear. Nor can the second be said, both because in the same part of matter there cannot be something of a form without the whole form being there, since it is indivisible; and also because, even if part of the form were present and part were to be introduced, this part would be made from nothing; for it cannot be made from a worse part; it remains therefore that the third be said, which nevertheless is contradictory and exceeds the power of natural agents.

4. The ancient philosophers were ignorant of substantial forms. In this question almost all the ancient philosophers were ignorant of substantial forms, as is clear from what we have related above concerning their opinions about prime matter or the first subject of natural transmutations; for since they thought that subject to be a complete being in act, they could not acknowledge substantial form; for substantial form and prime matter which is pure potency are as it were correlative. Some also among later philosophers denied substantial forms, at least in the elements. Thus Alexander of Aphrodisias indicates, XII Metaph., com. 12, although there he seems to speak only by way of example and according to proportion; and Philoponus, II de Gener., com. 7; and Galen earlier held the same opinion, lib. I de Element.; and before him Empedocles felt the same

way, who did not deny the forms of mixed things, but of elements, as Aristotle indicates, I Phys., text. 51, and II Phys., text. 22.

Resolution of the Question

5. It must be said that all natural or corporeal things consist of substantial form (besides matter) as an intrinsic principle and formal cause. This is the opinion of Aristotle in countless places, who often reproaches the ancient philosophers because, having almost passed over substantial form, they applied their entire inquiry to matter, as is clear from the whole of lib. I Phys., and lib. II, c. 1, where he says form is a more perfect nature than matter. The same he has in lib. I de Partibus animalium, c. 1, and VII Metaph., c. 4, and lib. XII, c. 2, where he calls form "this something" (hoc aliquid), because it completes substance, which is "this something"; and in the same place, especially lib. VII Metaph., he calls form "what it is" (quod quid est); and he gives the reason because it is what constitutes and distinguishes the essences of things. Moreover, lib. II de Anima, c. 1, he distinguishes substance into matter, form and composite, and calls form entelecheia (ἐντελέχειαν)[1], concerning which name Fonseca writes much learnedly, lib. I Metaph., at the end; commonly however teachers teach that the word entelecheia is more general and comprehends more things than substantial form; for it properly signifies perfection or act perfecting a thing. By antonomasia, however, it is customarily attributed to substantial form that it is the principal act and greatest perfection of a substantial thing. By other names also substantial form is customarily named by Aristotle, which we shall note below when

[1] The correct Greek form is ἐντελέχειαν, the accusative singular of ἐντελέχεια. The form ἐντελέχειαμ, occasionally encountered in some Latinized scholastic texts or manuscripts, is not a proper Greek word and likely results from confusion with Latin accusative endings (e.g., -am). Aristotle's original Greek consistently uses the correct accusative ἐντελέχειαν when referring to substantial form as "entelechy."

explaining its causality. However, Aristotle was not the inventor of this truth, for before him Plato acknowledged substantial form, as is clear from the Timaeus, where he calls forms "simulacra of truly existing things," that is, participations of ideas, although he himself posits ideas only of substances. And before Plato some of the philosophers are believed to have touched upon substantial forms, as is clear from Aristotle, I de Partibus animal., c. 1, and other places cited above. Now this doctrine is so received in philosophy that it cannot be denied without great ignorance; and it is so consonant with the truth of the Christian faith that its certainty is not a little increased thereby; therefore it pleases us to begin the proof of this truth from a certain principle certain by faith and evident by natural light.

Other Substantial Forms are Gathered from the Rational Soul

6. The first argument therefore is this: man consists of substantial form as an intrinsic cause; therefore all natural things do also. The antecedent is proved, for the rational soul is a substance and not an accident, as is clear, because it remains separated from the body by itself, since it is immortal; therefore it is subsisting by itself and independent of a subject; therefore it is not an accident, but a substance. Again, that soul is the true form of the body, as faith teaches and is also evident by natural light; for it cannot be an assisting substance or one externally moving the body, otherwise it would not vivify it, nor would the works of life essentially depend on its presence and conjunction; nor finally would it be man himself who understands, but some other assisting substance. It is established therefore that man consists of body as matter and rational soul as form; therefore this soul is substantial form; for, as we shall declare below, by the name of substantial form nothing else is signified than a certain partial substance which can be so united to matter that with it it composes an integral substance and one per se, such as man is.

7. The first consequence is proved, supposing the discussion concerns natural things generable and corruptible, for these are of the same order as man with respect to this part, and among them there can be transmutation and vicissitude; from this however it will easily be concluded a fortiori that the same must be said of incorruptible bodies, supposing the opinion we treated above concerning their matter. The composition of man from matter and substantial form therefore shows that there is in natural things a certain substantial subject apt by its nature to be informed by some substantial act; therefore such a subject is imperfect and incomplete in the genus of substance; therefore it always seeks to be under some substantial act. But this subject is not proper to man, but is found also in other natural things, as is self-evident; whence it is also presupposed for the generation of man, and for nutrition, and after his corruption it remains; therefore all natural things, which consist of that subject or matter, also consist of substantial form actuating and perfecting that subject. Moreover, from the same composition of man it is gathered that an aggregation of several faculties or accidental forms in a simple substantial subject is not sufficient for the constitution of a natural thing; for in man there are those faculties and accidental forms perhaps more numerous and more perfect than in other natural things, and yet they do not suffice for the constitution of any complete natural being, but in addition a form is required which as it were presides over all those faculties and accidents and is the source of all actions and natural motions of such a being, and in which that whole variety of accidents and potencies has its root and a certain unity; therefore by the same reason in other natural beings some substantial form distinct from accidents and more intimate and more perfect than they is necessary. Third, by the same example it is established that the substantial generation and corruption of man does not consist in the acquisition or loss of some accidents, but in the union or disjunction of the rational soul substantially informing the human body, for which certain accidents prepare, and when these are removed, the soul

withdraws and man is corrupted; therefore in the same way the corruption and generation of other natural beings must be understood to occur. For, as far as can be gathered from experience, the mode of generation and corruption in other things is the same as in man, except for the difference in perfection and subsistence of the human form, which we would not gather from the mode of generation and corruption unless it were known to us from elsewhere. And therefore it is said in Ecclesiastes 3: "One death is of man and of beasts, and the condition of both is equal; as man dies, so they also die," etc. Finally, all the signs and indications of substantial composition that can be thought of in man are in other natural beings, and especially in animals, as will be established from the following argument.

Various Indications of Substantial Form

8. The reduction of an altered patient to its pristine state. The second principal argument therefore is taken from various indications arising from the accidents and operations of natural beings, which indicate that a substantial form lies hidden under them. The first is seen even in the elements; for if water, for example, is heated, and afterwards the agent is removed, it is reduced from within to its pristine coldness, as is established by experiment; therefore it is a sign that there is in water some more intimate principle from which the intensity of cold flows again, with external impediments removed; but that principle cannot be other than substantial form; therefore. The first consequence is proved, because there can be no external principle of that reduction, both because, if that reduction were from something external, it would not be per se and necessary, but accidental, insofar as an external agent might occur by chance; and also because, running through all the external principles that commonly occur, none exists from which that action could proceed, because proximately only the surrounding air is wont to occur, which either is not naturally as cold as water, or is accidentally wont to be left equally warm as the water

itself; whence it also reduces itself to its pristine state, as much as it can; remotely however only celestial and universal causes intervene, which of themselves are not determined to such action, as is known.

9. Various causes of such reduction are refuted. The second antecedent, namely, that no other intrinsic cause of that action can be devised besides the very form of water, is proved, for what will it be? Some say that in certain parts of water intense cold always remains, and from those parts others that have been heated are cooled, which Cajetan considers probable, I, q. 54, a. 3; and it is attributed to Averroes, II de Anima, com. 1. But this is frivolous and against experience; for by sense we perceive that all the water poured into some vessel is very hot, from whatever part it is touched; but if there were some parts so cold, they would either be perceived by sense or at least would temper the sensation of heat in some part of the water; but neither happens. It is also against physical reasoning, for all the water according to all its parts is uniformly applied to fire naturally acting; therefore according to all parts it suffers in the same way uniformly; for what is there that could either impede that action, or so interrupt it that it would occur in some parts and not in others? Likewise, either those parts which are said to retain cold can be heated, or not; if not, therefore they could not be corrupted either; but if they can be heated, therefore if all the water is sufficiently applied to fire, those parts also will be heated, or certainly a state can be given in which that potency is reduced to act, and with that posited, that water will still be reduced to its pristine coldness with the contrary agent removed, provided corruption of the water has not been reached.

10. Others respond that action does not proceed from some principle distinct from coldness; for coldness always remains in some degree, and it itself, as soon as it is not impeded, recalls itself to its pristine state. For in coldness itself two things can be distinguished, namely, essence and mode of intension; and the essence always remains integral, even if the intension is diminished, and therefore the mode of intension can flow from the same essence. But this response

is also false. First, because a more intense degree cannot proceed from a remiss quality, otherwise air also would make itself supremely hot, and so with all other things. Second, because it often happens that there are more degrees of heat in water than of cold; therefore, even with the external agent removed, coldness could not overcome intense heat, because it would be helped in no way by the subject, since matter alone is of itself indifferent to either accident. Third, because otherwise cold and heat could never remain quiet in remiss degrees in the same subject, but always one quality would expel the other, perfecting itself up to ultimate intension, because from the part of the subject (if it were only prime matter) there would be no impediment, and we suppose all other external things to be removed.

11. In elements no qualities virtually contain the primary ones. Others finally respond that another internal principle prior to coldness is indeed necessary, which remains integral even if coldness is remitted, from which that reduction is derived; they deny however that principle is substantial form, for alteration could not proceed immediately from it, but they say it is a certain quality of higher character, virtually containing the primary sensible qualities. Nevertheless this opinion can be understood in two ways: first, not denying substantial form, but positing that virtual quality as intermediate between substantial form and primary sensible qualities, and in this sense it does not contradict the truth we intend to prove; it nevertheless weakens the argument we are pursuing, and moreover it should be rejected as superfluous and gratuitously devised, for it multiplies qualities without any foundation or experience, since the emanation of accident from intrinsic form does not need another intermediate accident, otherwise we would proceed to infinity. Likewise, because it is contradictory to give in elements some qualities prior to the primary ones; but, as Aristotle testifies, the primary qualities of elements are formal heat, coldness, etc. Whence, although perhaps in mixed things some quality is sometimes given virtually containing heat or cold, that nevertheless is both posterior to the

temperament of primary qualities connatural to the mixed thing and is not for the intrinsic emanation of primary qualities in the same subject, but for effecting by proper action in extrinsic subjects. In another way that response can be understood, so that it intends to remove substantial form from the middle and put quality in its place. But understood in this sense, it is easily refuted, because that quality is not immediately and per se sensed, but is known from this effect of natural emanation; by what foundation therefore is that internal principle said to be accidental quality and not substantial form? Likewise that principle is the first act of matter, completing with it this natural being which we call water; therefore it is substantial act and not accidental. Likewise, that form is not only the root of cold, but also of humidity, density and other properties which the element water requires; for concerning these the same argument can be made, that if by contrary action they are changed from that natural state which water demands, immediately when the contrary recedes, they revert to their natural state; therefore they have another prior form from which they are derived, which remains unchanged; therefore either individual forms correspond to individual ones (so to speak) or virtual ones, which nature abhors and is entirely superfluous, or there is one form in which all those properties are rooted and as it were gathered together, which is most true; therefore that form is not accidental, but of a higher order. It is therefore substantial form, from which such reduction proceeds, as the common opinion holds: Avicenna, lib. I Suffic., c. 5; Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 8; Soto, II Phys., q. 1, and others.

12. And from this another indication can be taken, which is a confirmation of the preceding, for by almost evident experiment it is established that even in these inanimate things or elements substantial corruption is distinct from alteration; I speak specifically of inanimate things, so that the universal induction may be a fortiori; since in animate things the matter is more evident, as will be clear. We experience therefore that alteration, such as, for example, the heating

of water or iron, is sometimes so vehement that most intense heat is felt in them, and nevertheless if the action of the contrary agent ceases, those things remain either integral or nearly integral in their substance, and also easily revert to their accidental state; sometimes however alteration proceeds so far that complete transmutation of the thing occurs, so that although the agent is removed, that patient can never return to its pristine state, nor recover its former actions or similar accidents; sometimes also it is changed into a viler sensible substance, like ashes, slag, etc.; sometimes however it is consumed entirely insensibly, because it is transformed into another more subtle and insensible body; therefore it is an evident sign that alteration is sometimes pure and remains within the latitude of accidental change, sometimes however it has joined to it a greater change of the thing. But this cannot be other than because the substantial composite itself is dissolved, with the substantial form receding; therefore substantial forms are given. The final minor premise is proved, because if the whole substance of the thing always remained equally integral, however much alteration might proceed, it would of itself always have the same relationship to accidents; therefore either it would always after any alteration remain quiet under whatever accidents, as much as would be from itself and with contrary agent removed, or certainly with the same agents removed it would always return to the same accidents.

13. And this argument is confirmed, for we see that certain accidents are so inseparable from some subjects that, if they are removed, or too much diminished, complete transmutation occurs in the subjects, so that they cannot return to their pristine state by intrinsic power; therefore that inseparability proceeds from the connection of such accidents with some internal principle of such things. This cannot be prime matter or that first subject which remains under every transmutation, because with respect to it there is no inseparable accident among those that can be acquired or lost through alteration. Nor can that principle be some accident, if there is

discussion of the first and radical principle; for, although one accident is inseparable with respect to another, such as rarity with respect to heat, or whiteness with respect to such temperament of primary qualities, that temperament nevertheless is inseparable from another prior form with its nature left; therefore it is necessary to stop at some form which is first with respect to inseparable accidents; therefore it is substantial form and not accidental, since it constitutes the proper essence to which such accidental properties connaturally and inseparably belong.

14. The subordination of properties among themselves is an indication of substantial form. Finally, another argument can be formed from this indication, because in one natural being many properties are joined, which sometimes are so subordinated among themselves that one arises from another, as will from intellect; sometimes however they do not have subordination among themselves, as heat and humidity in air, whiteness and sweetness in milk, or several senses in an animal; therefore this multitude and variety of properties, especially when they are related in the latter way, requires one form in which all are united; otherwise they would be merely accidentally congregated in the same subject, and, with one entirely removed, another would not therefore recede; but experience establishes the opposite; therefore it is a sign that such accidents required in such number, weight and measure in such subject and being do not have that connection with respect to the first subject alone or prime matter, but with respect to some composite which by reason of form requires that order of accidents among themselves. And this argument is customarily confirmed especially in mixed bodies, in which we see contrary accidents reduced to certain degrees conserved in the same mixed thing; but this cannot proceed from the qualities themselves, as is sufficiently clear per se, since they rather fight by their nature. Nor does it proceed from an extrinsic cause nor from matter, as is easily clear; therefore it must proceed from form. Nevertheless this confirmation either has no force at all, or is not a

distinct argument from the preceding ones, for the four primary qualities reduced to that temperament in which they can be simultaneously in the same subject, so that they are perpetually conserved in the same state in it, do not need another internal cause or principle, but only the removal of an external corrupting agent, because those qualities constituted in that degree are neither properly contrary nor can they have action among themselves; indeed, if they could have it, substantial form could not impede or reconcile it. Whence it happens that in living things, even in man, where form is maximally one, it cannot impede action between heterogeneous parts, because, although in individual parts qualities are so tempered that they agree among themselves with respect to their proper subject, they are not so tempered with respect to the qualities of another dissimilar part. From this conservation of temperament consisting of contrary qualities, therefore, taken precisely, substantial form is not inferred. It is however inferred excellently from the fact that in such temperament not only are qualities permitted (so to speak) to remain in that degree, but also they are so connected in it and so require it that if one of them is externally either increased or diminished, with the external agent removed, the temperament immediately returns to its former proportion, which is maximally seen in animals; this therefore is an evident sign that such temperament is of some form in which those qualities are connected. But this sign coincides with that concerning the reduction of a thing to its natural state.

15. That a thing acting intensely in one thing is remitted in the action of others is a sign of substantial form. Finally, this argument is confirmed by another indication taken from the action of certain natural things; for we experience that some thing having several faculties of operating, while it operates intensely through one, is impeded so that it cannot operate through another, or not with such effort; therefore it is a sign that those faculties are subordinated to the same form, which operates principally through them; for if they had no subordination among themselves nor with some common

principle, each of them would have its operation independently of the other, nor would there be any reason why the effort of one would impede the effort of another more than if they were in diverse subjects; but from subordination to the same form an excellent reason is given, because since it is of finite virtue, while it is intensely applied to one operation, it is distracted from another, and it can apply itself to one with such effort that its virtue is exhausted there. The antecedent is declared by some in natural things or agents, which while they act intensely to overcome a contrary cannot entirely protect themselves from being overcome or suffering in some part from the contrary. Nevertheless this experience concerning the repassion of natural agents does not proceed from the subordination of several faculties to one form, but from the fact that a thing is not always equally powerful to resist as it is to act. Whence also red-hot iron, while it heats water, suffers reaction from it, although the form of iron contributes nothing at all to that action; indeed there the operations of diverse faculties do not intervene, but the action of one quality, namely heat, and passion in some part contrary to the same, which proceeds from the fact that heat is not as powerful to resist as to act. Therefore in inanimate things I scarcely believe any experiment can be found by which that antecedent might be proved, because in accidental actions, which do not proceed from life, no concurrence of substantial form does not seem to intervene proximately by reason of which the action of one faculty is remitted from the effort of another. But in living things, and especially in us, we manifestly experience such an effect; for sometimes attentive interior cogitation prevents us from seeing even present things; indeed prolonged meditation is wont to impede the action of the nutritive part. Nor does it matter if someone says this proceeds from the concurrence of vital spirits, which are necessary for the operations of these faculties, and while they flow to one, they abandon another; both because that very concurrence of vital spirits to one faculty rather than another is a sign of one form using the spirits and faculties themselves for two actions, otherwise there would

be no reason why spirits would flow more to one faculty than to another; and also because intellectual operation does not occur through spirits, and yet effort and attention to it impedes inferior actions. Nor can this be attributed to the cooperation of phantasy, which requires the concurrence of spirits; for intellectual attention, especially if it is vehement and concerning things of a higher order, also greatly diminishes the very action of phantasy; therefore it does not proceed from spirits, but from the occupation of the same soul concerning some operation.

The Causes of Substantial Form Clearly Show It

16. That substantial form exists is not contradictory. The third principal argument can be given a priori from the proper causes of substantial form, which are final, efficient and material; for it does not have a formal cause, since it is itself form, whence no positive reason can be taken from it. We can however suppose that from its part there is no contradiction that such a genus of being or incomplete substance is given in the nature of things; for what contradiction can be feigned or devised in this? Likewise, because it is not contradictory that substantial acts of the highest order are given in the nature of things which are subsistent and not informing, like angels, and a substantial act of middle order which is simultaneously subsistent and actuating or informing, as was said concerning the rational soul; therefore it will not be contradictory that substantial acts of the lowest order are given, that is, which are actuating acts and not integrally subsistent, and these we have called substantial forms. Likewise, either such act would be contradictory because it is act, or because it is substantial, or because it is contradictory for these two to be joined in the same thing; none of these can be said with probability; therefore neither is it contradictory that substantial form be given as far as concerns its part. But if from its part it is not contradictory, it will immediately be easily proved from

other causes either that it is not contradictory, or even that it is necessary. The first two parts of the first antecedent seem self-evident. The first indeed, because it is self-evident that entities are given in things which are acts and perfections of others; thus whiteness is the act of what is white and understanding of what understands. The second however, because it is also self-evident that substantial entities are given in things, since these are the foundation of all others. The third part therefore remains to be proved, namely, that it is not contradictory for these two properties or characters to be joined in the same entity; but this is clear, both because nothing can be assigned in either of those characters which intrinsically contradicts the other, and also because the character of act of itself speaks of perfection; therefore if it is not contradictory to be joined with accidental being, why is it contradictory to be coupled with substantial being? And finally because, since the character of substantial entity looks to perfection simply, it seems more contradictory with the character of potentiality than with the character of actuality; but the first is not contradictory, as is established in prime matter; therefore neither will the second be contradictory. And from this a new argument arises; for potency and act in every genus correspond to each other with proportion; but it is not contradictory that substantial potency is given in natural things which in the genus of substance is an incomplete and imperfect being, as has been shown above and is manifest from the composition of man; therefore it will not be contradictory that act proportioned to this potency is given by which any natural thing can be actuated and exist and be conserved in the manner connatural to it.

17. It is demonstrated from material and efficient cause. And from this the argument taken from material cause is easily concluded; for, since matter is substantial potency, it contains in its genus and in receptive potency every act proportioned to it; therefore it is capable of causing it in its genus, if it is not contradictory from elsewhere; therefore from this part substantial form has sufficient material cause

so that it can exist. Again, the argument from efficient cause is concluded; for if there is discussion of the first cause, virtue cannot be lacking by which it could have effected substantial forms actuating matter in the universe, either dependently or independently from it, according to various degrees and perfections of such forms, supposing their non-contradiction; therefore since such forms are necessary in the nature of things, they have been effected by such cause. But if there is discussion of proximate cause, it must be seen afterwards what can intervene with respect to each form. Now it suffices to say that such cause cannot be lacking, if such effect is necessary for the constitution of natural things; whence if this virtue sometimes fails created causes, it pertains to the causality of the first cause that it also supply the office of proximate cause, which, speaking per se, it does only in the rational soul as to its effection; for other forms, from the mode in which they are made, it is not contradictory that they be made by created agents, since they are made with the concurrence of matter, as we shall immediately explain. Whether there is sufficient virtue in such agents, we shall say when treating efficient cause.

18. The principal index of form is its end. Therefore the principal argument must be taken from the end of substantial form, which is to constitute and complete the essence of a natural being, which end or effect is absolutely necessary in the nature of things; otherwise nothing would be complete and perfect in corporeal things in its substantial nature; nor would there be multitude and variety of substantial species, in which the wonderful disposition and beauty of this corporeal universe maximally consists. For this end therefore substantial form is entirely necessary, because since matter is a very imperfect being, the integral essence of each thing cannot consist in it alone. Next, because matter, insofar as it is the first subject, is one and the same in all natural things; therefore the essence of them cannot consist in it alone, otherwise all would be of one essence and would differ only accidentally, which contradicts the amplitude and beauty of the whole universe, which arises maximally from the variety of

species. This seems to be signified in Genesis 1, in those words: "making seed according to its genus," or "according to its species." And that repetition is often made, "according to their species and in their genus," and finally it is concluded: "God saw all things that he had made, and they were very good," because namely the complete goodness of the whole universe arises from that variety. Which also the various virtues and operations of things and mutual generations and corruptions sufficiently show, as has been declared. Something therefore besides matter must be added to it by which the essence of each thing is completed; but since matter is potency, that which is added to it for completing essence will be act, because potency speaks of essential order to act.

19. But that act which is joined to matter for completing the essence of a thing cannot be accidental act. First indeed because from act and potency of diverse orders an essence truly and per se one is not completed; but the essence of a natural and substantial thing ought to be truly and per se one; otherwise it would not be one substance. Second, because since matter is substantial potency, it is not fulfilled by accidental act; therefore with it it cannot complete the true essence of a natural thing. Third, because if such act is accidental, I ask to what does it happen. For either it happens to the composite from that act and potency, as such, and this is contradictory, because since that composite intrinsically consists of such form, it cannot happen to it; just as whiteness is not an accident of what is white, as white, but of the white subject. Or it happens to matter or the substantial subject, and thus I ask again why it is said to happen to it. Either because matter can be with such act, and also without it. And this is not sufficient, otherwise the rational soul also would be an accident of the body; this therefore can be common to both substantial and accidental act. Or it is because such form depends on matter in its being, and this also is not sufficient, because even parts of substance can depend on other parts, and matter itself depends in its way on form; there are therefore various modes of dependence, and it

is not contradictory for some incomplete substance to depend on a subject of the same order. Or finally it is said to be accident because in its being it has entity so imperfect and diminished that it is of an inferior order than the whole latitude of substance. And this is first said gratuitously and without foundation; for whence is it established that act of matter, to which it is ordered per se first and which with it completes the essence of a natural thing, is such diminished and incomplete entity? Then it contradicts the end of such form, because, as I said, one substantial essence cannot be composed from substantial subject and accidental form, especially since form is what gives the ultimate degree and complement of essence. On account of which Aristotle rightly said, I Phys., c. 6, that substance is not composed from non-substances; but it is established that natural things and their essences are substantial and per se one; therefore it is a most certain philosophical doctrine concerning substantial forms.

Arguments are Resolved

20. From the reasons for doubting set forth at the beginning, the first two are left resolved by what has been said. For to the first, it is denied that sufficient indications and effects are lacking in natural things, through which one can sufficiently arrive at knowledge of substantial forms, and it is denied consequently that either all actions or transmutations can be preserved without substantial forms. To the second, it is denied that it is contradictory for some form to be subsisting and informing, either in different states or even in the same state, as we shall declare more extensively below when treating of subsistence. It is also denied that it is contradictory for a form to be dependent on a subject and to be substantial, as was said a little before; but how this dependence differs from the inherence of an accident, we shall say in the following disputation. In the third argument, however, a special difficulty is sought, which must be treated in the following section.

SECTION II
HOW A SUBSTANTIAL FORM CAN BE MADE IN MATTER AND FROM MATTER

1. The reason for the difficulty. The reason for doubt was touched upon in the preceding section; for a substantial form is something distinct from matter; therefore, either that thing is something before generation, or it is nothing. If it is something, then it is a substantial form before it is made; for that thing is indivisible and essentially is a substantial form; therefore, that thing cannot be something before generation without being a substantial form. But this is impossible, both because otherwise there would be no substantial generation, and also because otherwise there would be simultaneously in matter repugnant forms. If, however, the other part is chosen, namely that the form is nothing before generation, it follows that the form is made from nothing, which contradicts the axiom of the philosophers: "From nothing, nothing is made." Nor is he satisfied who would respond that the form is not made, but the composite; the composite, however, is made from matter, and therefore there is nothing that is made from nothing. This (I say) is not satisfactory, because it consists more in words and manner of speaking than in reality, for the form truly was not before and afterwards is; therefore it has been made. Likewise, because the composite is not made except insofar as it is composed from matter and form; but it is not composed except from beings that have been made. Likewise, because when the whole is corrupted, the form truly ceases to be and passes into nothing; for what was previously something, afterwards is nothing; therefore when the whole begins to be, the form is also made.

2. The teaching of the ancient philosophers is rejected. Because of this difficulty, the ancient philosophers denied substantial forms, and judged that all things are made through the mutation of

accidents alone. Their opinion has already been disproved from the demonstration of substantial form and of generation and corruption; but now we add that they did not solve the difficulty by denying substantial forms unless they also deny accidental forms, which truly and really are made anew, and consequently say that there is no mutation in things except perhaps local motion, but things seem to be transmuted because those that appeared are hidden, and those that were hidden appear, which is manifestly absurd. The assumption is clear, because concerning accidental form the same difficulty can be raised; for that form also, when it exists, has its own reality and entity. Therefore either that form, before it is made, was something, or nothing. If something, then it is not made; if nothing, then it is made from nothing. Hence Anaxagoras, as we saw above, granted that all forms of things actually exist in atoms, from whose various concurrence he composed all things; but that teaching has been sufficiently refuted in what precedes.

The First Opinion is Proposed & Explained in Various Ways

3. Albert the Great is rescued from this opinion. Having omitted therefore the ancient philosophers, among later thinkers there are various opinions concerning this matter. The first is that all forms actually exist in matter, not indeed integral and perfect, because they see that this would eliminate the true generation and corruption of things and involve manifest contradiction, since the forms themselves are mutually repugnant, and since the same reasoning applies to accidental forms, which are sometimes properly contrary. But they say that forms exist actually in matter according to certain inchoations of them. Soto, I Phys., q. 7, attributes this opinion to Albert, ibid., tract. III, c. 3; but Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 28, denies that Albert holds this opinion. And indeed Albert only says that in matter, which is the subject of forms, there exists a confused habit of the same forms, but

he declares that this habit is nothing other than the habitual potency by which matter encloses forms within itself; he signifies, however, that this confused habit is something distinct from the nature of matter, by reason of which the form is said to preexist in matter: "I do not intend (he says) to say that part of the form is from within and part from without, but the whole is from within and the whole is from without." Explaining this, he signifies that the form is from within, that is, preexists in matter according to essential being, and therefore he says that the agent does not act to produce the essence of the form, but toward the being of the form; and in this sense he had said that the whole form is from without, that is, is made by the efficient cause as regards existential being. All of these things, although they are stated most obscurely, can be drawn to a correct meaning, if by essential being we understand only being in potency, which is not made by a natural agent, but is presupposed in matter. Hence the same Albert, V Metaph., tract. II, c. 12, says that the whole form is from within according to potential being and from without according to actual being; in VIII Phys., c. 4, he also calls the potency toward form the inchoation of form. Therefore, we correctly understand by that confused habit the very potentiality of matter, which Albert himself calls habitual power. He only seems to distinguish the potency of matter from matter, which pertains to another question treated above, and could quite probably be explained as a distinction of reason and not of thing; for there in the same way he distinguishes in genus the nature of the genus from the power by which it contains differences.

4. Another opinion is reported by Durand, In II, dist. 18, q. 2, which posited in matter certain possibilities of forms, which do not remain when the forms are produced, but are converted into them; and thus it preserved that forms are not made from nothing, but from those possibilities. However, Durand does not report any author of this opinion, and therefore we cannot affirm its meaning with certainty; yet it can scarcely be believed that those authors understood by that possibility some true thing distinct from matter and from

form, but only the possible essence of the form, which others call objective potency; although if this opinion intended only this, it brought nothing special by which to explain that the form is not created; for even things that are created are made from this kind of possibility. Finally, Soto reports another opinion of Aureolus, In II, dist. 18, that the form preexists in matter according to a part, from which it is perfected by the action of the agent, and therefore is not made from nothing; but this opinion neither does Capreolus report from Aureolus nor could I find it in any other author.

5. Therefore, in whatever sense it is asserted that there precedes in matter some thing distinct from matter itself from which the form is produced, it is improbable and serves nothing to untangle the difficulty in which we are engaged. The first point is clear, because it cannot be understood what or of what kind that entity is, because it is either substance or accident; the latter is not said by those authors, nor can it be said, both because an accident is not an intrinsic inchoation of a substantial form, but at most can be a disposition, and also because on account of a preexisting accident it is not avoided that the whole reality of the form is made from nothing of itself, because an accident is not something of the form itself. If, however, the former is said, it will be asked again whether that substance is matter, or form, or composite; it cannot be composite, as is evident per se; not matter, because it is supposed to be a thing distinct from it; nor form, because this begins to be through generation. Perhaps it will be said to be form in imperfect being. But against this it is further urged, supposing that we are speaking of actual being, by which a thing is a true actual entity outside its causes; for it would be quite frivolous to speak of possible being only, because according to that being no true thing distinct from matter is posited in matter which is outside nothing and is form in imperfect being.

6. Therefore, speaking of such a thing having true actual being, although imperfect, I ask how from that thing the form is made in perfect being, whether by intensification, or by transmutation of

one into another. Nor can any other mode besides these be devised; for in the former mode the prior entity remains, which was imperfect, with the imperfection removed through something that is added to it; in the latter mode, however, that imperfect entity is removed and a perfect one succeeds it, whether by conversion of one into another, or by any other reason; therefore the two modes include immediate contradiction; hence another cannot be devised which is not reduced to one of them. But the first mode has no verisimilitude. First, because a substantial form is not intensifiable and remissible, as I shall show below. Second, because otherwise all substantial forms that can be educed from matter would preexist actually in matter, indeed in a remiss degree, yet according to some true and actual entity, and thus there would be simultaneously in matter infinite actual entities, for forms can be multiplied infinitely. But this is plainly absurd, both because of the infinity of entities, and also because matter does not have from itself such congenital forms as if emanating from its own entity; nor is there any agent by which they have been made; nor are they owed to matter itself, so that we might imagine God to have infused them or concreated them. Third, because even with those imperfect entities posited, the same difficulty remains, how that degree or part of entity is made which is added to the preceding one, because it begins to be absolutely, since it was nothing before; for in forms that are intensified the second degree is not properly made from the first, except perhaps as from a term from which; in which way rather the posterior degree is made from the remission or limitation of the prior, which is the privation of a further degree, than from the very positive entity of the prior degree; therefore that one degree is presupposed does not remove that the second was nothing before until it receives being through the action of the agent; therefore concerning that degree the same difficulty remains, how it is not made from nothing. Finally, according to that opinion true substantial generation and corruption is removed, because there will be only a certain intensification or remission of forms.

7. Nor are reasons equally effective lacking against the latter mode; for first, from it follows that infinite entities are supposed in matter; nor indeed can one and the same be imagined which is the inchoation of all forms; for if when one form is made the inchoation of it is removed and destroyed, with others remaining, and thus in all things this can happen reciprocally and mutually, it is necessary that all those entities be distinct among themselves. Second, because if a perfect form is made from an inchoate one through transmutation or conversion, then one is made from another only as from a term from which; therefore the whole entity of the form is made, which was nothing actually before; for because of the preexisting inchoation it cannot be said to have preexisted actually, since they are distinct things, of which one perishes when the other begins; therefore that imperfect entity is impertinent so that the form is not made from nothing; for that inchoation is also not something, that is, some part or some degree of that form which is made. But if the relation to a positive term from which is necessary or suffices so that a thing is not made from nothing, even for this that inchoation is not necessary, because a contrary or repugnant form suffices, which is always expelled when another is introduced, because the generation of one is the corruption of another. Third, it can be asked whether that imperfect entity which is cast aside, and the perfect form which is introduced, are of the same essential species, or distinct. For if they are distinct, then each is perfect in its species; and if one casts aside the other, they will be mutually repugnant; therefore to posit those inchoations is nothing other than to multiply forms in matter without utility; for so that one form might be made from a repugnant term, one contrary or incompossible form suffices, which is always presupposed. If, however, those entities are of the same species, no reason can be given why one should cast aside the other or why one should be made in a subject in which another actually preexisted.

8. What difference Aristotle posited between the materials of diverse artifacts. But you will object that Aristotle, VII Metaph., text.

21, says that in matter there is some part of the thing to be made, and constitutes in this a difference between artificial and natural things, that in artificial things only matter apt to obey the artificer is presupposed, but in natural things there is in matter something of the form to be introduced. And this is confirmed, because otherwise the natural generation of a complete substance would be no more natural than the production of an artificial thing in its matter. It is responded that Aristotle calls the very aptitude of matter toward form a part of the thing to be effected. Thus St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales explain it, and it could be understood concerning a part not of the form itself, but of the whole composite. But the proper sense is that Aristotle does not call the matter itself a part, but some active virtue, which is sometimes conjoined with matter, and cooperates toward the generation or production of the thing. For there Aristotle doubts why those things that are made by art sometimes are also made by chance and without art, as health, but sometimes it does not happen to be made without art, as a house; and he responds that the reason is because sometimes in the matter from which or about which art operates, there precedes some part which can be a principle of moving or operating about that matter, as in health there precedes animal heat, which happens to be excited or aided from elsewhere besides art, and thus without it and by some chance to effect health. But sometimes in the matter of art there is no active part, as in stones and wood, and therefore a house cannot be made from them without art. Therefore Aristotle does not speak of the inchoation of forms, as St. Thomas and Scotus correctly noted, but of virtue which sometimes exists in matter for beginning action. And this exposition also was handed down by the Commentator and Alexander of Aphrodisias. Hence it is false and entirely contrary to the letter of Aristotle that there a difference is constituted between artificial and natural things; for only a difference is constituted between artificial things among themselves, and rather there, text. 31, Aristotle signifies that the same happens in natural things, as St. Thomas noted; for sometimes that which is acted upon

from which a natural thing is generated exists in passive potency alone, and then nothing can be generated from it except by an extrinsic natural agent; but sometimes it has joined to it an active seminal virtue, which is as it were a part of it, as is clear in seed or in a grain of wheat, and then the effect happens to be made without another extrinsic agent. To the confirmation it is responded that generation is natural on the part of natural passive potency, and consequently also on the part of natural active potency, which corresponds to the passive; but for artificial things as such there is not so much natural passive potency as obediential, to which natural active potency does not correspond, but rational or ideal, which we shall explain a little below.

Not All Substantial Forms Are Created

9. Plato and Avicenna are vindicated from error. A second opinion was of others who, overcome by the difficulty mentioned, said that all substantial forms are made through creation. Albert reports this opinion, In II, dist. 18, a. 12, and some attribute it to Plato in the Phaedo, because he said that forms are induced in matter by separate ideas, and to Avicenna, I Sufficient., c. 10, and IX of his Metaph., c. 4, who said that the same forms are induced by a separate intelligence, which he said was the tenth after nine which preside over nine celestial bodies, and presides over the sublunary world. But these two philosophers, although they perhaps erred concerning the effective principle of substantial forms (concerning which we shall speak later about efficient cause), nevertheless that they erred concerning the mode of effecting these forms is not established; nor does Aristotle attack Plato under this title, but because he introduced separate ideas without cause, since such things can be generated by things similar to themselves. This reason presses more against Avicenna; for Plato perhaps did not posit ideas outside the divine mind, and said that forms are introduced from them, as from a universal principle, which

does not exclude proximate agents; but Avicenna indeed erred in attributing to superior intelligences the creation of inferior things, and to the lowest the introduction of substantial forms; nevertheless it is not established that he said all inferior forms are made through creation. Hence Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 29, judges that his opinion can probably be defended; concerning which we shall speak in the place cited about efficient cause, and again below in treating of created intelligences. But whoever held that opinion, understood universally it is improbable; for concerning the rational soul it is true and Catholic, but concerning others it is false, because otherwise all substantial forms would be subsistent and independent from matter in becoming, and consequently also in being, which is most absurd, otherwise all souls of brutes would be immortal. The consequent is clear, because creation both belongs to subsistent things and does not depend on material cause, as we shall say below. Second, the reason hinted at above presses against this opinion, because if substantial forms are created for the stated cause, accidental forms must also be created, because an accidental form is also made from nothing of itself and does not preexist actually in the subject, neither according to its whole self nor according to a part. But if this is conceded, it further follows that, just as the introduction of substantial forms for that cause is not from natural agents, so neither is the production of accidental forms. And thus finally it follows that natural agents do absolutely nothing, which we shall show below to be most absurd.

Resolution of the Question

10. The first assertion concerning the rational soul. Therefore the true and peripatetic opinion is that among substantial forms some are spiritual, and substantial, and independent from matter, although they truly inform it; but others are material and thus inherent in matter so that they depend on it in being and becoming. Of the former order are only human souls (for we are dealing only with informing

forms), and concerning these it must be conceded that the consequent drawn in the difficulty mentioned follows, namely that they are made from nothing through true creation, which is to be shown more extensively in its proper place; now it suffices to say that this necessarily follows from the principle posited, supposing that these souls do not preexist before they are united to bodies, which is certain from faith and from that principle that they are true forms of the body. Indeed, even if they preexisted, they could not exist except through creation, because they are not necessary beings from themselves and from their quiddity having being, as we shall demonstrate universally below, partly in the disputation on efficient cause, partly by demonstrating that only one being is uncreated. But if the rational soul has being only through the efficiency of another, and is imagined to exist before the body, it is in a certain way more clearly and evidently shown to have being through creation, because it has been made from nothing and without the concurrence of a subject or material cause. I say, however, that it is in a certain way clearer, because now, while the disposition of the body is awaited so that the soul might be made, it can seem not to be so properly creation, because it is made with some concurrence of matter. Nevertheless it is true creation, because on the part of the body there is no concurrence per se and in the genus of material cause into the very being or becoming of the rational soul, but it is like a certain occasion requiring the creation of that soul, without which occasion neither is it owed to the soul itself that it be made, nor would its cause be determined to its production. But that the body or matter does not influence per se the becoming or being of the soul, is established from the fact that the rational soul, separated from the body, retains its being; therefore it does not depend on a sustaining subject in its being; therefore neither in becoming, because such is the becoming of a thing as is its being; therefore conversely the subject itself or matter does not have per se influence in the being or becoming of such a soul; for these two are correlative, or rather the same, the dependence of the effect and the influence of the cause.

11. "From nothing, nothing is made" - the axiom must be limited. Therefore that principle, "from nothing, nothing is made," understood universally concerning every cause and every effect, is false and contrary to natural reason, as is shown by this very example of the rational soul, and also by the example of prime matter, as was touched upon above, and we shall bring forward more instances in what follows. But understood concerning the virtue of a finite and natural agent, it is true. Hence concerning this form, it must be conceded that there is not in proximate natural agents the virtue to effect it, but the proximate agent disposes the matter, while a separate intelligence effects the form, not indeed a created intelligence, as Avicenna thought, nor a separate idea existing outside God, but God himself, whom alone we shall show below to be the effecter of all things that are made through creation.

12. Prime matter is natural potency toward the rational soul. You will say hence that prime matter is not in natural potency toward the rational soul, which seems inconvenient. The consequent is clear, because to every natural passive potency corresponds a natural active potency; but there is no natural active potency which can effect this form in matter; therefore neither is there in matter natural passive potency toward it. Some concede the consequent, both because of the reason given, and also because, if matter were in potency toward the rational soul, when this soul is made, it would be said to be educed from the potency of matter. But this opinion is not pleasing; for if matter were not in natural potency toward the rational soul, the generation of man would not be natural, because it would be natural neither from the active nor from the passive principle. Likewise, because matter is naturally disposed ultimately to receive the rational form, and to matter thus disposed according to the order of nature such a form is owed; therefore it is in natural potency toward it. Therefore to the difficulty it is responded by denying the consequent. To the first reason it is responded that natural potency is to be considered first and per se in order toward a connatural and

proportioned act; but the rational soul is a natural and proportioned act of matter, and therefore matter is also natural potency toward that act; hence from both is made a certain natural being per se one, and matter itself is connaturally conserved under such an act. But what pertains to active potency, first there can be given natural active potency for uniting such an act to such potency, and in this way natural active potency already corresponds to natural passive potency. Then, although this form can be made by God alone, nevertheless God in that action operates according to the mode and order owed to the natures of things, and this suffices so that he is said to operate through the mode of natural cause and so that sufficient active virtue corresponds to passive potencies. To the other reason it is responded that it is one thing for matter to contain form in potency, and another to be in potency toward form; for the former indicates the power of causing the form, for a cause contains its effect in its genus; but the latter indicates only the capacity for receiving the form. Therefore matter is in natural potency toward receiving the rational soul, yet it does not contain it in its potency, since it cannot cause it; and therefore the rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter, because nothing is educed except whence it is contained, and because eduction indicates causality of matter in form, as we shall now say.

13. All substantial forms, except the rational, are made from the underlying subject. Second, concerning all other substantial forms it must be said that they are not properly made from nothing, but are educed from the potency of underlying matter; and therefore in the production of these forms nothing is made contrary to that axiom: "from nothing, nothing is made," if it is correctly understood. This assertion is taken from Aristotle, I Phys., throughout, and book VII Metaph., and from other authors, whom I shall immediately mention. And it is briefly explained; for to be made from nothing says two things: one is to be made absolutely and simply; the other is that such production is from nothing. The first is properly said of a subsistent thing, because it belongs to that to be made whose it is to be; but that

properly is what subsists and has being; for what is adjacent to another, rather is that by which another is. Therefore from this part, material substantial forms are not made from nothing, because they are not properly made. And St. Thomas gives this reason, I, q. 45, a. 8, and q. 90, a. 2, and it will be more explained from what is to be said. Therefore taking the very making itself in this propriety and rigor, thus to be made from nothing is to be made according to its whole self, that is, with no part of itself presupposed from which it is made. And for this reason natural things when they are made anew, are not made from nothing, because they are made from presupposed matter from which they are composed, and thus they are not made according to their whole selves, but according to something of themselves. But the forms of these things, although they truly receive their whole entity anew, which they did not have before, because nevertheless they themselves are not made, as has been said, therefore neither are they made from nothing. Nevertheless, because taking that word "making" in a broader way it cannot be denied that the form has been made in that way in which it now is and was not before, as the reason for doubting posited at the beginning of the section also proves, therefore it must be added that, taking making in this amplitude, to be made from nothing not only negates the relation of material cause intrinsically composing that which is made, but also the relation of material cause per se causing and sustaining the form which is made, or comes to be. For we said in what precedes that matter is both the cause of the composite and of the form dependent on it; therefore so that a thing is said to be made from nothing, both modes of causality must be negated, and in the same sense that axiom must be taken, so that it is true: "from nothing, nothing is made," namely by the virtue of a natural and finite agent nothing is made except from a presupposed subject concurring per se both to the composite and to the form, if both are made in their own way by the same agent. Therefore from these things it is correctly concluded that material substantial forms are not made from nothing, because they are made from matter, which

in its genus concurs per se and influences the being and becoming of such forms, because, just as they cannot exist except affixed to matter by which they are sustained in being, so neither can they be made unless their production and penetration into the same matter is sustained. And this is the proper and per se difference between production from nothing and from something, on account of which, as we shall show below, the former mode of producing surpasses the finite power of natural agents, but not the latter.

14. What it is to be educed from the potency of matter, explained in various ways. First. From these things it is also established that properly concerning these forms it is said not that they are created, but that they are educed from the potency of matter, and what it is to be educed from the potency of matter; in explaining which many labor, both in I Phys., and in VII Metaph. But St. Thomas briefly explained both, I, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2. For since those forms are not made from nothing, they are not created, because to be created is to be made from nothing. But since those forms are contained in the potency of matter, and through the action of the agent are made as it were outside that potency, not that they exist outside matter and do not actuate and adhere to its potency, but that, since they were previously only contained in potency and in cause, afterwards they are in act and outside the cause, and thus from the potential being of matter, in which they were contained, they are educed into act by the virtue of the agent, with the same matter concurring. You will say: therefore by the same reason things will be said to be educed from the potency of the agent, because they also were contained in it by virtue and power, and from this being in potency they are educed into act through the action of the agent itself. It is responded by absolutely denying the consequent, because those words in all propriety signify the relation of material cause and not efficient. And so, both efficient and matter can be said to contain the effect, but in a diverse way; for the agent contains eminently or virtually, but matter only in receptive or passive potency; therefore when it is said that form is educed from the

potency of matter, the relation of material cause is peculiarly denoted; but the agent is properly said through its virtue to educe the effect from potency into act.

15. Second. It is also customary to explain otherwise what it is for form to be educed from the potency of matter, namely, that it is to be made in matter with dependence on it in being and becoming, which belongs to all substantial forms, except the rational. This explanation differs from the preceding only in words; for (as I was saying above) for matter to contain in its potency imports causality or the power of causing on the part of matter in its genus; therefore for form to be drawn or made outside the potency of matter in which it is contained, is nothing other than to be made actually in matter, with matter itself concurring in its genus through its potency to the becoming and being of such form; but this itself is for form to be made with dependence on matter in becoming and in being; and it is only a diverse mode of explaining through the relation of effect to cause, or conversely through the relation of cause to effect. Another explanation also occurs, which, although it does not contain a different thing from the preceding ones, nevertheless declares it more and is apt for explaining certain difficulties that arise. Therefore for form to be educed from the potency of matter is to be made by the same action by which the composite is made from preceding matter which is not made through that action; which exposition St. Thomas seems to have intended when he said that form is not created, but educed, because it is not itself that is per se produced, but the composite, while the form is coproduced from underlying matter. And by induction it is established that this happens in all forms that are educed from the potency of matter. But the reason can be given, because eduction consists in this, that it is an action or mutation per se and essentially depending on matter; but through this action simultaneously the form is made and united to matter; therefore through the same action the composite is made per se primarily and such form is coproduced, and is made actually outside the potency of matter, therefore the eduction

of form from the potency of matter is best explained through that action.

Corollaries from the Preceding Resolution

16. The rational soul is not educed from the potency of matter. And hence it is first understood more fully what we were saying above, that the rational form is not educed from the potency of matter, because it is neither contained in the potency of that, so that it is educed outside it, nor is it made or exists dependently on matter, nor is it made by the same action by which the composite is made, or by which it itself is united to matter; for first, at least by nature, it is made in itself and receives its being independent from matter, and afterwards by another action it is united by which the whole composite is generated.

17. Whether celestial forms are educed from the potency of matter. Second, another difficulty that occurred here concerning celestial forms is resolved from what has been said, namely, whether they can be said to be educed from the potency of matter; for according to the prior interpretations it seemed that this should be affirmed; for those forms depend in becoming and being on their matter; therefore they are educed from the potency of that; for if they depend in becoming and in being, therefore they are caused by matter; therefore they are contained in the potency of it; therefore, when they are made actually, they are educed from the potency of it. Nor is it sufficient to respond that those forms are not made, but are made together with the composites, because the forms of generable things also are not made, but are made together, and nevertheless they are said to be educed because of the stated dependence and containment. But it must be said with the common opinion that those forms are truly not educed, because where there is not generation of the whole composite, neither can there be eduction of form. But the reason a priori is because, as was touched upon above, there is a single action

by which heaven is produced according to its whole self, and not only the form, but also the matter is made, which action is complete and perfect creation of the whole and concreation of matter and form, and therefore there is not there eduction from the potency of matter. Therefore when it is said that form is educed which depends in becoming and being on matter, it is understood when toward the form itself or toward the formal being which is communicated through it there tends proper becoming and proper action, which so presupposes matter that matter is not made through it. And similarly, when it is said that form is educed from the potency of matter because it was contained in the potency of it, matter is presupposed existing previously in potency toward form rather than having it actually; but the matter of heaven, although it is potency toward its form, demands from its nature that it not be in potency toward it, because this being in potency includes privation.

SECTION III
WHETHER IN THE EDUCTION OF SUBSTANTIAL FORM, MATTER OUGHT TO PRECEDE IN TIME

1. This difficulty arises from the preceding resolution, and knowledge of it is necessary for further understanding the origin or eduction of such form. The difficulty is best explained with regard to the forms of elements, under which this matter of generable things was created when it was first produced, concerning which it is asked whether they were educed from the potency of matter. For it seems to some that the same judgment should be made about these forms as about celestial forms, because the elements also were not then generated, but created; therefore their forms were not educed, but concreated. Likewise, because matter was never in potency to those forms, since it was always actually under them; therefore they were

not educed, because, as we were saying, eduction by the property of the word indicates a relation to a subject which was previously in potency. Likewise, in that beginning, by the same action by which the earth was created, its matter and form were simultaneously concreated; therefore there is no eduction there. Third, when an angel or soul is created, its powers are not educed from the capacity of the subject, because they are concreated; therefore much less will substantial forms be said to be educed, which are concreated with any matter. Fourth, when an angel is created, subsistence or personality is not educed from the potency of nature, although it is concreated; therefore similarly, etc. And thus by these arguments it seems to be concluded that for eduction it is necessary that matter precede form in time.

2. On the other hand, however, there seems to be a very different account of the forms of elements and of celestial bodies; for the latter are such that by their nature they require being made by the same action by which matter is made, but the former not at all, rather they presuppose matter created through a proper and distinct action, and are introduced into it through another action, even in their first condition; therefore that action by which form is introduced can only be true eduction. The antecedent is proved, for that action by which elementary matter was created is such that the same action continues even now conserving that matter itself; but the action terminated to form or composite ceased when that composite was corrupted; therefore it is a sign that those actions are diverse by the nature of the thing. Nor can it be said that those were partial actions composing one; otherwise it would have to be said that even now one action is composed from the conservation of matter and the eduction of form or generation. For if there was one composite action by which this part of earth was created and afterwards this earth is corrupted and converted into grass, the action ceases as to that part through which the form of earth is conserved in that matter, and in place of it another

succeeds, by which[2] the form of grass is induced into the same matter; but the action terminated to the entity of matter always remains the same; therefore if that is of itself partial and composes one complete action with the inductive or conservative action of the first form, by the same reasoning it composes one action with that through which the second form which succeeds the prior is induced. The consequence is proved, because there is entirely the same reason, proportion, conjunction and aptitude between these actions, as between those; and also because otherwise that conservative action of matter would be of itself partial and apt for composing one total action, and yet now would perpetually remain incomplete and without due composition. The consequent also seems plainly false, because the action by which matter is made is true creation, and the same persevering is that by which it is conserved; but from creation and generation one action is not composed; therefore those are two actions and not two parts of the same action; therefore also in the first condition of things these actions intervened distinct among themselves, although joined in time. According to this discourse, therefore, it is plainly concluded that for true eduction it is not necessary that matter precede in time; for of those two actions, that which is posterior by nature has the true character of eduction; for it depends essentially on matter, which is not made through it, but is presupposed as created. And it is confirmed, for if we imagine God had produced that matter first as unformed and after some time had induced form into it, no one would deny that it was true eduction; but although this posterior action is joined to the prior in the same instant, it is of the same character; therefore it is true eduction.

3. You will say: by a similar argument it would be proved that the form of heaven is educed from the potency of matter, because if God had first created that matter in time without form, and afterwards induced form into it, then he would educe it from the potency of

[2] by which in Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605 editions; because in Paris 1861, Madrid 1960 editions.

matter. It is answered by denying the consequence, and to the proof the assumption is denied, because even then heaven could not be said to be made through generation, and consequently neither its form made through eduction, because that action by its nature does not presuppose matter as made; but that in that miraculous case it presupposes it, is accidental and does not change the nature of the action. And perhaps that action by which matter would be made or conserved without form or under another distinct form would not be of the same character as that by which it is made under its proper form. And therefore in the aforesaid case, when the form of heaven would be induced into preexisting matter, the prior action by which it was conserved naked would cease, and a new action would begin by which from then the whole heaven would receive being, which in reality would be true and total creation, although perhaps it would not be so denominated on account of the preexisting matter. But if anyone contends (which is probable) that God conserves that matter through the same action by which he previously conserved it, and induces the form of heaven through another total action entirely distinct, in that case (if it is possible) we will confess that posterior action to be eduction of the form of heaven, and consequently heaven to be generable in a miraculous and extraordinary mode; we deny however that the form of heaven by its nature is made through such action, as the form of an element is made; but heaven was now made in a mode proportionate to its nature, and therefore there is no similar consequence. But we gather that difference between heaven and element from the incorruptibility of one and the corruptibility of the other; for when matter and form are inseparable by their nature, they require being made through one action indivisible in itself or entirely or at least by the nature of the thing. When however matter is of itself separable from any form distributively, under the same matter the inductive actions of forms can be varied, and therefore the action through which such matter is made and conserved is distinct and by its nature is presupposed to any inductive action of form.

4. The objections are satisfied. But someone will say again, granted these things are true, nevertheless the first form concreated to this inferior matter cannot be said to be educed from the potency of matter, because that matter did not precede in time as existing in potency to such form; for it is not sufficient that it precede in order of nature; for even the matter of heaven precedes its form in order of nature in the genus of material cause. Indeed some add that for the eduction of form it is necessary that dispositions also precede in matter, which cannot be said in the creation of elements. But this about dispositions seems irrelevant; for remote dispositions usually precede in time quasi accidentally on account of the inefficacy of the agent; but if God in one instant transmutes water into wine, those dispositions do not precede in time, and nevertheless that is true generation and true eduction. But the ultimate disposition never precedes in time the introduction of form; but in the mode by which it precedes in order of nature in natural generation, it also preceded in the first creation of elements. For truly that union of form to matter which was then made, was made with the same dependence on the ultimate disposition which it now has in any element; therefore with the same causality on the part of the disposition; therefore with the same order of nature, for this is taken from causality. But concerning prime matter itself, this is what we contend, namely, that for form to be educed from its potency, it does not seem necessary that matter precede in order of time under privation, but it suffices that it precede in order of nature; in which mode it is established that the creation of the matter of elements was prior to the induction of form; for those were two actions, as we declared, so subordinated, that the induction of form essentially presupposes the creation of matter, on which it depends as on an entirely necessary cause.

5. The difference between celestial and elementary matter regarding concurrence in the making of their forms. But that this precedence suffices can be confirmed in many ways. First a priori from what has been said; for that suffices so that that induction of form be

an action of the same character as that which would be posterior in duration, if God first created matter without form and afterwards informed it. For the mere interruption of time does not suffice to vary actions essentially; therefore the same precedence of nature suffices for the eduction of form. Second from similarity, because if in the same instant in which air is created, it is illuminated by the sun, that light is educed from the potency of air; for I suppose that other illuminations are made through eduction, which I will show below; but air then would only precede in order of nature the introduction of light, as is evident; therefore. The major is clear, because that illumination is a proper and per se action distinct from creation. Third, from the difference between the matter of heaven and the matter of an element regarding precedence to form; for there is a twofold difference to be noted which especially pertains to the matter. The first is that the matter of heaven even in order of nature does not simply precede the introduction of its proper form, because it has with it a necessary connection, such that it cannot be created in a connatural mode without it; but the matter of fire simply precedes in order of nature, because it does not have an intrinsic connection with the form of fire, but could be created under others. The second difference, which declares the preceding, is that the matter of fire is so prior that by virtue of the action through which it is created it could exist under privation of the form of fire. And in this mode not only matter, but matter as in potency, is said to be prior by nature, not because in reality it first has privation attached, but because by virtue of the action through which it is created, it does not lack privation, but another action is necessary by which it is informed, which can have the true character of eduction; but the matter of heaven by the same action by which it is created, is informed, and, although according to its proper character of causing it is said to be prior by nature, nevertheless, as existing in potency and in some mode under privation, it is in no way said to be prior by nature, and therefore it does not have that priority of nature which is necessary for the

eduction of form. Wherefore I think it most probable that there is a very different account of the first information of the matter of generable and celestial things.

Resolution of the Question

6. In this matter I think it true first of all that in the creation of a corruptible thing, whether an element or any other, those two actions declared above intervene. This Henry indicated, Quodl. I, q. 10, citing Augustine, XIII Confessions, c. 33, saying that matter was made from absolutely nothing, but the appearance of the world from unformed matter, although there Augustine speaks indifferently of heavens and elements. Nor is there reason why this should seem wonderful, since in the conservation of fire or any other similar thing two actions intervene, as that reasoning sufficiently declares that when one ceases, the other perseveres. But according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, conservation, properly speaking, is the same action as production; therefore. Indeed, in the conservation of man three actions intervene, namely, conservation of matter, and conservation of soul, and conservation of union or of the whole, which are rightly gathered to be distinct from the fact that when this ceases the other two remain, and from this also the argument is rightly made that the same three actions intervene in the production of man; therefore the same is proportionally in others.

7. Then I also think it true that that action through which the matter of generable things is informed in the first instant of its creation, is of the same character as the action by which it would be informed by the same agent God, even if the creation of matter had preceded in time. This persuades that reasoning that the interval or concomitance of time makes no difference to varying actions essentially. Likewise, because those actions agree in formal or total term and in principles or causes on which they depend; therefore there is no reason for distinguishing them essentially. From which it is

further concluded that that action by which this matter is informed, even in the first instant in which it is created, is not creation, speaking rigorously and precisely considering that action. It is proved, because if that action were made at a later time, it would not be creation according to everyone's opinion; therefore neither when made then, because it is of the same character. And the reason a priori is because that action is from matter presupposed in order of nature. Nor does it matter that earth is said absolutely to be created in the beginning, both because sprouts and animals are also said to be created, although it is certain that the forms of these things are not introduced through rigorous creation; and also because earth is said to be created, not on account of that union precisely taken, but as conjoined to the action by which the matter of earth was created; for because those two actions were made simultaneously and by way of one, from them earth is said to be created. Hence, although by the same word it is said God created heaven and earth, it is not necessary that the mode of creation or action which intervenes in the production of each be the same, except as to that which is common to both, namely being made from nothing; but as to the rest each is created according to the mode and capacity of its nature.

8. And hence lastly I conclude that there remains only a question of name whether the eduction of form from matter has place, even if matter does not precede in duration, but only by nature, or (which is the same) whether that first making of the form of earth should be called eduction from the potency of matter; for if by the name of eduction is only signified the positive character of that action through which form is made dependently in becoming and being on matter which through that action is not created, but is presupposed as created, truly that is eduction, as the discourse made shows. But if by the name of eduction, besides the said positive and real character there is connoted negation or extrinsic denomination, namely, that with that action the subject itself is not produced simultaneously, even if it is created through another action, thus it cannot be called eduction, as is

evident per se, but is called concreation in the sense to be immediately declared. And it seems certainly that the name of eduction is more frequently taken in this posterior signification, and therefore it should be spoken of thus with the many, although it is necessary to understand and explain the thing itself with the few. And according to this form of speaking the reasons made for the prior opinion are easily reconciled and conceded; nevertheless, lest they seem to proceed against the thing declared by us, it will be necessary to touch on their solutions.

Solutions of Arguments

9. And the first indeed, which is taken from celestial forms, is already dispatched, and the difference established between incorruptible and corruptible bodies. But the second, which is taken from the property of the word to educe, is also admitted by us, if it looks only to the mode of speaking and to extrinsic connotation; but if to the thing and positive action, thus we deny that it is of the character of eduction that the subject precede in time; for priority of nature suffices, as has been declared by us. The third argument relied on the name of concreation, in which it should be observed that something is said to be concreated to another in two modes: in one mode, because by the same action by which something is created it itself is made, in which way the matter and form of heaven are concreated with heaven, and when form is thus concreated it is not educed, as was declared in the form of heaven. In another mode that is said to be concreated which is made simultaneously with the thing which is created, although it is not made by the same action, as grace is said to be concreated with angels, and thus also the form of earth is said to be concreated to matter, and what is thus concreated can be made through an action which in reality is of the same character as eduction, although on account of the concomitance of the creation of the subject it is not called by that name. And hence also the solution to the

fourth argument is clear, which was taken from the concreation of powers in the substance of soul or angel. But in that last argument a special difficulty is sought, which could be treated here in fourth place, concerning the eduction of accidental form from the potency of subject; nevertheless, because we are about to institute the following disputation concerning accidental form, there we will more conveniently explain this difficulty.

10. Whether substantial modes are educed from the potency of matter. But the fifth argument seeks another difficulty concerning substantial modes, namely, whether they should be said to be educed from the potency of subject, as, for example, subsistence from the potency or capacity of the nature which it terminates; and the same is true of the mode of union of form with respect to the potency of the form itself or subject; indeed even concerning substantial generation itself it can be asked whether it is educed from the potency of matter. Concerning all of these it should be said briefly that in them there is a certain mode or participation of eduction, nevertheless it does not belong to them so properly as to substantial form; for subsistence is not made through proper action, and moreover does not properly inform, and consequently is not compared to nature as to subject and proper material cause, wherefore from this part it is not properly said to be educed; but in this it imitates eduction, that in its being and becoming, whatever that may be, it depends entirely on the nature which it per se terminates and actuates in its mode, as we will declare more widely below treating of subsistence. Substantial generation likewise is not so much made as it is the way through which substance is made; hence it is not so much educed as it is eduction itself; nevertheless in that mode by which generation itself is made while through it the term is made, it also itself is educed from the potency of matter by which it is materially caused, as was said above, and depends essentially on it in becoming and in being, which two in generation are the same. Finally the same judgment is of the union of form to matter, which nevertheless is not per se educed, but form is educed as united

to matter, and thus also (so to speak) the union itself is coeduced. Which indeed seems rightly said in material forms.

11. Whether the union of rational soul is educed from the potency of matter, or of the soul itself. But in the rational soul it has peculiar difficulty, because on one part that union seems to be educed, because it is made per se through proper action distinct from that by which form is made; but I say the union is made per se as formal term, for the adequate term is man; but that suffices for proper eduction, because, as we will immediately say, form is never per se term of action except formal and as quo; therefore that union of soul to body is properly and per se educed. Likewise, it depends essentially in becoming and in being on body as on material cause; therefore it is properly educed. But on the contrary is because that union is a certain spiritual mode; therefore it cannot be educed from the potency of matter more than the soul itself. The consequence is clear, because it is repugnant for a spiritual thing to be contained in the potency of matter. But the antecedent is clear, because that mode proximately affects the soul itself, which it unites to matter; therefore it is proportionate and consequently spiritual, just as it itself is. And it is confirmed, because, if form is not contained in the potency of matter, neither can union be contained, because union is nothing but a mode of form; therefore, if form is not educed, neither can union be educed. To this it should be said that this mode of union is like a certain medium or bond between form and matter, and therefore touches both and affects them in some way, and therefore depends on both in becoming and in being. Whence it happens that this mode of rational soul, although it is spiritual in its entity, nevertheless participates in the conditions of material thing, because it depends entirely on matter and is coextended in its mode, although from the part of soul it does not have extension. On account of this cause therefore that mode can be educed from the potency of matter, although not adequately nor primarily from that alone; for it is also educed from the potency of the soul itself, which it per se first affects and unites to matter.

SECTION IV
WHETHER FORM, WHILE BEING EDUCED FROM MATTER, IS MADE PER SE

1. This difficulty arises from the foregoing and contributes to explaining them more. For, since it has been said that eduction is an action by which form is so made in matter dependently on it that through that action matter itself is not made, from this it seems to follow that through such action form alone is made per se first, which contradicts Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, text 26 and 27, and book VIII, text 4. The consequence is clear, because through that action form alone according to its whole self is educed from non-being to being, but the whole is not made except insofar as it coalesces from parts already made; therefore form is what is made, and prior and more properly. Prior indeed, because, for the whole to be composed from parts, it is necessary that the parts be presupposed as having being. More properly indeed, because that which according to its entity is educed from non-being to being is more properly made than what is only composed from already existing things.

2. In this matter the prior opinion admits, what the argument made seems to prove, that form is properly and per se made; thus it is taken from Albert, II On the Soul, tract. I, c. 1 and 3, where he says that among these three, matter, form and composite, form is properly and first being, which Zimara also defends at length, Theorem 20. Others distinguish two actions, even in the making of material forms. One, by which form is made; another, by which it is united; and concerning the former they concede that it is terminated per se first to form, although the latter is terminated primarily to composite. This opinion is taken from Durand, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, at the end.

Resolution of the Question

3. Nevertheless both opinions are false. And concerning this latter we will speak at length below, explaining the various modes of causing of efficient cause. Now it suffices against it the argument, which can easily be gathered from what has been said so far; for material forms (for only of these is there speech) are not even as to their entity without the material concurrence of subject; but subject does not influence form except insofar as it is united to it, as is evident from what was said above about material cause; therefore such form cannot be made through any action which is not unitive of form to subject; therefore two actions cannot there be distinguished according to reality, but only according to reason or inadequate concepts, or at most according to parts which are essentially conjoined among themselves, as we will declare in the said place.

4. The twofold term of action. But the prior opinion truly contradicts Aristotle in the cited places, whom the Commentator follows, in the same places, and XII Metaphysics, com. 12 and 18, and St. Thomas, ibid., and I, q. 45, a. 4 and 8, where in the solution to 1 he adds that forms are not made per se, but only per accidens, which is to be understood in a sound mode, using the word per accidens broadly insofar as it is the same as "with another"; but form is more properly said to be congenerated, as the same St. Thomas signifies in that a. 4, and q. 65, a. 4. The same expressly holds Scotus, VII Metaphysics, q. 10; Antonius Andreas, q. 9; Zimara, Theorem 100; Soncinas, VII Metaphysics, q. 23. But the reason is because it belongs to that to be made per se first whose it is to be, since becoming tends to being; but that properly is which subsists, therefore that properly is made; but these forms do not subsist, but composites from them; therefore action is terminated properly and principally to composites. It is confirmed, for action is one, as we suppose; therefore the adequate term also is one; but this cannot be form, because composite truly is made, and is not form; therefore. But for greater clarity a twofold term is usually distinguished, namely, ut quod and ut quo, or what is made

absolutely or by which another is made. Therefore composite is the term qui or ut quod, because it is made per se first; for it is most intended through generation and generation is ultimately terminated in it, and similarly it is clear in artificial things; for house is what is per se first built, etc. But the term quo is form, because it is made so that through it composite is constituted. Hence, because the word to be educed properly only indicates relation to this term quo, therefore form is properly and simply said to be educed from the potency of matter, but not composite; but the word to be generated or made speaks principal relation to that which is or which is made, and therefore it is said simply of form and not of matter.

5. To the argument to the contrary it is answered by denying the consequence, because, speaking of the order of time, form is not made prior to composite, nor conversely. But speaking of the order of nature, composite is not only made first, but also absolutely it alone is made through this action; but form only is made with it. And although we grant that in some genus of cause form is prior by nature educed quasi in order of execution, nevertheless absolutely the action is not understood as terminated nor that made which is per se first intended, until the whole composite exists. Nor does it matter that some composed part is presupposed, and not of form; for it is necessary to distinguish four genera of actions; for some action is productive only and not unitive, and this is always terminated to a simple thing, and therefore can of itself be terminated to partial entity, if it is naturally apt to be produced in this mode; and such is the creation of rational soul, and the same is true of the creation of prime matter, as I think. Another is action unitive only and not productive of components, as is the generation of man, and this without controversy is terminated only to composite as quod and to union as quo. Again, there is another action so productive of some composite that it is simultaneously unitive and coproductive of all components; and of this kind is the creation of heaven, which is established to be terminated per se first to composite, concomitantly indeed to matter and form. Another finally

is action simultaneously unitive and coproductive of another part of components from presupposition of another; and of this kind is the eductive action concerning which we now treat, and therefore it is not of its character that its adequate term is so made anew that no part of it is presupposed to exist.

6. And hence it is incidentally gathered that this opinion is true not only in substantial forms, but also in accidental ones, even if Scotus above, Antonius Andreas and others signify the opposite, because from accident and subject one per accidens is made, which does not seem to be able to be made through action and causality per se. But the proposed opinion is true, for Aristotle speaks universally, and especially applies examples in accidents. And finally in text 32, he expressly and in particular teaches this concerning accidental forms. For (as he says there) the reason is the same, because much more accidents are not made per se, but as united to subjects and from them. Nor does it matter that they are beings per accidens, for they have real and true and physical composition, which that action per se includes; and therefore through it the accidental composite is made per se first, for the action itself also is accidental.

SECTION V
WHAT IS THE PROPER CHARACTER OF SUBSTANTIAL FORM AND ITS PROPER CAUSALITY IN ITS GENUS

1. Description of form in general. From what has been said about the existence of substantial form, and about the mode in which it is made, it can easily be understood what it itself is and what mode of causing it has; but we can comprehend both in this brief description: form is a certain simple and incomplete substance, which as act of matter constitutes with it the essence of composite substance. In which description substance is placed in place of genus, in that

mode by which it is distinguished by the Philosopher into matter, form and composite. And through that particle it is distinguished from accidental forms, which are not substances; it can also be distinguished from substantial modes; for, although these are referred to the category of substance, nevertheless they are not substances in that propriety; hence they are not enumerated by Aristotle in that partition, because they are not properly substantial entities, as is form, which for this reason is called substance. But simple and incomplete is added so that through the prior particle it is separated from composite substance, but through the posterior from separate substances, which are sometimes accustomed to be called assisting forms, as those which move celestial bodies, which truly do not exercise the office of formal cause, but some efficiency; wherefore they are not substantial forms insofar as we now speak of them.

2. How form is said to be act of physical body. The remaining part of the definition distinguishes form from matter, which also is simple and incomplete substance, nevertheless as potency; but form as primary act of that potency. And therefore Aristotle, II On the Soul, defined soul to be act of physical body, etc. Which definition can easily be accommodated to form in common, if by the name of act we understand substantial act, as it ought to be understood, and we only say that form is act of physical body, removing the remaining part which separates soul from forms of inanimate things. But we can understand by physical body, either matter itself, insofar as it is the other part of natural composite, which, so that it may be informed by form, is always presupposed in order of nature in its genus of cause affected by quantity and some proximate dispositions, and for that reason it can be called physical body. Or also we can understand by physical body the natural being itself which consists of matter and form, whose act form is said to be as constituting it; in which way also Aristotle defined it to be act of living thing or that by which we live. Therefore we have explained both relations in the said part of our description; for substantial form is so incomplete substance that it is

act of matter, act (I say) either actually informing or by its nature instituted for informing matter, for words (as they say) in definitions speak aptitude, and thus rational soul is comprehended, even if it is separated from body. And hence consequently it has that with matter it composes the essence of natural being, which is composite substance; and therefore Aristotle, II Physics, c. 3, says form to be the character of essence or quiddity, that is, which completes the essence of natural composite and essentially and quidditatively distinguishes it from others.

3. And hence the causality of form also is explained; for because form essentially is act, therefore it includes intrinsically transcendental relation to that of which it is act, and to the actuation which it exercises in it; and therefore the character of form can scarcely be declared, unless through relation to its causality. In which we can consider those four things which we expect in every cause, namely, formal principle of causing, condition necessary for causing, the causation itself and the effect which is caused, all of which are to be explained individually, just as we did in matter, although, presupposing what we said there, they can be dispatched more briefly here.

SECTION VI

WHAT IS THE MANNER OF CAUSATION OF FORMS

1. We can embrace three things under this title, namely, the principle of causation, which would be like a first act, the necessary conditions for thus causing, and that causality in second act.

2. Regarding the first, it must be said that the principle of causation is nothing other than the entity and nature of the form itself, which through itself and its own entity causes, exhibiting (so to speak) its whole self to the matter or to the composite. For this it does not need another faculty or power distinct from itself, but through itself is essentially apt for exercising this causality. Whence, just as we said

above that in matter the principal and proximate principle of causation are not distinguished, because the receptive power through which it causes is not its property, but itself essentially, so in form there can be considered a certain power or aptitude for causing formally, which remains, for example, in a separated soul, even if it does not actually inform, and that aptitude is the proximate principle of causing formally. It is not, however, distinct from the principal, because that aptitude is not a property superadded to the entity of the form, but is the essential nature and specification of it; for form is essentially act that actuates; but of the essence of such act is aptitude for actuating. Likewise, because from matter and form there comes to be per se one for this reason, that they are not united by the intervention of some property or accident, but immediately through themselves, on account of the proportion and mutual aptitude which they have to each other through their own incomplete entities pertaining to the same genus, as is taken from Aristotle, VIII Metaph., c. 6, and II de Anima, c. 1, where the Commentator notes this, com. 7, and other writers, VIII Metaph.1; St. Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 70, and I, q. 76, a. 7; and other theologians, In II, dist. 12, especially Scotus, q. 1; and Durandus, q. 2; therefore, just as in matter no distinct power is to be imagined which would mediate between it and form, so neither in form is an aptitude to be conceived which would be something distinct from the form itself. You will say: how can form, which is so distant in its nature from matter, be immediately united to it through itself? This can seem especially difficult in the rational soul, which is spiritual. I respond first that there is not so great a distance that they do not agree in the same genus. Then, distance is no obstacle, if there is due proportion; for as Plato said in the Timaeus, mutual proportion is like a bond between things which are united proximately and per se; but this proportion consists in the nature of act and potency and in the natural and essential aptitude and mutual relation which they have to each other.

The Necessary Conditions for Form to Cause

3. Actual existence. Regarding the second, concerning the conditions necessary for exercising this causality, three conditions seem able to be assigned. The first is the actual existence of the form itself, concerning which diverse opinions must be held according to diverse views about the existence of creatures and its distinction from essence. Although in no opinion does existence seem properly to be called a necessary condition for the causality of form; for if existence is a thing distinct from essence, it cannot be said to be a condition of form for causing, but rather an effect, either in the genus of formal cause, insofar as form is said to give being, or in the genus of efficient cause, insofar as some say existence flows from essence, or, as others wish, in the genus of material cause, insofar as form completes the essence, which is the proximate receptacle of existence. But truly, if existence is not distinguished in reality from actual essence, the existence of form cannot properly be said to be a necessary condition for causing; for a required condition, if we speak properly, is distinguished from the very nature of causation; but existence cannot be so distinguished according to that opinion, because form causes through its actual entity, since it cannot be understood to actually cause except as having its actual entity and outside its causes; therefore as having existence. And this opinion is more to be approved; because just as the actuality of form is not a condition distinct from the nature of causation or actuating, so neither is existence, which is intimately included in actuality itself. But whether it is necessary for the existence of form to be prior to its causality, it must be said that it is not necessary for it to be prior by order of duration, because such precedence is irrelevant; indeed it is not naturally possible, because being is not owed to forms until a proximately apt subject demands it, and when this is posited, form, as soon as it exists, naturally informs that subject. Again, neither is it necessary for the existence of form to be so prior by order of nature that some sign or moment is understood in which it exists and does

not inform, because neither is this necessary for priority of nature nor can it be understood in forms which depend on matter, as is established from what was said in the preceding section. But precedence of nature according to some genus of causality can intervene and is necessary; for the causality of form depends on its entity and existence; whence it is necessary that between the existence and causality of form there be an order of nature from which is taken priority (as they say) a quo, not in quo. More will be said about these priorities in what follows.

4. Intimate proximity of form to matter. Another necessary condition can be assigned: the presence or intimate proximity of the entity of form with the entity of matter; which condition is most truly assigned and so necessary that without it, even by God's absolute power, form cannot provide its formal effect. For who would understand that a substantial form distant in place from a body composes a substance that is per se one? Therefore this composition happens through intimate union, which is indeed not local presence, but something distinct from it, yet necessarily requiring it. This can be declared more fully and persuasively from what was said above in a similar case about matter; for regarding this there is the same reasoning about form.

5. Dispositions connatural to form. A third condition can be assigned: an accommodated disposition on the part of matter, which form necessarily requires in order to be able to confer its formal effect. Some think this disposition is so necessary that even by absolute power form cannot inform matter lacking all disposition, especially quantity. Thus Henry, Quodl. VII, q. 17. Nevertheless, whatever may be the case whether on the part of matter or quantity it is repugnant for it to be separated from this, which we cannot treat until the disputation on quantity, nonetheless, if it is once supposed that matter can be conserved by God without quantity, which we think is truer, it will not be repugnant for such matter also to be conserved by God in that state informed by substantial form, because there is no such

essential connection between form, as exercising its intrinsic formal effect, and these accidents, that it cannot be conserved by God without them. Therefore there is no such absolute necessity; but that this condition is necessary in the natural and physical mode, experience itself teaches. For hence comes the natural corruption of a thing, through which form is separated from matter, which begins through the rejection or corruption of dispositions; therefore it is a sign that such dispositions are at least conditions necessary from the nature of the thing for form to inform matter. But whether they are conditions prior to or consequent upon form by order of nature, must be sought from what was said in the preceding disputation.

The Causality of Form Explained

6. Regarding the third point, about the actual causality of form itself, what it may be, it is not easy to explain; nevertheless, from those things which have been said about matter, we can proceed proportionately to declare it. And first it seems certain that such causality is something in the nature of things distinct by the nature of the thing from the entity of form. This is proved, because just as acting is something in the nature of things, so also is informing, because it truly is to cause really and physically. Again that, whatever it is, is separable in the thing itself from form; for in the rational soul it is in fact separated and in any substantial form it could be separated by God's absolute power; for it can be conserved outside matter, just as quantity has been conserved; for there is the same or greater reason; therefore it is distinguished by the nature of the thing from it.

7. The union of form to matter is the causality of form. The difference between the causality of efficient and formal cause should be noted. Then it must be said that this causality can be nothing other than the actual union of form to matter. This is proved first by sufficient enumeration, because it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite; therefore it is the said union; for besides these nothing else

can be conceived; and the antecedent regarding all parts is self-evident. For concerning form it has already been proved; and the same reasoning proves a fortiori concerning matter; but the composite is the ultimate effect of this causality, as will be said immediately; therefore it is not the causation itself. Likewise, the composite includes the entity of matter and form; but the causality of form precisely taken cannot include all these things. Furthermore, given the union and with anything else removed, besides those things which have been mentioned, form necessarily exercises its causality; but with all other things posited and the union removed, it is impossible for form to exercise its causality; therefore it is a sign that such causality consists in union. The major is evident, because if form is united to matter, it necessarily communicates itself to it through itself, that is, not by effecting another similar thing but by communicating its own perfection and entity to it and in this way actuating it. And from this there also necessarily arises the substantial composite nature that is per se one; but the whole causality of form and its whole effect consists in this, which, with union removed, cannot remain, as is self-evident; therefore. Whence in this the difference should be noted between union, which we have said is the causality of form, and action, which we shall later say is the causality of the efficient cause, that action is so the causality of the agent that the agent, insofar as it is agent, remains entirely outside the effect; because, although through action it communicates itself, nevertheless not itself through itself by giving to the effect, but by conferring some similar entity on it; but union is so the causality of form that through it as medium it offers itself either to matter or to the composite; for it is an intrinsic cause causing through itself. In which sense it could also be said that the causality of form embraces in itself the entity of form, or that this causality is the form itself, not taken absolutely, but as united. But in this manner of speaking cause is confused with causality and the nature of causation as in first act with causation, which is as second

act, and therefore more formally and more precisely this causality is said to consist in union itself.

8. A small difficulty. But a difficulty occurs, for this union happens in two ways in diverse substantial forms. For in some there is pure union, that is, without inherence or dependence of form, as in rational souls; but in others there is union which is simultaneously dependence and quasi-inherence of form in matter. Therefore the prior union cannot be the formal causality of the rational soul, because it is produced by it efficiently; but effective causality is far different from formal. The antecedent is evident, because by the very fact that the soul is created by God in a disposed body, it immediately as by natural impulse unites itself to matter by effecting the union; for, since the soul is naturally inclined to that union and has its proper subject applicable and perfectible by it, there is no reason why it cannot as by natural weight copulate itself to the body, as Henry thought, Quodl. XI, q. 14; and Aureolus, apud Capreolus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 2; and Richard there considers it probable, a. 3, q. 2. Likewise the latter union cannot be the formal causality with respect to other forms, because those forms through that very union are caused by matter and depend on it in their being; therefore the same forms cannot be causes of the same union; therefore union cannot be the causality of such form; for causality is from that cause whose causality it is, just as action is from the agent, and therefore it presupposes the being of such cause. Nor can it be understood that the same thing or mode is the nature or quasi-way by which form is caused and through which form causes. And this is confirmed, for above, disp. XII, sect. 1, we said that form cannot be the formal cause of generation, because through generation it comes to be and is educed from non-being to being; therefore by the same reasoning it cannot be the cause of union, and consequently neither can union be its causality. The consequence is evident, both from parity of reasoning, and also because generation itself seems to be the same as union, since it has been said that these forms come to be and are united by the same action.

9. Whether the rational soul intimately unites itself to the disposed body. To the former part it is responded that Henry's opinion, which is commemorated there, is quite uncertain, as can be seen in Scotus, In IV, dist. 43, q. 3, a. 3; and Capreolus, there, q. 2, a. 3. For perhaps the union of rational soul and body happens, either by virtue of the seed and dispositions from the generator itself, or if this is only dispositive, it will be done effectively by God alone, by whom the soul is created. But that it is done by the soul itself, no sufficient reason is shown; for, although form by its nature is apt to be united, and therefore is naturally inclined to union, it does not follow from this that it is powerful to unite itself; for these are diverse aptitudes or powers, one of which is not necessarily inferred from the other; just as matter too is apt to be united and is in its genus inclined to union, and yet is not powerful to unite itself. For just as receptive power and appetite founded in it is of diverse nature from active power and its inclination, so power (so to speak) or formal aptitude and inclination founded in it is of distinct nature from active power; nor is there any sufficient reason why this should be inferred from that, especially since in all other forms it seems more probable that union is not effectively from form. Second, even if that opinion is admitted, the consequence must be denied; for even if union to a sufficiently disposed body effectively remains from the rational soul, nonetheless it can be the formal bond by which the soul is conjoined to matter as act to potency. And nothing is repugnant in the same union being from the soul in a twofold genus of cause, namely efficient and formal, or in it being an effect of the soul, as efficient, and in it being the nature of causing formally the whole composite; for no repugnancy is involved in these diverse relations.

10. Union which is the causality of form is caused by this and by matter. Various acceptations of union. To the latter part it is responded that the same union is caused both by form and by matter and by the efficient cause, by each in its genus of cause, because it depends on all of them; and therefore it is not repugnant that the same

union, insofar as it is from form, be as the way or nature by which as medium form causes the whole composite; and insofar as it is from matter, be the nature by which as medium the material form depends on matter in its being. For that union is the bond of both, namely, of matter and form, and therefore when such union is also inherence, it can simultaneously be both the way (so to speak) of matter to form and of form to matter. Nor does it matter that the causality of form should be from form, and therefore should presuppose it to be prior by order of nature; for, as we touched on above, this priority is not in quo, but a quo; but it is not repugnant that the same union both be from form as informing matter, and be such a bond of form with matter, that through it as medium form is sustained by matter. And thus the very same union insofar as it is from form is the medium or nature by which as medium form actuates matter and composes the composite, and in this way it is said to be the causality of form; but insofar as through it form adheres to matter and is sustained by it, it is the dependence of the same form on matter. For there is such an intrinsic connection between such form and union, that by diverse relations they mutually depend on each other. To the confirmation it is responded that union is sometimes taken for action, which to remove equivocation is usually called uniting; but sometimes and more properly it is taken for the very mode of union or of permanent inherence in accomplished being between matter and form, and sometimes it is also taken for the consequent relation, as is noted more broadly in III, q. 2, a. 8. Therefore when we say that union is the causality of form, there is no discussion of relation, as is self-evident; for this if it is taken as something distinct from others, either is nothing or is something posterior. Neither is there discussion of action, concerning which the said confirmation proceeds; for we admit that form, especially that which is educed from the potency of matter, is not properly the formal cause of that action by which it is educed, as we showed in the cited place, because it is the terminus of it, whence that action is in some way actively compared to the form

itself, and therefore it cannot be truly and properly caused by the form itself. Therefore we speak of the mode of union, concerning which there is a far different reasoning, because it is not actively compared to form, but is as the formal bond between it and matter, and therefore it can have dependence on both, as has been declared.

11. But here a difficulty would immediately occur, why this mode of union is attributed more to form than to matter. But this has been satisfied in disp. XIII, sect. 6. Nor does anything occur to be added here.

SECTION VII

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF FORMAL CAUSE

1. Only two effects are those which can be attributed to form, namely, the composite and matter; for concerning generation or union it has already been said that it cannot properly be its effect. But concerning union itself in accomplished being, it is established from what has been said that it cannot properly be called an effect, unless perhaps in that way by which action is called the effect of the agent, insofar as it is from it, although it is more properly called the way to the effect.

The Prior Effect of Form Explained

2. The composite is the primary effect of form. Regarding the composite therefore it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that it is the proper and primary effect of form; for it consists intrinsically and essentially from it, and from it has its species and (so to speak) its beauty; for it completes the essential nature and notion of it, as is established from Aristotle's definition given above. Likewise matter is a cause of the composite, as was shown above; therefore much more is form, because it contributes more to the being of the composite;

therefore conversely the composite itself is the effect of form, for in its being it depends maximally on it.

3. Form causes both matter and composite by a single union. But some object, for if the composite is the proper and primary effect of form, then the proper causality of form will be to constitute the composite; but this cannot be true, because form by nature actuates matter before the composite; for since it is essentially the act of matter, it regards matter first, and through it the composite; therefore the composite is not the primary effect of form, but matter as actuated or as informed; from which effect the composite follows as a posterior effect. I respond that these words do not explain two causalities as two effects of form, but only one under diverse relations. For there is only one union of form to matter, and with this posited and with every other thing or real mode removed, matter remains informed by form, and the composite results from both, although in the form itself diverse relations can be considered with respect to matter or the composite. Again, for matter to be actuated by form is not an effect distinct by nature of the thing from the composite, because by matter as informed we do not understand matter alone with some quasi-extrinsic denomination; for this concept either is nothing or is not the concept of some real effect, but of a denomination which the intellect can feign from concomitance or relation to form as present; but by informed matter we understand matter as intrinsically affected by form; therefore informed matter includes both matter itself, and form, and union. But the composite includes these three and nothing else; therefore these are not distinct in reality; therefore they are not two effects, but one diversely conceived and declared by us.

4. And this is confirmed and explained by a similar case; for in accidental form it is not different to inform the subject and to compose with it an accidental composite; as in whiteness to make snow white and to constitute this white thing as such, are the same; therefore the same is proportionally in substantial form. They respond that there is a disparate reasoning, because from subject and whiteness

there comes to be one per accidens, which is not something distinct from the extremes taken and united together; but from matter and form there comes to be one per se, which must be something besides those three, even taken together, so that it can be more one. But this response supposes false doctrine; for it is impossible for composite substance to include in reality anything besides those three taken together. This I will show below, disputing about the essence of material substance. Neither can the difference between being per se and per accidens consist in this, but in this that the very union and extremes of union are all of the same order in per se being, but not in per accidens being. Whence it also happens that in per se being the union is more intimate and arising from greater proportion of the unitable things among themselves. But that the difference is situated in this alone and not in another can be demonstrated, because both per se being, as we now treat of it, and per accidens being is not one with unity of simplicity, but with unity of composition or union; therefore the greater unity of per se composite being consists in more noble union and greater proportion of unitable things and not in addition of a third intelligible entity, which, if it is simple and taken alone precisely is said to be per se one, will not be one by composition, and thus will not be that composite which is constituted by form. But if that third thing is one intrinsically including matter and form and their union, it is unnecessary to add anything to those so that it be per se one; indeed rather this unity would be diminished from this, for more things would be aggregated in that composite without any necessity. Therefore the reasoning made retains its force, that if in accidental form to actuate the subject and to constitute the accidental composite, for example white, are the same in reality, also in substantial form to actuate matter and to constitute the composite are the same. Neither does per se unity prevent this, but rather demands it.

5. Therefore to the reasoning to the contrary, the consequence must be conceded, namely, that the composite substantial essence is the primary effect of form in its genus, and

consequently the principal causality of form is to constitute the same composite, not in whatever way, for this said absolutely is common to matter, but as perfecting and completing the essence; for matter begins it, but form completes it. But when it is added that form by nature actuates matter before constituting the composite, the assumption is denied, because those are not two, but one in reality, whence there is not causality between them and consequently neither order of nature, but at most there can be order of reason according to inadequate concepts. Neither does it obstruct that form is essentially the act of matter, for it is equally essentially a part of the composite; indeed, if comparison were to be made between these, it is more essentially a part of the composite than act of matter, because form is not for the sake of matter, but for the sake of the composite; but in truth these are not two in the form itself, but one founding two relations. From which rather the argument is retorted; for, just as form by one and the same aptitude is part of the composite and act of matter, so by the same exhibition it gives its whole self to matter and to the composite, to this as to whole, to that as to co-part; therefore also in the effect it is the same and entirely simultaneous that matter be informed by form and the composite be constituted; therefore the composite is the proper and primary effect of substantial form, and perhaps the only one in the genus of formal cause; but concerning this last point it must be said in the following section.

Whether Form is More Perfect Than the Composite

6. But first the occurring objection must be solved; for cause should be more noble than effect, as the Commentator testifies, II Phys., com. 4; but form is not more noble than the composite; therefore the composite cannot be the proper effect of form. To this objection some respond by denying the minor; for Aristotle, VII Metaph., text. 7 and 8, prefers form to the composite, saying it is more

being and prior to it. And thus the Commentator thinks there, and Zimara defends absolutely, Theorem. 10, who also reports Lyco. And he proves because whatever perfection is in the composite is in form alone, and matter adds no perfection; and otherwise all that perfection is in form as in a cause, and it is that which brings being with itself, which does not belong to the composite except by reason of it; therefore it is simply more perfect. But this response rests on a false foundation; for without doubt the composite is more perfect than its form. Which is the open opinion of Aristotle; for in II de Anima, in the beginning, and wherever he distinguishes substance into matter, form and composite, he prefers the composite to form and form to matter; indeed below, treating of substance, we will show that being is said of them analogically and the Commentator explained thus, II de Anima, com. 3; and therefore Aristotle said in the category of substance that first substance is maximally substance, where, although he compares first to second, nevertheless he also prefers first and complete substance to parts and incomplete substances. Whence also the Commentator, XII Metaph., com. 15, says the composite is of greater nobility than matter or form, and Alexander is reported in the same opinion. Which Simplicius also holds, in I Phys., text. 70, and II Phys., text. 4.

7. But the reasoning is because the composite includes whatever perfection is in form, and adds something; therefore it is more perfect. The antecedent is proved by some[3], because the composite includes being, which form does not include. But this reasoning is of no moment; for either existence is distinguished in reality from actual essence or not; if it is not distinguished, just as composite essence includes its adequate being, so form its proper being; but if it is distinguished, first that reasoning has no place in man because being belongs to the soul before man. Then, so that comparison be rightly made, it should be made between the essence of form and the essence of composite precisely, and thus that reasoning

[3] Soncin., VII Metaph., q. 28.

does not proceed; or if comparison is made of form to composite as it includes being, form also should be taken as including being in its way; for it is owed per se primarily as to the first root of being itself; which also exists through it, although the denomination of existing simply is attributed to the composite on account of the mode of subsisting. Therefore the antecedent is proved, because the composite includes the perfection of form and besides includes the perfection of matter. Zimara responds that no perfection is taken from matter, but rather all imperfection. But he is mistaken, because, as was shown above, matter has true reality and partial essence; whence it is necessary that it have some perfection in the latitude of being, and greater than accidents. Likewise subsistence is a perfection; but material substance has this maximally by reason of matter. Likewise matter brings with itself its partial being, all of which will be established below, treating more broadly of subsistence and existence. And in this sense the prior reasoning applied is efficacious; for the composite has complete being, but the being of form is incomplete. Finally the union of form to matter is some perfection; otherwise why would form naturally desire it? But the composite includes this perfection, not however form. The said author responds otherwise, although the composite formally includes some perfection besides form, it does not follow that it is more perfect than form, because all that perfection is from form and is contained virtually in it. Just as (he says) God and the world is not something more perfect than God alone. But first, as a minimum, it will be false what he asserts that form is more perfect than the composite; just as God alone is not more perfect than God and the world together. Then it is false that form contains eminently or virtually the whole perfection of the composite; for it does not have the perfection of matter in virtue nor can it supply its causality in any way, especially since it itself depends on matter. Finally form is for the sake of the composite as for its proper and principal end; but such an end is something more perfect than that which is ordered to the end, II Phys., text. 31.

Aristotle's Passage from VII Metaph. Explained

8. First exposition. To Aristotle in VII Metaph., it is responded that that passage is variously explained. The first exposition is that Aristotle in that text. 7 does not speak of priority of perfection, but of priority of causality; for thus the Philosopher concludes by force: form is prior to matter and matter prior to composite; therefore form is prior to composite. But if he were speaking of priority of perfection, the minor would be false; therefore he speaks of priority of causality. Thus Albert the Great and Scotus, and St. Thomas indicates. But the exposition does not please. First, because that way of arguing is not formal, since the genus of cause is changed. Then, because he would conclude better and more briefly that form is prior to composite because it is its cause. Third it is proved, because Aristotle not only says it is prior, but also that it is more being. It is true that Aristotle in the inference does not repeat that it is more being, but only that it is prior; and therefore Javellus there, q. 4, says the comparison between form and matter is made in priority and perfection, but between form and composite in priority only. But this is beyond the exposition of all; for from the mode of concluding and arguing which the Philosopher uses it is established that either for brevity's sake that particle was omitted in the consequent, which was understood from the force of the antecedent, or certainly priority of perfection was comprehended under priority. The second exposition is that form is prior and more perfect not simply, but secundum quid, so that the Philosopher concludes by force thus: form is prior and more perfect than matter, because that is act, this potency; therefore form is also more perfect and prior than the composite, at least according to something, namely, because form is simple act not including potentiality; but the composite includes the potentiality of matter. Thus St. Thomas and Alensis there; and Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 28. But two things obstruct this exposition: one is that on account

of excess secundum quid Aristotle should not have simply affirmed and concluded this, especially since in the antecedent the comparison is absolute, because form is simply more perfect than matter. The other is that even secundum quid the composite does not seem less perfect than form, for to include the potentiality of matter is not an imperfection in the composite in comparison with the informing form, but only in comparison with complete immaterial substance. Just as for a thing to be simpler is not always greater perfection, even secundum quid, when such a thing is ordered to compose something simply more perfect. Sicut rem esse simpliciorem non est semper maior perfectio, etiam secundum quid, quando talis res ordinatur ad componendum unum aliquid simpliciter perfectius.

9. For which reason I think that Aristotle in no way there prefers form to composite, but either makes no comparison between them or rather prefers composite to form, which Simplicius noted, in the cited place, and is established from Argyropulos's version, which has thus: If form is prior to matter, and more being, that also which is from both will be prior for the same reason. Whence the ancient version deceived the expositors, because instead of the nominative ipsum it has the ablative ipso. And as for the context, this reading is also more consonant with Aristotle's intention; for he principally intends against the ancients to show that matter is not maximally substance, but is less perfect than the rest. Whence afterwards, in text. 8, he reports the ancients saying matter is maximally substance; but he himself teaches it is impossible, and concludes: for which reason form and that which is from both seems to be substance more than matter. Whence in the prior comparison, when he concludes that the composite is prior for the same reason, formally indeed and immediately he only seems to compare the composite to matter, but virtually he also prefers it to form, while he thus concludes: form is prior to matter; therefore also the composite, for the same (I say) reason, namely, because it includes the form itself; and consequently it

is also prior in perfection and nobility to the form itself, since it is compared to it as whole to part.

10. Not every cause is more noble than its effect. But to the objection posited in the beginning it is responded by denying the major simply; for it is not necessary that every cause be more noble than its effect, but only in some efficient and final cause; but not in material, as all admit, nor even in formal, almost for the same reason, because, namely, these intrinsic causes are so causes that they are also parts, and neither per se gives the effect its whole entity or perfection, but constitutes it by giving to it that which it has of entity; but that, because it arises from many things, becomes more perfect than the singulars. Whence it can also be added that the effect does not surpass the cause according to that which it receives from it; but it can surpass according to that which it has from another cause. Concerning which more broadly below, disp. XXVI, sect. 1.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER SUBSTANTIAL FORM IS THE TRUE CAUSE OF MATTER, AND MATTER IS ITS EFFECT

1. Arguments on both sides that introduce the difficulty. Here we are no longer dealing with matter as informed, for this was discussed in the preceding section, but with matter as regards its entity or as regards its being. And the reason for doubt is that the entire entity of matter is presupposed to the eduction or introduction of form; therefore that entity cannot be caused by form, especially since matter receives being through creation, to which form cannot cooperate as a co-cause. On the contrary, however, it is because it is not repugnant for form to be the cause of matter, since causes are mutually causes of each other, II Physics, text 30, and V Metaphysics, text 2. Likewise, because if form were not the cause of matter, matter

could naturally exist without form; for if there is no causality, there is no reason why there should be dependence.

Opinions are Reported

2. Concerning this question there are various opinions, according to different ways of thinking about the being of matter. For those who think that matter of itself has no being of existence say that form is properly the cause of matter, because that is the cause of a thing which gives being. This opinion appears to be that of St. Thomas, I, q. 66, a. 1, and de Potentia, q. 4, a. 1, which all the Thomists hold: Capreolus, In II, dist. 13, q. 1; Cajetan, de Ente et essentia, c. 5, sub q. 9; Ferrariensis, in lib. III cont. Gent., c. 4; Soncinas and Javellus, VIII Metaph., q. 1. Durandus followed the same opinion, In II, dist. 12, q. 2; and Argentinensis, q. 1. But the manner of explaining this formal causality according to the opinion that really distinguishes existence from the actual essence of a creature should be here that the partial entity of the essence of matter is of itself incapable of existence until it is informed by substantial form; but the form itself according to its entity of essence is united per se primarily to matter and with it composes one integral essence; and this is the primary formal effect of form. From which it further follows that form communicates the being of existence which it brings with itself per se primarily to the composite and by participation to matter, whether that being remains actively from form or through resultance, or only formally, which can consist solely in this: that to such a form or to a thing informed through it, such being is owed by natural necessity, even if it is conferred by the extrinsic cause alone from which the form comes. And Cajetan indicated this explanation in the cited place, nor does it seem that it can be more fittingly explained in the principles of that opinion; for if existence is an entity distinct from form, the being of existence itself cannot be the first effect of form, but the being of essence, which is distinct; for the first effect of form is essential to the

thing, because form as form belongs to the essence of the thing; but existence is outside essence according to this opinion; therefore it does not pertain to the first formal effect.

3. Whence according to the principles of this opinion, the rational soul in Christ as man has its proper and primary formal effect; for it cannot be deprived of this if it actually informs, and yet according to this opinion it does not have its proper created existence; therefore form can only give existence formally in a secondary way, namely because it is or constitutes the proper receptive subject of substantial existence, or (which amounts to nearly the same thing) because substantial being is intrinsically owed to essence completed by form, and not to another. Thus declared, this opinion is proved first because matter is pure potency; therefore of itself it has no act, but from form; therefore since existence is a certain act, it cannot belong to matter except through form. Second, because existence is a posterior act, if it is compared to essence; therefore it presupposes essential act; but this act is form. Third, because substantial being is complete and perfect being; therefore it is not owed per se except to complete and formal nature; therefore it is owed only to form or by reason of form.

4. But Durandus adds that even if it is said that existence is not distinguished in reality from essence, nevertheless it must be asserted that form is the formal cause of the actual existence of matter; for although essence is its existence, this must be understood with proportion; for essence in potency will be existence in potency, and actual essence will be actual existence; therefore only form will be actual existence, by which matter formally exists. And from this opinion, explained in either way, it follows that matter naturally depends on form in its entire entity, so that it cannot remain without it, because it cannot remain without existence; but it has existence only from form and through form on which existence itself depends; therefore. It also happens from this that, when form is changed, matter changes existence, although under diverse forms and existences the

same essence of matter is conserved. But whether this dependence is so great that it cannot be supplied by God without form, we will discuss in the following section.

5. The second opinion is entirely contrary: that form does not give being to matter nor is it the proper cause of it. Henry holds this, Quodl. I, q. 14; and Avicenna is cited for this opinion, lib. VI Metaph.; and Scotus holds the same, In II, dist. 12, q. 2, at the end; and Gregory there, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1 Aureoli, and q. 2, a. 3. The foundation is that matter has its proper being, which it receives formally from no cause, since it is simple and partial being and distinct from the being which form gives, but it has that being effectively from God alone and according to that being matter is presupposed to form absolutely and simply by order of nature; therefore in no way is that being caused by form, but it is completed or actuated through form.

6. Who assert, and how, that matter can naturally exist without form. But if you object against this opinion that matter can naturally exist without form, since form is not its cause, some respond by conceding the consequence, which Marsilius seems to have thought, In II, q. 9, a. 2, while he asserts that in the beginning God created the matter of generable things without any substantial form, and after some time he formed it. This also pleases Gabriel, In II, dist. 12, q. 1 and 2; and sometimes seems to have pleased Augustine, Lib. I de Genes. contra Manichaeos, c. 5 and 7, and lib. XII Confess., c. 8. But if God did this in the creation of the world, it must be thought that it is not beyond the natures of things, because, as Augustine notes in the beginning of his exposition of Genesis, God then did not operate as a worker of miracles, but as the author of nature. Nor does Henry seem to dissent from this opinion above, when he says that matter according to the common course of nature cannot be stripped of every form, because the corruption of one thing does not occur without the generation of another following. Therefore if corruption could occur naturally without the generation of another, as far as it concerns matter, it would naturally remain without form. That this actually

happened in the death of Christ, Marsilius holds, In III, q. 3, a. 1, and q. 13, a. 1, and Henry considers it probable, Quodl. I, q. 4, indeed even true as far as this: that there a separation of one form was made without the introduction of another; which nevertheless he thinks was singular and preternatural in Christ in Quodl. II, q. 2, ad 4. But Scotus thinks it is natural in any death of a human being, especially violent death, and indeed of other living beings, as is clear In IV, dist. 11, q. 3. These, however, do not say that in that case matter remains without form absolutely, but without specific form and with the form of corporeity which they posit. But others use a distinction: for something is called natural either according to particular or according to universal nature; for it is not natural for water according to its private condition to ascend; nevertheless to fill a vacuum this is natural according to the propensity of universal nature. Thus (they say) it is not repugnant to matter according to its private nature to be conserved without form, if it is deprived of it; but from the owed order of universal nature this cannot happen, because if it is repugnant for a vacuum to be given in local space, much more so in the capacity and potency of matter. Others finally say that even according to the particular condition of its nature, matter cannot exist without form, although form is not its proper cause, unless every condition necessary for existing is called a cause. And this way of speaking seems to approach closer to the truth.

Resolution of the Question

7. I say therefore first: form is not the proper cause of matter, giving formally the proper being by which matter exists. This is proved because form does not give to matter that partial essential entity which it has in itself, as was shown above, and which it retains under all forms; but that entity includes its partial[4] existence distinct from every

[4] partialem Salamanca 1597, Venice 1605; particularem, Paris 1861, Madrid 1960.

existence proceeding formally from form; therefore. The major is evident, both because that entity of matter, as regards its proper partial being of essence, is simple and distinct from form; and also because it is presupposed to form, and remains unchanged as regards that being, under whatever form; whence also the authors of the first opinion say that form constitutes with matter one complete essence, but does not give its proper essential being to matter, which rather it presupposes; therefore form cannot be the proper and intrinsic formal cause of that being of matter. But I say proper and intrinsic, because extrinsically by the mode of a term this being of matter can be said to be taken from form, because the essence of matter consists in aptitude toward form, but this respect is not toward form as actually informing, but in aptitude. Whence the same specification would remain in matter, even if it were without form. But the minor is proved, because the real being of essence, if it is actual, that is, outside its efficient cause, is intrinsically the being of existence, as will be proved at length below in treating of being and essence; but matter, as it is presupposed to form according to its proper partial being of essence, has actual being, as it is distinguished from potential objective being, because without such being it could not be the true and real subject of transmutation and form; therefore. And it is confirmed and clarified; for God, by the same action by which he created and conserved matter under the first form, conserves it under all forms which afterwards succeed; therefore that action of God is terminated toward some being of matter which remains the same under all forms; for creation and corresponding conservation is terminated toward some being, and action cannot remain the same unless the term is the same; therefore that being is not given formally by form, for the being which form gives is varied when form is varied; but that being is the being of existence, because it is temporal and actual being outside the efficient cause; therefore.

8. Therefore Durandus does not speak consistently when he says that even if being is not distinguished from essence, matter has being from the informing form. But he labors in equivocation when he

says that matter only has essence in potency, and therefore of itself only has being in potency; for matter according to itself has in potency the essence of form or composite; but it does not have the essence of matter in potency, but in act, by the very fact that it has been created; for it is one thing for matter to be essentially potency, another to be only essence in potency. The first is universally true, even of actually existing matter, because nothing else is signified in this than that matter is essentially a subject or receptive potency. But the second is false of actually created matter, even as it is preunderstood to form; for although the essence of matter of itself, that is, with efficient causality removed, is only in potency, which is common to every created essence, nevertheless through its creation it becomes essence in act, although partial and potentially subjectively; therefore as such it has its proportionate being of existence; therefore that being does not flow formally from form. But more on this point, that is, on the existence of matter, below.

9. Matter depends on form nor can it exist naturally without it. I say second: nevertheless matter depends in its being in some way on form, insofar as it cannot naturally exist without it, not only from the order of universal nature, but also from the debt and need of its proper and peculiar nature. The first part is received more frequently by philosophers and theologians, who for this reason say there is mutual connection and necessary connection between matter and material form, as can be seen in the cited authors, and Avicenna, II Metaph., c. 2 and 3; Commentator, I Phys., com. 56, and lib. II, com. 13; Themistius, I Phys., last digression; Plotinus, Ennead. III, lib. VI, c. 14; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 1. And it is proved by reason, because the entity of matter would be idle in the nature of things if it remained without form; for it could exercise no operation; but this is abhorrent to nature; therefore it is against the order of nature for matter to exist without form. Many use this reason; it does not seem efficacious, however, because although what is not apt for some office of nature is vain in nature, nevertheless what is apt of itself to exercise some office

to which it is instituted by nature is not vain nor simply idle, even though it sometimes does not carry that out. Thus therefore, even if matter remained sometimes without form, it would not be idle in nature, because of itself it would be apt to receive it, if an agent were present who would introduce it, and it would happen accidentally that it lacked it, because perhaps an agent who was disposing to introduce it previously removed the disposition necessary for the conservation of another, before it could introduce another. As Scotus thinks happens in the death of a human being or another animal; nor does a corpse remain idle on this account, or matter would remain idle, especially because gradually it can again be disposed to receive another form.

10. Whence neither does the reason which is usually given from the continuous succession of generation and corruption seem efficacious, both because it is not certain that generation immediately and in the same instant follows every corruption, as is clear from the said opinion of Scotus; for although nature per se does not intend corruption, but generation, it can nevertheless happen that a thing is corrupted before another can be generated. Wherefore what Aristotle said, namely: the generation of one is the corruption of another, perhaps does not convert, or it must be understood speaking per se, although it can fail accidentally.

11. Another reason is usually given, because what is not apt to operate per se without another, neither is it apt to exist per se without it; but matter by its nature can do nothing without form; therefore by its nature it needs form in order to exist, nor can it exist without it. But I ask whether the discourse is about operation properly taken, which expresses a relation to an efficient principle; and in this mode it is not to the point; for matter neither under form nor without form can have any operation. Or operation is taken broadly for any causality; and thus the assumption is false; for often one thing needs the partnership of another for causing and not for existing, as the agent intellect needs the partnership of phantasy to abstract species, and yet it remains

without phantasy and is not considered to be idle, even if then for that state it does not exercise its operation. The rational soul also needs the partnership of body to exercise formal causality, but not to exist, and so for others; thus therefore matter will be able to need the partnership of form to exhibit material causality, even if it does not require it for existing. And the reason is that causality expresses a relation or transcendental relation, and therefore can postulate the partnership of another; but the thing from which causality comes can be more absolute, and postulate the society of another not actually, but only in aptitude.

12. From which also another common reason appears weak, which is considered to be especially a priori, namely, that matter is pure potency, and therefore must naturally depend on the act of form. For what is called pure potency does not exclude the actual entity of matter itself, but says only that its entity is such that it is essentially potency and entirely instituted for the office of receiving and sustaining form; but it is not of the nature of potency, generally speaking, that it should always be under its act; whence therefore is it shown that this belongs to the nature of this potency?; for from the fact that it is substantial potency, this cannot be collected, since from this it is rather obtained that it is subsistent potency, although partially and incompletely, and therefore can exist per se, even if it does not actually exercise its causality, just as the rational soul remains, because it is subsistent, although it does not actually inform.

13. The reason proving that matter cannot naturally exist without form. It seems difficult therefore to give a reason which convinces of this natural dependence of matter on form, on account of which at this time it pleases many, especially in Italy, that matter indeed is never separated from form because of the necessary order of natural agents, both inferior and celestial, which always introduce one form when another recedes, but not because of intrinsic dependence of matter, which they say would not be reduced to nothing if, with one form removed, another did not succeed in it, but would have remained

naturally with its entity and existence. Nevertheless one must not recede from the ancient and common opinion, which we can explain and confirm in these ways. First, it is not likely that this inferior matter is more independent of the form of a generable thing taken indefinitely than each matter of heaven is from its proper form, since it is less perfect; but each matter of heaven naturally depends on its form; therefore. Second, it is not likely that this matter depends more on accidental forms than on substantial form, since it regards it per se primarily and principally; but this matter so depends on accidental form that it cannot naturally exist without all of it, as is evident, at least concerning quantity.

14. Augustine finally asserted that matter preceded without form by no real duration. Third, the best physical conjecture is that this matter is instituted for this purpose: that it should always be under some substantial form and never be separated from them; therefore it is a sign that it is also made such that by its nature it postulates the partnership of form in order to be able to exist. The antecedent is clear by induction, because matter, from the beginning in its creation, was established under forms. Nor is the contrary opinion likely; for Scripture does not say that God in the beginning created matter, but heaven and earth; which words cannot be explained of matter, as was shown above. And although Augustine sometimes seems to have doubted about this, nevertheless XII Confess., c. 17 and 29, he rejects the former opinion and concludes that matter preceded its formation not in time, but only by nature; whence XIII Confess., c. 33, he thus concludes: Since the matter of heaven and earth is one thing, the form another, you indeed made matter from absolutely nothing, but the form of the world from formless matter, nevertheless you made both simultaneously so that matter would follow form with no interval of delay. The same he has lib. I de Genes. ad litter., c. 19, and lib. IV, c. 22 and following, and I de Civitate, c. 7. But after that first creation, matter never lacked every form; and thus natural causes are disposed by the author of nature so that one form can never desert matter

without another being introduced. For that axiom of Aristotle, I de Gener., text. 17: the generation of one is the corruption of another, is universally true, nor can it be true of generation that corruption always follows it, unless also generation always follows the corruption of one; for if something were corrupted and no generation occurred, afterwards something could be generated from the same matter without new corruption. And since it is true that in matter there is no form of corporeity or generic form, as was shown in previous sections and we will also show below, it is necessary that form always succeeds form in matter, unless we want to say that in fact matter often remains without any substantial form with accidental forms alone. Which would be absurd and paradoxical in philosophy.

15. Therefore this matter is made to be perpetually under form; therefore it is likely that it is made such that it needs form to exist. The consequence is proved, because it is not repugnant to understand that primary matter is such that it has this need, which that reason correctly proves, namely because it is pure potency, that is, imperfect in its entity, and incomplete and potential; for with these imperfections that need and dependence does not conflict, indeed it fits most excellently. Nor does it matter that it is partially subsistent; for subsistence excludes dependence on a subject, but not on act or form. Nor is matter to be compared in this with a subsistent soul, because this is far more perfect and actual and simply immaterial. Therefore this mode of dependence not only does not conflict, but is also most consonant with the entity and imperfection and office of matter; therefore it is more likely that such is the nature of matter. Finally in physical things, what always happens in the same way and not otherwise, is likely to be naturally necessary; but for matter to exist under some form, this always happens naturally; therefore it is from necessity of nature and not from necessity of form, because when one form perishes from defect of dispositions, there was no necessity from the part of another to introduce a new form. Nor can the necessity be attributed to the extrinsic proximate agent alone, because

often also there is no private agent from which such form comes; therefore that necessity is founded in the intrinsic need of matter itself. Nor is it sufficient to say that this effect is natural from the order of the universe or from universal nature, or that necessity arises from universal acting causes, which are always prepared to introduce some form, when particular ones fail; for this universal institution of nature is founded in the proper need of matter; for because it pertained to the universal good that no portion of matter should ever fail or be reduced to nothing, therefore nature provided that it could never be deprived of every form, but with one receding, another would always succeed, because this was necessary so that matter could be perpetually conserved naturally. Otherwise why would nature have been so provident in such succession of forms, especially when the form which succeeds was not per se necessary to expel another, which recedes because of defect of necessary disposition or organization?

16. Nor is it similar to what was brought forward about the ascent of water to fill a vacuum; for universal nature avoids a vacuum because of the perfect unity and integrity of the universe and because of the necessity of action and influence, and not for the convenience of some private entity. But that matter should be as if vacant of every form, if nevertheless it could be conserved and suffer and be disposed to generation and in its genus concur to it, would be no inconvenience to universal nature. Therefore the universal reason is no other than the conservation of matter. I confess that this entire discourse supposes that in fact matter never remains without substantial form, and from this infers that this proceeds from the need of matter, which inference I think is sufficiently proved; but I doubt whether the antecedent is sufficiently demonstrated; for we do not experience substantial form except from effects or accidents; but often there is no effect which evidently shows the introduction of a new form after the recession of the former, as in the death of a human being; and therefore Scotus and others deny that a new form is introduced, although, lest they confess that matter remains without form, they posit a form of corporeity or

mixture, which being excluded, we do not convince by any other reason that in every death or corruption a new form is introduced unless because otherwise matter would remain without form; and thus we seem to commit a circle in these proofs. But although it is true that this is not evidently demonstrated from effects, nevertheless that axiom is so consonant with the natures of things and the end and use and imperfection of matter, that by the unanimous consent of almost all ancient and recent philosophers it is received as certain and undoubted, which is sufficient to found a philosophical reason.

What Kind of Dependence Matter Has on Form

17. Twofold mode of dependence. Arguments proving that matter depends on form only as on a condition. But it remains to be explained what kind of dependence this is; for it can be understood in two ways, namely, either as from a proper cause or as from a condition so necessary that without it being should not be owed to such a thing, which two modes of dependence I explained at length, in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 1, and Fonseca seems to signify them, V Metaph., c. 2, q. 3, sect. 1, when he says that matter can be understood to depend on form either as on a true cause or as on a certain concomitant; and sect. 3 he seems to make mention of the same, when he says that accidents conserve substance, not a priori, but a posteriori. It can therefore be doubted in which of these ways matter depends on form. And indeed, that it is only dependence a posteriori and from a necessary condition, seems to be probably persuaded. First, because this mode of dependence is possible; for substantial form or its union to matter, and thus the whole composite, depends in this way on some accidental forms as on necessary dispositions by way of conservation, as they say, not because they are proper and direct causes of such conservation, but because they are dispositions so connatural that they are also necessary; therefore by greater reason matter can have such dependence on form as on a necessary and

primary disposition. Likewise matter depends in this way on quantity; therefore it can also depend on form. Then this mode is sufficient to save all things which are said about the dependence of matter on form, and all the reasons made prove no more. It is also an easy and clear mode; for according to it the two conclusions posited are easily reconciled. It is also correctly understood how conversely form depends on matter and matter on form: for one will be said to depend a priori and the other a posteriori; one as from a true cause, and the other as from a concomitant condition.

18. But according to the other mode this mutual dependence is difficult to understand; for since matter is simply presupposed to form so that this can be educed from its potency, it is scarcely understood how matter can depend a priori on form. And the difficulty is further explained and increased from the fact that matter comes to be through true creation and is conserved through the same permanent action; therefore it does not depend in its coming to be on form as on a true cause, because no created cause can naturally concur to creation. Some respond that this is true of efficient cause, but not of other genera of causes; for a creature cannot be the efficient cause of creation; it can nevertheless be a final cause, as is clear per se; and by the same reason it can be a formal cause, indeed also material; for when the whole is created, the parts concur to the being and becoming of that in the genus of material cause. But, omitting final cause, whose causality has a peculiar nature, because it is not through real and proper motion distinct from the action of the efficient cause, and therefore does not prerequire real being in the thing which exercises such causality, concerning material cause its concourse seems to directly conflict with creation, as it is proper and true creation; which is easily clear from what was said above about the eduction of form from the potency of matter, and will be shown more extensively below in the proper disputation on creation. But I speak of creation, as creation is properly; for under the aspect of concreation it can have dependence on material cause, as was declared above in

treating of the matter of heaven, because concreation as such by order of nature presupposes creation, and therefore can have some dependence. Therefore by the same reason creation as such cannot have dependence on formal cause, because formal cause presupposes material, although concreation can have dependence on form, as was declared above in the cited place. But the matter of generable things is truly and properly created, and is not properly concreated, that is, it is not produced through one and the same action by which the whole is created; therefore form cannot concur as a true cause to its creation.

19. Which is declared and confirmed in this way from what has been said; for the creation of this matter of generable things and the introduction of form are distinct actions, both now in the conservation of matter and generation of things, and in the first production of sublunary things; but the action introducing form cannot be the true cause of the creative action of matter; therefore much less can form which is introduced through that action be the true cause of the creation of matter. The minor is clear, both because the introduction of form absolutely presupposes the creation of matter or created matter, nor can it be understood that the introduction or union of form is presupposed in any genus of cause to the creation of matter, because the introduction of form as such expresses a transcendental relation to already created matter; whence, just as a relation cannot be presupposed to its term in any genus of cause, so neither can the introduction of form to the creation of matter. And also because otherwise the creation or conservation of matter would depend per se on the eduction of form; therefore also on the agent educing form; and thus natural agents as true effective causes would conserve matter. Whence it would also happen that whenever form is changed in matter, the action by which matter is conserved by God would be changed, because with dependence of action changed, action is changed, because it is essentially dependence, as we will declare below. But the consequent is false, because matter, as it is the first subject of generation, is something ingenerable and incorruptible,

because it is presupposed to generation and corruption; therefore by the same reason it is something unchangeable as regards the action through which it comes to be and is conserved, because it is presupposed as made and conserved; otherwise through any generation of a natural entity matter would be concreated, or would be so related as if it were concreated, because through new action terminated to the whole it would begin to be conserved, which plainly conflicts with the action of a natural agent; otherwise by the same reason it could be said that new matter is always coproduced through such action. Therefore the creation or conservation of matter does not depend on the eduction of form as on a proper cause or action per se; therefore much less can it depend on form as on a true cause, since form is in every genus of cause posterior to the action through which it is educed from the potency of matter; therefore from first to last, neither can matter itself depend on form as on a per se cause, but only as on a concomitant cause or condition and one well disposing and actuating matter itself.

20. Reasons persuading that matter depends on form as on a proper cause. Nevertheless there are not lacking arguments by which it seems to be persuaded that matter can depend on form as on a proper cause which contains it in being through its information. And especially because material substantial form depends on matter as on a proper and per se cause in its genus; therefore conversely matter depends on form as on a true cause, because, although it does not sustain it as a subject, it can as act contain it. For just as effective act holds an effect in being through its causality, so informative act can in a mode proportionate to itself contain its subject in being; therefore substantial form is so related to matter. The consequence is proved first, because material form is more perfect and actual than matter; therefore matter depends more per se on form than form on matter. Second, because such mutual nexus between matter and form as between causes which mutually and reciprocally are per se causes to each other is not repugnant. Which is clear both from that general

reason that in diverse genera of causes mutual priority is not repugnant, and also because in heaven there seems to be this mutual connection between matter and form; for both in becoming and in being they mutually and per se depend, as was said above, so that the concreation of one per se depends on the concreation of the other, and conversely. From which example a third reason can be taken, because the matter of heaven depends on its determinate form, as on a per se cause; therefore the matter of these inferior things will depend in the same way on generable form, although indefinite. The consequence is clear, because the matter of heaven is more perfect; therefore if it depends, much more does the other.

21. Judgment about the question and about the reasons proposed on both sides. These reasons are indeed probable, and thus either part can be probably sustained from what has been said; to me however (to confess the truth) the former seems more intelligible and easier, and if the reasons made are attentively weighed, the latter can more easily be dissolved. Which task I leave to the reader, because the matter seems easy, because below, in explaining how causes are mutually causes of each other, it must be declared from the roots what mutual priority can intercede between any two things, and what cannot, on the understanding of which the present resolution chiefly depends.

SECTION IX

WHETHER THERE IS SUCH DEPENDENCE OF MATTER UPON FORM THAT WITHOUT IT, MATTER CANNOT BE PRESERVED EVEN BY DIVINE POWER, AND CONVERSELY

1. Rational forms can be preserved naturally when separated, others supernaturally. Concerning the dependence of form upon

matter, doubt can only arise regarding material forms; for concerning immaterial forms, it is established that they can remain without matter not only by divine power, but also naturally. Regarding other forms, however, Aristotle and the philosophers would perhaps deny that they could subsist in any way when separated from matter, because they would consider actual dependence and inherence in matter to be essential to them. But we Catholics, who believe that God preserves accidents without subjects, cannot doubt (though certain moderns do doubt) that God can also preserve a material substantial form without matter, because the dependence of an accident upon its subject is greater, insofar as an accident has less being and actuality than a substantial form. Hence all the Doctors to be cited immediately agree on this point regarding substantial form, although they disagree about matter.

The First Opinion About Matter is Treated

2. Concerning matter, therefore, the first position denies that God can preserve matter without substantial form. This is held by St. Thomas, in the places cited in the preceding section, along with his other followers cited there, and moreover in Quodl. III, a. 1, and the Master indicates this position in II, dist. 12, c. 5, where he only says that matter was not lacking all form at the beginning of creation, because no corporeal thing can exist which has no form; he does not, however, declare whether he speaks of absolute power or according to the natures of things. And Hugo of St. Victor seems to speak in the same manner, I de Sacrament., part. I, c. 4. Bonaventure speaks more openly, dicta dist. 12, a. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. VI, q. 1; Aegidius, in principio sui Hexameron, c. 1 et 2; Jandun, I Phys., q. 26; Zimara, Theorem. 15. The principal foundation of this position is that matter formally has no existence from itself, but receives it formally from form. But God cannot give a formal effect without a formal cause, nor can he preserve matter without existence; therefore he cannot

preserve matter without form. Nor does it matter that the being of existence, according to this position, is not the primary formal effect of form, both because, although for this reason the primary effect could remain without this secondary one by divine power, nevertheless conversely the secondary cannot be given without the primary, for it depends essentially upon it; and also because it pertains to the primary effect of form to be or constitute the proximate receptive subject of existence, which effect is never separated from form itself; for it has this even in the humanity of Christ; but God cannot constitute an act outside its proper receptive subject. Second, from the Commentator, because matter is pure potency; but whatever exists is in act; therefore it is contradictory for matter to exist without act, because otherwise it would simultaneously be in act and without act; but the act of matter is form; therefore it is contradictory to be without form. Third, even if matter has some partial existence, it has this depending upon form in the genus of formal cause; but God cannot supply the effect of formal cause by himself; therefore. Fourth, this argument is usually made, because if matter were preserved without form, there would be in the nature of things some individual under the genus of substance and not under any species; for matter would be in the genus of body, for example; and would not belong to any species of it. Fifth, all accidental being is from accidental form, and therefore nothing can have such being without it; therefore all substantial being is from substantial form, and cannot be without it; but matter has some substantial being; therefore this cannot be without substantial form. Other arguments are usually multiplied, but they do not introduce new difficulty, and therefore I consider it useless to dwell on them.

The Latter Position is Treated & Preferred to the Former

3. The contrary position is quite common. It is held by Henry, Quodl. I, q. 10; Scotus, In I, dist. 12, q. 2; and there Lychetus, Maironis, Bassolis, and other Scotists; Richard, q. 4; Gregory, q. 1; Gabriel, q. 1; Marsilius, In II, q. 8; and Soto inclines toward it, I Phys., q. 6; and this position seems to me entirely true, because I not only find no clear implication of contradiction, but indeed not even a sufficiently probable reason that would persuade of it. And first, even if we held that existence is a thing distinct from essence, no sufficient reason could be given why God could not place that act in matter alone; because, although according to the connatural order that act would have to be received in the whole nature or complete supposit, nevertheless by divine power it could be constituted in one part, just as accidental existence cannot naturally be received except in an accidental composite or in a substantial supposit through the mediation of accidental form, and yet God can cause it to remain in the separated accident alone, and by greater reason could preserve substantial being in a substantial material form alone; therefore he could also place the act of existence in the essence of matter alone, because, although matter is potency toward form, nevertheless it is truly a certain partial substantial essence; insofar therefore as it is some essence, it will be able to be actuated by existence; for existence is the act of essence. Nor is there any reason which proves that order between substantial form and the act of existence, or the dependence of that existence upon form, to be so essential that it cannot be changed or supplied by God; for form is not the cause of existence in such a way that it intrinsically composes it, since they are supposed to be simple distinct entities; but the causality of form, which is not through intrinsic composition, but either through emanation or some other similar relationship, can be supplied by God, as I shall show immediately.

4. Nor indeed can it be said that matter existing through an act of existence really distinct already has form, because every act is form. For this axiom is false according to that position, even

concerning actuating act; for the authors of that position place in one substantial supposit both substantial form and an act of existence really distinct, and do not admit two substantial forms; therefore substantial existence is not substantial form. And therefore they also say that the existence of created humanity can be supplied by the uncreated existence of the Word, because existence is not form; therefore if matter were preserved with an act of existence really distinct from its essence without another form, it would truly be preserved without form, and thus would be in act without informing act, but not without terminating act. Add that some of the authors who posit existence as really distinct from essence concede that God can preserve essence in the nature of things and outside causes without existence. In which, although they speak an open contradiction, nevertheless, supposing a false principle, they seem to speak consistently. Why therefore would they not also admit that the essence of matter can be preserved in the nature of things and outside causes without the distinct act of existence? For in order that a thing be in the nature of things and outside causes, according to them the being of essence suffices; but matter from itself and through itself formally has some being of essence, although partial and diminished.

5. Genuine and A Priori Proof of the Conclusion. But these proceed as it were ad hominem from alien principles; from our own principles, however, the a priori reason for this position is because matter, just as it has its own partial entity of essence, so also of existence; for the existence of substance is as composite as the essence of substance, and therefore without any implication or contradiction God can preserve matter without form just as form without matter. Because, although the proper receptive subject (so to speak) of complete and integral existence is complete nature or substantial supposit, nevertheless a part of nature or partial nature is capable of partial existence proportioned to itself, in which it can partially subsist alone by divine power, just as quantity exists separated in its proportioned existence by divine power. For no greater contradiction

can be brought forward in the partial existence of matter than in the partial existence of form or the accidental existence of quantity. For this partial existence of matter does not flow intrinsically from form, but only naturally depends upon it, either as upon a condition or actual disposition naturally due, or at most as upon an informing cause and through its information concurring per se and assisting the being of matter; but this mode of dependence can easily be supplied by God without contradiction. And concerning the first indeed, which seemed more probable to us, the matter is clear, because that mode of dependence is very extrinsic and a posteriori, and consists only in this, that being is not naturally due to a thing constituted in such a state or lacking such disposition or act. But God can confer being even beyond natural due or beyond natural order, and thus can preserve form in matter without natural disposition and soul in body without natural organization.

6. Concerning the latter mode of dependence the same is proved, because, although according to that mode form concurs in some way as cause to the being of matter, not however as intrinsically composing that being or as its proper subject, but only as informing or actuating cause and as extrinsic, in this sense that it is entirely distinct from the effect itself; but God can supply such a cause by efficient action, even if it itself causes by informing. Which is proved contrariwise from material cause, which is intrinsic just like formal cause, and therefore God cannot supply it with respect to that effect which it intrinsically composes. He can however supply its causality with respect to the other component or form, even if matter in its genus influences per se and as true cause in the being of the form itself. And in this way God supplies the dependence of accident upon subject, even if it be in the genus of material cause; and in the same way he can supply the dependence of corporeal substantial form upon matter; because, although it is truly causality per se and material, nevertheless it is not entirely intrinsic, that is, such that matter itself is an intrinsic part of such effect, but it is concerning a thing entirely

distinct, sustaining it. But this causality which matter provides by sustaining, God can supply by efficient action; therefore by the same reasoning he will be able to supply the causality of form, not into the composite, but into matter, not by informing, but by efficient action. The consequence is clear, because equally the whole reason of contradiction ceases, which consists in this that God cannot be united by the mode of form to matter, which would be necessary for conserving or composing the composite, but not for conserving one part of the composite without the other. In which there is equal reasoning concerning matter and form, because it is not of the nature of an essential part existing in act that it be form or have form, because neither does the essence of such part require this, since it consists only in aptitude toward form, not indeed in actual union, nor also existence, since it depends only extrinsically upon form in the manner already explained. And then matter would indeed be in entitative act or of existence and in potency toward formal act, in which there is no contradiction or difficulty, since receptive potency necessarily includes some entity and entitative actuality, as was declared above.

7. What New Thing God Must Provide in Order to Preserve Matter Without Form. And hence it is understood in passing through what action God could preserve matter without form, or what new thing it would be necessary for him to exhibit in order to preserve it. For one must speak diversely according to the diverse modes of dependence of matter upon form touched upon above. For if matter depends upon form only as upon a consequent act or disposition, no new action is necessary on God's part to preserve matter without form; but if from the beginning he were to create matter alone without form, the action would be entirely the same as that by which God actually created matter under forms, and the miracle or preternatural work would consist only in this, that God would perform that action without the concomitance of another through which he would induce form into such matter. Just as if God were to create the substance of soul without intellective potency, he would create it through the same

action, and the miracle would only be to impede the natural emanation of faculty from essence; indeed, in fact the soul of Christ was created by the same action without proper subsistence as others are created, and only in it was the action or emanation of proper subsistence impeded. And one must speak proportionally if God wishes to preserve without form matter which is already under it; for by expelling one form and not concurring to the introduction of another, it would only be necessary for God to continue that very action by which he now preserves matter, because through it he would sufficiently preserve the entity of matter in the nature of things and outside causes; and the miracle would only be placed in this, that God would continue the conservative action of matter in that state in which being would not be due to it and without those conditions which are necessary for the natural mode of existing.

8. But truly if matter depends upon form as upon its proper cause influencing per se upon its being, thus it will be necessary for God to supply that causality of form by another genus of efficiency and action; because if that causality of form is per se necessary beyond the common influx by which God now preserves matter, matter could not be preserved with this common influx of God alone without the causality of form unless this necessity be supplied by another genus of causality. Just as, when God preserves quantity without the material concourse of subject, it is necessary that he supply that concourse of subject by special efficiency, without which quantity could not naturally exist, and therefore we say that God preserves quantity without subject by a far different reasoning from that by which he preserved it in the subject, as I have treated at length in the third tome of the third part. Thus therefore it would be necessary in the present case, proportion being maintained. But what would be that new action which God would employ to preserve matter without form is not easy to explain; but we say that it would be action by the mode of absolute and entirely independent creation, and would be distinguished from the action by which matter is now preserved, because this is by the

mode of concreation; which indeed in celestial matter, if it were to be preserved without form, can easily be understood; but in this matter of generable things it is more difficult, for the action by which it comes to be is truly absolute creation, as was declared in what precedes, and therefore the former mode of speaking always seems more probable regarding this matter.

The Arguments of the Former Position are Answered

9. The arguments of the contrary position are almost all solved from what has been said. For to the first it has already been responded that it falsely assumes that all existence is from form as from intrinsic and quasi-essential cause (for this is true of complete substantial existence, but not of any partial one), and the inference is not necessary, because, granted that natural order between form and existence, it would not follow that it is immutable by the omnipotence of God. To the second, Scotus and others respond that equivocation is committed in the name of potency and act; for matter is called pure subjective potency, which if it be in its purity, will lack informing act; but when it is said that every existing thing is in act, it is understood of entitative act, which is not opposed to subjective potency, but only to objective potency. Which response Javellus and others think is sufficiently excluded by attacking objective potency, but we need not stick to the word objective potency, about which perhaps there is controversy about the name, as Javellus also admits and must be treated below; but we should attend to the thing signified, which is a thing in possible being, whether it be called possible from objective potency or from active potency of agent; for now it makes no difference. But to a possible thing thus taken is opposed a thing in act, and in this sense it is true that an existing thing ought to be in act; but this being in act is not opposed to pure subjective potency. But if matter already created is called pure potency in this sense, the

assumption is false. To the third, it has already been sufficiently declared how God can supply the natural dependence which matter has in its partial existence upon form.

10. Matter Assigns to Itself a Substantial, Proper, and Stable Species. To the fourth it is responded that that argument does not proceed any more in matter without form than in formed matter. For matter does not have another substantial and essential species for itself because it is under form or under this or that form. But I say substantial and essential, because we are dealing with prime matter, not with proximate matter, which includes forms or accidental dispositions, by reason of which it is sometimes said to differ in species; but that is truly not diversity in the substantial difference of matter, but in accidents. Therefore form does not give specific difference to matter, but to the composite. Hence, just as the same matter numerically remains under diverse forms, so also the same in species; if therefore matter existing without form would be an individual of genus contained under no species, it also is so now; or certainly, if now it is not such an individual (as indeed it is not), neither would it be then. Hence the consequence is to be simply denied, because it does not pertain to the nature of matter that it be in the species of man or horse, but in the species of matter; but that matter would be in some ultimate species of matter, either celestial or elemental. Therefore it is one thing to say that in that case there would be given matter which in its latitude of incomplete essence would be contained under no ultimate species proportioned to itself, and it is false that this follows; but another thing to say that there would be given matter from which no complete individual contained under some ultimate species of complete substance would actually be composed, and this we admit follows; but there is no inconvenience, but it is our very assertion, because it is not of the essence of matter that it actually compose such individual, but that it be apt to compose it. To the fifth it is responded that there is a distinction between substance and accident, that accident and accidental form taken in

their whole latitude are convertible, because every accident inheres in some way, and therefore it is contradictory to give accidental being without accidental form; but substance and substantial form are not convertible; for there is given substantial subject which is in no way form, and therefore substance is divided into matter, form and composite. Wherefore it is not necessary that all substantial being be intrinsically and formally form; for in the latitude of substantial being there is given being simply and complete, and this is from form properly and per se in its genus; there is also given partial being, which is not always from form, except speaking broadly, insofar as it depends upon it in some way, which dependence God can supply, as has been shown.

SECTION X

WHETHER ONLY ONE FORMAL CAUSE IS GIVEN FOR ONE SUBSTANCE

1. Several partial homogeneous forms are found in the same composite. Having explained the causality of form, it is necessary to expound the unity or multiplicity in the same effect or composite, so that from this it may at the same time be established whether within this genus of cause there exists any subordination or dependence of causes with respect to the same effect. Now in two ways it can be understood that there are several forms in one substance, namely, either in diverse parts of matter or in the same matter. Concerning the former way we do not dispute here, because, even if diverse forms are given in diverse parts of matter, nevertheless each of them has only one proper effect in its matter. But if from all those substances one is composed as from parts integrating it, it is necessary that those forms be not total, but partial, integrating one total form. And thus that multitude of parts will not prevent there being given one adequate formal cause of one total effect. And indeed if such partial forms are of

the same nature, there is no doubt that they can be multiplied in material forms according to the diversity of parts of matter and united to compose one substance. But whether forms of diverse natures can be partial and unite among themselves to compose one substance, and how great that union can be, whether namely through true mathematical continuation or through some lesser physical conjunction, all these matters do not pertain to the present subject, but to the science of the soul; for all those questions are usually asked chiefly on account of the heterogeneous parts of living beings, and especially on account of blood and other humors existing in animals, concerning which I have touched upon some things in tome I of part III, disputation XV, sections 5, 6 and 7.

2. The present question therefore concerns the formal cause with respect to the very same matter entirely, namely, whether in one matter there can be only one substantial form, in which question several matters are involved according to the variety of opinions which must be briefly touched upon. Now in three ways can several forms in the same matter be conceived: in one way, with subordination per se and essential, by the mode of superior and inferior form, of which the prior, although it is act with respect to matter, nevertheless is compared by the mode of potency with respect to a further form. Second, with subordination not indeed essential, but by the mode of disposition to the principally intended form. Third, merely accidentally and without any order among themselves. And to these three headings are reduced all the opinions which are or can be in this matter; and in each there is variety of views.

3. For to the first heading pertains the opinion treated above, disputation XIII, concerning the form of corporeity per se necessary for the introduction of ultimate forms, which it will not be necessary here again to report and refute.

The Opinion Concerning the Multiplication of Forms According to Essential Predicates is Rejected

4. There also is treated and cursorily refuted the opinion which affirms that substantial forms are really multiplied in a composite according to the multitude of essential predicates, which is reported from Avicebron, in his book Fountain of Life; and this was held by John of Jandun, II Metaphysics, question 10, and I On the Soul, question 8; and Paul the Venetian, VII Metaphysics. Nevertheless this view is now antiquated and rejected as entirely improbable; for besides the general reasons which we shall make below for the unity of form, this reason convinces that opinion of falsity, that it multiplies forms without foundation and necessity, for it has been shown above that universals are not really distinguished from particulars, nor genera from species; therefore, since these predicates are multiplied only through abstraction and precision of our intellect, it is vain to think that really distinct forms correspond to them in reality. Otherwise even in separated substances and in accidental forms, really distinct forms would have to be multiplied and subordinated among themselves according to the multitude of essential predicates which our reason also distinguishes in these things. Indeed even matters would have to be really distinguished and multiplied in material substances, because diverse essential predicates can be taken from them, such as being a material thing, which is common to celestial and inferior bodies, and being a generable thing or something similar. Finally, these predicates can be abstracted in great number, according to various agreements of things; therefore it is impossible for forms to be really multiplied according to their number. I omit other reasons, which we made above, disputation XIII, section 3.

5. That parts of the thing correspond to parts of the definition. What order of inference essential predicates and substantial forms maintain. But you will object that Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, chapter 10, says that parts of the thing correspond to parts of the definition; but parts of the definition are genus and difference;

therefore to these parts correspond in the defined thing really diverse parts, which are not only matter and form, for animal, for example, does not signify matter alone, but the composite of matter and sensitive soul. Likewise the same Aristotle, II Metaphysics, chapter 2, proves that there is no infinite process in formal causes, because there is none in quidditative predicates. Likewise, because the properties which belong according to these predicates are distinct in the thing itself, such as, for example, sensing, understanding, moving, etc.; therefore also the forms from which those predicates are taken. To the first testimony of Aristotle it is responded, either that he does not speak generally about every definition, but about that which is given in the physical mode and through physical parts, as when man is said to be an entity composed of soul and body; or, if he speaks universally, it need not be understood about parts distinct in reality, but in reality or reason, as is taken from Saint Thomas there and more clearly from Alexander of Hales, who calls them real parts or of reason. To the other testimony it is responded that from the negation of several or infinite essential predicates the negation of several or infinite forms is correctly collected, because from any form at least one quidditative predicate can be taken; if therefore there are not infinite quidditative predicates, neither can there be infinite forms. Conversely however from the multitude of quidditative predicates the multitude of forms cannot be collected, because from the same form several predicates can be taken according to various agreements and differences which it has with other forms. Therefore what is adduced from Aristotle is not similar.

6. Hence however it is very well inferred that, just as from the unity of form it is not collected that quidditative predicates are not several, but only one, so also it is not collected that they are not infinite or that there cannot be an infinite process in them, because with the unity of form remaining these predicates can be multiplied; but whether from elsewhere there is a limit in these predicates, and how Aristotle proved this, we shall say in the following section. To the

last it is responded by denying the consequence, for just as from the same cause several effects, so from the same form diverse faculties can arise, as is known by experience, for sometimes several faculties belong to the same thing, not only according to the same physical form, but also according to the same specific difference, as to man intellect, will, risibility; sometimes however these faculties arise from the same form according to various degrees of it, which are often distinguished by us through order to those very faculties or actions, although in reality the degrees themselves are not distinct in substantial forms, concerning which matter enough has been said in treating of universals.

The Opinion of Scotus Concerning the Form of Corporeity is Rejected

7. Third, to this heading pertains the opinion of Scotus and Henry touched upon above, disputation XIII, who also posit the form of corporeity or of the mixed as per se necessary between matter and certain substantial forms, although not in the same way; for Scotus thinks it intervenes between matter and every soul, but not between matter and forms of inanimate things; Henry however requires that form only in man. The foundation of Scotus, if it be explained a priori, seems to have been because the soul is a form transcending the common grade of body and requires in matter a certain disposition and variety of organs, which other forms do not require; therefore the soul as such does not give the being of body but presupposes it through another form, by reason of which matter is supposed capable of organization and disposition necessary for the soul; but in inanimate things this necessity ceases. And this can be confirmed from the common manner of speaking; for we say that a living thing consists of body and soul, but we do not say that water or air consists of body and such form, but of matter and such form; therefore it is a sign that the body, which in living things is said to be the other part of

the composite, includes besides matter a certain substantial form intermediate between matter and soul. Concerning which body that definition of soul is very well understood: it is the act of a physical body, organic, having life in potency. For since that body which is distinguished from soul is a physical part, it does not include the soul itself, even as giving the superior grade, because otherwise there would not be physical but metaphysical composition from them; nor does it signify matter alone either naked, because this way it is common to all natural things, or with accidents, because these do not pertain to the essence of substance; therefore it includes a special substantial form distinct from the soul. Second and principally Scotus was moved by an a posteriori argument, because in the death of an animal the soul departs and a new form is not immediately introduced; but it is not to be said that matter remains without form; therefore it must be said that it remains under the form of corporeity, which was present in the animal. The major is proved, because, if a form were introduced, it would be diverse according to the diversity of dispositions; but we see that it is not so, but in the death of man the same cadaver remains whether he dies from excess of heat or cold. There is also often no agent from which such a form is educed. Third, Scotus uses a theological argument, which especially moved Henry; for it cannot be said that the body of a dead man is always specifically or numerically distinct from the body of the living; therefore it is necessary to confess that the same form of body remains numerically without a new form, because with form varied, the individual is varied, indeed also the species. The antecedent is clear, because otherwise there would not have been in the sepulcher the same body numerically, which was in the living Christ. And if a host had been consecrated before Christ's death and preserved in the triduum, the same body numerically would not have remained in it, which seem to be against the sayings of the Saints.

8. Two principles of Aristotle are strengthened which are destroyed with the form of corporeity being posited. But this opinion

also multiplies forms without sufficient foundation, and can be refuted by the same reasons which we used in the aforesaid disputation XIII against Avicenna. And moreover Scotus supposes in his view two things which are repugnant to Aristotle. One is that substantial corruption sometimes occurs without subsequent generation, against Aristotle, I On Generation, chapter 3. The second is that substantial corruption occurs with a complete sensible substance composed of matter and form remaining, against the same Philosopher, I On Generation, chapter 4. To which the Scotists respond that Aristotle speaks when complete corruption occurs; but when an animal dies, complete corruption does not occur until so much transmutation occurs in matter that even the form of corporeity is cast off. But this same distinction of complete or half corruption of substance is foreign to the doctrine of Aristotle, who always defines substantial generation and corruption to be the inception and cessation simpliciter of the whole substance. And moreover it follows third that there remains in fact in the nature of things an individual of the genus from the category of substance constituted under no species of body, which is not less impossible than to understand some animal in the nature of things of no species of animals.

9. It can be responded from Scotus that that composite from matter and that form of corporeity is not an individual contained under the genus of body from the category of substance, as Avicenna thought; for that individual ought to be a substance complete in reality including some specific form which body from the category of substance confusedly expresses, and therefore is predicated directly of inferiors; but that body consisting of matter and the form of corporeity alone is only an incomplete and partial substance; for it is a part of a certain substantial composite. Hence, just as matter, because it is a part, can be reductively under the genus of body and not under some species, so that body which is part of the composite.

10. But this response does not satisfy, first, because for some individual to be contained directly under some species, it suffices that

it actually contain the whole actual essence of that species, nor is it necessary that it actually contain whatever the species contains in potency, as is known per se; but body from the category of substance is a subaltern species contained under the genus of substance, of whose actual nature it is only that it be substance composed of matter and substantial form or that it be substance existing per se and capable of quantity; but this whole actual nature belongs to that individual; therefore. Second, because, although a part of substance can reductively be under a genus and not under a species, nevertheless if genera and species are directly and proportionately assigned to it, it is impossible for it to be under a genus without being in some species of it, just as we said above that matter, even conserved by God's absolute power without form, cannot not be in some ultimate species of matter. So therefore that form which constitutes that body or cadaver cannot be under the common genus of substantial form without being in some ultimate species of substantial form; therefore the composite from such form and matter will also be in some ultimate species of composed substance; therefore not only reductively in the genus of body. And this reason, as I said above, also convinces that that composite is no longer actualizable through a further substantial difference, nor through a form from which such difference is taken, and therefore it is not a part nor a potency per se ordered to a further substantial act, but is a complete substance constituted in ultimate act; for no substance is so complete in act unless because it has some substantial form constituted in some ultimate species of such form.

11. Third is an argument ad hominem against Scotus, because, if he does not consider it inconvenient for this body, which he says is part of substance, to remain without further form, there is no reason why he should judge it inconvenient for matter to remain without form; therefore to avoid this inconvenience he should not have introduced this form of corporeity. The antecedent is clear, because, just as matter is potency per se ordered to form, so that body is potency per se ordered to soul. And just as matter under that form

of corporeity has some actuality, so per se alone it has proper entitative actuality, which suffices for existing; therefore there is no reason why the entity of matter should depend more on that form of corporeity than the form of corporeity itself on a further form, that is, the soul; if therefore the form of corporeity can remain without soul, matter also will be able to remain without the form of corporeity. That form is therefore impertinent. Fourth, it follows from the opinion of Scotus that in substantial generation two really distinct forms are often introduced; since therefore changes are multiplied from terms, there will be two substantial generations for constituting one substantial composite.

12. Fifth, it can happen that the same body numerically, consisting of the same matter and form numerically, now lives the life of man, afterwards the life of a brute; for when a worm is generated from a cadaver, there is no reason why the form of corporeity should be changed; for if it remains in the cadaver without the dispositions of man, it will be able better to remain under the form of any living thing. Indeed from there it seems further to follow that this form is limited to living things alone without cause, but should at minimum be extended to all mixed things, even inanimate ones; for, as Scotus himself also speaks, it is the form of mixture arising from the mixture of elements; therefore wherever this mixture is, there will be in matter sufficient disposition for this form; it will therefore be in all inanimate mixed things; otherwise Scotus must declare what transmutation made in the matter of the cadaver suffices to expel this form. Certainly none can be reasonably assigned, unless perhaps resolution into the first simple elements; for to all other dispositions which arise from the mixture of elements such form seems to be indifferent, since it is said to remain in wood, bone and flesh, etc. But if this consequence is admitted, a reasonable difference can hardly be assigned, why such form is not in matter with the form of gold or another homogeneous mixed thing, etc. Hence if a form of corporeity were to be posited, he would speak more consistently who would posit it in all natural

entities with Avicenna than in certain ones, as others do. And these reasons suffice also against the opinion of Henry; for what has been said about living things in general, can easily be applied to man alone.

13. The arguments introduced for the form of corporeity are weakened. It is added that the reasons by which these authors were moved to introduce that form are very weak. For to the first it is responded, although the soul is a superior form than forms of inanimate things and requires organization of members in matter, the form of corporeity is not therefore necessary; for per se it suffices for immediately actuating matter and conserving it in being or terminating its dependence, and consequently it is also sufficient that the composite from such matter and form be capable of three dimensions, which is to be body from the category of substance; finally it suffices that such form require in diverse parts of matter diverse accidental dispositions, through which diverse organs are completed, either because the soul itself, if it be divisible, has various parts of diverse partial natures, to which those dispositions correspond; or because, if the soul be indivisible, in its eminent and perfect entity it virtually contains all that variety. But whether those accidental dispositions precede in matter by natural order or entirely follow the soul as to the proximate and ultimate degree, the same account holds of heterogeneous dispositions as of homogeneous; and therefore it is not necessary on account of this particular cause to introduce a particular form in living things, but one must philosophize in this according to what was said in the superior disputation concerning quantity and accidents in first matter.

14. In what sense a living thing is said to be constituted by body and soul. To the confirmation, as far as pertains to the matter, when a living thing is said to consist of body and soul, if by body a physical part is to be understood, it essentially includes nothing besides matter, because, with the form of corporeity excluded, nothing else essential can remain in body as it is a physical part, as the argument made there correctly proves. Hence Aristotle, VII

Metaphysics, text 39: "It is manifest," he says, "that soul is indeed first substance, body however is matter; but man, or animal, is what comes from both." And although in such matter organic dispositions are required as ultimate dispositions and necessary conditions, nevertheless they do not pertain to substantial composition; and consequently neither are they essentially included in the essential physical part. Nothing however compels us to understand by the name of body the pure physical part, which is matter, but as it stands under a certain metaphysical degree of form or (which is the same thing) it designates the composite of matter and soul, for example, not insofar as it is soul, but insofar as it gives the degree of corporeity; for to declare the proper nature of soul and the singular degree of perfection which it adds beyond the common degree of body, we particularly distinguish in living things soul from body and signify body by the mode of physical part, not because the form included in it is a physical part compared to soul, but because it is so conceived and abstracted as if it were a distinct form. Concerning which matter more could be said, which I omit, because I wrote these things in tome III of part III, disputation LI, section 4.

15. In the death of any living thing the form of cadaver is introduced into matter. Of what species it is and by what agent it occurs. To the second it is responded that the assumption is false; for in the death of man and of any animal the form of cadaver is introduced lest matter remain without form. Concerning which form and concerning its unity or distinction and concerning its efficient cause there is no place for speaking here, and it matters little for the thing about which we are acting. It is therefore probable that in living things specifically diverse the form of cadaver which is introduced in place of soul, is specifically distinct, as is established concerning plants and also concerning animals. But whether with respect to the same living thing a form of the same species succeeds, either can be said probably, as Cajetan disputes against Scotus, I, question 76, article 4. Concerning the efficient cause however, it must be said that it is

produced by some proximate temperament with the concurrence of some universal cause, just as generally must be said concerning those things which are accidentally generated from putrefaction. To the third it must be said that the dead body is specifically diverse, and consequently as to substantial form it is also numerically distinct. Nor does it matter what is brought forward concerning the body of Christ, for it is said to be either sensibly the same numerically dead and living on account of the identity of matter, quantity and sensible accidents, or suppositally the same on account of the identity of the supposit. Concerning which matter I have spoken in tome III, in the place cited, and more broadly in tome II, disputation XXXVIII, section 3, where I also declared whether the form of cadaver, which was in the triduum in the body of Christ, was hypostatically united to the Word. Which Henry also touched upon in the place cited above. It is therefore not necessary on account of theological locutions, which can have convenient sense, to feign in man a new form without philosophical foundation, indeed against the true reason of substantial and essential composition, as has been partly shown and will be more fully shown in what follows. But the special physical reason, which in man can be taken from the fact that his soul is spiritual, will be treated in the following point.

The Opinion Concerning the Multiplication of Forms According to the Degrees of Things is Treated

16. The ultimate way of speaking in this first heading can be that in each thing substantial forms per se subordinated are multiplied as many as there are degrees of natural things and according to the number of degrees which are participated by one and the same substance. Now there are four degrees of material substances, namely, of inanimate bodies, vegetable, sensible and rational. Again certain natural entities participate only one degree, and in them there is only one form, and these are inanimate bodies; vegetating things however

participate two degrees, hence they are constituted by two forms; animals three, men four. Which view declared integrally in this way I do not find; nevertheless authors who taught that there are in man three really distinct souls, if they speak consistently, it is necessary that they embrace the whole discourse made; for by what reason they distinguish three in man, they must also distinguish two in brutes; and by what reason they separate the souls themselves among themselves, they must also distinguish the degree of soul from the common degree of corporeal form; for the same proportion holds for all these. Nor can any other reason of distinction be given except subordination and distinction of degrees. Now they hold that opinion concerning the distinction of three souls Philoponus, I On the Soul, text 91; whom John of Jandun follows, chapter On the Soul, question 12; and Paul the Venetian, in Summa On the Soul, chapter 5. Whose foundations I shall not report in this place, because they almost coincide with those which have been touched upon in reporting the opinions of others.

17. Only in man does there seem to be found a peculiar necessity of several souls, at least two, on account of two principal causes proper to man. One is, because the rational soul is perfectly spiritual and indivisible and maximally distant from the imperfection of matter; and therefore extremes so distant do not seem to be able to be immediately conjoined; therefore some form is necessary by whose mediation they are united. And this reason particularly favors the opinion of Henry treated above, for the rational soul, since it is incorporeal, cannot give corporeal being; therefore neither can it be the form of corporeity. And by the same reason it cannot be vegetative or sensitive form formally; for forms of this kind are material and corruptible; therefore on account of these things some material form is required in man besides the soul, whether it be one or multiple.

18. The Manicheans posited two souls. The other cause is because in man there are contrary operations, for the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; but contrary operations cannot proceed from the same principle, but from

contraries. Ockham uses this argument, who teaches this view, Quodlibet II, question 10, and in 11 he also adds that these souls are distinguished from the form of corporeity, and in brutes he also makes such form distinct from their sensitive soul. Concerning the sensitive and vegetative soul however he denies that they are distinct. In which certainly he does not speak consistently; nor does he declare whether in plants the soul is distinguished from the form of corporeity. The Manicheans also asserted that there are two souls in man, one spiritual placed by the good God, the other however animal contrary to it, and proceeding from a contrary principle, namely the evil God, whom they feigned, as Augustine reported, in the book On Two Souls against the Manicheans, and X Genesis Literally, chapter 13, and the book On True Religion, chapter 9; and that several Catholic Doctors followed this view concerning two souls in man, spiritual and sensual, Jerome testifies, epistle 150 to Hedibius, question 12, treating the place by which they were moved, I to the Thessalonians 5: "May the God of peace sanctify you, that your whole spirit and soul and body may be preserved blameless at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ." To which testimony they joined that of Daniel 3: "Bless the Lord, spirits and souls of the just." The same was held by Philo, in the book That the Worse Lies in Wait for the Better.

19. The adduced view with its explanations is disproved. But this view is not only improbable in philosophical reason, but also not very safe in our faith, as to that part in which it posits several souls in man. And indeed as to that general reason of distinguishing several substantial forms from degrees of things, it is correctly disproved a posteriori from the fact that from that principle it follows that really distinct souls are necessary in man, which is alien to sound doctrine. Then all the reasons by which we proved that the soul is not distinguished in living things from the form of body, a fortiori prove that the addition of a new degree does not suffice for really distinguishing forms.

20. Indeed the reasons made against the first view, by which it was shown that forms are not really distinguished on account of diverse quidditative predicates subordinated among themselves, prove the same, even if one predicate adds a new degree to another, for when those two degrees are conjoined in one and the same thing, one is compared to the other as specific difference to generic, and thus from both one substantial species is constituted as from universal and particular; therefore in reality the degrees or differences as conjoined in such species are not distinguished; therefore neither are the forms, which are principles of such degrees or differences, really distinguished in such substance. Which finally is declared by applying with proportion the reason made above, for if in a horse, for example, there is a vegetative soul, it is necessary that it be contracted through some specific difference, for vegetative soul as such only expresses a generic nature, which is distinguished through various species, as is most evident in trees and plants; but there cannot be in a horse an individual and real soul constituted under the genus of vegetative soul and not under some species of that genus; therefore it is necessary that it be contracted and constituted through some specific difference. Therefore either that difference is contained within the vegetative degree itself, just as the specific difference of some tree, for example a pear tree, remains within the latitude of the vegetative degree; or it is the very difference elevating that soul to the sensitive degree. The first cannot be said, because otherwise that soul as such would constitute some ultimate and lowest species of vegetable thing, which would not be capable of further difference and consequently neither of further soul; nor would that degree be compared to the subsequent as genus to species, but they would be opposed as two ultimate species distinguished from each other; therefore it is necessary to say the second, namely that the vegetative soul according to its generic nature is contracted in the soul of a horse through the very specific degree. From which it is clearly concluded that the vegetative soul in a horse is not really distinct from the sensitive, because no thing can be really

distinguished from the difference through which it is essentially constituted.

21. And this reasoning has the same force in the case of the rational soul, and can be applied in the same manner. For if the sensitive soul, for example, were really distinct from the rational soul in man, it would be specifically contracted within the sensitive grade. Hence it would be a certain irrational and bestial soul which, when separated from the rational soul, either through the intellect or at least in reality through God's power, would truly constitute some brute animal as complete and integral in the species of animal as is a horse. In this manner Augustine correctly states, in book 83 Questions, question 8, that Apollinarius, when he asserted that the Word assumed a sensitive soul without a rational one, actually said that He assumed a certain beast. How therefore could a composite constituted by such a soul be further informed by a rational soul?

22. Furthermore, there is an excellent argument common indeed to all cases, but which is seen more clearly in man and is taken from the subordination and dependence of all human powers and faculties. For from excessive attention to the action of one faculty, for example the intellective, the operation of the senses is impeded, and indeed even nutrition itself. And from the operation of one power, for example the operation of the imagination, the heart is moved and other natural faculties are excited. From this experience we have proven above that there exists a substantial form distinct from accidental faculties, so that there might be one principle in which all faculties are rooted and from which proceeds that sympathy of actions.

23. Moreover, theological arguments could be added here, such as the one taken from those words of Genesis 2: "God formed man from the slime of the earth and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul." For by that spirit which God breathed, there was a rational soul, and through the same soul man was made living and consequently also sensing. Another is from the

Eighth General Synod, which is Constantinople IV, canon 11, which states thus: "It appears that some have come to such a degree of impiety that they dogmatize that men have two souls. Therefore this holy and universal Synod anathematizes such inventors of impiety and similar wise men, since both the Old and New Testament and all the Fathers of the Church assert that man has one rational soul." Hence in the book On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 15, this is also handed down as a certain dogma. But because Ockham says that there is discussion there of two rational souls, so that it may be evident that this is false, I shall cite the words: "Neither do we say there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrian writers write, one animal soul by which the body is animated and mixed with the blood, and another spiritual soul which ministers reason; but we say there is one and the same soul in man, which both vivifies the body by its association and disposes itself by its reason." Augustine has similar statements in On Spirit and Soul, chapter 3; Damascene, book II On Faith, chapter 12. It follows that otherwise, when a man dies, some soul would cease to exist, and Christ dying would have simply released some substance united to the Word. Hence Ockham, to avoid this inconvenience, says that the sensitive soul of Christ was preserved in Christ, either with the rational soul or with the body. But if he understands that it remained united to the body, this is heresy, otherwise that body would not have remained dead, but would sense. If however he understands that it remained separate, he speaks of an unheard-of miracle that a material form should be preserved without matter. Likewise it is unheard of in the Church that two souls of Christ should be separated in the triduum. Therefore it would be rash, not to say erroneous, to assert this.

24. Therefore, when spirit and soul of man are named distinctly in Scripture, they are not distinguished in substance, but in function and office, as Jerome indicates above, and we have declared extensively in volume I, part III, question 6, in Commentary article 2, and disputation XVII, section 4. Indeed the soul itself is often called

by the name of spirit, insofar as it gives life to the body absolutely, as in Ecclesiastes 12: "And the spirit returns to the Lord," etc. This spirit, which is immortal, is elsewhere called soul, namely in Matthew 10: "Do not fear those who kill the body, but cannot kill the soul." And of Christ the Lord it is said in Matthew 27 that He "gave up His spirit," that is, His soul. Hence in the Clementines, the unique text On the Supreme Trinity, it is said that Christ assumed the united parts of our nature, namely body and rational soul.

25. The rational soul, although inextended, is the form of matter. Nor do the arguments made to the contrary have a difficult solution. For to the first, the minor is denied, since although the soul is indivisible and spiritual, it can be immediately united to matter, because it is essentially its act. For it does not matter that matter and the rational soul are very distant from each other in perfection of being, since for union one must not consider distance or proximity in perfection of entity, but proportion and agreement in the mutual respect of act and potency. This sufficient proportion is found between matter and soul, indeed perhaps greater and more perfect than between matter and any other form. Otherwise, even if we imagine matter already informed by any form or by an extended and material soul, the soul would still be disproportionate to be united to it. For as regards extension, that form is as extended as matter; therefore if disproportion arose from this, it is not removed, but rather increased from another source. First, because since that sensitive soul is a substantial and specific act, as has been proven, it is more distant from the rational soul as regards the proportion required for union than soul and matter are, and thus rather impedes than helps toward union. Second, because if a sensitive soul intervened, the intellective would be a pure principle of understanding; but a pure principle of understanding is not apt for informing a body, as we shall show more extensively below when treating of separated intelligences. Therefore, in order that the rational soul be the true form of the body, it is necessary that it itself be the principle not only of intellections, but

also of operations which are exercised through the body; therefore especially of sensitive operations, which are closer to the actions of understanding. This is so necessary that some have doubted whether the soul itself, insofar as it is intellective, informs the body. But there is no reason for doubt, for the rational soul is essentially the form of the body according to its whole self and according to all its grades, which, although distinguished by us in reason, are nevertheless the same thing in the soul in reality. Hence, although from the essence of this soul there do not flow forth intellective powers which are received in the body, nevertheless the same sensitive and indeed vegetative powers flow forth with a certain singular perfection proper to the rational soul and proportioned to minister to the actions of the mind. And this is also an argument that the sensitive soul is the same as the rational in man.

26. How the rational soul is the form of corporeity. From this it is also understood how the rational soul, although it is incorporeal, can be the form of corporeity. For to be the act or form of corporeity is not to be itself corporeal or extended, but to be the form constituting with matter one composite substance capable of quantity. Hence, as I said above in disputation XIII, it is entirely the same thing to be the form of corporeity as to be the substantial form of matter, because from this precisely, that it is the substantial act of matter, there is constituted from both an integral, material and corporeal substance. Therefore, since the rational soul, even if it is indivisible, is the true substantial form of the body, it has whatever is necessary for it to be the form of corporeity. From this it can also be concluded that it also sufficiently contains the intermediate grades, namely the vegetative and sensitive, so that it can formally confer them on the composite, because it cannot contain the extreme grades without these intermediate ones. But the rational soul is frequently said to contain these grades virtually and eminently. This, however, seems to others insufficient for formal causality, although it is sufficient for efficient causality. And thus without doubt it must be said that, just as it is not

of the nature of the form of corporeity that it be corporeal formally, so it is not of the nature of the vegetative and sensitive soul that they be material and extended, but that they be the formal principle of vegetating and sensing, and that they formally constitute a living thing according to these grades of life, which the rational soul truly and formally possesses. It is nevertheless said to contain eminently, by comparison made to the forms of those grades which do not transcend their perfection, because it contains their perfections in a higher manner. Hence, speaking generally, it must be denied that it is of the nature of a vegetative or sensitive form that it be corruptible, or educed from the potency of matter, but it should be added that this is of the nature of a soul which is only vegetative or only sensitive. But in man there is no form which is only vegetative or only sensitive. Therefore there is no form in man educed from the potency of matter. Nor does this hinder, as others object, the natural generation of man, because for this it is not necessary that the form come to be through eduction; otherwise, even if there were a sensitive soul in man educed from the potency of matter, man would not be generated, but that irrational animal constituted through such a soul. Therefore for natural generation it suffices that the union of the soul to the body occur in a natural manner through natural disposition and action.

27. Contrary operations in man. To Ockham's final argument it is answered first that diversity or opposition of operations indicates diversity of proximate faculties, not indeed of forms, as was said above. Then it is said that there can be contrary operations in man in two ways, namely either simultaneously or at different times. The latter can happen not only in the same soul, but also in the same power, as is evident per se. But the former is not true, understood of proper contrariety, for when the will and appetite are simultaneously moved by contrary affections, they tend toward objects under diverse aspects and also in a diverse manner. For if the affection of one is efficacious, that of the other is inefficacious, from which it is rather gathered that these appetites are rooted in the same soul, for the motion of one

retards the motion of the other, if it is in some way repugnant. But if they consent with each other, each becomes easier and more prompt. And these things concern the first chapter and mode of imagining several substantial forms in the same matter.

On Heterogeneous Parts & Their Forms

28. The second mode of holding an opinion about the plurality of forms can be that two substantial forms remain in the same matter or in the same part of it, when one is imperfect and is compared to the other as a disposition preparing the matter and not as a generic and specific form. In this there is a great difference between this mode and the preceding one, because in that mode both forms are essential to the composite, and predicates derived from individual forms are predicated of each other quidditatively and essentially, as that man is animal, etc., which would plainly be repugnant if the forms were distinct. But truly according to this second way, the form which is a disposition to another is not of the essence of the substance composed from matter and the other form, just as such accidental dispositions are not of the essence, but are causes in some way extrinsic.

29. But I find two opinions which seem to pertain to this second chapter. One is that which places in living things alone, in individual dissimilar parts, individual partial forms specifically distinct, disposing toward the integral form, which is one really distinct from all those partial ones. Thus holds Antonius Andreas, VII Metaphysics, question 17; and Paulus Venetus, in Summa On the Soul, chapter 5; Niphus, I On Generation, text 78; and it is usually attributed to the Commentator, because in VI Physics, comment 59, he says that the heart, head, and such parts differ in species; and in II Metaphysics, text 17, where he says that the animal and its parts agree in the form of the whole and differ in their proper forms. And concerning these parts some understand what Aristotle says in II On

the Generation of Animals, chapter 3, that man first lives the life of a plant, then of an animal, finally the life of man. The arguments are chiefly that in these parts there are dispositions not only diverse, but also contrary, and from the same come operations of different natures. Therefore they also have partial forms of different natures. Likewise, because a heterogeneous part when cut off retains the same nature of flesh or bone, and yet the form of the whole does not remain in it; therefore the partial form remains. Third, because these parts differ in species; for this reason they are called heterogeneous or dissimilar parts; but they do not differ in the form of the whole; therefore they differ in partial forms.

30. But this opinion is rightly rejected by all who deny the plurality of forms, whom I shall mention below, and Javellus specially argues against it in VII Metaphysics, question 16. And besides the general arguments which prove the unity of substantial form, it is attacked in this manner. Either we speak of living things having an indivisible soul, or a divisible one coextensive with matter. If the discussion concerns the latter, it can easily be granted that in diverse heterogeneous parts there are diverse heterogeneous parts of the form; for indeed in a tree that part of the form which is in the leaf is not of the same nature as that which is in the fruit, etc. Nevertheless those forms are partial and apt to be united and continued among themselves, and therefore they compose one integral form of the whole. Therefore it is false to imagine another total form superadded to these partial forms and again informing all those parts; for what purpose is such a form, or by what probable indication is it shown? For whatever is in the whole and in individual parts, as regards accidents and operations, is sufficiently preserved with those partial forms alone united among themselves, or (which is the same thing) with the sole integral form composed from those parts. Furthermore I inquire whether that total form is indivisible or extended. The first cannot be said of these material forms; and if it is said of any, this pertains to the second member proposed above. Therefore that form

will be extended and composed of parts; concerning which I again ask whether its parts, which correspond to diverse heterogeneous parts of the body, are entirely similar and of the same nature among themselves or in some way diverse and dissimilar. The first cannot be said, especially speaking consistently in that opinion, for against that proceed the arguments on which it relies, namely how a form, which in itself is of the same nature, should require in diverse parts diverse and contrary dispositions, especially since it is not whole in individual parts, but according to diverse parts which among themselves are entirely similar. Likewise, how does that form have diverse actions in diverse parts? For if this is attributed to diverse dispositions, therefore diverse accidental dispositions suffice for that diversity of actions, since the actions themselves are also accidental; therefore it is superfluous to imagine in individual parts a double substantial form, namely partial and total, of which one should be a disposition to the other. And furthermore against this mode of multiplying forms will proceed a fortiori what we shall say in the following member.

31. The forms of all brutes are divisible. Therefore in those living things which have indivisible forms, there can be seen some greater reason for doubt, which indeed has place only in the composition of man. For although there is some controversy concerning the souls of perfect animals, I nevertheless suppose it is more probable that no material form is truly and properly indivisible. For a form can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because, although it consists of parts, nevertheless either they cannot be separated naturally, as in celestial forms, or they cannot be so separated that when separated they are preserved, but as soon as they are divided, they are corrupted. And perhaps in this way the souls of perfect animals are indivisible; but this indivisibility has no bearing on the matter we are treating, because it suffices that the soul itself consists of heterogeneous parts and that the whole arises from their inseparable union, so that it is superfluous to fashion other partial forms in individual parts, as the argument made above proves. For it

proceeds equally, whether that form is divisible or indivisible in the said sense, as is evident per se. Therefore in another way a form is called indivisible properly and rigorously, because it consists of no parts, which must be both whole in the whole and whole in any part, and in this way we think that the rational soul alone is indivisible; although the arguments which will be made concerning it can be applied to any other, if anyone should think it to be indivisible.

32. One form in the heterogeneous parts of the human body. That such a form does not require diverse partial forms in the parts of its organic body is proven first from the eminence and perfection of such a form, which, since it is in itself an indivisible act, per se primarily regards, as its adequate receptive subject, that whole consisting of all those parts diversely disposed partially so that from them arises the integral disposition consonant with the perfection of such a form; therefore also in such a composite such partial forms are superfluous. The consequence is evident, both because the indivisible form itself is sufficient for fully and perfectly actuating any part of that matter, even if it is variously disposed; and also because those partial forms do not prevent the indivisible form itself from regarding all those parts variously disposed as composing its adequate receptive subject; nor do they prevent that same form from being the radical and principal principle of all actions which are exercised through those various members; in which genus it is also a sufficient principle of them; therefore those partial forms are superfluous.

33. Second, because it is repugnant that one substantial form should be the proximate and permanent disposition to another substantial form. Indeed one form can be a remote and transient disposition (so to speak); thus the form of blood is a disposition and as it were a way to the form of flesh, remote however and transient, because they do not remain together, but flesh comes from blood as from transient matter. Similarly the form of the embryo is a disposition to the form of man, and in the same sense must be taken what we referred above from Aristotle, namely that man first lives the

life of a plant, then the life of an animal, etc. In this he signified the process of generation from the imperfect to the perfect through various dispositions, until the introduction of the ultimate form is reached; nevertheless the more imperfect form always recedes when the more perfect arrives. But that one substantial form should be the ultimate disposition to another, remaining simultaneously with it, can in no way happen; because each substantial form gives being absolutely and constitutes a complete essence in the genus of substance; therefore one form cannot be such a disposition to another. Nor does it matter if someone says this is true of total forms, but not of partial ones, for if in all parts of the human body besides the soul there are such forms, from all those partial forms will arise one integral form distinct from the rational soul. For just as all parts of matter are united among themselves and compose one integral body, so all those partial forms will be united among themselves, just as the parts of matter which they inform; therefore they will compose one integral form constituted in its proper genus and species; therefore it cannot be a disposition to another total form of the same matter.

34. From this I argue third, for either that form composed of partials is a vegetative or sensitive soul, or it is the form of something inanimate. The latter cannot be said consistently, otherwise these partial forms would not serve the proper vital functions of individual members, although they are said to be posited chiefly for this cause. And furthermore against such a form proceed all the things which were said above concerning the form of mixture or corporeity. And in a similar way, if such a form is said to be a soul, against that position proceed all the things adduced above against those who posit two or three souls in man. Nor does it matter if someone contends that one is not composed from those partials, for then concerning each partial form taken per se, as of flesh or bone, the same argument will proceed; because indeed in this consideration each of those forms is called partial only in name, since it is not a true part of some total form; therefore in itself it will be a certain integral form, concerning which it

can be asked whether it is a soul or not, and the argument made will proceed.

35. And similarly it can be inquired whether these partial forms or the integral one composed from them remains in the body when the rational soul departs, or perishes. If the first is said, it follows first quite consistently that that body remains alive when the rational soul departs; for (as I said) those forms, or that which arises from them, must be a soul, otherwise it would serve nothing for the operations of life. Likewise, it follows that a part cut off and joined to the human body is univocally flesh or bone, etc., which is against Aristotle, VII Metaphysics, text 56, and more clearly I On the Generation of Animals, chapter 19, and I On the Soul, chapter 1. If however all such partial forms depart when the soul departs, first they are imagined without any indication or necessity. And then follow the theological inconveniences which we inferred above, namely that in Christ's death some substantial form was released by the Word or remained separated simultaneously with the rational soul.

36. How Plato posited several forms in man, and refutation. Add that Aristotle, in I On the Soul, text 91 and following, professedly attacks the opinion of Plato, who posited several souls in diverse parts of the body. But there is the same argument concerning many partial forms. It is true that Plato only posited diverse souls as it were partial in diverse parts, but not then one integral one in the whole; but this mode of positing several does not pertain to the present disputation, because indeed according to that, several forms are not posited in the same part of matter. But it is evident that it is entirely false, because from that it follows that the rational soul does not inform the human body, but some part of it, and consequently it follows that it is not the principle of all vital acts of man, which is repugnant to sound doctrine, which defines that the rational soul is the true form of the body. And above it was also shown from the connection of these operations that their rootedness in one principle is gathered. Finally, Aristotle's argument is what pertains most to the matter; for he thus concludes:

either those souls informing diverse parts are united in one soul, or not. If they are not united, therefore they do not compose per se one thing. But if they are united in one soul, or are contained by one as it were common to all in one composite, that one suffices, and the others are falsely and superfluously multiplied; but this argument proceeds equally concerning any partial forms whatsoever.

37. The solution to the arguments of the contrary opinion is evident from what has been said. To the first it is answered that those various dispositions of organic parts complete one integral disposition of one total form, whether divisible or indivisible, as has been explained. But as regards the operations of these parts, if the discussion concerns merely natural and transient actions, such as heating, cooling, etc., these proceed proximately from the primary qualities, by which these parts are diversely disposed and affected. But if the discussion concerns vital operations, such as attracting, expelling, touching, seeing, etc., these proceed proximately from diverse vital faculties, which sometimes exist in the same, sometimes in diverse parts of the body; but the radical principle of all is one and the same form, because it is the universal principle containing all these things virtually. And therefore because of these dispositions or operations it is not necessary to multiply partial forms, especially since, with those posited, it is necessary to confess that the superior and total form informs those parts and requires in them those various dispositions, and can through them exercise those various operations.

38. Whether a cut-off part, if united again, does this substantially. To the second it is answered by denying the antecedent, for in a heterogeneous part that is cut off the same form which was there before does not remain, and therefore a severed hand is equivocally a hand, as Aristotle said. But it is usually objected against this, because such a cut-off part, if within a brief time it is again joined to the whole according to the same part from which it was cut off, is truly and substantially united and lives as before; therefore it retained the same form, otherwise it could not again be informed by it, because

there is no return from privation to habit. But this reply has the same difficulty in every opinion, because it cannot be denied that that part through division lost the information of the total form, for example of the rational soul; if therefore it is afterwards again united and informed by it, there occurs a return from privation to habit. But if it is denied that it is again informed by the rational soul, by the same reasoning we shall deny that it is again truly united. Hence Soncinas, VIII Metaphysics, question 10, to 7, thinks it more probable that perfect physical union of such a part never again occurs. But to the experience, which is said to exist that such a part again lives and senses, it will be answered according to this opinion by denying that there is sensation in the part itself, but in neighboring parts, just as in bones or teeth there seems to be a sensation of pain from the proximity of other parts. But as regards nourishment and conservation of temperament, it will be said to occur through juxtaposition. But because these things are difficult to believe, it is perhaps more probable that that part is again informed by the rational soul, nor is it inconvenient from that partial and as it were momentary privation to return to habit, because the form remained integral in itself, and the dispositions which were in such a part toward that numbered form remained the same, and in that small delay they were also little diminished, and therefore it is not inconvenient that the same form should immediately return to that part of matter.

39. Whether heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species. To the third it can be answered by denying the assumption, namely that heterogeneous parts differ in substantial species, but it suffices that they differ accidentally, whence they are called dissimilar because of the diversity of dispositions. Nevertheless in living things having extended souls, I think it more probable that among the parts of the soul itself which inform diverse organic parts there is some greater diversity than exists among the parts of a homogeneous form, and therefore in the substance itself there is some diversity among these parts, which will rightly be called specific partiality. But in the human

form there is special difficulty how it informs these parts, and according to the nature of dispositions is diversely united to them. But this matter pertains to the science concerning the soul.

On the Forms of the Elements: Whether they Remain in the Mixture

40. The second opinion, pertaining also to this second chapter, is that of Avicenna, the Commentator, and others, who say that in all mixed bodies the forms of the elements remain; for it does not seem possible to believe that they remain for any other purpose than to serve as dispositions to the form of the mixed body. This opinion is held by Avicen., I Sufficient., c. 10; and Comment., I de Generat., c. de Mixtione, and III de Caelo, text. 67. These authors differ, for the former posits that the substantial forms of the elements are indivisible, and therefore affirms that they remain in the mixed body integral and substantially perfect; the latter, however, thinks that those forms are capable of being intensified and diminished, and therefore says they remain in the mixed body in a diminished state, according to the proportion of their qualities. For he thinks that these forms of the elements are so imperfect that they are like intermediates between qualities and perfect substantial forms; on account of which they are perhaps called qualities by Plato in the Timaeus, and therefore they imitate qualities in gradual latitude, according to which they can be intensified and diminished. This opinion, as thus explained, is followed by Niphus, I de Gener., text. 118, and VIII Metaph., disp. IV, and XI Metaph., disp. ult.; Zimara, Theorem. 48. Many physicians have also followed this same opinion, as can be seen in Thom. de Garvo, in Sum. medicin., lib. I, tract. I, q. 1; and especially Galen., in II Method., c. 2, and lib. de Substantia naturali, ad finem; and among theologians the same opinion has been followed by Aureol., In II, dist. 15, as Capreol. and Gregor. report there.

41. The opinion is explained in various ways. This opinion can be understood in various ways. First, that the forms of the elements remain in different extremely minute particles of matter. And in this way Avicenna posited that such forms remain in the mixed body, and perhaps he wanted the form of the mixed body to inform all those particles and to unite them among themselves, otherwise he could not preserve substantial mixture, but only mixture by juxtaposition, as is self-evident. For each of those particles would be distinguished not only by matter and form, but also by quantity; therefore also by place, for they could not penetrate each other in place; therefore they would be said to be mixed only by juxtaposition, like water and wine, while they remain integral in their substances; nevertheless, the individual particles would not be mixed, and consequently neither would the whole be substantially mixed nor would it be one per se, because the parts would not be connected per se; whence they would easily be dispersed by mutual action or local motion. Therefore another proper form of the mixed body is necessary, different from the forms of the elements, as we shall show again below against Aureolus. But this is also impossible. First, because the form of the mixed body and the form of an element require different and incompatible dispositions, to omit the general arguments against the plurality of forms. Second, because since all parts of the mixed body, especially in homogeneous things, have the same temperament of primary qualities, no reason can be given why in one part of the matter of the mixed body there should be the form of fire, in another that of water, etc. This reasoning also proceeds in heterogeneous things; for any heterogeneous part consists of homogeneous parts and is mixed. Third, because if in parts disposed in the same way there remain diverse forms of the elements, it is a sign that that form in such a part is not a disposition to the form of the mixed body, since in a similar part it can exist with a contrary substantial form of the mixed body; therefore it could exist equally well or better, even if no form of an element existed in such a part of

matter, provided that there be there a proportioned temperament of primary qualities, which also cannot depend on the form of such an element, since in another similar part it is said to exist with a contrary form. From which it is also concluded that such a form is irrelevant to every action and conservation of that part of the mixed body in which it is said to exist; and therefore from no effect or natural sign can it be gathered that the forms of the elements remain in this way in the mixed body.

42. In another way that opinion can be understood, namely, that all the forms of the elements simultaneously inform any part of the matter of the mixed body, and then the form of the mixed body supervenes, also informing all that matter. And this way contains so many absurdities that for this reason it seems to have been asserted by no one; for first it follows that formally repugnant forms exist simultaneously in the same part of matter in their integral and perfect being; for the forms of the elements formally fight among themselves; for, if their dispositions are formally repugnant, how will the forms themselves not be? Otherwise, how will one element be generated from another? Or why will the generation of one be the corruption of another, if their forms are not repugnant in matter? Second, if such forms do not have their proper dispositions in their proper degree, and consequently neither their proper actions, they can contribute nothing to the form of the mixed body; therefore they are not dispositions to it. Indeed, it is impossible that the same form should postulate in the same part of matter dispositions entirely repugnant and in their perfect being, like the highest heat and the highest cold; but the substantial forms of water and fire are no less repugnant to each other, especially in their perfect being. Third, the general arguments usually made against the plurality of forms work most strongly against this opinion, because it posits in the same part of matter several specific forms sufficient per se to constitute a supposit having its own being simpliciter and requiring very repugnant dispositions; for the form of earth postulates maximum density; but

the form of fire maximum rarity; the latter intense heat, but the form of water, intense cold; how therefore can it happen that such integral and perfect forms simultaneously inform the same part of matter?

43. The forms of the elements are most perfectly substantial. In a third way this opinion can be understood as the Commentator explained it, namely, that all the forms of the elements are in the whole matter of the mixed body and in all its parts, but refracted (as he says) and in a diminished degree, and then the whole matter thus affected and disposed by those forms is informed by the form of the mixed body. In this opinion, first, what the Commentator supposes is usually attacked, namely, that the forms of the elements are not perfectly substantial, but intermediate between accidental and substantial. Against this St. Thomas argues, I de Gener., text. 84, because it is impossible to give an intermediate between substance and accident, both because there is no intermediate between contradictories, but substance and accident are distinguished by immediate contradiction, and also because an intermediate is between extremes of the same genus, but substance and accident are of different genera. Then we can add that the substantial form of fire and of any element is sufficient per se to actuate matter, so that it constitutes or conserves it in being, and to constitute with it one supposit which is properly and univocally substance; therefore such a form is as properly and univocally substantial as any other. And this very thing was confirmed above, when we showed that substantial forms are given.

44. Intensification is repugnant to substantial forms. But if perhaps the Commentator does not deny this, but calls them intermediate only because among substantial forms they have the least perfection, whence it happens that in some properties they can have similarity with accidental forms, against this, omitting the controversy about the manner of speaking, I show second that it is false to attribute to them similarity with accidental forms in this condition of intensification and diminution, because this condition is so proper to accidents or qualities that it directly repugnates substantial form qua

such; if therefore the forms of the elements are truly and properly substantial, as has been shown, they cannot be similar to accidents in this condition. The antecedent is proved first from the Philosopher, in Praedicament., c. de Substant., saying that substance does not receive more and less; but if the substantial form of water were intensified and diminished, truly, just as water is more or less cold, so it would be more or less water.

45. Second, St. Thomas argues, 1, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, because the substantial being of any thing consists in the indivisible, and every addition or subtraction varies the species, just as in numbers, as is said VIII Metaph., text. 10. But this reasoning can suffer calumny, because by similar reasoning it would be proved that quality cannot be intensified and diminished, since it is also true in accidental forms that their essences consist in the indivisible and that their species are like numbers, and consequently that any subtraction and addition varies the species; but this should be understood of essential and formal addition, not of intensifying addition; therefore the same could be answered concerning substantial forms. Nevertheless, it is answered that there is a different reason for substantial and accidental form; for the former is what first constitutes the essence of a thing simpliciter, and therefore it is necessary that it be entirely indivisible and invariable, as long as it remains in the same matter. This is declared a posteriori from that effect from which we gather above that substantial forms are given, namely from the reduction of water to its pristine coldness; for if the substantial form of water were capable of diminution, certainly it would be diminished when the coldness is diminished, because just as the form depends on the disposition, so the intensification of the form depends on the intensification of the disposition; therefore it would be impossible for water afterwards to reduce itself to its pristine state by intrinsic power, because a diminished form cannot intensify itself; nor does it have another prior principle from which that intensification might emanate. Therefore, so that water, however much heated, can, with extrinsic agents removed,

restore itself from within to its connatural state, it is necessary that it remain integral and perfect in the nature of water, and consequently that the very formal constitutive principle of water remain untouched (so to speak) as long as it is not entirely corrupted. And in this sense we say that it is of the nature of substantial form to be invariable and immutable in its entity, when it remains essentially the same and in the same matter, because it is the radical principle of all properties, and constitutes the first essence of the thing.

46. And it is confirmed because for this reason, as the Philosopher testifies, V Phys., and I de Gener., the substantial corruption or generation of elements does not happen successively with the alteration itself, but in a moment at the end of the alteration, when the sufficient disposition is completed, because, namely, the substantial form is not diminished nor taken away by parts, but all at once; but if it were capable of being intensified and diminished, certainly it would be introduced successively, and similarly expelled; indeed, as often as water is heated by fire, so many degrees of the form of fire would be introduced into the water as of heat, which is incredible. Add that if the forms of the elements can thus be intensified and diminished, why also would not the forms of mixed bodies be intensified and diminished according to the intensification and diminution of simple forms? especially since these are said to be required for those as necessary dispositions. For example, if the form of gold requires in its matter six degrees of the form of fire and two of water, to be in its connatural state, if by contrary action those degrees of the form of fire are further diminished in the gold and the form of water is intensified, why would not the form of gold also recede from its natural perfection and be diminished in its very entity? Certainly no sufficient reason can be given; for that it be more perfect, is not enough; for from this alone it follows that the degrees of its latitude would be more perfect. It must therefore be said that it is of the nature of substantial form to have or constitute an essence indivisible

intensively, and therefore this equally pertains to the forms of the elements as to the rest.

47. The forms of all the elements can in no way be in the same matter. Third, this opinion must be attacked principally from the thing we are now treating, because it is impossible for so many substantial forms to be simultaneously in the same matter. For, although they are said to be diminished, nevertheless each one, if it is substantial, gives being simpliciter and constitutes a true substance and substantial supposit; but it cannot be understood that one supposit is simultaneously in four or five distinct species, and that there are many individuals of diverse substantial species consisting of the same matter. We shall explain this reasoning more fully below. It is added moreover against Averroes that, if the forms of the elements in diminished degrees filling the latitude remain simultaneously in the same matter, therefore the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by them and mixture is also sufficiently accomplished from them alone; therefore it is both superfluous and impossible that a new mixed form be added to all those forms.

48. The form of the mixed body is distinct from those of the elements. Whence Aureolus (as Gregor. reports above) said that the form of the mixed body is not some simple form, but only that commingling or aggregation from the forms of the elements in diminished being. But how absurd this opinion is, is self-evident; for from it follows that mixed substances are not true substances one per se. Then it follows that animals, even man himself, do not have one simple form. Finally it follows that all mixed bodies do not differ substantially and essentially, but only according to more and less, nor do they have properties or actions of a more perfect nature than are the qualities and actions of the elements. Therefore the very properties and faculties of mixed bodies evidently indicate proper substantial forms of a more noble nature than are the forms of the elements.

49. And hence, turning the argument around, it is concluded that those forms of the elements simultaneously conjoined in the

same matter and as it were supposed under the form of the mixed body, are superfluous, even if by impossibility they otherwise did not repugn, because both for the being of matter and for the substantial being of the composite, and for every physical action which can be known by experiment concerning such a composite, the form of the mixed body suffices with the faculties that flow from it and the temperament of primary qualities by which the matter is disposed. This temperament indeed, although it is not some simple quality virtually containing the primary ones, as Avicenna thought, but is formally composed of the primary ones in diminished being, as the true and common opinion holds, which is treated extensively in I de Generat., nevertheless does not require the substantial forms of the elements formally existing there, but the form of the mixed body suffices, to which such temperament is connatural and has the power and efficacy of conserving or recuperating it, if extrinsic impediments are removed.

50. And as to this, the elements are rightly said to remain, as to substantial forms, virtually in the substantial form of the mixed body, but as to accidental forms formally, although they do not remain integral, but diminished. This Scot. declared well In II, dist. 15, whom Gabr. and Gregor. follow, there; Aegid., II de Generat., and others, and is undeservedly attacked by Caiet., I, q. 76, a. 4, in fine; for it does not repugn the doctrine of St. Thomas; for nowhere did he deny this, but rather indicates it in the sense explained by us, Opusc. 33. Nor is there any difficulty in this, because the form of the mixed body is not said to contain the forms of the elements in the genus of formal cause or according to the total perfection eminently contained, as Cajetan seems to have thought, but only according to a certain participation and agreement, as has been declared.

51. From these things, therefore, it is sufficiently concluded that it does not follow from the mixture of elements that there are several substantial forms in the mixed body, because the forms of the elements do not remain in the mixed body formally, but only virtually,

which is the opinion of Aristotle, as I shall show below, and commonly received, as is clear from Alexander, Philoponus, St. Thomas, in I de Gener.; and the same St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4, ad 4, and q. 5 de Potent., a. 7, and other scholastics, In II, dist. 12, especially Caprolus and Gregor., loc. cit.; and Scot., q. 1; Hervaeus, tract. de Pluralit. form., q. 15; Aegid., Quodl. IV, q. 11; Soncin., X Metaph., q. 27, and lib. XII, q. 68. But the discourse is about the substantial forms of the elements; for accidental ones remain formally, but this is irrelevant to the present question. Whence philosophers who denied substantial forms in the elements, consequently said that elements remain formally in the mixed body, and in this way Galen proceeded, for, as we saw in sect. 1 of this disputation, he does not acknowledge substantial forms in the elements, but only primary qualities. Whence, as far as pertains to the present matter, he does not contradict us, but rather favors us. See him lib. I Methodi, c. 2, and libello de Substant. natural. facult., somewhat from the beginning, and lib. VIII de Placit. Hippocr.

52. Objection. But they object to us from Aristotle, who, I de Generat., c. 10, defines mixture as the union of miscible things altered; since therefore elements when mixed are not corrupted, but only altered; and thus in that whole chapter Aristotle often repeats that miscible things are not corrupted; that if either perished, they could not be mixed; for things that do not exist (he says) are not received into admixture. Second, the same Aristotle, V Metaph., c 3, defines element as that from which something comes to be, so that it is present in it and into which there is ultimate resolution; therefore if elements do not remain in the mixed body, they are not elements, nor will the mixed body be able to be resolved into them, which is false and contrary to experience; for when wood is burned, we experience smoke, and watery moisture, and ashes, and fire proceeding from it. Nor is it sufficient to say that all these things are contained in wood virtually or potentially, otherwise water would also be said to be mixed, at least from air and water, both because it has in itself a certain quality of air, and also because when water is heated, airy vapor

exhales from it. And it is confirmed; for from virtual containment alone it follows only that elements can be generated from the mixed body; but this is not sufficient, for a mixed body can also be generated from any element, and one element from another. Whence Aristotle, III de Caelo, c. 3, says that elements are contained in wood and flesh, because they are manifestly separated from them; but on the contrary flesh and wood are not contained in fire, because they cannot be separated from it. Therefore separation is one thing, generation another; therefore separation requires formal containment. Third, Aristotle says, I de Caelo, c. 7, that a mixed body is moved with the motion of the predominating element; therefore it remains in it. Fourth, lib III de Caelo, text. 67, and II de Partib. anim., c. 1, and IV Meteor., c. 12, he says that elements are the matter of the mixed body.

53. Aristotle's opinion: elements remain only virtually in the mixed body. The definition of mixture is elucidated. It is answered that Aristotle, III de Caelo, c. 3, asserts disjunctively that an element is present potentially or actually in the mixed body; for this, he says, in which way it is, is still ambiguous; but the question which he left undecided in that place he resolves I de Generat., c. 10, when he expressly says that those things which are received into mixture are in a certain way and in a certain way are not; for actually (he says) they are not, but virtually or potentially they remain, and in this he constitutes the difference between mixture and other mutations; and II de Partibus animalium, c. 1, he says that the first composition of bodies is that which is made from those beginnings which some call elements; I mean earth, water, air and fire, but perhaps it can better be said to be made from the powers[5] of the elements; for humidity, and dryness, heat, and cold, are the matter of composite bodies. Therefore concerning Aristotle's opinion there is sufficient certainty. When therefore Aristotle says that mixture is the union of miscible things altered, he said altered rather than corrupted to denote that they do

[5] virtutibus, Salamanca 1597, Paris 1861; virtutis, Madrid 1960 (BHF, t. IV, p. 764).

not entirely perish, but remain virtually and according to qualities. Nor did Aristotle in that chapter deny that in true mixture miscible things are corrupted; nor could he deny this, for since through mixture a new substantial form of the mixed body is introduced, it is necessary that substantial corruption of the miscible things occur, because the generation of one is always the corruption of another. Nevertheless he said they do not entirely perish, because they remain virtually.

54. The description of element is explained. To the second it can be answered, first, that that definition of element does not pertain to those simple bodies which are commonly called elements, but to the first principles from which a natural thing is composed. This opinion is favored by Averroes, V Metaph., com. 4, saying that prime matter is properly an element, but simple bodies only by human opinion, for because the ancient philosophers did not know any other matter except these simple bodies, therefore they called them elements. And thus Aristotle, II lib. de Partib. animal., c. 1, does not call them elements absolutely, but what some call elements; and he speaks in the same way II de Generat., c. 1, and in other places. And this can be confirmed from that particle of the definition of element, namely, to be that from which something is first composed. But these bodies are not those from which something is first composed, since they themselves are composed from other prior things. Also Aristotle, in the same place, says that an element ought to be something indivisible; but these bodies are not indivisible, as is evident. And according to this opinion it is easily answered to the argument that it is not incongruous that that particle of the definition of element, namely that it is present, does not properly pertain to these bodies, because they are not properly elements. Second, lest we seem to stick only in words, we admit that the name and definition of element properly pertains to these bodies; indeed St. Thom., V Metaph., lect. 4, wants them to be more properly elements than matter or form. For he wants it to be of the nature of an element to be directly and properly in some

species. But I do not see why this should pertain to the property of that word and why it should not suffice for an element to be something partial or incomplete in its species. Therefore element in Latin seems to be the same as principle of some thing, which in its order is first in composition and last in resolution, and therefore also it is of the nature of an element that it be indivisible, not simpliciter and in every way, but in its order and latitude. And similarly it is of the nature of an element that it be present not always formally, nor always only virtually, but in a way accommodated to its composition. Thus therefore the four elements truly participate in the nature of an element, because in that genus of composition by which one body can be formed from many bodies, they are first, because they do not consist of other bodies, and the rest consist of them. And similarly they are simple and indivisible, because they are not resolvable into more bodies. Finally they are also present in that way which is necessary for that genus of composition which is made through mixture. And thus Aristotle, III de Caelo, c. 3, expressly places under disjunction in the description of element, that it be present potentially or actually.

55. The name of element properly pertains to prime matter. Sometimes it is attributed to form. Whence it does not prevent that prime matter be prior to these bodies and formally be present or remain in its composite; for from this alone it happens that matter can also truly and properly be called an element, but for another reason and perhaps a prior one, insofar as matter is prior in composition and simpler, as St. Thomas noted, III de Caelo, lect. 8, where he seems to retract the opinion which he held in V Metaph., as Soncin. noted, V Metaph., post q. 9, circa text. 4 Aristot., who also lib. XII, q. 27, ad 1, adds that form can be called an element, and thus Aristotle names it, lib. XII Metaph., c. 4; and St. Thom., cit. loco. For, although the name of element seems to be attributed principally to the material principle, as is clear from common usage and from the property of that particle of the definition from which something comes to be, nevertheless,

speaking more broadly, it extends to any part, just as also the whole is said to be composed of its parts, both formal and material. Indeed for this reason any parts, if they are considered absolutely under the common notion of parts, are said to have the nature of matter with respect to the whole. For this reason, therefore, any part, if in its order it be first and indivisible, can be called an element.

56. From which it follows, to respond to the other part of the argument, that it is not of the nature of an element that the composite or mixed body can be resolved into it in such a way that in reality the element is conservable separated from the thing containing the element; for in this way not every natural composite can be resolved into matter and form. And by parity of reasoning, it is not necessary that the mixed body be resolvable into the same individual elements from which perhaps the mixed body was made, but it suffices that it be resolved into similar ones; which sometimes will happen, if the efficient causes are accommodated and suitable for making that resolution; often, however, it does not happen thus, but the whole mixed body is converted into some element, especially into earth. Wherefore, although the experience which is brought forward in the argument were true, it would conclude nothing, because it is not necessary that those things which seem to come from wood when it is burned, formally preceded in it, but virtually according to some less remote disposition, by reason of which all those things are generated anew; but in reality those things are not elements, but imperfect mixed bodies, because neither is smoke air nor ash earth.

57. In mixed bodies there are sometimes imbibed smaller corpuscles. Add also that in these mixed bodies there are often several substances accidentally mixed through pores or through division and interposition of parts, which substances afterwards through the action of some agent are not so much generated anew as separated, as happens in the concoction of wine and in the corruption of blood outside the veins, and perhaps thus also it happens in that action of fire on wood, although it can also happen that not the same substances

which were there are separated, but others which are easily generated from them according to their diverse dispositions. But this mixing of substances is irrelevant to the matter we are treating, because, although there are several forms there, they are nevertheless in diverse matters and make diverse composites, although locally conjoined.

58. How a mixed body is moved by the predominating element. Nor finally does what was inferred in that argument follow from this, that one element is resolved into another or consists of another; for, although water agrees with air in humidity, nevertheless it does not have that participated from air, but from itself and from its simple nature. But when through heating humid vapor exhales from water, water is not resolved into air; for that vapor is not air, but a certain imperfect mixed body; but when it happens that water is transmuted into air, it is not resolution into miscible things, but a certain generation and corruption. Whence elements are far otherwise in a mixed body than one element in another; for this is true only in passive potency; but that not only in this way, but also virtually and by a certain participation of active potency; for in this way Aristotle must be understood when he says that elements are in the mixed body actually or potentially. And hence also the solution to the third testimony is clear. For, so that a mixed body be moved with the motion of the predominating element, it suffices that it contain that virtually and participate more in its qualities than in those of another. Finally elements are said to be matter of the mixed body passing away formally, but remaining virtually. Whence the same Aristotle, II de Generat., c. 5, denies that elements are the matter of natural things. For if air (he says) remained, it would not be generation, but alteration. It is evident therefore, on account of the disposition of one form to another, that it never happens that several substantial forms are conjoined in the same matter.

Whether Two Non-Subordinated Forms Can Simultaneously Inform the Same Matter

59. Matter can be informed by two forms divinely. There remained to be said about the third way of imagining two substantial forms in the same matter without any relationship between themselves or with respect to some third form to which they dispose, but by accidental concomitance alone, as whiteness and sweetness are related in the same subject. But it is not necessary to dwell on attacking this way; first, because I find no opinion in this matter; for no philosopher (that I know) has hitherto said that in this way and naturally two substantial forms can simultaneously inform the same matter. But I say naturally, because concerning absolute power I do not think it implies contradiction, whether that matter be placed in diverse places with diverse forms, which I showed elsewhere can happen[6]; or whether it have both forms in the same place; for unity of place adds no special repugnance. Second, because from those forms existing simultaneously in the same matter, truly one essence nor one substance would be composed, because neither would one form be of the essence of the composite made from matter and another form, nor conversely. Whence, if we imagine one to be the form of gold and another of wood, neither would wood be gold nor gold wood, because essentially diverse forms are not predicated of each other, even concretely, except by reason of the same supposit in which they agree; but those forms would not agree in the same supposit, but only in the same matter, with which, just as they would make diverse natures, so also diverse composites; I exclude other miracles. Whence, although matter could be said to be informed by the form of wood and gold, nevertheless wood would not be gold, because wood is not matter, nor is gold matter. And thus, even admitting that case, there would not be given two formal causes of one effect, which we are now investigating, but each would constitute its own effect, which would have only one formal cause.

[6] III tom., III p., disp. XLVIII, sect. 3.

60. Why naturally the same matter cannot be actuated by several substantial forms simultaneously. From this, however, the natural repugnance is understood on account of which such forms cannot simultaneously inform such matter; for that one and the same matter successively compose essences even specifically distinct with many forms, is not incongruous, indeed it happens naturally, because it is itself indifferent to any form and can be actuated by any. But that the same portion of matter simultaneously compose diverse essences with diverse forms, repugns the natures of things for many reasons. First, because the potency of matter is sufficiently actuated by one form and its dependence is sufficiently terminated. Second, because diverse forms require naturally incompatible dispositions, which is a sign that also their natural effects are naturally incompatible. Third, because matter serves form for its natural motions and actions; but the same matter cannot simultaneously minister to distinct forms, which have diverse natural inclinations. Fourth, because otherwise, if matter could in this way be under distinct forms, by the same reasoning it could be under any multitude of them to infinity, because things which are per accidens can be multiplied to infinity; nor can greater repugnance be assigned in three than in two, and so concerning any number. But this is both absurd per se, and repugns the end and institution of matter, for thus it would be unfit for the generations and corruptions of things. Whence this very fact, that the generation of one is naturally the corruption of another, sufficiently declares that matter is naturally incapable of several forms.

The True Opinion & Conclusion of the Entire Question

61. It remains therefore that the most true opinion is that which asserts that there is only one formal cause of one composite substance, and that in one natural composite there is only one substantial form. This opinion is held by St. Thomas, I, q. 76, a. 4; and

there by Cajetan and all the Thomists; extensively by Capreolus, In II, dist. 15; and Ferrari, II cont. Gent., c. 58; Soncinas, VIII Metaph., q. 7. Likewise Gregory holds it, In II, dist. 17, q. 2; Giles, II de Anim., q. 6, and tract. de Pluralitate formarum; Hervaeus also treats extensively de Pluralit. formar.; Marsilius, I de Gener., q. 6. From Aristotle, however, we have nothing express concerning this matter; but from his principles this opinion is clearly gathered; for he never attributes to a natural composite anything but one form, and in this sense he assigns three principles of a natural thing, namely matter, privation, and form; for this reason he says that whenever one thing is generated another is corrupted and conversely; he says furthermore that substantial form is the proper, per se and immediate act of matter, and therefore from these things a per se unity is maximally made, as is taken from II de Anim., text. 7, and VII Metaph., text. 49.

62. The arguments can easily be drawn from what has been said in the refutation of other opinions. The first is taken from a sufficient enumeration of parts, because in matter there cannot be several forms essentially subordinated as act and potency, nor ordered as disposition and form, nor even entirely by concomitance without any order among themselves; but besides these modes no other can be devised; therefore in no way can several substantial formal causes concur to the same effect.

63. The second argument is taken from the sufficiency of any substantial form; for every substantial form is necessarily such that by itself alone it suffices to constitute one substantial supposit complete in some ultimate species of substance; therefore it not only does not require another form as a co-cause of that effect, but indeed it cannot even admit such. The antecedent is established from what has been said; for it has been proven that every substantial form must necessarily be constituted in some ultimate species of substantial form, and consequently it belongs to its nature that it give being simply and completely up to the ultimate notion in the genus of substance. The consequent is proven, because either the second form

would come to the composite as constituted by the prior form and immediately actuating it, or it would come simultaneously and as it were concomitantly to the matter itself. The first is repugnant to the nature of substantial form, which per se regards substantial potency; but a complete substance is no longer in substantial potency, but only accidental; for of this it is maximally true what Aristotle said above, namely that what comes to a being in act does not come per se, but per accidens. The second is repugnant both to the substantial forms themselves and to the capacity of matter; for those forms according to their specific differences are mutually repugnant; for by this very fact that each substantial form constitutes a complete substantial nature, it so determines the matter which it informs to itself and as it were draws it to its own being that it does not admit in it another substantial form, or one of the same order. Matter likewise has limited capacity and as it were power of causing, so that simultaneously it cannot sustain one substantial form, nor concur except to composing one essence, which can also be seen in celestial matter; and this is no less necessary in this inferior matter, which is a principle of corruption, insofar as it so underlies one form that it necessarily abandons it, if it receives another.

64. A third principal argument can be constructed from those things which we said above to prove that substantial forms are given in natural things; for the most powerful arguments by which substantial form is shown rest on this, that for the perfect constitution of a natural being it is necessary that all the faculties and operations of the same being be rooted in one essential principle, which connection and rooting the natural effects themselves also show, as we deduced there; therefore plurality of forms is entirely alien to the constitution of nature. Nor is there in the whole of nature any indication for asserting it; for the subordination of essential predicates is no indication, as we have said; and therefore Aristotle said, II de Anim., text. 31, that the posterior form contains the prior ones, because that which gives the ultimate difference also gives the superior ones. The multitude also of

actions, faculties, or organs, not only is not an indication, but rather maximally requires the unity of form. Finally, the vicissitude or succession of generation and corruption indicates and requires this same unity; therefore there is nothing that causes us to doubt that one formal cause suffices for each natural effect. Nor do new objections occur against this truth which it would be necessary to satisfy.

From What Has Been Said It Is Concluded That There is No Infinite Process in Formal Causes

65. And from these things that question which is usually moved concerning formal cause is resolved in passing, namely whether in this kind of cause there can be given an infinite process. For, speaking of proper physical formal cause, it is established from what has been said that there is no place given to this question; for this can only be asked when several causes can concur to the same effect; for where there is a unique cause, what process can there be? But it has been shown that formal cause cannot be other than unique; therefore in this cause the question concerning infinite process has no place. Then, this process is usually either among causes per se and essentially subordinated or among those subordinated per accidens; but it has been shown that no substantial forms are per se subordinated. Hence, those who distinguish them according to the order of essential predicates can suffer some difficulty in this; for perhaps in these predicates it is not repugnant to give an infinite process, as we shall touch upon in the following section; according to our opinion, however, this matters nothing, because we think that these predicates, in whatever number they are multiplied, not only do not require distinct forms per se subordinated, but even such predicates cannot be taken with respect to the same composite except from one and the same form, so that not only from the nature of the thing, but also from absolute potency there cannot be given formal causes per se subordinated in this way, because there cannot be given a substantial

form which is not constituted in some ultimate species of such form, and consequently which does not essentially include all the superior grades of such forms. Nor does it matter that Aristotle, II Metaph., c. 2, proves from this that there is no infinite process in these forms, because there is no infinite process in quidditative predicates, because, although from that negation this negation is very well inferred, nevertheless from the opposite affirmation the opposite affirmation does not follow, as has been said above. Again, neither in this genus are there causes per accidens subordinated, because it has also been shown that several forms cannot concur simultaneously, even entirely per accidens, to informing the same matter. But if someone should say that there can be given an infinite process in forms contained under the same genus or species, and call these formal causes per accidens subordinated, he must note that these are not causes of one and the same effect, but each has its own distinct effect; but when subordination of causes is investigated, it must be understood with respect to one and the same effect, otherwise it is not subordination, but multiplication of things or effects. Hence even if by the absolute power of God forms were multiplied per accidens in the same matter, there would not be subordination of causes there, because, as I said above, they would not constitute one and the same effect, but diverse ones, and besides they would have no order among themselves, but would be multiplied entirely per accidens. In this genus of cause, therefore, there is no process of causes, neither infinite nor in any finite number.

Infinite Process Is Excluded from Material Cause

66. From which it is finally understood that much less can there be an infinite process in matter, because if there were, it could arise only from an infinity of forms; for, as has been demonstrated above, there must necessarily be given one prime matter which is not in another subject; but this prime matter in each composite can only

be one, because one matter cannot be received in it, since this is against the nature of prime matter; nor can several matters be joined in the same composite and informed by the same form, unless one of them is united to the other, so that from both one potency is made, which can be understood in no way; therefore in substantial matters not only can there not be an infinite process, but no process at all or any plurality can be.

67. But if there is no discussion of prime matter, but of proximate matter, either proximate matter is understood substantially and as potency immediately and per se receiving form, or proximate matter is understood accidentally, that is, as affected by dispositions accommodated to form. In the former way, truly only prime matter through its simple entity is also proximate matter to any form whatsoever, and thus there is no process; and it could only be imagined if between prime matter and the ultimate substantial form there intervened some substantial forms, of which one would be compared to another as proximate potency to its act; but these forms are not given, as has been shown, and even if they were given, an infinite progress would not be intelligible in them, both because an infinite multitude of forms is no less repugnant than an infinite multitude in act of any beings whatsoever; and also because it is necessary to give some first form, that is, one first informing matter; for, since matter from itself is immediate potency, it is necessary that it be immediately informed by some determinate form, otherwise information would never begin. Again from the part of the other extreme it is also necessary to give an ultimate form; otherwise information would never be finished nor would the thing be constituted in some certain and determinate species; therefore between those two extremes there could not intercede an infinite multitude of forms, because to each there must necessarily be some immediate one which is compared as proximate potency and act. I omit other arguments which Aristotle makes in the cited place, because the matter is clearer than that it should need proof.

68. But if we speak of proximate matter by reason of accidental dispositions, the same arguments prove that in those dispositions there cannot be an infinite process, because if they are not subordinated among themselves, but have a concomitant relation, like the four primary qualities, in them such a process cannot be given, only because there cannot simultaneously be actually infinite qualities in multitude, and much less can a finite form postulate them; but if the dispositions are subordinated among themselves as act and proximate potency, just as quantity and quality, the argument made concerning substantial forms proceeds, that in them it is necessary to give a first and ultimate, otherwise neither would disposition be begun nor consummated; but between those extremes there cannot be an infinite multitude. Nor is it similar to what can be brought forward concerning infinite points contained between two extremes, because points are only infinite in potency, that is, constituting with parts one finite continuous quantity, but the multitude of forms would be actually infinite. Also, because one point is not immediate to another, and thus all the intermediate points between two extremes cannot be numbered[7]; but one form, whether substantial or accidental, if it is compared to another as potency to act, must necessarily regard it proximately; therefore in no way can there be an infinite process between matter and form.

69. But the arguments made proceed concerning permanent matter, from which a thing is made, so that it inheres in it; but Aristotle, in the cited place II Metaph., also speaks of transient material cause when he denies that there is given an infinite process in material causes, because if earth is generated from water and grass from earth, and something else from grass, there is no infinite process, but a circle is made. Nevertheless, whether this process is given or not, it matters nothing to causality, because that process is merely per accidens, and therefore nothing would obstruct causality from tending to infinity. But if it does not tend, it is only because there are not given

[7] Iavell., I Metaph., q. 6

infinite species of generable things nor an infinite process in the generations of such species, but always a circle is made and a return to the same species. Some think this necessarily follows from the fact that each of these species indicates a limited perfection. But this is no argument, because at least by divine power it is not repugnant that species of mixed things be multiplied to infinity, even if each species is finite and in fact there is always given a highest and lowest species contained under that genus, although it is possible that another could be made, either more perfect than all those made or more imperfect than all. Others say it is established by experience that there is no infinite process in the generation of one species from another, but always a return is made to the same species, concerning which experience I very much doubt whether it is evident to us; for many things are perhaps generated anew by the power of the heavens and the concourse of elements, which are hidden from us. Add that St. Thomas, III, q. 10, a. 3, says that infinite things are contained in the potency of creatures. And he speaks of substantial things; for concerning these he had said he does not see infinite things in act in the soul of Christ. Hence explaining that passage there, we said it could be understood both of infinite species and of infinite individuals. If therefore infinite species of mixed things are contained in the potency of creatures, it will not be repugnant to proceed to infinity in their generations. And perhaps Aristotle in the cited place does not contradict this; for he only proves that this process is not necessary for the causality of things, because the generation of one is the corruption of another, and in this a reflection according to species is easily made, although it is not made according to individual. Nevertheless it seems more probable, speaking naturally, that there is a state in the generations of things according to species, because the powers of natural causes are finite and the modes or aspects and concourses by which they are applied are determinate and finite; and therefore, although infinite things are contained in the absolute potency of creatures, if in created things and causes all the conditions

and mixtures are made which can absolutely be made, nevertheless in fact according to the order of the universe they can be made only in finite modes, and therefore it is also more likely that in this process there is given a state and term.

SECTION XI

WHAT METAPHYSICAL FORM IS, WHAT MATTER CORRESPONDS TO IT, AND WHAT KIND OF CAUSALITY IT HAS

1. In every composition there is something as matter and something as form. Since the distinction of form into physical and metaphysical is very common, and all that we have said thus far applies to physical form, it seems to be a matter for metaphysics to say something also about metaphysical form, which, given what we have said, can be briefly explained, because this is called form only by analogy and as a kind of metaphor. It should be noted, therefore, from what was said above, that besides physical composition from matter and form, there is another kind which imitates it; yet it abstracts from true matter, and therefore is called metaphysical. This is twofold, as far as the present matter is concerned: one from nature and suppositum, the other from genus and difference; I omit that which is from being and essence, because it is more obscure and, as far as the present matter is concerned, no special notion of form intervenes in it, as will be clear from what is to be said. Next, it must be considered that in every composition, so that it may be understood that one thing arises from many, something is always considered as matter and something as form, both because composition from matter and form is the first real composition and most proper and per se, and therefore by a certain analogy to it every other composition is explained; and also because matter is something formless and imperfect and a certain beginning and as it were foundation of nature; form, however, is as it

were the beauty and perfection and consummation of nature; but in every composition there is something as it were potential, which is the foundation and beginning of the thing, and something which is the term or consummation of the thing, and therefore something is always considered as matter and something as form. This is so true that even in composition from integral parts, which seems to be most material, one part is always considered as matter and another as form, which will appear more clearly in heterogeneous things, as in man the head is like the form of the other parts; and in artificial things the roof, for example, is as it were the form of the building; according to which analogy theologians also distinguish matters and forms of sacraments. And in homogeneous things, where among the parts that diverse relation cannot be distinguished because of their similarity and uniformity, all parts are said to be the matter of the whole, but the composite is compared as form to individual parts. In all these cases no special causality intervenes, but only union with analogy and proportion to matter and form.

2. From these things, therefore, it is understood that metaphysical form in general is called that which in metaphysical composition essentially constitutes the thing itself, or completes or actuates the essence of the thing; nor can this form, taken so commonly, be described otherwise. But there is a distinction between the two metaphysical compositions mentioned above, that the former, namely, from nature and suppositum, is a composition of the thing (we speak of creatures), that is, from those things which in the thing itself are somehow actually distinguished, as are nature and subsistence, concerning which we shall treat extensively below; the latter, however, is a composition of reason, because its extremes are not actually distinguished in the thing, but only by reason, as was seen above. There is also another difference, that in the former composition one extreme is the whole essence of the thing, the other does not pertain intrinsically to the essence, but is the term or mode of the essence; in the other composition, however, both extremes are

essential and neither explicitly or actually expresses the whole essence of the thing, although it may confusedly include the whole of it. Whence it happens that the former is also usually called total form, real and most properly metaphysical; the latter, however, is more form according to reason, and therefore can be called not only metaphysical, but also logical.

The Essence of Metaphysical Form is Shown

3. Metaphysical form is the whole essence of the thing. It must be said, therefore, first, that metaphysical form properly so called, which is the form of the whole, is nothing other than the whole substantial essence of the thing, which we also call the integral nature of the thing, which is not called form because it specially exercises the proper causality of form, but because it essentially constitutes the thing through itself. I explain and prove each point; for in man, for example, this form of the whole is said to be humanity, which, since it consists of the matter and form of man, expresses the whole essence of man; for that which man adds to humanity is not of the essence of man, as we shall say below when treating of subsistence and as briefly appears in the mystery of the Incarnation; for in Christ there is the whole essence of man, although there is not a created human subsistence. Moreover, this form of the whole is found not only in material things, but also in spiritual ones; indeed, not only in created things, but it is also considered by us in God himself; for we conceive the Deity as the form essentially constituting God and any divine suppositum, insofar as this one is God; although it is proper to it that in the thing itself it is not distinguished from that of whose essence it is; in which it falls short of that notion of form which essence has in created things, because that does not pertain to perfection simply, but includes imperfection; therefore this form in immaterial things can be nothing other than their essence. In material things, however, this form of the whole differs from physical and partial form, as is clear

from the common use of these terms, and from the very distinction of physical form from metaphysical; but it differs only because the form of the whole expresses the whole nature composed from matter and form, while physical form expresses only the formal part; therefore this metaphysical form even in these things expresses their whole essence. Because, as we shall show below in the disputation on material substance, matter too is of the essence of this substance, and thus the nature composed from matter and form is its whole essence; and thus the first part of the conclusion is evident.

4. Metaphysical form is designated by the name of nature. That this metaphysical form is usually called most properly by the name of nature is clear first from usage; for thus we attribute even to God divine nature, to intelligences angelic nature, to men human nature, and so concerning other things. Then in this way we distinguish nature from suppositum, either from the nature of the thing, as in created substances, or by reason only, as in the divine; and in this way we say that nature in God does not generate, but the suppositum does, and that the divine Word assumed nature, not a human person. Likewise, each thing has through its nature that it is such and that it is essentially distinguished from others; therefore the substantial nature of a thing is adequately (so to speak) the very total form by which it is essentially such. Finally, nature, as is commonly held, expresses an order to operation, in which alone it differs from essence in that the name of essence is taken from the order to being, but the name of nature is taken from the order to operation; for nature is said as if it makes something to be born; whence it is said that nature is not idle and is the maker of things, and does nothing in vain, etc. Whence also theologians say that faculties and operations are multiplied when natures are multiplied. But the first and adequate principal principle of operations in each thing is its essence; which is manifest in immaterial things; in material things, however, form seems to be the principle of operating, which is the formal and active principle; nevertheless, because matter in its genus also concurs in

some way, especially to natural and intrinsic motions or acts, therefore I said that the adequate first and radical principle of each thing is its essence; therefore the very essence and form of the whole is the same as the nature of each thing.

5. Etymology of the name "nature" and its various meanings. I know that Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, chapter 4, assigns various significations to this name nature, and among them puts in the last place that by which it signifies the substance or essence of a thing, which he says is a translation from another signification by which nature signifies form, which is the term of generation. And in Physics II, chapter 1, he restricts the notion of nature to the first intrinsic principle of motion alone, and thence natural being is usually said only of material substances. I think, however, that these things are to be understood concerning this word nature as to its imposition, not as to the thing signified; for these are usually very distinct in these analogical names, as St. Thomas rightly noted in I, question 13, article 6. As to the imposition of the word, therefore, it is likely that this word first signified other things which Aristotle there enumerates, as, for example, natural generation and especially the birth or nativity of living things; for nature is said as if "about to be born" (nascitura), and thence the word could be derived to signify the intrinsic principles of the generated thing, namely, matter and form. Or, as St. Thomas says in I, question 29, article 1, ad 4, because the nativity of living things is from an intrinsic principle, therefore this word was derived to signify the first intrinsic principle of motion, which is matter and form. And because the essence of the thing is completed through form, finally that word was derived to signify the essence of the thing. And because the ancient philosophers who disputed about nature did not know other substances except material ones, therefore they attributed nature to those alone, and thence they peculiarly obtained the name of natural beings.

6. But truly, if we consider the thing signified and speak of this word metaphysically rather than physically, this word absolutely

and principally signifies the essence simply and integral of each thing, as it is signified through the mode of total form. And in immaterial things it is simple; in material things, however, it is composed from matter and form, because neither matter nor form is the integral nature of the thing, but partial; the integral nature of the thing, however, is composed from both; and therefore it is rightly called metaphysically total form. Accidents, however, just as they do not have essence simply, so neither do they have nature except with an addition, namely accidental nature, and they are more properly said to be according to nature, or against or beside nature. Wherefore in accidents, as will be seen below, this notion of total form of which we now treat does not properly have place (I speak according to the thing, whatever may be the case concerning our possible mode of conceiving); and the reason is that accident is a form as it were partial and physical, whence in itself it is an incomplete nature and so imperfect that it does not make one per se, but per accidens with its subject; and thence it happens that from both there does not result one integral nature and form of the whole, as from matter and substantial form.

7. Whether metaphysical form exercises any causality. Finally, the last part of the conclusion can easily be proved from all that has been said, for first, since this form of the whole in material things includes prime matter itself, it cannot exercise proper formal causality, which consists in actuating some subject. Likewise in immaterial things, since the whole essence is simple and abstracts from everything receptive, it cannot be called form because of proper formal causality. And, if it is permitted to argue from theology, the humanity of Christ is the metaphysical form of this man Christ and yet is not the true form of the divine Word, having true causality in it, by reason of which it might be said to formally constitute this man. And the argument can be extended to any nature with respect to its proper suppositum; for either nature is compared to subsistence itself or to the composite from nature and subsistence. With respect to

subsistence, nature does not have formal causality, but rather as it were material causality (I omit the active, concerning which later), because proper subsistence is not compared to nature as its subject, but as its term. Whence rather subsistence is in some way the act of nature than conversely. Likewise, because subsistence is the mode of nature, whence it affects and in some way actuates it; according to this comparison, therefore, nature does not exercise the causality of form. Whence in the said example of the mystery of the Incarnation theologians say that humanity is not only not compared to the Word as its form, but rather the Word relates as form insofar as it in some way perfects and actuates humanity, although no proper and true causality intervenes there.

8. And thence it further happens that, even with respect to the whole composite or suppositum, integral nature is not called total form because of true and proper causality of form; because this causality never exists with respect to the composite, unless it is first and immediately exercised around some subject, from which and the form the composite results. If, therefore, total nature does not exercise formal causality around the other extreme of this composition, neither can it exercise it around the whole composite. It remains, therefore, that integral nature is called form only because it is the whole quiddity, notion, or essence intrinsically constituting the suppositum in such a genus or species. This constitution is not through causality somehow distinguished from the nature itself, but is through the intrinsic actuality and entity of the total nature itself. And on account of this also this form is said to be metaphysical and not physical.

9. Whence also it is understood incidentally that no proper matter corresponds to this form, because, as was said, it is not called form because it informs some subject; but, if we speak generally, only the suppositum corresponds to this nature as essentially constituted through it. In material things, however, integral nature can be compared, as total form, to the partial natures from which it is composed; for, although one of them is form, nevertheless, insofar as

both matter and form are a certain incomplete part and imperfect of themselves, it can be compared as matter to the whole composed nature, and this as something whole and complete is compared to the parts as form; for the whole relates as form with respect to parts, according to Aristotle, Physics II, text 31, although there he speaks chiefly of the integral whole with respect to its parts.

10. Individual metaphysical forms in individual composites. Finally, it is understood from what has been said that this form can only be one with respect to the same thing; this is evident, because it expresses the whole nature of the thing; but this in one thing cannot be except one. Nor does it matter that according to reason there can be distinguished in the same thing specific and generic form of the whole, as humanity, animality, etc.; for if these are taken with respect to the same thing, they are not several forms in the thing, but one and the same conceived in diverse modes; and insofar as that is conceived as several according to reason, it is not taken with respect to one, but several, also according to reason; for animality is not the total form of man, but of animal as such; and thus, preserving proportion, the form of the whole is only one with respect to the same thing.

11. A doubt is met. Someone can only doubt concerning the conclusion posited; for if the total form is the form of the suppositum, it includes not only essential principles, but also individuating principles, which are not of the essence of the thing, because the total form and integral nature of Peter is not only humanity, but this humanity; therefore it is false that this form includes only the whole essence of the thing. Then it follows that existence is not included in this form, because this also is not of the essence. But the consequent appears false; for, if it does not include existence, how does it really constitute? To these things, however, it must be said that this form must be taken with proportion with respect to that which is constituted through it, and thus it always expresses the integral and sole nature and essence of it. For if it is compared to the common species taken precisely, it includes only specific essential principles,

and humanity expresses the total form of man. If, however, it is compared to a determined individual, thus it includes essential individual and particular principles, which, although they are not of the essence of the thing, speaking absolutely, because in this word a certain precision of mind is included, they are nevertheless of the essence of the individual as the individual is, as was declared above when treating of the principle of individuation. Similarly it must be said concerning existence; for, although this is not absolutely of the essence of a created or creatable thing, it is nevertheless of its essence as existing or as constituted in the notion of actual entity; and therefore, although this form includes nothing except the essence of the thing, nevertheless, in order that it may actually constitute it, it includes existence, not only as a necessary extrinsic or concomitant condition, but also as intrinsically constituting the actual entity of the nature itself, through which it formally constitutes such a substance or substantial individual.

What Logical Form is

12. I say second: metaphysical form according to reason (which is also called logical) is usually said principally of essential difference; nevertheless according to some respect it is also attributed to genus, and also to definition; whence this form does not have proper real causality, but only of reason, and proportional matter corresponds to it. This whole assertion is very clear and is established from common usage of speaking, given what has been said above about the thing itself, when treating of universals, where we explained how genus and difference are compared among themselves and whence they are taken. Where among other things we said with Aristotle, Metaphysics VII, texts 42 and 43, that from genus and difference one per se arises, because they are proximately compared among themselves as potency and act of the same genus and per se ordered among themselves, where St. Thomas, lecture 12, part 5,

explains that genus and difference are not compared as potency and act distinguished in reality, but because they express the same essence as determinable or through the mode of its determination. From which it is understood that difference imitates form in the notion of actuating, terminating, and distinguishing, and therefore it is that to which this notion of metaphysical form primarily belongs; genus, however, by comparison with it has the notion of matter, because it is something potential, actuable, and indifferent to many things, until it is understood to be contracted and determined through difference; whence also it happens that difference of itself is more perfect than genus, because that which within the same genus relates as act is more perfect than that which relates as potency. Whence also in the place cited above we said that difference is taken from a nobler principle; in this, therefore, there is also proportion between form and difference, that just as form is more perfect than matter, so is difference than genus. Again, just as matter and form are really distinguished, so that neither is the other nor does one intrinsically include the other, so also genus and difference are separated by concepts, according to which they are so distinguished that neither is difference actually included in the concept of genus, nor genus in the concept of difference; otherwise there would not be proper metaphysical composition, nor would they be compared as proper act and potency, because it is of their nature that they do not include each other; and Aristotle taught this, Metaphysics VII, where above, book III, text 10, and Topics VI, chapter 3.

13. By which also it happens that, just as it does not belong to matter per se and necessarily to be under this or that determined form, so genus per se and necessarily does not require determinately any one of the differences, although it necessarily requires some one confusedly, just as matter requires form. In this, however, there is a difference to be noted between matter and form on one part, and genus and difference on the other, that, although matter naturally cannot be without some form, absolutely, however, it does not imply

contradiction to be so conserved, and similarly form sometimes can not depend on matter even naturally, and that which so depends can nevertheless supernaturally be conserved without matter; but truly genus and difference are so conjoined per se that it entirely repugns either that genus be without all differences, or that difference subsist outside the genus which it actuates. And the reason is clear, because genus and difference are not distinguished in the thing, but express the same essence as determinable and determining, and therefore it is not surprising that they cannot be separated in the thing in the said mode. Likewise, because in the thing there cannot be anything which does not have a determined essence and consequently is constituted in some proper and ultimate species, in which it is necessary that both common or generic predicates and proper ones be included; therefore these cannot subsist so precisely and abstractly, as they are conceived.

14. How genus and difference are understood to be united. From which it is further understood another distinction, namely that between genus and difference there does not intervene a union of a medium distinct from them, even according to the true notion of conceiving, just as we said above that between matter and form there intervenes a mode of union in the thing distinct from them, because actual union between them is not of their intrinsic nature, indeed it is separable from them, and therefore it is necessary that it mediate between them and be distinguished from them. But truly genus and difference are so united per se (or rather are one in the thing, although they are distinguished by reason) that they are entirely inseparable according to the thing and in some way according to reason; for, although difference can be understood without genus by a precisive concept, nevertheless it cannot be conceived negatively as existing without genus, or as not actuating genus. And therefore, just as in real modes, which are only modally distinguished from the things which they modify, we say that they are not united to those things through a distinct union, but through themselves, so much more by reason difference must be conceived as an essential mode of the species and

through itself contracting and actuating genus without any other mediate union.

15. Difference does not cause really. Finally, from these things it is understood that difference, insofar as it is called form, does not have proper real causality, because real causality exists only between those things which are distinguished in the thing itself, or at least it is necessary that some real influx and causality distinct from the nature of the thing from the cause itself or effect intervene; but here none of these things intervenes, because neither is difference really distinct from the species, nor from genus, as it is contracted through it. Nor does any causality distinct from the difference itself intervene there. This is, therefore, only a certain constitution according to reason and our mode of conceiving, which is called form or formal causality only by analogy and proportion to real cause. And the same must be understood concerning genus, insofar as the notion or causality of matter is attributed to it. Nor does it matter that the thing constituted from these is often a true and real essence, as man or horse; for, although such essence is real in itself, nevertheless as so composed, it is not a being of the thing, but of reason, since the composition itself is only of reason.

16. How genus is predicated of the whole species. But someone will object: for if difference is compared to genus as form, and genus to difference as matter, therefore each is compared to the species or defined thing as part to whole; therefore neither will be able to be predicated absolutely and directly of the species, because a part, although it can be predicated obliquely or denominatively of the whole, nevertheless not absolutely and directly; for we do not say: man is matter, but has matter, or is material; therefore these locutions will be false: man is animal, and similar ones. This objection was only proposed to explain the other part of the conclusion, by which we said that both genus with respect to species and definition with respect to the defined thing are usually called metaphysical form. The common distinction, therefore, is that genus (and the same is proportionally

true of difference) can be considered in two ways: either precisely, as it expresses such a grade and in it as it were stands still of itself; and in this sense it is a part, and as such also is not predicated of the whole, because it would render this sense, that man, for example, is animal precisely, and solitarily, and abstractly taken, or is not more than animal, which sense is plainly false. And genus under this consideration is compared as matter to difference, and conversely difference as form to genus. And so proceed the things which have been said thus far. And in the same sense the whole that is inferred in the objection is conceded, namely that genus and difference are parts, and as such are not predicated; nor only parts, but also elements are called by Aristotle[8], especially differences and supreme genera, because of their simplicity, and because in them the ultimate resolution is made in metaphysics, as is clear from Posterior Analytics II, chapter 14. In another way, however, genus is considered as a whole, which they call potential or confused, because it confusedly expresses the whole quiddity of the species, and in this way it is excellently predicated of the species or defined thing, because now it is not predicated as a part, but as a whole; and this is the common sense of this locution; for when it is said man is animal, nothing is excluded from man, but it is affirmed that the same suppositum which is man is also animal; or that man, by the same form and essence by which he is man, is also animal; both of these, however, are true. Genus, therefore, insofar as it can be predicated of the species, as something superior to it and as it were containing it, is said in some way to have the notion of form with respect to it; and conversely inferiors, insofar as they are subjected to superiors and in some way sustain them in themselves, have a certain notion of matter. And by similar or greater reason species is compared as form to individuals, but these as matter.

17. And in this sense I understand Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 2, when he refers both parts of definition to formal cause; for, as far as genus is concerned, I think this must be understood not

[8] III Metaph., c. 3, et lib. V, c. 5.

formally as it is a part, but as it is a certain whole, as I explained. But truly the whole definition, because it declares the whole essence and is the proper notion of the defined thing itself and is most properly predicated of it, therefore it can also be called metaphysical form, although it is not composite. And thus it is easy to explain all similar locutions, which consist only in a certain analogy and translation.

18. Distinction between metaphysical form and physical form. Only a brief doubt remains to be expedited, which arises from the difference to be noted between this metaphysical form and physical form, that substantial physical form is not multiplied in the same composite, as we said above; but this form can be multiplied; for both the genera of the same thing can be several, and differences likewise; indeed even definition, although it seems to contain and explain the whole essence of the thing, nevertheless can be multiple, as is clear from Posterior Analytics I, chapter 7, and book II, chapters 8 and 12, and On the Soul II, chapter 7. But the reason for the difference is easy, because physical forms really distinct are so compared that each constitutes a perfect and consummated species of substance, and their composition would have to be real and physical, and therefore they are repugnant in the same substance properly and per se one. But truly this metaphysical form, namely difference, neither makes real composition nor is distinguished from another difference except through the precision and abstraction of mind; but our mind can prescind and abstract the same thing in various ways, and therefore it can conceive in the same thing several predicates of genus and difference; therefore the multitude of essential differences does not impede the unity and per se composition from genus and difference.

Whether There is an Infinite Process in Essential Predicates

19. From this distinction, however, a difficulty immediately arises; for it follows that there can be an infinite process in these

metaphysical formal and material causes, that is, in quidditative predicates. But the consequent is against Aristotle, Metaphysics II, chapter 1, where he thought it more evident that there cannot be an infinite process in the parts of definition, which are genus and difference, than in forms themselves; and therefore from the negation of infinite predicates he proves the negation of infinite forms. But the consequence is proved, because it is no more repugnant to give two differences in one thing than three or four, and so concerning any number; therefore in this number one can proceed to infinity. Especially because this number of predicates does not arise from things or modes distinct which are on the part of the thing in one and the same substance, but from our concepts with some foundation in the thing; but we can prescind and abstract in infinite ways, and in things there is foundation for this to be done by us because of the various agreements and dissimilitudes which one thing has with others, in which agreements these abstractions are founded. And the difficulty is especially urgent, if one species is compared not only to other made species, but to all possible ones, which can be multiplied to infinity and in infinite ways.

20. Several reasons which are usually brought forward for the conclusion are shown to be ineffective. Nevertheless it must be said absolutely with Aristotle that even in these formal causes there is no infinite process. So teach all interpreters, who bring forward various reasons. The first is, because otherwise the constituted thing would be infinitely perfect, because each predicate adds some perfection. But perhaps the consequence will be denied, because one finite perfection can be the foundation of infinite concepts, which, although they express perfections distinct by reason, do not increase perfection in the thing. The second reason is, because if these differences are infinite, the properties which follow from them will also be infinite. But it will be responded that from generic and specific difference there do not always follow properties distinct in reality, as is clear in these predicates: substance, spiritual, of Gabriel, etc.; but it is sufficient that

the very properties also correspond proportionally according to universal or special notions, as was also touched upon above.

21. The true reason for the conclusion. The third reason and most probable is that it is necessary to give a supreme genus which is as it were the first matter of this composition and a specific and lowest difference which is as it were the ultimate form; therefore also intermediate forms are necessarily in finite and determinate number. The major is proved by Aristotle because in these quidditative predicates one is always prior to another, that is, more universal and extending to more things; but it is not prior except because it approaches more to that which is first; therefore it is necessary also to give some supreme genus. Then this is clear from experience, running through all categories, and especially in substance, which, as it immediately signifies complete substance, is the supreme genus; for none more universal with respect to substances can be thought; I suppose, however, that being is not a genus, although if it were a genus, nothing would impede, for that would be supreme; and thus we have what we intend. And thus also nothing will impede, if anyone contends that this resolution ought to be made up to transcendental predicates, because, although this were true, it would stop at something ultimate. And the reason is that in all things or substances there is given some first or minimal essential agreement, according to which either a transcendental predicate or supreme genus can be abstracted. But the minor is proved from the very constitution of the ultimate species, because there cannot be any thing which is not constituted in some ultimate species; otherwise it would not have a determined essence, nor one diverse from other determined species; but the ultimate species must be constituted through some ultimate difference. Nor do I now dispute whether this ultimate difference is simple or coalescing from many, each of which are common, as Porphyry seems to have signified in the chapter on Difference; and Aristotle favors this not a little, Topics I, chapter 3, and book VI Topics, chapters 3 and 4, and Posterior Analytics II, chapter 14; for

this makes no difference to the present matter, because one must necessarily stop at differences which are not actuated through others, although perhaps two or three of these may come together to constitute the ultimate species; for now the argument made proceeds only concerning subordinated differences. But the first consequence seems self-evident, because between the first and ultimate extremes there cannot be given infinite media, just as we said above concerning forms; for the reason made there proceeds equally here.

22. Objections against the preceding argument. But this argument can be weakened in two ways. First, by saying that although essential predicates subordinated in one line according to the manner of act and potency are finite, nevertheless those that are not subordinated or are in diverse lines can be multiplied to infinity. For instance, if someone were to say that there are several supreme genera, or that several differences not subordinated among themselves contribute to the constitution of the ultimate species, and that these can be multiplied to infinity. Or that one and the same genus, whether proximate or remote, can be simultaneously contracted by several differences which do not entirely conflict with each other nor are subordinated among themselves. For example, according to the ancient philosophers, animal is contracted by rational and by mortal, which come together in man but are separated in others; and substance could be immediately divided by living and by corporeal, which come together in some substances but are separated in others. From this it also seems to follow that among the differences themselves there is a certain circle, and they are compared reciprocally and mutually as potency and act. For if substance is immediately divided into living and non-living, then living substance will be able to be divided into incorporeal and corporeal; but if, on the contrary, substance is divided into corporeal and incorporeal, the corporeal will be divided into living and non-living. If this is not inconvenient, because these are reflections of the intellect, for the same reason that infinite multiplication of those predicates will not be absurd. The

second evasion can be that, although a supreme genus and lowest difference are granted, it is not repugnant that several intermediate predicates can be abstracted or distinguished by the intellect to infinity between them, just as between the extreme points of a line there are infinite parts or points. For just as these are infinite in potency, so those predicates, as they are in reality, can be said to be multiple only in potency, because in reality they are not actually many unless they are distinguished by the intellect. And therefore, although the intellect can distinguish more and more to infinity, it does not follow that there are infinitely many in reality except in potency. From this it also happens that those predicates which we actually distinguish are always finite, both because we cannot form except finite concepts about things, and also because all the agreements and differences of any species in relation to others that have been made are in a certain and determinate number, even if with respect to possible things they might perhaps be multiplied to infinity. And thus someone could interpret Aristotle concerning differences or essential predicates which are in fact abstracted or can be abstracted through discourse or human cognition.

23. They are resolved. Aristotle's statement is explained. But nevertheless I think the argument made is efficacious and it simply cannot happen that predicates are multiplied to infinity. And first I assume that with respect to any thing there is only one supreme genus or predicate and one ultimate difference. And indeed the first part is sufficiently proven both by reason and by use or experience; concerning the latter, however, some have doubted, though it seems equally certain to me. First indeed, because difference is taken from form; but every form specifically diverse from another has some essential grade proper to itself and not common to others; therefore from that a difference can be taken that is entirely proper and common to no other. Second, because an ultimate species cannot be constituted by the conjunction alone of two common differences, since each of those differences constitutes a subaltern and generic species; but an

ultimate species is not an aggregate of two subaltern species, otherwise it would neither be one proper and special essence, nor would it be one metaphysical composite constituted from proper act and proper potency. For example, in that example about man, if rational and mortal were taken as subaltern and common differences, man would never be constituted from their aggregation; but rational must be taken as it is proper to man, that is, as it includes discourse or aptitude for it; but in this way rational will be the simple proper difference of man, while mortal is of itself a subaltern and common difference, not indeed to others using reason, for there is no rational or intellectual mortal besides man, but to others that are sentient or living. Thus therefore it happens in all species of things. And this is what Aristotle said, in Metaphysics VII, text 43, that one must proceed in the division of common differences until one arrives at indifferent things, that is, to ultimate and entirely proper differences, as St. Thomas and all explain; and then (Aristotle says) there will be as many species as differences. For each individual difference (St. Thomas adds) will constitute one most special species.

24. Intermediate differences are enclosed in finite number. But with this principle established, that intermediate differences can only be in finite number, it is declared in this way. And first, if differential grades were distinct in reality itself, it is evident that they cannot be except finite, because they would be actually many; therefore finite or infinite, but in a finite thing there cannot be infinite grades of distinct perfections; therefore they will be finite. Especially because those grades are not understood to be communicating among themselves, like proportional parts, but entirely co-distinct and indivisible; nor are they compared to the thing as points to a line, which are so indivisible that they do not increase the quantity of the line; but each difference adds a certain grade and as it were a determinate part of perfection, from whose parts' conjunction arises the integral perfection of the species, which, since it is finite, cannot arise except from finite quasi-parts. Hence, just as in the intensive

latitude of a finite quality only finite grades not communicating among themselves can be distinguished, from whose conjunction arises the whole finite intension of the quality, in the same way one must philosophize proportionately about differential grades. But although these grades according to the truer opinion are not actually distinguished in reality, nevertheless the reasoning made has the same force in order to the distinction and conception of our mind, because even as distinguished by reason, they are conceived as not communicating among themselves, if the grades themselves are taken precisely and formally, as they ought to be taken. For one subaltern difference does not include another, because neither is the inferior of the concept of the superior nor conversely; therefore the intermediate differential grades are entirely co-distinct and not communicating among themselves; therefore from this part their distinction, even if it is according to reason, cannot proceed to infinity nor can it be compared with the division of parts of a continuum. On the other hand, each of those grades is indivisible according to concept; for each difference, whether generic or specific, is indivisible, and is so indivisible that it essentially increases the perfection of the thing in order to the concept of the mind; therefore also in order to the concept of the mind a finite essence cannot be divided or constituted through such differences unless they are finite in number, which since they are indivisible, one will not be able to proceed to infinity in their division.

25. And thus the consequence made in the third argument remains efficacious; and the objection insinuated in the second evasion ceases, because in a finite thing there cannot be contained, even in potency, infinite things not communicating among themselves and increasing the perfection or quantity of the thing. Therefore, if once all the differences that can be founded in the essence of a thing are conceived and distinguished by reason, their number cannot be increased, whether with respect to existing or possible things; for

through those it agrees or differs from all, both those that are and those that can be.

26. And from this the prior objection is also easily excluded, for in whatever way differences are multiplied, and whether they are subordinated among themselves or not, they cannot be except in finite number because of the stated cause; namely, because finite perfection cannot even be divided by the mind into several quasi-parts not communicating among themselves, except only in finite number. But it is more probable that all differences that contribute to the constitution of one essence are in some way subordinated among themselves as potency and act; otherwise they could not constitute one per se. Nor is it likely that a circle is committed in this, since the relations of act and potency are so opposed among themselves.

27. Therefore, although the same genus is divided by us in various ways, it is not always divided by proper and immediate differences by which it is proximately contracted and actuated; and therefore it can sometimes happen that two differences are compared among themselves as act and potency. As in the example given, although substance can be divided by corporeal and incorporeal, living and non-living, the prior division is always immediate and proximate; whose sign is that it is taken as if from intrinsic principles and the absolute entity of the thing, but this is taken in order to operation; and therefore the difference of living, as it is in corporeal things, is always compared as act and not as potency to the corporeal grade. And although that difference is also found in incorporeal things, nevertheless it is found in a far different way, because incorporeal substance is (so to speak) totally living, that is, it lives by reason of its whole substance, but corporeal by reason of a part; in which special way it seems to be taken when the difference of body is posited. And although we grant that there can be a common difference of living abstracting from those two modes, from this at most it happens that some genera not posited subalternately have a common difference,

which perhaps is not inconvenient; for thus Aristotle thought, in Topics VI, concerning which elsewhere.

28. Another argument of Aristotle for the conclusion. Thus therefore the third argument remains sufficiently declared and confirmed; and the first also receives strength from the aforesaid discourse. But the second, if it is understood not of properties in the strict sense, as they call faculties of operating or some other thing distinct from substance, but of any mode of being or operating, can be defended, because these genera and differences are especially distinguished by us through order to some such property. Finally Aristotle adds another argument, namely, because if in these differences there were a process to infinity, a thing could never be sufficiently distinctly known or defined by us, because entirely distinct cognition or definition begins from the supreme genus, and through the addition of all differences arrives up to the ultimate; which could not happen if those were infinite. This especially has place in human cognition, which proceeds gradually from one to another, in which way it is impossible to traverse infinity successively by counting, as is established from Physics III, chapter 7, and is sufficiently known per se.

DISPUTATION XVI

ON THE ACCIDENTAL FORMAL CAUSE

Many things that have been said about substantial forms can be applied to accidental forms; for they agree in some way in that common notion, and according to that notion they have many things in common, which it will not be necessary to repeat here. Finally, therefore, we shall explain how this causality befits accidents, and whether according to that notion they have anything singular.

SECTION I

WHETHER ALL ACCIDENTS EXERCISE TRUE FORMAL CAUSALITY, AND CONCERNING WHAT EFFECT

1. The reason for doubt is that an accident is neither the formal cause of its subject nor of the composite; therefore it has no effect; therefore it does not have true and per se causality. This final consequence is evident, because cause and effect are correlative; the first part is established by sufficient enumeration of parts; but the antecedent regarding the first part is proved because the subject of an accident is substance; but an accident cannot be the formal cause of substance. Regarding the second part, it is proved because if an

accident were the formal cause of the composite, such a composite would be per se one, since from a proper and per se cause arises a proper and per se effect; but a composite from accident and subject is not per se one; therefore.

2. The opinion of Aureolus is rejected. Concerning this question, the opinion of Aureolus can be reported, as found in Capreolus, In II, dist. 18, q. 1, saying that no accident has the proper entity of a form by which it formally affects the subject, but that it is the very actuation itself. This can scarcely be understood what it means, unless perhaps he understood that no accident is a thing really distinct from the entity of substance, but only a mode, which disagrees in many ways and is at variance with the truths of faith. For who would understand that accidents in the Eucharist are separated and remain without the entity of substance, and that they do not have some proper entity really distinct from the entity of substance? Likewise, how can the entire doctrine that faith teaches about infused qualities be correctly understood, if those qualities do not have proper entities distinct from the natural entity of substance? Furthermore, that opinion is contrary to experience insofar as a physical thing can be; for who, seeing air being illuminated now and later losing light, would not almost see with his eyes that light is some entity distinct from the substance of air? I omit other things that we shall say about quantity, quality, etc., in their proper places. Moreover, that opinion in that sense rests on no probable reason; for why does it contradict the notion of accident that it should have its own entity distinct from substance and naturally depending upon it? Perhaps, however, this was not the sense of that author, but that an accident, whether it be a thing distinct from the subject or not, is not really distinguished from the actuation or inherence in the subject; for all the arguments that Capreolus reports there seem to tend toward this. According to which sense he does not exclude that an accident can be truly and properly a form, but he badly explains its formal causality. And even in this sense the opinion is dangerous, as Capreolus notes there; for if the

information or (which is the same thing) the inherence of an accident is not really distinct from it, it cannot be understood how an accident is preserved without its actual inherence, which nevertheless faith teaches happens in the Eucharist. Furthermore, if the arguments that Capreolus reports there were of any weight, the same would prove the same thing about substantial form and its information; for they all especially insist on inquiring what that information is, whether it is something distinct from the accident, whether it is relative or absolute, and other things of this kind which are common in substantial information and in any union.

3. Multiple division of accidents. Therefore, in order to resolve the proposed question, various genera of accidents must be distinguished. For some are those which properly and intrinsically affect the thing to which they are said to happen; others, which only extrinsically denominate, like action with respect to the agent and habit or clothing with respect to a clothed man. The former accidents, again, some are those having proper entity and reality distinct both from substance and from other accidental entities. Others, however, are only certain modes attached to other entities, which sometimes are really the same as substance, as for example, local presence, sometimes however are the same as other accidents, as figure with quantity, and the relation of similarity (if it is a distinct mode) with whiteness.

Accidental Entities Truly Cause Formally

4. I say therefore first: accidents which have their own entity distinct from substance exercise proper and true formal causality. I do not assert that this notion befits them univocally; for in this the same reasoning will apply that concerns the notion of being or being itself; for since form is what gives being, if the being that such a form gives is not univocally being, such a form will not be univocally a formal cause. Nevertheless, just as an accident, although it is analogically a being, is nonetheless truly and properly a being and not

metaphorically, and has true and proper real being, so an accident that gives such being is truly and properly a formal cause, even if it is not univocally such. Furthermore, substance is truly in passive potency and receptive of such accidents; therefore conversely the accidents themselves are proper acts actuating and as it were filling that receptive capacity and they inhere in it and are sustained by it; therefore they are properly forms and exercise proper formal causality. And thus all philosophers and theologians feel, who call these accidents formal causes. And divine theology favors this, when it calls inherent justice the formal cause of our justification. Finally, these accidents are causes of their own proper effects, and not extrinsic, but intrinsic, because through themselves they intrinsically constitute their effects. Whence it cannot happen through divine power that such effects be made without such causes, as white, for example, without whiteness. Since therefore it is established that these accidents are not material causes, it is necessary that they be formal causes; for there is no other genus of intrinsic cause besides these two.

5. Hence it is permitted to gather that those four things which were declared above concerning substantial formal cause are found in the same proportion in this accidental formal cause, namely, the formal and proximate principle of causing, the necessary condition, the causality and the effect. The principle, both principal and proximate, in this genus, is the very entity of such a form naturally apt for thus informing, which aptitude is not something really distinct from the entity of such a form, but is its intrinsic and essential difference, for it is instituted for this per se primarily by its nature, just as was said about substantial form. Likewise, because that aptitude is entirely inseparable from such entity, even by divine power, which is a sign that it is not a mode distinct from the nature of the thing. Furthermore, because if the aptitude for informing were some potency as it were distinct from the nature of the thing from the accidental form, that would be some accident; concerning which again it must be asked whether it per se affects; which cannot be denied

unless we wish to proceed to infinity; nor can any other reason be given why that aptitude proximately affects or is the proximate reason of affecting, unless because it is intrinsically instituted for this by its nature; but this very thing is most truly said of the accidental entity itself; therefore one must stop at that and say that it through itself is apt for providing this causality. Concerning the necessary condition for causing, nothing particular occurs to be said here, besides those things that were said about substantial form; for only proximity and lack of distance can be required as a necessary condition, for existence properly is not a condition, as was declared in the same place.

The Said Causality is Explained

6. Concerning causality likewise the same way of philosophizing must be followed; for it cannot be denied that it is something distinct from the nature of the thing from the form and from the subject, since God can preserve the entire entity of the accidental form and of the subject without the accident exercising its formal causality around the subject; which can in no way be understood unless actual causality is something distinct from the causing form and the receiving subject, for separation in reality is an evident sign of distinction in reality, as was shown above. But I add further that such causality is nothing other than the actual union or inherence of the accident in the subject, just as was said about substantial form; for it is the same proportional reasoning.

7. The arguments of Aureolus are resolved. It is necessary, however, briefly to satisfy here the arguments of Aureolus. The first is, because either that information is something absolute or relative; if absolute, therefore separable from the form by the absolute power of God, so that such an absolute remains in the subject without the form, because God can separate any absolute from another. If however relative, therefore being informed, as, for example, being white, is relative. Second, for if it is something distinct from the form, of what

category is it? For it will especially be of the category of action; but this cannot be said, because otherwise the causality of the form would not be formal, but efficient. Third, because if the actuation of the form is something distinct, since it especially actuates the subject, I ask whether it actuates through itself or through something else; if through another, it will proceed to infinity; if through itself, therefore it would have been better to stop at the form itself. And to these arguments are reduced all those which Capreolus reports there most extensively, besides those which pertain to the distinction of quantity from substance, which we shall treat in its proper place.

8. But to these Capreolus responds by supposing the real distinction between being and essence and saying that the actuation of the form is something distinct from the form; but that is not another accident, but the being of the form itself, which is reduced to the species of the form, from which it flows. But what he supposes is not necessary in the present case, nor can it satisfy in his opinion, if he speaks consistently; for it implies contradiction that that actuation be separated from the informing form; but truly according to his opinion God separates being from the informing form in the humanity of Christ, and by the same reasoning he could do the same thing in an accidental form. Nor does the response that he there insinuates satisfy, namely, that God cannot separate proper being from a form, unless he supplies that through some alien being. For granted that this is so, nevertheless that alien being, through which God supplies proper being, is not the formal effect of the form. Likewise, with proper being separated and impeded, proper information remains; therefore it is something distinct from being. And thus it would undoubtedly have to be said consistently in that opinion, that that action does not pertain to the being of existence, but to the being of essence of the whole composite, and that it is something prior to the very being of existence, as is evident in the humanity of Christ, in which, according to that opinion, there was only proper essential being, and nevertheless in that there was proper actuation of the soul, of which

the soul was deprived in the death of Christ, although it was not again deprived of any being of existence. And quantity in the Eucharist is deprived of its action and not of its existence. Therefore those arguments must be solved abstracting from that question about the distinction of essence and existence.

9. To the first therefore it must be said that this information or actuation is something absolute, including essentially a transcendental respect. But it is something absolute not as an entity really distinct from the entity of the form, but as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing, and from this part it implies contradiction that such a mode be preserved without the form itself, although not conversely. Furthermore, that mode includes a transcendental respect of actual union to the subject, and from this part it implies contradiction that that mode remain in the nature of things, unless the subject remains affected and informed by such an accident. Nor is it new or singular that an absolute mode include essentially a transcendental respect, but it is very frequent and common to many entities, especially imperfect and incomplete ones. Nor does it follow from this that denominations taken from absolute forms are relative, as white or being white and similar; for these denominations are not taken from unions (so to speak), but from united forms: but the forms are absolute. To the second, it is correctly said that this mode of information is reduced to the category of the accidental form; because it is a mode completing in some way its being, just as subsistence in its own way completes the being of substance. If anyone however should say that these causalities are revoked to the categories of action or passion, not as actions, but as causalities specifically distinct, perhaps he would not err very much; but we shall examine this when treating the sufficiency of the categories. To the third I respond that actuation properly does not actuate the subject, but unites the form to the subject, through which form the subject is actuated; just as action properly does not act, but conjoins the acting cause to the effect in its genus. Whence, just as action, in the way that it is from the agent, is

not through another action, but through itself, so that actuation, in the way that it actuates or attains the subject, attains not through another, but through itself. Nor is there the same reasoning concerning the form itself, because the form in its precise entity does not include essentially the transcendental respect of actual union, which however that actuation includes.

The Effect of this Form is Declared

10. Concerning the fourth, namely, concerning the effect, it must be said that the proper effect of this form is only the accidental composite, for that is what first and immediately arises from the accident informing the subject, and that alone is what intrinsically and in its own way essentially depends on such a form; therefore this is the proper and unique effect of such a form. Then the effect of this form cannot be the subject itself, since it is substance, which of itself is prior to accident; therefore it is necessary that it be the composite, because there is nothing else that could be. It will perhaps be said that there is a middle between these, namely the subject being affected by the accidental form, as, for example, the effect of whiteness being the subject whitening, so to speak, or being white, which is the same thing; but this is something distinct from the whole composite from subject and whiteness, for it says only the effect left by whiteness in the subject; this therefore is the formal effect of the accidental form, and not the whole composite. I respond that whiteness making the subject white and with that constituting such an accidental composite, is entirely the same and differs only in the mode of signifying, as is established from the terms themselves and from what was said above about substantial form. Only it must be noted that the accidental composite, although in the genus of formal cause it is the effect of the accidental form alone, absolutely however does not arise from the form alone, but simultaneously and especially from the subject itself. Whence it happens that that effect can be signified either precisely as

it is caused by the form, and thus we say the effect of whiteness is making the subject white; or absolutely, as from such a subject and form arises this white thing, and in this way the accidental composite is said to be the effect of the accidental form.

11. The reason for doubt is solved. Nor does the reason for doubt placed at the beginning present any obstacle; for there is equivocation in that term per se when it is applied to the effect as it is an effect or as it is one composite; for the accidental composite itself, although in the notion of being it is not per se one, but per accidens, in the notion of effect it is the per se effect of the accidental form; for these are diverse relations and formal notions, and therefore nothing prevents that composite which is not per se one, but per accidens, insofar as it is such, from being the per se effect of the accidental form; for that composite, whatever it may be, per se and essentially requires that form, insofar as it is such a composite, whence it is per se caused by it in its genus.

Why One Per Se Does not Arise from Accident & Subject

12. The reasoning of some is disproved. But, in order to explain this thoroughly, it can be asked why from an accidental form and subject there does not arise a being per se one, since such a form through itself is truly and really united to such a subject. Many think the reason is because an accidental form presupposes some being of existence in the subject; and furthermore it confers its own proper and peculiar being of existence; but from a double being of existence one per se cannot be composed, but only per accidens. Thus Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 5; and Henricus indicates, Quodl. X, q. 8, where he says that if an accident did not have its own proper being in the subject, but only the being of the subject, it would in no way compose one being per accidens, but per se. Whence, as he reports there, some even from those who posited multiple substantial forms per se ordered in the

same composite, in order to preserve that one per se arises from them, said that the prior forms do not give being when they are actually conjoined to the ultimate form. Indeed even Capreolus, In III, dist. 17, q. 1, concl. 2, considers it probable that it can sometimes happen naturally that a substantial form gives being of essence and does not give being of existence, because of a certain testimony of St. Thomas, in the Opusculum De natura materiae, c. 8, although it is more probable that that opusculum is not by St. Thomas. Add that there have not been lacking Thomists who thought it probable that accidents do not have proper being distinct from the being of substance, according to whose opinion (if the principle posited is true) it follows that from accident and substance one per se is made, for those things which have entirely the same being and per se one, will deservedly be said to have per se unity, since one follows being and being is said from being. Nevertheless all these things are founded on and suppose the real distinction between being and essence, which we think is not possible speaking of actual essence; and even if it were possible or true, it is nevertheless not necessary for defining the present question. For, such as the essence is, such also is the being; whence just as essence can be one, either through simple entity or through composition, so also being itself. If therefore they are said to constitute one per se only those things which have one simple and not composite being, that principle is false and taken without foundation. If however the discourse concerns one being through composition, thus although it is true that an accidental form gives its own proper being, the same question remains, why from such being and the being of the subject one being is not composed which is truly and properly per se one.

13. The effective reasoning of the conclusion. Otherwise therefore it can be responded that an accidental form presupposes complete and perfect substantial being, and therefore from the being of such a form and of the subject one per se being is not composed. Which reasoning is excellent, as regards accidents which are subjected

in complete substance. Nevertheless, because we think that quantity inheres in prime matter, with which it does not make one per se, but per accidens, therefore it must be added that an accidental form, by this very fact that by its nature it regards a subject having being of another order and category and is not ordered toward constituting or completing that being in that order and category, does not constitute with it one per se, but per accidens, because what is per se one ought to be of one order and category. And by this reasoning from matter and quantity one per se does not arise, because, although matter has incomplete substantial being, it is nevertheless not ordered toward quantity as toward the act by which that being is to be completed. And similarly from soul and its potencies there does not result one per se, but per accidens, because, although the soul also has incomplete being, it is nevertheless not ordered toward completing one being with its properties, which are of a lower order, but is per se primarily ordered toward matter, as toward a potency of the same order. Therefore, just as above we were saying that the reason why from matter and form one per se arises is none other than the mutual proportion and relation which they have within the same genus, so, on the contrary, the reason why from accident and substance one per se does not arise is none other than because they do not have that proportion, but another far different one, because, although substance is capable of accident, it is nevertheless not per se ordered toward such an act, as was also declared above; and, conversely, the accident itself is such an act as is not ordered toward completing substance in its genus, but toward perfecting it in another genus.

14. From which it is also understood that this unity and its reasoning must be considered not only in the being of existence, but also in the being of essence (however these may be distinguished); indeed, it is found per prius in essence as such, and by reason of it in existence. For from matter and substantial form truly one essence is made because of the said cause, and therefore the being of that is truly and per se one; but from accidental form and substantial subject one

essence is not made, and therefore neither does one per se being result from them. Although however an accidental form is said to compose only one per accidens, it nevertheless composes it through true and physical union; for we are dealing with a proper accidental form, which intrinsically inheres in its subject; and therefore, as we were saying above when disputing about unity, this unity, although by comparison with per se unity it is analogically unity, is nevertheless not unity only by metaphor, but because it truly and intrinsically participates in some notion of unity, in which it much exceeds beings per accidens, which are called such through aggregation or coordination alone; for not every composite per accidens is equally one, as we said there. And thus the reason for doubt proposed is entirely satisfied; for, although this form constitutes one per accidens, nevertheless because that such is that it includes some physical and real unity, therefore it can compose that through proper and per se formal causality, proportioned to such a composite.

Other Effects of this Accidental form are Examined

15. But there remains another objection against the exclusive part of the conclusion, because not only the composite, but also the very subject of the accident seems to be the effect of the accident informing it, and consequently this effect also proceeds from the formal causality of the accidental form. The assumption is proved, because the subject of the accident depends in being on the accident itself, and only in the genus of formal cause; therefore. The major is evident in the composite, which depends on the ultimate disposition; and more clearly in matter, which cannot be without its quantity; and in the soul, which cannot be without its potencies. Furthermore, beyond these positive effects this form can have a formal privative effect, which consists in the abjection of the contrary form; for heat formally expels cold, and so concerning others. Then, one accident

seems to be able to be the formal cause of another accident, as quantity is said to be the reason of being in place, although being in place is an accident distinct from quantity itself; and similarly the object either through itself or through species is said to be the formal cause of the act of vision, for example; indeed the very visual potency is said to be in some way the formal cause of its vision; for therefore God cannot make vision or a seer without visual potency or without the concurrence of such potency, because formal causality intervenes there which God cannot supply.

16. To the principal objection it is responded that it is not necessary universally and per se speaking that the subject depend on such an accidental form, as is established in light with respect to air, and similar things which come from outside. Wherefore, even if with respect to some forms some dependence of the subject on them intervenes, nevertheless, per se speaking, accidental form as such in its causality does not include dependence of the subject on it. I add then that the subject never depends on accident as on its proper formal cause, in which all authors seem to agree; for if the substantial composite depends on proper accidents, almost all revoke that dependence to the genus of material cause, which they call dispositive causality; and especially this has place in disposition preparing and making apt the subject. For that which is concomitant as it were conserving the subject, cannot have the notion of dispositive cause, much less formal, since it absolutely presupposes the being of the subject and remains from it or ought to be owed by reason of it; and therefore these accidents deservedly are said to conserve the being of the subject, not a priori as causes, but a posteriori as properties concomitant with such a subject, which can truly be said of all intrinsic accidents. For it is almost the same reasoning in all those, and there can only be difference in this, that some simply follow, others are presupposed by order of nature, not because they have special causality besides their information but because they are required on

the part of matter, and therefore according to that reasoning they are said to be revoked to material cause.

17. How an accident expels an accident from the subject. To the first confirmation some think that an accident effectively expels its contrary from the subject and not formally. But, although this is true of an accidental form which is in the agent, with respect to the expulsion of the contrary form which was in the patient, nevertheless of the form which is received in the patient, and universally of contrary forms insofar as with respect to the same subject one through itself repugnates the other and expels it, that cannot be true, because no form effectively expels another, directly and per se effecting expulsion, because (as they say) no agent intending evil operates; nor is there any action which per se tends toward corruption, but per se makes something positive from which follows the privation of the other. But truly an accidental form which is in the patient does not effectively cause itself nor any other form through which it expels its contrary; therefore it exercises no efficiency toward that expulsion, but only by informing the subject it expels the contrary form, because they have formal natural repugnance between themselves with respect to the same subject. To the argument therefore I concede that the expulsion of the contrary form pertains to the formal effect of the accidental form, not of all, but of that which has a contrary. Nor does this contradict the conclusion posited, both because that must be understood concerning positive and proper effect, which is per se primarily caused by the form; and also because the exclusive expression does not exclude concomitant things; but this expulsion of the contrary form so accompanies the positive effect of such a form that it follows by natural necessity from the force of the same formal causality by which the form affects the subject and composes the composite.

18. An accident causes formally no other accident distinct from itself. To the other confirmation it is responded that no accidental form properly causes formally another accident distinct

from itself and from its union with the subject, because one form does not formally cause another form. Whence, if one accident is intrinsically connected to another, it will be either because of natural resultance of one from the other, which pertains to efficiency, or because of necessary subordination by which one is the reason of receiving the other, which pertains to the genus of material cause. Thus therefore quantity is said to be the reason of being in place circumscriptively, in both of the said modes; for it is both the reason through which corporeal substance is capable of such a mode of being in place, and to it naturally follows being somewhere in the said mode. But the object, if it be compared to the potency, insofar as it influences species into it or insofar as by means of species it concurs to the act, does not have the notion of formal cause, but of effective, as is evident per se; if however it be considered as it terminates and specifies the act, thus it exercises no proper causality, but the pure notion of term, which some revoke to formal cause, and call it extrinsic, concerning which we have already said above; but now we are dealing only with proper informing cause. Finally, vital potency is in no way the formal cause of its act, but active and receptive; but for constituting the subject in the notion of actually living, that is, knowing or loving, or something similar, it can be said to concur somewhat formally from part, because although such actual life is consummated formally through second act, nevertheless it also includes the first, which the second per se and essentially presupposes; and perhaps by this reasoning it cannot happen that anyone sees without visual potency and its use, concerning which elsewhere.

19. The unique formal effect of one accident. Why multiple accidental forms can be in the same subject, but not multiple substantial ones. From all these things finally it is inferred that the formal effect of such an accidental form is only unique, and also conversely to such a formal effect only one formal cause can concur. In which there is some similarity between accidental and substantial form and some difference or dissimilarity. For they differ because

substantial forms neither per se nor per accidens can naturally be conjoined in the same subject, but multiple accidental forms can be simultaneously in the same subject in both ways; because since they do not constitute per se one nor give being simply but secundum quid, it does not contradict that such being be multiplied in the same subject, either entirely per accidens, that is, without any relation between themselves, as when white becomes musical, or in some way per se, because one is subordinated to the other, as potency to act, or first act to second, in which way the quantified is colored and the eye seeing. Whence it happens that in the prior way accidents at least specifically or generically different can be multiplied in the same subject in any number without any certain term; for although they cannot be infinite from the general reasoning that it contradicts that the infinite be given in act, and although perhaps also from the defect of natural agents these forms cannot be multiplied beyond some certain term, as much in the same as in diverse subjects, nevertheless, as much as is from the part of the subject and from the part of the accidental forms themselves, no term can be assigned in this, nor is there greater repugnance in a greater multitude of these forms than in a lesser, because in those things which relate per accidens, this makes no difference to their repugnance, unless from elsewhere special contrariety or opposition intervenes. But it is otherwise in those things which are per se ordered, for by this very fact that they have order among themselves, it is per se necessary that there be given in them first and last, and consequently, if there are any middle terms, it is necessary that they be in a certain number by the same reasoning by which this was proved above concerning essential predicates.

20. But the similarity between accidental and substantial form consists in this that, just as a substantial composite is constituted by one form, so also an accidental composite, insofar as it is in its own way one and of one species, is constituted through only one accidental form, because through subordination of genus and difference there is no multiplication of forms, even in accidentals; but from many

accidental forms of diverse species one does not arise properly and immediately, but only by reason of one subject, which with various forms makes multiple composition. You will say: sometimes one form arises from the conjunction and proportion of many, as temperament, health, beauty and perhaps one habit. I respond that these unities either are not proper or arise from some union of such forms among themselves, and such as that union will have been, such will be that unity; and under that notion that form is only of one total species, even if it coalesces from many partial ones. It could also be inquired here whether toward the same formal effect two accidental forms of the same species can simultaneously concur; but this question was disputed above in common when treating the principle of individuation. And then we add that, although such forms were conjoined in the same subject, they would not concur toward the same formal effect, but each would confer its integral effect distinct from the other, as is easily established from what was said.

Whether & How Accidental Modes Cause

21. Second, it must be said that accidents which do not have proper entity distinct from others do indeed exercise formal causality, but in a different way than other accidental forms. The first part is proved first by induction, for figure is the form of the figured thing, and thus Aristotle names the fourth species of quality under the distinction form or figure, and yet figure is not a thing, but only a distinct mode. Likewise, position and Ubi or local presence formally affect the subject, whence they denominate a man, for example, sitting, or standing, or present; nevertheless they are also modes and not distinct entities. The same can be said of passive mutation of a thing. Then a reason can be given, because these accidents through themselves truly and in reality itself affect the subjects in which they are and with them compose one accidental composite; which insofar as it is such, intrinsically depends on them as on the proper act

constituting; and the accidents themselves depend on their subjects as on material causes; therefore they themselves exercise formal causality around their subjects.

22. The second part of the assertion is declared, for these accidents, since they are not distinct things, but only modes, do not affect subjects by means of some mode of union distinct from them from the nature of the thing through which they are united to them, but they are immediately conjoined by themselves, according to the doctrine handed down above concerning modal distinction and the nature of mode. Whence it happens that in these modal forms the formal cause itself is not distinguished from its actual causality, because the causality of the form, as I have often said, is nothing other than the actual union of the form to the subject; therefore where the union is not distinguished from the form, neither can the causality be distinguished. Of which also a sign is that such modal forms cannot remain in the nature of things unless actually causing their effects, even by the absolute power of God; for sitting cannot remain unless it constitute one sitting, etc.; which was demonstrated above concerning modes in general, namely, that they cannot be conserved separated from the things which they modify; but they cannot be conjoined to them without formally affecting them; therefore they cannot actually be without actually causing; it is therefore a sign that their actual causality is not distinct from them, but is intrinsically and essentially included in their notions. In this therefore is the difference between these modes and other proper forms, but in all other things they agree proportionally.

23. Objection against what has been said above. It is resolved. One can only doubt concerning these modes, because from the aforesaid assertion it follows that the mode of union or inherence of accidental entity is a form distinct in reality from the inherent form, for example, from whiteness; but this seems absurd, otherwise, whenever a form is a thing distinct from matter, it will be necessary that two forms intervene and be conjoined so that a formal effect can

arise. Furthermore, it follows that generation is a form of matter distinct in reality from the form which is introduced through generation; and the same will be true of alteration and any change, maintaining proportion. I respond first that, although all these things may be conceded, there is nothing absurd in the matter, if the equivocation of terms is removed; for these forms are both of different natures and are ordered to different effects; therefore there is nothing absurd that they should be multiplied in the same thing and that the same mode, which is a way to a terminus, should be an imperfect form with respect to the subject, or that the same mode of information, which, insofar as it is from a form, is its causality, insofar as it unites and affects it, should be some kind of form of it. But I add furthermore, so that we may speak better and more properly, that there are certain modes which do not constitute their proper species in the breadth of being, but are reduced to the species or predicaments of other things or forms, because they are only like required conditions or their intrinsic causalities, and these modes do not have the proper nature of form, but retain the proper nature of substantial and accidental modes. And for this reason neither the union of the rational soul, for example, can be called a form, because it could be called neither substantial nor accidental. Likewise neither the union of humanity to the Word nor proper subsistence can truly be called a form, as we shall show below. Thus therefore neither the inherence of an accidental form can be called a form nor a distinct accident, if we speak properly, but a mode of accident. The conclusion therefore proposed is to be understood concerning prior accidents; for those only, speaking properly and absolutely, are to be called accidents or accidental forms. Finally, it can be said that by that argument it is correctly shown that these modes, speaking universally, participate in imperfect formal causality, and have another peculiar mode of affecting, pertaining to formal cause.

24. I say third: improper accidents, which only denominate or are adjacent externally, do not exercise true formal causality, but only participate in its denomination according to a certain proportion. This is proved by induction, for action is not a form of the agent, because it does not affect it nor give it any being, nor does it compose with it anything truly one. The same is true of vision, for example, with respect to the object which it denominates as seen; for who would say that vision is a form of the thing seen? The same is true of clothing with respect to a clothed man, and of the surrounding and containing surface with respect to the contained thing, and of all similar things. The reason for all these is that all these things confer no real being to those things which they externally denominate; therefore they are not true real forms, since form is that which gives being. Likewise, because all these things do not have true and real union to the things which they denominate, but form does not cause except through union, whether it be distinct from the form or not; for excluding physical union, there is no composite that is truly one; but where there is no proper composition from which results a composite that is one by some physical unity, true and physical formal causality cannot intervene. Finally, formal and material causality are as it were correlative, for they correspond to each other mutually; but in those things which are externally denominated by others, true material causality does not intervene; for neither can the agent be called the material cause of action, and so on with others; therefore neither are things thus denominative externally true forms. A sign of this is also that God is denominated agent or creator from action or relation which is in the creature, and yet no one would say that such action is compared to God as his true form. But excluding from these things true and physical formal causality, nothing can remain in them on account of which they might be called in some way extrinsic forms,

except some proportion, which consists in this: that such things express certain relationships to other things which they denominate, in which they conduct themselves in the manner of an ultimate terminus or act and therefore seem to denominate in the manner of forms. And thus explained, the conclusion remains and is confirmed regarding both parts. But how these may truly be said to constitute certain predicaments of accidents or certain species of them, will have to be declared below, when we discuss the individual predicamental natures; how likewise in these denominations certain beings of reason are customarily founded we shall say in the proper disputation; and therefore no difficulty remains to be treated in this place concerning this matter.

SECTION II
WHETHER EVERY ACCIDENTAL FORM IS EDUCED FROM THE POTENCY OF THE SUBJECT

1. From all the questions that we have treated concerning substantial form, only this one remains concerning accidental form, which requires special clarification. For if we carefully consider what has been said in the previous section, we comprehend there all things that pertain to the nature of physical form. Those things that pertain to the nature of metaphysical form can be taken from the final section of the preceding disputation. For in the final part of that section, we showed that genera and differences are found in accidents according to the same reason and proportion.

The Meaning of the Question is Explained, Separating the Certain from the Uncertain

2. Extrinsic denominations are not educed from the potency of the subject. Therefore, in order to separate the certain from the

uncertain in the present difficulty, we must presuppose that threefold division proposed in the preceding section concerning the proper entity of accidental form, concerning the accidental mode, and concerning the accident that denominates only extrinsically. And indeed concerning this third member nothing needs to be said, for it is certain that all these predicates that extrinsically denominate other things are not educed from the potency of those things that are extrinsically denominated by them, since they are not in them as in a subject and either do not depend on them at all, like clothing depends on a man and the containing surface on the thing contained; or if they do depend, it is not in the genus of material cause, but either efficient, as action depends on the agent, or objective, as vision depends on the object. Therefore it must always be noted that the thing which extrinsically denominates another is intrinsically in some other thing, for either it is some substance, and that exists in itself, or it is an entity or accidental mode, and thus it is necessary for it to be intrinsically in some subject by which it is sustained. Hence when any thing is newly made that extrinsically denominates another, the mode of its production or eduction is not to be considered with respect to the thing extrinsically denominated, but with respect to that thing or subject from which the denomination comes. Hence, if that thing is a substance, there will be production of the whole and eduction of the form in it, just as in other substances; but if it is an accidental form or mode, there will be the same account concerning these as concerning other accidents.

3. Various modes by which accidental forms come to be. Again, it is necessary to distinguish a twofold mode by which accidents are accustomed to come to be, namely either per se through proper action, or through resultance. Likewise, among accidental forms, some are of the natural order, others are of the supernatural order, like grace, the light of glory and similar things. And the same distinction can be applied concerning accidental modes, for some are natural, like the figure of the earth or place (ubi); others are

supernatural, like the mode of existing of Christ's body in the Eucharist. And we can add here a third member, for some modes are said to be neither natural nor supernatural, but artificial, which member has no place in proper forms or accidental entities, because there is none that is properly made through art, unless perhaps either insofar as art assists nature, as in health, or insofar as active things are applied to passive things through art, as if gold is made through the art of alchemy, and in this way other mixtures are made, like liquors, etc. All of these forms are not properly artificial, except perhaps through some extrinsic denomination; for intrinsically they are physical and natural forms, not only accidental, but sometimes they can also be substantial and of the same nature as those that are made naturally. Hence, the fact that the application of agents and patients is made through art does not prevent them from coming to be through true eduction. Therefore, properly artificial forms are only modes, for they all consist in some figure; because the effective power of humans, which can be ruled or directed by art, cannot extend further, the reason for which we shall see below; but any figure is only a certain mode of a quantified thing, as is evident per se.

4. Natural accidents that come to be through transmutation are educed from the potency of the subject. Therefore, from all these things, only one thing is certain, namely that accidental forms of the natural order that come to be through proper action and proper transmutation of the subject are educed from the potency of the subject; for in these all things that can be necessary for eduction from the potency of matter manifestly concur, which will be established a fortiori from what is to be said. But many other things are doubtful and uncertain, which we shall touch upon individually and briefly resolve.

Doubt Concerning Intentional Qualities

5. The opinion of some. The first doubt is whether certain qualities that are natural, insofar as natural is distinguished from supernatural (they are called intentional, and for that reason they are accustomed to be distinguished from entirely natural and physical qualities, such as intentional species and similar things), the doubt (I say) is whether such qualities are educed from the potency of the subject. For some deny this, like Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 8; this opinion is followed by, In II Sent., Aegidius, dist. 13, q. 2; Thomas de Argentina, a. 8; Carthusianus, q. 1, who extends this to light that is produced in air or another transparent body from the outside; which Alensis also taught, VII Metaph., text. 13. Their foundation is that these forms come to be in an instant and without resistance and rejection of the contrary, and consequently without transmutation of matter; and therefore they are called forms without matter; therefore they are not educed from the potency of matter. And it is confirmed, because these qualities come to be not only in elementary bodies, but also in celestial ones; but truly no form can be educed from the potency of heaven, otherwise heaven would be alterable and would receive foreign impressions.

6. Resolution of the doubt. But this opinion rests on no firm reason, and therefore it must be said that all such accidents are educed from the potency of the subjects in which they are received. Thus holds Richard, In II, dist. 13, a. 2, q. 1; and Hervaeus, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, and Quodl. VII, q. 20. And it is proved, because these qualities come to be from natural agents; therefore they do not come to be from nothing; therefore they do not come to be from a presupposed subject concurring through its natural power in the genus of material cause to the being and becoming of such forms; therefore they are truly educed from the potency of the subject. For all other conditions that are required for eduction are voluntarily fabricated without any reason. For, that an accidental form comes to be in an instant, what prevents eduction? For even a substantial form comes to be in an instant; therefore from this it only follows that there can be both instantaneous

and successive eduction, just as there is change. Nor does it matter that for the eduction of substantial form a successive previous alteration precedes, for, as I showed above, the nature of eduction does not consist in a relation to preceding alteration, but in the intrinsic mode and causality of such action. Hence in this respect it is accidental that previous alteration precedes on account of rejecting the contrary form. Then it is also said gratuitously that it is necessary for eduction that the form have a contrary, since this is not necessary for real action and change from a presupposed subject, which concurs in the genus of material cause to the being and becoming of the quality itself. And it is further clarified in light, which has no contrary, for such illumination is an action whereby not the form of light per se primo comes to be, but the illuminated thing; hence that is a certain accidental generation, for there the three principles of generation concur which are the same in all categories, proportion being preserved, as Aristotle testifies, XII Metaph. But every generation through which a form comes to be or is coproduced is an eduction of the same form, otherwise no certain account of eduction could be assigned; therefore light is truly educed from the potency of the subject, and the same reasoning applies to other intentional qualities.

7. Finally, when these qualities are said to come to be in the subject without transmutation of the subject, this can be understood in two ways: first, absolutely and simply without any real change, and this sense is false; for since they really receive something and are reduced from potency to act, it is necessary that they be changed really in some way, that is, pass from the lack of some being to having it. In another way it can be understood concerning corruptive or privative transmutation of some proper and connatural perfection or disposition; and in this way these forms are truly said to come to be in the subject without transmutation of it; but such transmutation is irrelevant to eduction, whose nature does not consist in the rejection of another form, except when and insofar as it is necessary for the introduction of another. But if the introduction of a form can happen

without corruption or rejection of another, such transmutation will not be necessary for eduction, but perfective change will suffice. This is clarified in this way, for there is true introduction of form into the subject and it is not introduction of a form coming from outside (to use Aristotle's words), that is, it is not mere union of a preexisting form; therefore it is true eduction of a form that was contained in the natural potency of the subject and could not happen otherwise.

8. What change is repugnant to heaven, what is not. And from these things a response has been given to the foundation of the contrary opinion. To the confirmation, however, it is denied that these forms cannot be educed from the potency of heaven, for both they themselves and the changes through which they naturally come to be are contained in its potency. Nor is every perfective or productive change repugnant to heaven, but only that which in some way disposes toward corruption or which draws the thing from the connatural state due to it. But if the name of alteration is extended to instantaneous and perfective change, thus it is not repugnant for heaven to be altered; however, according to the customary manner of speaking, alteration is not said except of successive change that tends toward one quality from a contrary one, and in this way heaven is said to be unalterable; but with the name of alteration taken in this way, the eduction of quality extends more broadly than alteration. Indeed I rather add that not only these corporeal qualities, but also spiritual ones that come to be through proper action in a natural way are educed from the potency of the subject in which and from which they come to be. For thus the agent intellect does not create intelligible species, but educes them from the potency of the possible intellect, in whose natural potency they are contained and on which they depend in becoming and in being; hence they are educed from it into act through the power of the agent intellect. And for the same reason the vital acts both of intellect and of will, both in humans and in angels, come to be through eduction; for previously they were contained in potency not only active, but also receptive of their powers, on which

they naturally depend in becoming and in being; but these things alone are of the nature of eduction, as we shall confirm more fully in the following doubt.

Doubt Concerning Supernatural Qualities

9. The opinion of some and their foundation. Second, it can be doubted whether supernatural forms also, which are said by theologians to be infused per se, are educed from the potency of the subject in which they come to be. Some absolutely deny this[9], because there is no natural potency in the subject for these forms, therefore they cannot be educed from it. And it is confirmed, for nothing is educed except from where it is contained; but the soul, for example, in no way contains grace in its substance; therefore it cannot be educed from it. And the same reasoning applies to all similar qualities. Finally for this reason some theologians say that grace and similar forms are created, others say they are cocreated; but all say at least that they are infused, meaning that they come from outside, not that they are educed. But although it is true that the production of these qualities is not natural eduction, as the arguments made prove, nevertheless I do not think it is outside the latitude of eduction of form from the potency of the subject, but rather, just as a certain quality is of the natural order, another supernatural, yet both are true qualities, so that eduction of accidental form, one is of the natural order, another supernatural; yet both are true eduction.

10. Explanation of the doubt. Therefore it must be said simply that these qualities come to be through eduction from the potency of the subject, and thus theologians commonly speak, especially the more recent ones, treating of grace and the effecting of sacraments, as I noted in I and III of tome III of the third part. And it is proved by all the reasons made in the prior doubt, for all conditions

[9] Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 1, q. 4; Conimbricens., lib. I Phys., c. 9, q. 12

required for eduction and all dependence, causality and mode of effecting are found in these forms. The only difference is that the subject does not concur to these forms through natural potency, which condition the said authors require in the subject so that the form may be said to be educed from its potency; which however they do not prove; hence that condition seems to be added only to exclude these forms, just as anyone can think up and add another condition to exclude other forms; and thus nothing will be firm unless some account of eduction is established from some general and firm reason. Therefore that condition, although it is necessary for natural eduction, is not necessary for eduction simply, under which supernatural eduction is contained, for which natural receptive potency is not required on the part of the subject, but obediential potency suffices. For why, just as there is natural and supernatural quality, and natural and supernatural intellection, and natural and supernatural effecting, from a presupposed subject, will there not also be supernatural eduction distinct from natural, both on the part of the active and passive principle, although they agree in the general mode of eduction? And it is finally clarified by this reasoning, for eduction of form is immediately and adequately distinguished from creation of form in those things that come to be through proper action; for from this philosophers arrived at knowledge of eduction of form, because they understood that forms do not come to be through creation; therefore they suppose that every form that comes to be through proper action and is not created is educed from the potency of the subject. And indeed with good reason, for what is created comes to be from nothing, that is, from no subject and without the concourse of material cause; but to be educed is nothing other than to come to be from a subject with the aforesaid concourse and dependence in becoming and in being.

11. But they can respond that creation requires that it be from no subject, or at least from no natural potency of the subject, but it is not against the nature of creation, as such, that there be production or

effecting of form from a subject according to obediential potency only. But this is repugnant to the nature of creation as it is conceived and explained by all doctors, namely that it is production of being from nothing; for a form that comes to be from a presupposed subject in any way cannot truly be said to come to be from nothing. Hence St. Thomas and all conclude that proper creation is always terminated to a subsisting thing, because an inherent form, since it depends on a subject in becoming and in being, cannot terminate creation. Moreover, the action through which such a form comes to be (whether it is educed from natural or obediential potency of the subject) is not terminated per se primo to the form itself in itself, but to the composite or thing informed by such form as such; therefore just as what per se primo comes to be through the action by which heat comes to be is not heat itself, but the hot thing, but heat is cofit or coproduced, so what per se primo comes to be through the action by which grace comes to be is not grace, but the thing having grace; but that action, insofar as it is terminated to the thing having grace, cannot be creation, because creation is production of the whole entity that is in the primary term of such action; but through that action the whole entity of the composite having grace does not come to be, but it is only completed in the being of having grace; therefore neither can that action, insofar as grace is coproduced through it, have the nature of creation; for this reason no form depending on a subject in becoming is created, because it does not per se primo come to be, but cofit through the action by which the composite is produced without creation. This is finally clarified from the contrary, because when such a form ceases, it is not annihilated, because it only coceases (so to speak) at the ceasing of the composite, which is not annihilated.

12. Supernatural accidents are neither created nor cocreated. Augustine's saying is explained. From these things therefore it is sufficiently (as I think) proven that these supernatural qualities are not created, while they come to be dependently on a subject, even if it is through obediential receptive potency; and from this it is more clearly

concluded that they cannot be said to be cocreated, speaking per se and from the force of such action. For, although they sometimes come to be simultaneously with the creation of the subject and then are said to be cocreated, nevertheless this is accidental and only through extrinsic denomination; but speaking per se and from the force of the proper action through which they come to be in the subject, they cannot be cocreated; because then a form is said to be cocreated when through the action by which it is coproduced, the whole composite that consists of such form is created; but the composite that consists of such form is not created through that action, because it does not come to be absolutely and simply insofar as it is being, but only insofar as it is such a composite; hence it does not come to be from nothing, but from a presupposed subject; therefore neither can such qualities be said to be cocreated, unless the name of creation is taken broadly for any effecting or temporal production. If therefore these accidents are neither created nor cocreated, it remains that they are educed; for (as I said) eduction is proximately opposed to creation of form and is adequately divided against it. Nor does it matter that the production of these qualities is called infusion; for it is only called thus to signify that it comes from an extrinsic and superior cause and is not acquired through intrinsic power and action, just as acquired habits are accustomed to be compared. But that infusion does not happen without dependence on the subject in becoming and in being; nor indeed should it be thought of like the infusion of water into a vessel, but like the infusion of light into air; and therefore such infusion is not outside the latitude of eduction. And thus satisfaction has been given to the motives of the contrary opinion and the mode of speaking of theologians has been explained. Nor is it inconvenient to concede that grace is contained in the obediential potency of the soul; for to be contained in obediential potency is nothing other than what Augustine said: To be able to have faith is of the nature of humans. And therefore it is also excellently said that grace is educed from the obediential potency of the soul, because it is not naturally suited to

come to be per se, but dependently on the soul or another nature having similar capacity.

Corollaries from the Above Doctrine

13. From what has been said it is understood, first, that an accidental form made supernaturally in a subject only as to mode and not as to term, comes to be much more through eduction and not through creation. Examples are the visual power, which is divinely restored to a blind person, and health, which is made miraculously without the order or disposition of natural causes. For in these, although the mode of acting is supernatural, nevertheless the form that comes to be is natural and is received in the subject according to natural potency and capacity and depends on it in being and in becoming, even as it comes to be in such a mode, for that action, even if it is miraculous as to other things, as to dependence on the subject happens in a connatural mode, and therefore it is true eduction. Hence this can be extended to eduction of substantial form, when on the part of the agent it happens to come to be in a miraculous way through sudden and extraordinary transmutation, as when Christ converted water into wine; for that miraculous mode did not exclude the true nature of eduction, for the reason stated. And the same would be true of the action by which God would rouse and vivify the corpse of a horse or lion, for that action would also happen through eduction, as the same reasoning proves.

14. Second, it is gathered from what has been said that every proper accidental form, if it comes to be through proper action and in a connatural mode as to the term, is always educed from the potency of the subject. This is clear from what has been said. First by induction, because both supernatural and natural form comes to be thus; therefore any form. Second by reasoning, because every accidental form by its nature depends in becoming and in being on the subject as on a material cause; and this alone is required for eduction, as has

been shown. And therefore I said if it comes to be in a connatural mode as to the term; for if God were to produce an accident outside every subject (for he can do this just as much as conserve it), such an accident would not come to be through eduction, but through creation; for it would come to be in the manner of a subsisting thing, without dependence on material cause, and thus from nothing; nevertheless that mode of production cannot be connatural to accidental form, just as it cannot be connatural for it to be outside a subject.

15. I also said if it comes to be through proper action, to exclude accidental forms that are cocreated or cogenerated with their subjects, concerning which, either as to the thing itself or at least as to the mode of speaking, there is a special account. For it happens in two ways that an accidental form is coproduced through the production of the subject. The first is through concomitance in duration only, nevertheless through proper action entirely diverse from the action by which the subject is produced, without natural resultance of one from the other, in which way grace is said to be cocreated with angels, or light with air, if in the same instant in which it is created, it is illuminated, and then the action productive of accidental form as to the thing itself is true eduction entirely of the same nature as that which happens later in time, as is established a fortiori from what was said above about eduction of substantial form. But as to the mode of speaking it takes on another extrinsic denomination, because of the concomitance of actions, as has been clarified. The second mode of coproduction of accidental form with the subject is because of natural resultance, such as exists between intrinsic property and substantial form or essence. And then the accidental form is properly said to be coproduced at the production of its subject; but just as that coproduction does not happen without some activity of the essence into its property, so it does not happen without some eduction of the same property from the potency of the subject in which it is received, because that activity precisely considered as distinguished from the

production of the substance itself, essentially depends on the subject in the genus of material cause. But truly, just as that activity is not considered proper and per se action, because by its nature it follows and results from the term of another action, and this is the proper and connatural mode of such activity, so that is not considered proper eduction, because by eduction taken absolutely we understand action that per se primo tends to act something from a presupposed subject; which difference also pertains more to the mode of speaking than to the thing, as will be more clearly established from what is to be said below about efficient cause.

16. Any accidental mode of any condition is educed from the potency of the subject. Third, it is gathered from what has been said that every accidental mode, whether natural or supernatural, just as it participates in the nature of form, so comes to be through eduction, especially if it comes to be through proper action. This is clear speaking generally, because such a mode essentially depends in becoming and in being on the subject, so much so that not even by the absolute power of God can it come to be outside a subject, in which it exceeds accidental entity, as was shown above, whereby it happens that it can never come to be through proper creation; therefore, if it comes to be per se, it is necessary that it come to be through the mode of eduction. And this is especially clear in the category of Place (Ubi), which consists in a certain accidental mode, and to it per se is local motion, as is established from common doctrine in I Phys.: but that motion, since it comes to be from a natural agent, comes to be through the mode of eduction, for it is effected from a presupposed subject and with intrinsic dependence on it. But we said above that these modes imperfectly participate in the nature of form, and therefore they also imperfectly participate in the nature of eduction, not indeed on the part of dependence on matter, which rather is maximal, but on the part of the thing educed, which is an imperfect form. From which it is licit to gather that those modes that do not put on the proper nature of forms can be said to be educed only most improperly; as, for example,

local motion will not be said as properly to be educed from the potency of the subject as its term, because motion is not a proper form of the subject, but a way to form. And therefore it is not properly educed, but is eduction itself. But truly, just as action does not properly come to be, so neither is eduction educed, unless speaking in a broad way it is said to educe itself, just as action is said to make itself. And nearly the same judgment applies to accidental modes that do not come to be per se, but result when other things are posited; such are relations resulting when foundation and term are posited, if we suppose that such relations are modes distinguished from their foundation ex natura rei; for in the way that they come to be, they come to be dependently on the subject, and thus are educed from its potency; nevertheless, because they do not come to be through proper action, but only result, therefore that is not properly eduction, but is called by the proper name resultance.

The Doubt about Artificial Forms is Resolved

17. Finally, from this is resolved the frequent doubt about artificial forms, whether they are educed from the potency of the subject. For some absolutely deny this, because the subject of these forms is not in natural potency to them, but obediential with respect to human art. But this reason hardly stands, because it has already been shown that a form is truly educed from obediential potency. Second, because that obediential potency is not outside the latitude of natural potency, that is, which can be reduced to act by an agent of the natural order, whether such act is naturally due to such potency or not. Hence, when a human effects such a form, he really effects it through natural motive power, although he moves it through will and directs it through art. Therefore it sometimes happens that a similar form or figure is made by a natural agent by chance or from the concourse of several causes. Third, because otherwise in the motion of a stone thrown upward by a human, the Place (Ubi) to which it is terminated

would not be educed from the potency of the subject, because the stone also can be said to be only in obediential potency with respect to such motion; indeed in some way that potency is less, because that motion is violent; but the consequent is false, because the cooling of water, even if it is violent, comes to be through eduction; for although it is repugnant to the form, on the part of matter there is natural capacity; but thus it is in the stone with respect to upward motion. But that such motion is impressed by a free or natural agent matters nothing for eduction.

18. Therefore others absolutely teach that artificial forms are educed from the potency of the subject for the reasons stated. But I think the same judgment should be made about these forms as about other modes that come to be through resultance; for these artificial forms are only certain accidental modes, as was said above, and there is no per se physical action to them; for although the intention of the artisan tends per se to them, and therefore in such a way directs his action through art that he introduces the intended form, nevertheless the action itself, through which he carries out his intention, is not terminated per se and immediately to such form, but to some other mode from which such form results. For these forms always come to be through local motion, which is proximately terminated to Place (Ubi), and from this result various figures of artifacts, either through cutting and division of parts, or through composition and ordered arrangement of them, and therefore in the effecting of these forms there is not proper eduction, but such as can be in natural resultance. From this however I gather that this is not proper to these forms, in that they come to be through art, but is common to all figures, even if they are effected through merely natural action; for they always come to be through resultance alone, either to production or to rarefaction, condensation or situation of quantity.

DISPUTATION XVII

ON THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IN GENERAL

After the consideration of the material and formal cause, which are intrinsic, it follows that we must speak of the extrinsic causes, which are the final and efficient; among these, although the final cause is considered prior and more noble, nevertheless the causality of the efficient cause is better known to us, and therefore we must speak of it first. However, it is not necessary to inquire whether this cause exists, both because this has been sufficiently proved above in treating the number of causes, and also because nothing is more evident and better known by experience; for the transmutations and generations which we experience happening cannot occur except from some efficient agent, which is the cause both of the transmutation and of the effect; for nothing can transfer itself from non-being to being. Therefore, supposing this kind of cause in the nature of things, we must see what it is and in what its causality consists, and what it requires in order to be able to cause. But because in this kind there are many species and modes of causes, therefore we shall first declare in general what this cause is and how many divisions it contains under itself, and what is common to all of them. Afterwards, we shall discuss individually the various species of efficient causes and their various modes of causing, insofar as we judge it expedient for the completion of this matter.

SECTION I
WHAT THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS

1. Aristotle's Definition. What the genus is in it. Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, chapter 2, and Physics II, chapter 3, defines the efficient cause in general by saying it is that from which is the first principle of change or rest. This definition needs much interpretation and addition in order to be reduced to its true meaning, so that it may comprehend every efficient cause and declare its proper causality. For first, nothing appears to be in it that is constituted in place of the genus, for that particle "from which," which alone Aristotle posits, is both improperly placed in the place of the genus and is very equivocal; for both time and place can be said to be that from which motion begins. Therefore, it seems that "principle per se" should be understood in place of the genus; but lest it seem that tautology is committed by saying that the efficient cause is a principle per se from which is the first principle of motion, it should be said that the efficient cause is a principle per se from which first comes or is made change; and thus it happens that Aristotle's description virtually contains this genus through which the efficient cause can be defined.

2. How it is adapted to the defined alone. But then a second difficulty arises; because the definition thus explained also applies to other causes, for matter in its own kind is a principle per se of change and rest. Nor is it sufficient if it is said to be excluded by that particle "first," because, although through that particle the formal cause can be excluded (for indeed it is not the first principle of change, but rather is the terminus of it, on account of which we said in the above that form is not properly the cause of generation, but of the thing generated), nevertheless the material cause is not excluded by that particle, because in its own kind it concurs equally first in change with the efficient cause, and therefore it also is a principle per se from which change first begins. Someone will perhaps say that, although with

respect to some effect matter simultaneously causes change with the efficient cause, nevertheless, comparing the material and efficient cause absolutely, the latter is prior, because it is necessary that the matter itself be made first before it causes. But this is irrelevant to the present matter, because that precedence is remote and with respect to another action, which Aristotle does not mention, nor is it sufficiently established whether he knew it. Hence it is quasi-accidental with respect to the concurrence of matter and the efficient cause in natural change. Therefore this is not sufficient to exclude the causality of matter, otherwise even a secondary efficient cause would be excluded, because it is not first absolutely with respect to the effect, since it is necessary that it first be effected. Two things therefore can be said: one is that, although according to reality natural change is simultaneously from the efficient and material cause, nevertheless according to reason the influx of the efficient cause is prior to that of the material cause, whence, speaking according to precise formal rationes, passion is from action and not conversely, and therefore this causal locution is true and proper: because the agent acts, matter receives. Conversely, however, it will not be properly said that the agent acts because matter receives. Thus therefore the efficient cause is said to be first in the ratio of causing in comparison with matter. Then matter is said to be excluded by that particle "from which." For in rigor it signifies a relation to an extrinsic principle; for matter is the cause of change because it intrinsically receives it in itself and sustains it in itself; but the agent is the principle of action or change only because it flows from it and refers to it with an essential relation, as to an extrinsic principle on which it depends; and this proper ratio and relation is declared by that particle "from which," which is equivalent to the particle "by which," which is properly attributed to the efficient cause; for the material principle is rather "that from which." Hence, for the sake of greater clarity, it could be said that the efficient cause is an extrinsic principle per se by which change first comes.

3. How the final cause is excluded from it. But then a third difficulty occurs, because the definition thus declared rather applies to the final cause than to the efficient; for the end is a principle per se and extrinsic and is prior in causing than the efficient; for the efficient does not act except moved by the end, and therefore the final cause is usually called first among all causes. But because the influx of the final cause is very obscure, especially with respect to physical and real change, therefore it is briefly said that, even if the final cause is prior in the order of intention, nevertheless in execution the efficient cause is first; indeed it alone is that which per se and extrinsically really influences or moves. And in this way the aforesaid definition should be understood, which that particle "from which" or "by which" sufficiently declares. For the end is the principle or cause on account of which change occurs or toward which it tends, nevertheless it is not properly said to be the principle by which or from which action first flows, but this is most properly said of the efficient cause.

4. Whether that definition applies to first and second causes. But immediately a fourth difficulty occurs, because that definition does not embrace every efficient cause. For here it seems to apply only to the first cause, because it alone is that from which every change first begins, or at most it applies to the principal cause, not however to the instrumental or to the faculty, which is the proximate principle of acting, for an instrument does not act except moved or in virtue of a prior agent, and therefore an instrument cannot be said to be that from which motion first comes. On the other hand, that definition seems not to apply to the first efficient cause according to its first and most powerful efficiency, which is through creation, because creation is not change. To the first part it must be said that that particle "from which motion first begins" should not be understood of the first principle absolutely, that is, completely independent and which has no prior cause, otherwise, as the argument concludes, the definition would apply only to the first mover or efficient cause; but it should be understood of the first principle in such an order or kind of causing.

Hence a secondary cause is said to be the first principle from which motion comes, because in the genus of proximate cause motion first arises from it, and thus Aristotle gives an example in the father with respect to the son. Some indeed think with Alexander of Aphrodisias that through that particle instrumental causes are excluded, because they are not properly causes. But, since Aristotle gives an example in the counseling cause, which seems more improper, and universally concludes that the definition applies to every efficient or changing agent, it rather seems that it should be said that he comprehended all modes of efficient causes, as Scotus noted, and that each cause in its own order has the ratio of a principle from which action first comes, either as from a principal principle, or as from an instrumental, or as from a perfecting and executing, or as from a counseling or helping. That particle "first" therefore is only added either to exclude causes which are entirely per accidens, which in no way properly influence action, or to denote the proper mode of causing of the efficient cause and to distinguish it from the material and formal, which are not first in the same way as the efficient, as has been declared above. To the latter part, if we inspect Aristotle's mind, he indeed seems to have defined only the natural efficient cause, which always acts through motion or change; for in Physics II Aristotle disputed only about natural causes, and nevertheless in Metaphysics V he added nothing at all either to the definition or to the doctrine concerning the efficient cause. In both places nevertheless he insinuated that, with proportion preserved, the definition can be extended to every efficient cause. Hence, giving examples, he said: "As he who counsels, and the father, and in one name that which effects of that which becomes, and that which changes of that which is changed." If therefore in place of that word "change" or "rest" we put the word "action," the definition will comprehend every efficient cause, even the first as creating, because, as we shall see below, creation also is action, although it is not change.

5. How the defined is not included in it. But from this another difficulty arises, because it seems that in this way the defined

is placed in some way in the definition; for the efficient cause, according to the exposition given, will be a principle per se by which action first comes; but it is equally obscure what action is; indeed it is almost the same and needs the same exposition, for action and effection are the same; hence efficient or agent is named from action; therefore to define the efficient through action is to declare the same through the same or the obscure through the more obscure. Add that a cause should be defined through its effect, since they are correlatives; but action is not the effect of the efficient cause, but the ratio of causing, as I shall say below. Nevertheless it must be said that, since action is compared to the agent in the manner of a form, the ratio of the agent is not badly declared through its order to action; but Aristotle used the name of change, because it is better known to us, so that through it we might understand in each thing the emanation or dependence from that principle from which it receives being. Hence, although the proper ratio of action and its distinction from the agent and from the effect may be more obscure, as we shall see later, in the present case it is sufficient to understand by action the emanation and dependence of the effect from its extrinsic cause from which it receives being; for in this way, speaking confusedly and generally, it is most well known that there is given in the effect dependence or emanation from its principle, whatever that dependence or emanation may be.

6. Therefore, although action is not the effect of the agent, nevertheless, because it is the way to the effect or the dependence of the effect on the agent, the effect is sufficiently comprehended or indicated in the action itself. For it is the same to say that the efficient cause is the first principle from which action comes and to say from which the effect comes, through the mediation of action, or to be the principle from which the effect flows or depends through action. In this is also correctly signified the difference between this cause and others, for matter and form, properly speaking, do not cause through the mediation of action, but through formal and intrinsic union; the

end however causes only through metaphorical motion, insofar as it is an end; but the efficient cause causes through proper action flowing from it. And in this is also included that this cause does not give to the effect its own and proper formal being, but another flowing from it through the mediation of action, in which this cause differs from the formal and material, which cause their effect by giving their own proper entity, and therefore are called intrinsic causes; but the efficient cause is extrinsic, that is, not communicating to the effect its own proper and (so to speak) individual being, but another really flowing and emanating from such a cause through the mediation of action. From these things therefore it is sufficiently established both what Aristotle's definition is and what the thing itself is, namely, what the efficient cause is, and in what it is distinguished from other genera of causes; all of which will be understood more exactly by declaring the individual things which concur in this causality and are necessary.

SECTION II

IN HOW MANY WAYS THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS DISTINGUISHED

1. Since this name of efficient cause extends very widely and is attributed most improperly and through imperfect analogy to many things, but to others, although it is attributed properly, nevertheless according to various modes of causing, therefore, before we proceed further, it is necessary to premise various divisions of this cause, for the understanding of which it is necessary to have before our eyes the definition given; for according to the diverse mode of participating in it there will be difference in causes.

Efficient Cause Per Se & Per Accidens

2. Various modes of causes per accidens. The first division of the efficient cause therefore can be constituted into per se and per accidens, which Aristotle handed down in the cited places. A per se cause is that on which the effect directly depends according to that proper being which it has insofar as it is an effect, in which way (says Aristotle) the sculptor is the cause of the statue; and because this alone is properly and absolutely a cause, almost the entire following disputation will be about this alone. But the per accidens cause, since it is not a true cause, but is so called through some relation or similarity or conjunction with the cause, cannot be conveniently defined by one common description, but is said in various ways. For sometimes it is said to cause per accidens on the part of the cause, sometimes however on the part of the effect. On the part of the cause, that is said to cause per accidens which is per accidens joined to the principle of per se causing, which sometimes is the very subject of the form, which is the principle of acting; and in this way water is said to heat per accidens, because it happens to water that it is hot and consequently that it heats. And in this way (says Aristotle) Polycletus is the cause of the statue. Sometimes however it is another form per accidens joined to another in the same subject, per accidens (I say) as pertains to the power of effecting, whatever it may be whether they are necessarily joined for another reason. And in this way the musical person per accidens writes, and the white thing heats, etc. But Aristotle adds that this latter mode is more improper or more remote than the former, because the accompanying form contributes nothing at all to the effect of the other, but the subject of the form, since it at least sustains the form itself in itself, seems to contribute something. He adds moreover that these per accidens causes can be assigned both particularly and in common, that is, in species or genus, as "this white thing" or "white thing heats." Likewise they can be explained simply or compositely, as "the musical person builds," or "Polycletus the musical person builds." But these pertain more to the mode of predicating than of causing, and since they are per accidens, they can be

multiplied infinitely according to various modes of conceiving and speaking.

3. The doubt is satisfied. Only someone can doubt, since actions are per se of supposita, why Aristotle says action is attributed per accidens to the suppositum of the form. I respond first that action is per se from the suppositum insofar as it is affected by such a form, not however necessarily according to itself, and thus the hot thing per se heats, but not water. But I add furthermore that then action is attributed per accidens to the suppositum when the power of acting also inheres per accidens, as in the example given, because then in the suppositum taken nakedly the power of acting is in no way contained, and thus action is joined entirely per accidens. But truly if the power of acting per se inheres in the suppositum, even if the suppositum itself is nakedly expressed, it will not be said to be a per accidens but a per se cause of action, and thus I think these are per se: the sun illuminates, fire heats, according to the fourth mode of saying per se, from Posterior Analytics I, chapter 4, because fire radically and virtually includes the proper ratio of heating. You will say: therefore this is per se: man makes a statue, which is against Aristotle. Some respond that that proposition is not per se, because it is not necessary, but contingent. But this is irrelevant to per se causality or (which is the same) to the fourth mode of saying per se; for even these propositions are not necessary: the musical person sings, the hot thing heats, and nevertheless they are per se in the fourth mode. Hence as pertains to causality, I think these are per se: animal moves itself, man reasons, speaks, etc.; but that one: man makes a statue is more per accidens, because even if that art cannot be except in man (I omit intelligences), nevertheless it happens to man absolutely, whence man absolutely said does not include that art except in very remote potency.

4. What is the per accidens cause on the part of the effect. A per accidens cause is also sometimes assigned on the part of the effect, that is, with respect to that which happens to the per se effect, and in this way the very per se cause of some effect is the per accidens cause

of that which is joined to the per se effect, in which way motion is the cause of heat or the hot thing is the cause of blackness. In this way also those things which happen by chance or fortune are said to have a per accidens cause, as when someone digging finds a treasure. But in this kind of per accidens causes it should be noted first that sometimes an effect is called per accidens with respect to the concurrence of some causes, although, that concurrence being supposed, such an effect remains per se from such a cause; as, for example, that when a stone falls it happens that Peter walks there, is accidental; nevertheless, that concurrence being supposed, that the stone strikes by its own force and effects such a wound, is an effect per se proceeding from such active force of the stone, and therefore then the stone will not be said to be a per accidens cause of that effect, except with respect to that concurrence or even with respect to the intention of the mover. But we shall say more about these effects which are per accidens in this way below, when treating of chance and fortune. Again it should be noted that when an effect is said to be per accidens, because it is joined to the per se effect, it can be said to be per accidens in two ways. In one way, with respect only to the intention of the agent; in another way, also with respect to the action itself and the connection of one effect with another. For it happens that one effect is not only beyond the intention of the agent, but also is in no way connected with its action, as when someone digging earth finds a treasure. And then it is most properly a per accidens cause and effect. Sometimes however one effect is by the nature of the thing connected with another, although it is beyond the intention of the agent, as for example, the corruption of one is by the nature of the thing necessarily joined with the generation of another, it is however beyond the intention of the natural agent, and for this reason it is also usually said to be a per accidens effect, not however so properly and absolutely as the former; for insofar as it is necessarily connected, it is in some way per se. A sign of which is that concerning it there can be science and demonstration. Indeed, insofar as in the genus of disposition the privation of the contrary form is

quasi a necessary medium for introducing another form, that effect can be said not to be entirely beyond the intention of the agent; because, although it is not intended for itself, it is nevertheless intended in some way on account of the principal end, and therefore, as pertains to the present matter, we do not count such effects among those which are from a per accidens cause. Hence all such effects either consist more in the figure of predication than in causality, as when it is said: the doctor heals the musical person, of which kind are almost all examples posited in the prior member, or certainly are reduced to chance and fortune, concerning which below.

5. Whether conditions required for acting are per accidens causes. Besides these two modes, certain conditions necessary for acting are also usually numbered among per accidens causes, which do not per se influence the effect or action, as is the proximity of the agent to the patient, the removal of some impediment and any other similar thing, which is usually called a condition sine qua non. Nevertheless this, although it is per accidens with respect to proper and direct causality, nevertheless with regard to physical necessity and insofar as it can fall under science, is in some way per se, and therefore concerning these necessarily required conditions it will be necessary to speak particularly below. I only note that, since such a condition sine qua non agrees with the per se principle of action in this, that it is necessarily required, sometimes it is not easy to discern in which way some disposition or property of a thing concurs in action, whether, namely, as a per se principle, or only as a condition sine qua non. And therefore sometimes this can be known from the general ratio, or mode of such property, as we easily understand that proximity is only a condition, because it is only either a relation or a mode of presence, which from their kind are not active, and in the same way we reason that figure or density are not per se principles of actions, but at most are required conditions for some actions or for the velocity and mode of them. Sometimes however this is more obscure and must be hunted from some special ratio of that thing concerning which there is

question, as happens in that common question whether the knowledge of the object is only a necessary condition so that the appetite may effect its motion, or is also a per se co-effecting principle; for hardly can either part be defined from certain reason, and therefore particular conjectures taken from the proper matter must be used. Two things however occur here to be noted generally. One is that whenever it is established by experiment that some property is necessary for action and otherwise a sufficient reason for that necessity cannot be given, except from proper and per se causality, then one should not take refuge in a condition sine qua non, but this is a sufficient sign of some per se efficiency; of which the best example is in the necessity of the impressed species for seeing, which cannot be sufficiently understood except with per se efficiency posited, and therefore it will not be correctly said that it is a condition sine qua non. But truly, when without per se efficiency a sufficient reason for the necessity of such condition can be given, it can easily be understood that it is only a condition sine qua non, especially if otherwise there is in the cause another virtue sufficiently proportioned so that it is understood to be sufficient for influencing action, and perhaps it happens thus in the said example of knowledge required for elicited appetite, concerning which elsewhere; and thus far concerning the first division.

Physical & Moral Cause

6. What is meant here by the name of physical cause. What moral cause is in the matter at hand. The twofold mode of acting of the physical cause. Second, the efficient cause can be divided into physical and moral. Physical cause in this place is not taken for a corporeal or natural cause acting through corporeal and material motion, but is taken more universally for a cause truly and really influencing the effect; for, as we said above that nature sometimes signifies any essence, so physical influx is sometimes called that which occurs

through true real causality, proper and per se, and in this way both God is a physical cause when he creates, and an angel when it effects motion, either in heaven or even in itself, and the intellect when it effects intellection, and the will volition, and so concerning the rest. But a morally efficient cause can be said in two ways. Sometimes indeed a moral cause is said only because it effects freely, and in this way moral cause is not entirely distinguished from physical taken generally, as explained by us, but will be distinguished from physical acting naturally and necessarily; for thus the will when it freely loves is a true and physical cause of its love, which nevertheless it effects morally or freely. In another way however moral cause is taken as it is entirely distinguished from physical, and is said of that cause which does not per se truly effect, but nevertheless morally conducts itself so that the effect is imputed to it; in which way the counseling cause, or asking, or not impeding when it can and ought, is said to be a moral cause. And in this latter way we now take moral cause, so that physical cause is said to be that which truly effects, moral that which only imputatively. Whence it happens that, considering these physically or metaphysically, this division is reduced to the prior one concerning per se and per accidens cause; for the truly physically effecting cause is said only of the per se cause; but the cause which only morally or imputatively causes, considered physically, is only a per accidens cause, since it does not per se and truly influence. Hence it is always either a non-impeding cause, when it can and ought, or a cause applying the per se cause or inducing it, either through counsel, or through prayers, or through the mode of merit, or sometimes also through local motion, as when someone applies fire to a house; for, although it is a per se physical cause of that motion of combustion, nevertheless it is only a per accidens cause. But this causality, which physically is per accidens, is reckoned morally and imputatively as per se. Concerning the moral cause therefore taken in this way, nothing further is to be said by us, because, insofar as it is per accidens physically, it does not fall under science; insofar however as it is per se

in the genus of morals, its consideration pertains to moral science, not to metaphysics. But the physical and true cause can have a twofold mode of acting, namely, either naturally or freely, or necessarily or contingently, and concerning these two modes of acting we shall speak below, because they maximally pertain to explaining both the perfections and natures of diverse causes, and also the series and connection of effects of the universe and the mode of influencing or concurring of the first cause with the second; but the consideration of morality which pertains to free acts, insofar as they are free, does not pertain to the present science, but to moral philosophy or rather to divine theology.

Concerning Principal & Instrumental Cause: First Exposition

7. Third, the true and proper efficient cause is divided into principal and instrumental, of which words the use is usually very ambiguous and equivocal, therefore their signification must be carefully explained. Principal cause is usually said to be that to which action is properly and absolutely attributed. But this description does not sufficiently declare the matter; first indeed, because the form of a thing, as the soul, for example, is in some way a cause, and not instrumental, as is evident; therefore, if that division is adequate, it is contained under principal cause, and nevertheless action is not properly attributed to it, because the soul, as Aristotle said, does not properly act; therefore that description does not apply to every principal cause. For this principal cause, as the reason made declares, is one thing that operates, another that is the principal principle of operating, which are usually called principal cause as "that which" and as "that by which"; but the given description applies at most to the former cause, not however to the latter. Indeed it can be further objected that that description does not apply to every cause as "that which," but only to the proximate and particular cause, not however to

the universal and first. For as will be established below, the principal efficient cause is divided into first and second or proximate and universal, and both are principal causes; indeed the first is more principal than the second, and nevertheless absolutely and properly the effect is not attributed to the first, but to the second; for when man walks, sees or understands, God is not said to walk, see or understand, although he more principally effects those motions than man. But this objection does not press much, for truly the effects of second causes can be properly and truly attributed to the first, because "neither he who plants is anything, nor he who waters, but he who gives the increase, God"[10]. Hence, although the earth brings forth green grass, nevertheless it is attributed to God that he produces hay for beasts and herb for the service of men[11], and that he forms the fetus in the womb, and finally that he works all our works, as we shall say more broadly below. That therefore those denominations of seeing, etc., are not attributed to God, is because they are not taken from pure efficiency, but more from information and reception of the motion or act effected. For it is not said that he sees who in any way makes vision, but who so makes it that he is informed by it; indeed from this latter relation that denomination is chiefly taken, so much so that if that could remain without efficiency, or at least without principal efficiency, it would suffice for that denomination. Therefore there is no doubt that the effect as to pure efficiency can be truly and properly attributed to every principal cause operating as "that which."

8. Whether the absolute denomination of agent is attributed to the instrument. It brings greater difficulty, because this does not seem proper to the principal cause, for sometimes it is attributed to the instrumental, as appears from theological examples; for man is said to consecrate, absolve, etc., although he does this only instrumentally; and in physical things semen is said properly to

[10] 1. Cor. 3, 7

[11] Ps. 104 (103), 14

dispose matter and by means of that disposition to effect generation. And the reason seems to be that that denomination is properly attributed to the suppositum operating, and therefore, if it happens that the instrument is a suppositum in some way operating per se, action can also be attributed to it. For indeed, if water is properly and absolutely said to heat, even if it is only a per accidens cause, only because it is a suppositum sustaining the principle of heating, what wonder that action is attributed to man or to another suppositum, even if it has only instrumental power of operating? But to this it can be said that this denomination is never attributed to a cause except by reason of some principality (so to speak) which it has in such operation; as it is attributed to man that he consecrates or absolves, etc., because in exercising external actions through which effects are made he operates as principal cause and because he operates the same as lord of his actions. But semen is not said properly to generate, nor even properly to organize or dispose matter except insofar as by its own virtue it can effect something preliminary, in which it conducts itself as principal agent. Finally water is not said per se to heat, but per accidens, and therefore it is not to the point, because here we treat of per se attribution. And that same per accidens denomination has its foundation in this, that water in the ratio of subsisting and sustaining the principle of heating conducts itself as principal operant. Thus therefore, speaking absolutely, it is proper to the principal cause that action and effect are attributed to it. And this can be accommodated with proportion to the agent "that which" and to the principle of acting "by which," to the former as operating, to the latter as principal ratio of operating. And it can also be added that principal cause is said absolutely of the cause operating as "that which," but of the principle only reductively and in a qualified sense; and therefore it suffices that the description be accommodated in the same way. In this manner therefore that definition can be sustained, although in it the proper ratio is not explained on account of which the effect is absolutely

attributed to the principal cause, since nevertheless the proper ratio of the principal cause seems to consist in this.

Second Mode

9. Otherwise therefore principal cause is usually said to be that which influences the effect by its own virtue; or otherwise, which influences with sufficient virtue, or which with the concurrence due to it is sufficient for producing the effect. Nevertheless in none of these modes does the proper and adequate ratio of this cause seem to be sufficiently declared. For to influence the effect by its own virtue applies not only to the principal cause, but also to the instrumental, especially in natural instruments, whatever may be the case concerning others. For natural heat, which is an instrument for converting nourishment into the substance of the nourished, has natural and innate power for that action, and similarly the heat of fire, if it is the natural instrument for introducing the substantial form of fire, has proper and innate virtue for that instrumental action. For it cannot act without proportioned virtue, nor does it have it extrinsic or adventitious; therefore innate and proper. But if it is said that it indeed has virtue, but it is instrumental, this is what we are inquiring, namely what is lacking for the ratio of principal principle, since it has been shown that it operates by its own virtue; for it does not seem necessary what was added in the second place about sufficient virtue. First indeed, because just as heat alone does not suffice for introducing the form of fire, so neither does form alone without heat; therefore by the same reason form will not be a sufficient principle. Then, because principal cause is to be further divided into total and partial, and both are distinguished from instrumental; but partial cause does not operate with sufficient virtue; therefore it is not correctly separated from instrumental in this. Moreover, since the virtue of the principal cause is said to ought to be sufficient, either it is understood of sufficiency in every genus or order of efficient cause, and this is false,

otherwise no second cause would be principal, because none is absolutely sufficient; indeed not even the first cause, when it would concur with the second, would act as principal cause, because then it does not operate as sufficient per se alone. But if it is understood of sufficiency in its own genus, even the instrumental cause is sufficient in its own order; therefore the proper ratio of the principal cause is not sufficiently declared by this. Finally, what is added about due concurrence declares the matter nothing further, both because the necessity of concurrence does not apply to every principal cause, but only to the second, and also because concurrence is not only due to the principal cause, but also to the instrumental; for concurrence is due to heat both for heating and for producing fire, if it is sufficient heat; therefore in none of these modes does the ratio of principal cause seem sufficiently declared and distinguished from instrumental.

Third Mode

10. On account of these considerations, there can be another way of speaking: that the principal cause is that which proximately and through its proper influence flows into the effect or into the form constituting the effect. This position is better clarified by adding simultaneously the account of instrumental cause and the difference between both. For an instrumental cause will be that which by its action does not immediately reach the effect or form, but something preliminary from which such a form results, which the instrument does not reach proximately and in itself. Hence it happens that every instrumental cause is principal with respect to some effect, namely that which it reaches proximately and per se; but it is instrumental with respect to another effect which results therefrom. This is clarified first by examples in artificial things: for a saw, for instance, is an instrument for making such a work of art, which instrument proximately brings about only an incision, by impelling and moving parts from place to place, and with respect to this effect it is compared

rather as a principal cause; but from this results the artificial form, to which it is compared as an instrumental cause because it does not reach that form immediately by its proper action, but it only results from the prior effect. Then in natural things, the heat of fire is an instrument for the form of fire, because it immediately reaches heat with respect to which it behaves as a principal cause; but from this results the substantial form, which it does not reach immediately, according to the probable opinion of Scotus and others. Finally in supernatural things, according to the opinion of Paludanus, Capreolus and others, the sacraments are called instruments of grace because they do not reach grace itself, but something preliminary to it. Hence not without merit can this way of speaking be attributed to these authors cited in the second and third examples, whom St. Thomas seems to favor not a little in I, q. 45, a. 5, saying that the secondary instrumental cause does not participate in the action of the superior cause except insofar as through something proper to itself it operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent. And the reason can be given because the concourse of the instrument is always imperfect, and therefore it does not pertain to it to reach immediately the induction of that form for which it is an instrument, but only to prepare for it by acting. Hence conversely, every cause which immediately reaches the form will be principal and not instrumental.

11. Instruments reach the form intended by the principal agent. But this position cannot be proven, because first of all it is false that an instrumental cause as instrumental never reaches immediately and in itself the form intended by the principal agent, which is evident first by contrary induction. For in supernatural things, the sacraments are instruments for effecting grace, reaching it in itself; and similarly Christ through the actions of his humanity reached immediately supernatural works, concerning which much has been said in volumes I and III of part III. Again in natural things it is more probable that accidents as instruments of substances reach immediately the eduction of substantial form. There is also the probable opinion that

the phantasm instrumentally reaches the production of the intelligible species, and yet it does not reach something preliminary, but immediately the species itself in itself. Finally in instruments of art it sometimes appears that through the form of the instrument the form of the effect is proximately reached, as when a similar figure is impressed on wax or coins with a seal, although then also in reality the figure is not made per se, but the location (Ubi), whatever Scotus cited below may signify. Therefore it is said more generally that it is indeed true that these instruments per se do not reach the figure or artificial form, yet this is not because they concur instrumentally, but because that form is not otherwise producible per se. Hence neither does the principal agent itself induce it otherwise; for per se it only makes the local terminus of motion, which is some location (Ubi), and because it effects that motion in a certain manner and order, from this results such a figure; therefore in that action the principal and instrumental agent cannot be distinguished in reaching mediately or immediately. Indeed, if we consider the terminus produced per se, which is the location (Ubi), the instrument seems to reach it more immediately, because the painter does not move the color except by means of the brush, and so with others. But the final form or figure is not reached by another action per se, but results from the prior terminus.

12. Moreover, this is clarified by reason, because in three ways can an instrument be understood to concur toward the effect of the principal agent, namely, either only remotely, by reaching something preliminary, or only proximately, namely by reaching immediately the form intended by the principal agent, or simultaneously in both ways; but the nature of instrument is not limited to the former mode, granted that it can sometimes concur in this way; therefore the instrumental agent is not correctly distinguished from the principal in that mode of reaching. The minor premise is sufficiently clarified by the examples adduced. And the reason can be given because, although instrumental concourse is of an inferior nature, nevertheless, because

the instrument does not reach per se alone, but as aided and strengthened by the principal agent, therefore there is no repugnance that the instrument should immediately reach the effect of the principal agent. Hence St. Thomas in III, q. 77, a. 3, ad 3, and q. 79, a. 2, ad 3, says: "Nothing prevents an instrumental cause from producing a more powerful effect and beyond its own species." From this reasoning the foundation of the contrary position remains solved; nor does St. Thomas in another place oppose us, but rather favors this position; for he does not say that the instrument only concurs dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent, but that it does not participate in the action of the principal agent except through its own mediate action. Hence the Thomists conclude that every instrument has two actions: one by which it acts something proper, in which it does not completely exercise the office of instrument; another properly instrumental, by which it immediately flows into the effect of the principal agent. Ferrariensis contends that these actions are always really distinct in II cont. Gent., c. 21. But Cajetan more correctly says in I, q. 45, a. 5, that this is not necessary, for sometimes there is only one action, in which according to reason or accommodation we distinguish something which the instrument can reach from its own properties, and something which it reaches as an instrument. But both agree in this, which pertains to the present matter, namely that the instrument as such and through the action which it exercises as instrument, reaches immediately and per se the effect of the principal agent, insofar as it is reachable or producible per se. And indeed the nature of natural instrument can scarcely be otherwise preserved, except improperly and by extrinsic denomination, as I shall clarify below. And Scotus also inclines to this position in In IV, dist. 1, q. 1.

Fourth Exposition of Principal & Instrumental Cause

13. The fourth way of speaking can be that an instrumental cause is that which only acts as moved by another; but contrarily, a principal cause is that which per se and without motion from another has the power of operating. This explanation seems to be taken from what we experience in instruments of art; for those are better known to us and in them there is no other mode of operating. Hence St. Thomas in II cont. Gent., c. 21, reason 4, says that an instrument is never applied to cause anything except through the way of motion, for it is of the nature of instrument that it be a moved mover; and in reason five he says that the instrument is a medium between the principal cause and the effect, so that the efficacy of the principal agent reaches the effect through the mediate motion of the instrument. From this some infer, dissenting extremely from the third mode treated above, that when principal and instrumental cause concur simultaneously, the effect is reached more immediately by the instrumental than by the principal, more immediately (I say) by immediacy of the supposit (as they say); because the principal agent does not act except through the instrument; but by immediacy of power the principal agent is said to act more immediately, because the instrument does not act except in its power. And from this the position is confirmed by reason, for the instrument as such does not act except in the power of the principal agent; but the instrument cannot rely in operating on the power of the principal agent unless because it is moved by it; therefore the nature of instrumental cause is correctly explained through this, that it acts as moved by another, and consequently the principal cause will be that which does not need motion from another in order to act.

14. Whether the instrument claims some motion for itself from the principal cause. But neither does this position fully clarify the matter or satisfy. For when it is said that the instrument acts as moved by another, this can be understood in two ways. In one way, concerning real motion or change received in the instrument itself and prior to its action, and Ferrariensis understands that proposition in

this sense in II cont. Gent., c. 21. Nevertheless the proposition cannot be universally true in that sense; indeed it is scarcely found true except in instruments of art, which are applied to operate through local motion; but in instruments of nature, not at all; for if the phantasm is an instrument, what action does it first receive in itself in order to act? Does it perhaps receive in itself some spiritual light? But this is fictitious and plainly repugnant to a material subject. Likewise, the heat of fire is its instrument for generating fire, and vital heat or nutritive power for producing flesh, in which no true antecedent motion can be devised. Likewise, seed is called the instrument of the generator, which, after it has been separated, receives no new motion from the principal agent. I omit supernatural instruments, concerning which I have spoken extensively in III, q. 13, and 62. I add next that not all things which move when moved act as instruments, properly and rigorously, but as principal agents, at least partial ones. For some things do not alter unless altered, as pepper does not heat unless heated, and yet it does not heat only through received power, but also through its own and innate power, which is an eminent power for heating; hence in it it conducts itself as a principal agent. Likewise, a man does not move a stick unless by moving his hand. Although for this reason the hand is usually called an instrument, or rather the instrument of instruments or the instrument before instruments, as Aristotle said in IV de Partib. anim., c. 10, nevertheless it is really a partial principal mover, for it has in itself a partial power of drawing, or impelling, or lifting. Hence in these things often the motion of one thing is only a necessary condition for drawing or impelling another, which is not sufficient to remove the nature of principal agent and induce the proper nature of instrument. Indeed even the heavens (as many wish) do not move unless moved, and yet they do not move as an instrument, concerning which more below. Therefore from the nature or condition of a moved mover through real change received in itself, instrumental cause is not correctly distinguished from principal, because neither do all instruments move in this way to act, and almost

in the way that it happens that some instruments are moved, it also happens that some principal causes are moved. A sign of this is that instruments of art, even for doing that which they can do from their own power, need some motion, and through art it only happens that this motion occurs in an orderly fashion.

15. Are creatures to be called instruments of God? In another sense therefore it can be said that an instrument acts as moved by another, that is, as subordinated to another or as having the place of that other, or also as aided by the principal agent, according to various genera of instruments to be clarified below. And in this sense it is indeed true that every instrument acts as moved by another (if nevertheless it is permitted to speak thus), yet this is not proper to the instrument strictly taken as we now treat of it and distinguish it from the principal cause; but rather it is common to every inferior principle of acting and to every cause besides the first. For first of all, all secondary causes act when moved by the first, that is, with the concourse and aid of the first, as we shall clarify below, and yet they are not properly instruments, but principal causes in their own genus. I know that some of the ancient authors sometimes call secondary causes instruments of the first, as is evident in St. Thomas, q. 3 de Potent., a. 7, where he thus concludes: "So therefore God is the cause of every action, insofar as every agent is an instrument of the divine power operating." The same is taken from I, q. 105, a. 5. And Damascene speaks in the same way in his Physics, c. 9, where he says this is a doctrine of Plato, whom in this he judges to be preferred to Aristotle. Likewise Simplicius, 1 Phys., text. 29. Hence Scotus in In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, § Ad quaestionem ergo, says that a cause can be said to operate principally in two ways. First principally, that is, independently, and thus secondary causes are not principal, but instrumental. Second principally, that is, through proper and intrinsic form, and in this way he says secondary causes are principal. In which, although he does not sufficiently explain the nature of principal cause, he nevertheless truly says that secondary causes are principal, and in

Aristotle's doctrine it is certain that they should be called thus, as is taken from II Phys. and V Metaph. in the cited places. And from the very property of the term it is evident that to operate principally and independently are not the same; so that a cause may be principal, it is not necessary that it be entirely independent. And conversely, that a cause is dependent and needing aid from another superior, is not sufficient for it to be an instrumental cause. Moreover, the intellect is not commonly considered an instrument, but the principal principle of its natural acts, nor the will and other similar faculties, although in acting they are subordinated to their forms. It is true that all these faculties, indeed even all accidents, are called instruments by some, and correctly indeed, if by the name of instrument they understand every principle by which of operating, which is not for its own sake, but so that some supposit may use it, but not if we speak rigorously of instrumental cause and action; for thus heat is not properly an instrument for producing heat, since it does not exceed the perfection of the effect of the principle or cause.

The True Nature of Instrumental & Principal Cause

16. Various acceptations of instrument. Since therefore the difficulty of this matter seems to depend in great part on the use of terms, therefore, lest we labor in equivocation, it is necessary to distinguish the significations of these. And beginning from the instrument or instrumental cause, in one way it can be distinguished from the principal cause by antonomasia or operating entirely independently, as Scotus said; and thus the distinction of these members in common is easy; but I do not speak thus now, because I consider the discourse improper. Second, every cause or power which is given to someone so that he may operate through it can be called instrumental cause, in which way also form can be called the instrument of the supposit, although this is not in use, because form

essentially constitutes the supposit itself; nevertheless it is said of every other power superadded to the supposit; indeed sometimes also of integral parts, especially organic ones, as of hand and arm; in which way theologians call the humanity of Christ the conjoined instrument of the Word, which is said more properly in order to miraculous and supernatural actions than in order to actions connatural to humanity. And taken in this second way, instrument is said to be any power or principle of acting given to an operating supposit so that it may operate through it, even if such power is sufficient and equally perfect, or even nobler than the effect. But the principal cause divided against the instrumental, taken in this way, will be the very supposit operating, insofar as through itself or through its substance or through its form it has the power of operating. In another way also, instrument is said to be that which is substituted in place of another to carry out an action, even if it happens that such instrument is nobler than the action or effect for which it is destined, in which way gravity is usually called the instrument of the generator and impetus the instrument of the projector, and thus the principal cause respectively opposed to this instrument will be that whose place the instrument holds. And in moral matters this genus of instrumental or ministerial cause is more frequently used.

17. In the final and most proper way, instrumental cause is said to be that which concurs or is elevated to effect something nobler than itself or beyond the measure of its proper perfection and action, as heat, insofar as it concurs in producing flesh, and universally an accident insofar as it concurs in producing substance. And concerning this genus of instruments many doubt, not only in natural things, but also in supernatural, speaking, as we speak, of instruments truly efficient and physically reaching the superior effects themselves; as can be seen in Scotus and others, In IV, dist. 1, and we shall touch upon this more extensively in the following disputation, treating of the efficient cause of substances. But we suppose that in every order of things such instruments can be given, as we shall show concerning

natural ones in the cited place, and concerning supernatural ones we have said in III p., and concerning artificial ones all admit, although in those, as I said, the form chiefly intended by the artificer is not reached per se and immediately by the instrument, but results; yet in whatever way it happens, it exceeds in some way the power of the instrument considered according to itself and is made by it insofar as it is directed and moved by art. Therefore we take instrument in this proper and rigorous way when we distinguish it from principal cause.

18. And thus the principal cause will be that which through principal power, that is, either nobler or at least equally noble with the effect, flows into the action through which such effects are produced. In which way not only the first cause, but also the second, both univocal and equivocal, is comprehended under the name and nature of principal cause. Nor does this nature belong only to the total cause, but also to the partial, if it operates by similar power, because a properly so-called partial cause speaks of a relation to a co-partial of the same nature and order, so that neither is subordinated to the other, but from both coalesces one total principal cause of the same order, which is partially from such causes, and therefore each is principal, although partial. And such a principal cause is correctly said to operate by proper power, not only because it has that power of acting as intrinsic and innate, but also because it has it per se proportioned to the effect and not needing any elevation; and although it sometimes needs the concourse of a superior cause on account of the general nature of participated being, nevertheless not on account of special disproportion with the effect; and therefore it only needs concourse owed to it by reason of its perfection.

19. How the instrument is said to operate in the power of the principal agent. But the instrumental cause, divided against the principal so taken, will be that which flows into the effect through power of inferior nature or perfection, as has been clarified by reasoning and examples above. And this is said to operate in the power of the principal agent, not because it does not need some intrinsic

power, that is existing in it, for its instrumental action, whether that power is innate or superadded to the thing, and whether it is permanent and durable when the action ceases, or flowing (as they say) and consisting in motion; for in various instruments it can be found in various ways, yet some instrumental force is necessary, otherwise no action could proceed from such a thing, as Scotus correctly noted above, and I have extensively clarified in volume I of part III, disp. XXXI, sect. 6. Therefore these instruments are said to operate in the power of the principal agent, because that force which is in them is disproportioned and insufficient and only has the power of operating according to the measure of the power and elevation of the principal agent. Hence neither is such concourse or elevation properly or for its own sake owed to it, but is only owed to the principal agent or by reason of it. And according to this interpretation all the difficulties touched upon in other modes cease; indeed many things which are said in them, except the third mode, are reduced to a suitable sense.

First & Second Cause

20. And from these other divisions of efficient causes are easily understood, which are subdivisions of the said members. For fourth, efficient cause is divided into first and second, where, if we speak broadly, efficient cause can be divided in common, because every cause depending on another, whether it is principal or instrumental, can be called second; but speaking more strictly, the principal cause is there subdivided; for some is entirely independent in operating, and this is called first; but another is dependent, even if it operates through principal and proportioned power, and this is called second cause. But that both kinds of cause are given in the nature of things is most evident. For either some principal cause depending on another in operating is given in things, and from this member the other is necessarily inferred, because one cannot proceed infinitely in

dependent causes, and therefore one must stop at some independent one, which we shall pursue more extensively below, demonstrating that God exists. But with an independent cause admitted, the other member is also necessarily inferred, because not all causes can be independent; indeed such a cause cannot be except unique, as we shall demonstrate more extensively below treating of the actions of the first cause, and below disputing about the unity of God. And therefore we shall say nothing more about this division, because concerning these two members almost our entire future disputation about efficient cause will be.

Univocal & Equivocal Cause

21. The instrumental is not equivocally a cause. Fifth, cause is divided into univocal and equivocal, in which partition cause can also be divided in common, if we call instrumental cause equivocal. Which nevertheless is said improperly and contrary to common usage, as St. Thomas noted in In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4, q. 1, ad 4, from Alexander and the Commentator, XI Metaph., com. 24. Therefore the principal cause is there divided, and indeed it can be divided in common, because the first cause is also equivocal. But because the first cause is supposed to be not only equivocal, but also entirely of another order, therefore that division is more appropriately given concerning the proximate principal cause. For some is that which effects an effect of the same nature, and this is called univocal, as fire when it generates fire; and universally a cause, which operating through the power of its form renders the effect similar, is a univocal cause and principal in its order, as St. Thomas correctly notes in III, q. 62, a. 1. But another is a cause producing an effect of another nature, which must be nobler than the effect, otherwise it would not be principal, but instrumental, and this is called equivocal cause; because it does not agree formally with the effect in the same form, but contains it eminently. Again, even principal cause can be divided into that which operates from necessity

of nature, or with freedom. Likewise, into that which acts through motion or change from a presupposed subject and that which acts without motion and change and without subject. But these divisions are contained in the superior ones and only declare determined actions or modes of operating of the said causes, concerning all of which there is to be disputation below in particular.

Conjoined & Separate Instrument

22. Sixth, the division of instrumental cause or instrument into conjoined and separate should be noted, in which terms there is usually great equivocation and therefore it must be carefully observed that an instrument can be understood to be conjoined to the principal agent in two ways (for it is called conjoined or separate instrument with respect to it), namely, either according to being, or according to causality. I call conjoined according to being that which is united in some way, either through contact, or through some presence, or through some real union, to the principal agent, in which way the pen is a conjoined instrument, etc.; but separate, opposed to this, will be that which is in no way conjoined to the principal agent, as is seed already separated, and according to various modes of conjunction and separation there can be latitude and variety in these terms. According to causality, I call conjoined that instrument which for causing needs actual and proper influx and causality of the principal agent, in which way also the pen is a conjoined instrument; hence contrarily a separate instrument will be that which in its action does not require special influx and causality of the principal agent. And in this way, if heat is called the instrument of fire for heating, although it is conjoined according to being, it can be called separate according to causality, because it does not need another influx for heating, besides its own proper power. Hence it happens that sometimes an instrument can be conjoined in one way and separate in another, as is evident in the said example. And conversely, the sacraments are called separate

instruments of the humanity of Christ existing in heaven, namely according to being, and yet according to causality perhaps they are conjoined, because they can effect nothing unless Christ actually influences with them through his humanity. Sometimes an instrument can be conjoined in both ways, as sight or impressed species; sometimes separate in both ways, as the gravity of the generated with respect to the generator. All of which are clear, if the terms are understood. One thing alone remains difficult in the matter, how there can be given an instrument separate according to causality, speaking properly and rigorously about instrument according to the final mode clarified above; for if it is taken more broadly for power per se sufficient for the effect, which supplies the place of that cause which impressed it, thus the matter is clear, as in the impetus of projectiles, gravity, etc. Yet in the proper instrument, which must be elevated to act a superior effect, as seed is, for example, this is most difficult to understand. But the exposition of this matter requires many things to be explained first, which will be delivered in the following disputations.

DISPUTATION XVIII

ON THE PROXIMATE EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS CAUSALITY, AND ALL THAT IS REQUIRED FOR CAUSING

In the previous disputation, we have almost solely declared what the name of efficient cause means, and its many species and modes; now it is fitting to treat distinctly all things that pertain to this cause, through those chapters or divisions which we have touched upon in other causes, namely, what things it causes, what it causes, through what or by what principle it causes, what conditions it requires for causing, and finally in what the actual causality of this cause consists. All these things could indeed be treated concerning efficient cause in general; nevertheless, for the sake of greater clarity, it has seemed good to investigate all these things first in created causes, which are better known to us, and afterwards to discuss the first and uncreated cause, and finally the dependence of the others upon it. We do not, however, distinguish the treatment of the efficient cause of substances and accidents, since, as we shall see, these are so connected that the production of substances does not occur except through the mediation of accidents. And for the same reason we do not separate the disputation concerning principal and instrumental cause, since in treating the proximate efficient cause, to which action is attributed per

se and properly, it must simultaneously be seen what principles and what instruments it uses for effecting.

SECTION I
WHETHER CREATED THINGS TRULY EFFECT ANYTHING

1. Various opinions. Aliacensis alien from the preceding opinion. In this matter there was an ancient opinion asserting that created things operate nothing, but that God effects all things at their presence, and that action is attributed to fire, water, etc., on account of appearance, and because God has as it were covenanted not to effect such effects except at the presence of such things. This opinion is reported by Averroes, IX Metaph., comm. 7, and lib. XII, comm. 18; and Albert, II Phys., tract. II, c. 3; and St. Thomas, III cont. Gent., c. 69, and I, q. 105, a. 5, and In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 4; yet they report no certain author in favor of it; but Philo seems to incline toward it, lib. II Allegor., when he says that God is the unique efficient cause; and lib. de Cherub. et flam. glad., when he says it is proper to God to effect, but to the creature to suffer. But these could easily be understood by way of eminence, just as also other expressions of philosophers, which we shall report later, treating of God's action. This opinion is also usually attributed to Peter of Ailly, In IV, dist. 1, a. 1, at the end; there, however, he openly confesses that secondary causes truly and properly act by their own power and from the nature of the thing, and not by God's will alone; he adds, however, at the same time that it is true that the creature does nothing except by God's will, and with Him also acting, indeed even acting so that it itself acts, and consequently with God acting even more than if He alone acted, which pertains to the necessity of divine concurrence and can have a true and false sense, as we shall see later in the proper disputation; but Gabriel favors this opinion more, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3, where he considers this

opinion probable and brings forward in its favor those words from I Cor. 13: "God works all things in all"; and II Cor. 3: "Not that we are sufficient to think anything of ourselves, as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God." He himself, however, does not dare to assert that opinion.

2. Reasons for the preceding opinion. I see no foundation for this opinion that is of any weight; the principal one, however, seems to have been that whatever efficiency is attributed to the creature, so much is taken away from the divine power of the creator; for either God operates all things, or not; this latter derogates from divine efficacy; whence we shall show below that it is utterly false and erroneous, because it implies that something exists and does not depend on God. But if God effects all things, I ask again whether immediately and with sufficient power, or only mediately and with insufficient power. This latter derogates from divine perfection. But if the former is true, all other efficiency is superfluous, because one sufficient and efficacious cause is enough for the effect. Whence, since nature does nothing in vain, it conferred no power of operating on created things. And I confirm this, for whatever God is posited to do with a secondary cause, He will be able to do by Himself alone, for this at least pertains to His infinite power, as will be clear below; therefore He does so in fact. The consequence is evident, both because this better befits divine power and efficacy, and especially because this seems necessary for the creature to be made. Which I prove thus, for the creature has essential dependence from God alone, since without Him it cannot be made and without any other thing it can be made; therefore the creature cannot exist without this essential dependence, which it has from God alone, because it cannot exist without those things which are essential; therefore every creature exists through dependence on God alone; therefore it exists through the efficiency of God alone, for efficiency and dependence are either the same, or are correlative; therefore no creature has efficiency in another, and consequently there is no secondary cause which effects anything.

3. Second opinion. The second opinion denies that corporeal creatures can effect anything, but concedes this concerning spiritual ones. St. Thomas reports this from Avicebron in the lib. Fontis vitae, who said that no body is active, but that a certain power of spiritual substance existing intimately in bodies effects all actions which seem to be done through bodies. His foundation seems to have been that an agent ought to be intimately present to the patient; but bodies cannot be so present to each other, for quantity impedes that intimate entrance of one thing into another, which action requires. Whence he said that quantity not only is not active, but even impedes action; and it is confirmed, because corporeal substance is the lowest of all and most dissimilar to the first agent, and therefore it neither has a lower substance subject to itself, on which it can act, nor can it have similarity to God in acting. For which reason Augustine, V de Civitat., c. 9, expressly says that corporeal causes are not to be numbered among efficient causes.

4. Third opinion. The third opinion was that corporeal things can effect accidents, but not substances, while created spiritual substances can effect some inferior substances. St. Thomas reports this from Avicenna, lib. I Sufficient., c. 10, and lib. IX of his Metaph., c. 4 and 5, who in this matter seems to have held two errors. One is that one created spiritual substance can create another, for the first uncreated cause immediately effects only one intelligence and that the most perfect one, but that one creates a second, and the second a third, and so on to the lowest. The other error asserts that this lowest spiritual substance infuses substantial forms into matter disposed by proximate corporeal agents, which are insufficient to effect substantial forms. His foundation for the former part was that from one there is only one proximately and immediately. For the latter part, however, which pertains more to the present matter, it was because these corporeal agents act only through the mediation of accidents, which are insufficient principles for effecting substantial forms. And he confirms this because experience shows that many substances are

generated which do not have proximate causes sufficient for introducing such forms, as when animals are generated from putrefaction due to accidental dispositions, which concur by chance or fortuitously; therefore it is a sign that there is as it were some prepared superior spiritual power for inducing substantial forms, whenever accidental dispositions sufficiently concur; therefore all substantial generations are made by that power.

First Assertion Concerning the Efficiency of Created Causes

5. Nevertheless, it must be said first that created agents truly and properly effect effects connatural and proportioned to themselves. This truth I judge to be not only most evident by sense and reason, but also most certain according to Catholic doctrine. Whence, just as on account of the former reason St. Thomas called the opposite opinion foolish, on account of the latter we can call it rash and erroneous; and therefore it is deservedly rejected by all philosophers and theologians; for Aristotle, although he never expressly reported or refuted the opposite opinion, nevertheless everywhere supposes as most evident that natural causes do something. Indeed all the ancient philosophers, whose opinions he reports in I Phys. and I Metaph., and elsewhere, often suppose that natural causes effect something; and therefore they labored in explaining what and from what they can make, since nothing is made from nothing. Plato also, whom I cited from Damascene in the previous disputation, in this sense calls natural causes instruments of the first cause, because they have the power of acting derived from and dependent on it. In this sense Trismegistus[12] also said that the world is an instrument of God and has received seeds from Him so that it might produce all things. And in the same way Philo, lib. de Congress. quaerendae eruditionis causa, said that God has permitted this lowest kind of things to sow and beget. These

[12] In dial. IX, et in Primand, c. 16, in fin.

philosophers were followed by the Commentator and other later ones. Among the Fathers, however, Augustine, lib. III de Trinit., c. 7, 8 and 9, seems to have imitated the said philosophers in his manner of speaking when he says that God has placed in the elements and other created causes the seminal reasons of things. These are nothing other than active and passive principles of generations and natural motions, which God placed in created things, as St. Thomas elegantly explained, I, q. 115, a. 2, and In II, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2; where Durandus, Hervaeus, Aegidius and others; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 42, a. 3. Again the same Augustine, VII de Civ., c. 30, speaking of God, says: "Thus He administers all things which He created, so that He allows them to exercise and perform their own proper motions." This opinion all the scholastics confirm and celebrate, wherever they dispute either about the efficiency of causes or about human freedom, who can be seen in the cited places, and In II, dist. 1, where especially Durandus, q. 5.

6. The assertion is proved by experience. Absurdities from the opposite conclusion. And it is proved first by experience; for what is more known to sense than that the sun illuminates, fire heats, water cools? But if they say that we indeed experience these effects to occur when these things are present, but not to be made by them, they plainly destroy all force of philosophical argumentation, because we cannot otherwise experience the flowing of effects from causes or collect causes from effects. And the common consensus and voice of all, who think thus about these things, attests to this experience. Second, I argue from inconveniences, for according to that opinion living things cannot be distinguished from non-living, because some things would not have a principle of their actions more than others. Then nature would have given various qualities and powers, which we experience in them, to diverse things in vain. Indeed we could not even collect the variety of such qualities in the elements from action, and consequently not in other things either. For if fire does not heat, but God at the presence of fire, He could equally naturally heat at the presence of water; therefore from that action we cannot collect that

fire is hot any more than water. For if God could equally consistently with the natures of things have covenanted about heating at the presence of water, let us suppose He did this, then it would not be licit to collect from heating that water is hot; therefore neither now can we infer that it is cold or that fire is hot.

7. Someone can say that that covenant was not entirely arbitrary, but founded in some way on the natures of things, not because those are active, but because they have qualities similar to those to be produced; and thus we collect that fire is hot, from the fact that God heats at its presence, because this covenant was founded on such a quality of fire. But this cannot be said philosophically, both because by the same reasoning according to the natures of things God ought to have produced whiteness at the presence of whiteness, because if the quality heat is not more active of itself than whiteness, therefore from the nature of the thing that covenant is not more due to heat than to whiteness. And the same argument can be made concerning any other quality, indeed also concerning quantity, and substance, and any thing whatever. Also because that has no place in equivocal causes, in which there is no similar form or quality, nor is it necessarily more eminent, if those are going to do nothing. Furthermore, according to that opinion the dispositions of the earth, rains, prayers, motions of the heavens, etc., are superfluous, if all these do nothing; but it would suffice for wheat to be present, so that God might generate wheat at its presence, and so concerning other things. Furthermore a similar argument is made from the various organs and instruments with which God composed bodies, especially living ones; for just as some from their very disposition appear apt for receiving, so also others are for acting, all of which would be superfluous, if these things did nothing. Finally for this reason Aristotle excellently said, II de Caelo, c. 3, and I Ethic., c. 7, that all things exist for the sake of their operation, wherefore nothing is more repugnant to the institution of things and their end than to lack all efficiency. Furthermore, if created things did nothing among themselves, by nature all would be equally

incorruptible, because they could suffer nothing from a created agent; therefore God would have ordered so many motions of the heavens and such a multitude of causes in vain so that these species of inferior things might be preserved for a long time through the succession of generations and corruptions; for the same things created from the beginning would remain more easily perpetually if God Himself corrupted nothing, because the things themselves would not fight among themselves nor corrupt each other. Many similar inconveniences can easily be thought up, from which it is understood that the whole order of nature fights against that opinion.

8. A priori reason for the conclusion. Third, there is an a priori reason, because to have the power of acting does not contradict created things, but rather is most consistent with their perfection; therefore, since God established each thing perfect in its nature, it must not be denied that He created such things as have a connatural power of acting. The antecedent is proved, because not every power of acting requires infinite perfection; therefore finite power will suffice for the creature to be able to have some efficacy. The antecedent is evident, because no probable reason persuades of the necessity of infinite perfection for every action. Rather, as we shall see below, theologians have labored much to find a reason which proves that infinite power is required for creating; therefore for other actions and changes such power is not required, especially in those agents which do not act without dependence on a superior.

9. An objection is met. You will say that in this very thing a contradiction is found, namely, that it is an agent and dependent in acting on a superior agent, and therefore infinite power is required in every agent, because, if it acts, it acts by its power alone and without dependence on another. This objection touches the foundation of the contrary opinion, about which much must be said below in treating the necessity of divine concurrence; now it is briefly responded by denying the assumption; for just as it does not contradict to exist and to exist dependently on another, so it does not contradict to act and to

act dependently on another. For why? Is it because it contradicts that the same action simultaneously be from several total causes? But this is false, if those causes are of diverse orders and essentially subordinated. For which reason, so far is this efficiency of secondary causes from derogating from divine efficacy or authority that it rather maximally commends and declares it. For, as St. Thomas argues above, God so communicated His goodness to created things that He also gave them inclination and power to communicate to others that which they participate of God's own goodness, imparting to each according to its capacity. Because, as Plato said for this purpose, in dialog. de Natur., God is good and is not touched by envy nor does He envy anyone; and therefore He made all things good and similar to Himself in the appetite of communicating itself according to its capacity. Whence some communicate themselves materially, others formally; therefore it does not contradict that they also communicate themselves efficiently.

10. Whether God acts more when effecting with secondary causes than if alone. Therefore, what Ailly said above, that God acts more, namely, when effecting with secondary causes than if He effected all things by Himself alone, is presuppositively (so to speak) true, but formally false; that is, if a secondary cause effects something, it is presupposed that God both effected that secondary cause itself and communicated to it active perfection, in which He shows His power more, and then He acts with the secondary cause whatever it acts; and thus presuppositively He acts more. But truly through that very action by which He acts with that secondary cause, He does not act more nor equally as much as if He acted by Himself alone, because He does not apply all the efficacy necessary for Him to act alone. Whence in such a mode of acting, although He acts with sufficient power in the nature of primary cause, nevertheless not sufficient in every genus. Nor is this an imperfection in God, because it is not from His need or impotence, but from voluntary and most prudent application of His power. In which sense it is also true what Ailly said,

namely that secondary causes do nothing except by God's will; for they require, as we shall say below, God's concurrence, which God provides not by necessity, but by will; that will, however, is not entirely absolute (excluding miracles), but is accommodated to the natures of things and as from a certain debt of just distribution; and therefore this voluntary aspect does not prevent this kind of efficiency from being simply natural to created things. Just as also they have the very power of acting from God's will, yet not from a will entirely superadded and as it were joined merely gratuitously to the will by which He wills such creatures to exist, but these wills are connected according to natural debt and the connection of the things themselves. Whence, that God willed fire to heat and water to cool is not merely voluntary, but in its way due, from the supposition that He willed to create such things. We speak, however, of connatural power of acting, for concerning supernatural and infused power the reasoning is different, which does not pertain to us. And thus simultaneously the posited conclusion is proved and the foundation of the former opinion is solved.

11. What is touched upon in the confirmation concerning essential dependence must be treated ex professo below in the disputation on creation; now I only say that an equivocation is committed in that proposition: the creature essentially depends on God alone; for that proposition can be understood positively and negatively; understood positively it renders this sense: the creature essentially demands to depend on God alone; and this is not true, speaking universally, although perhaps concerning some action or some thing on account of a special condition this can be verified, which pertains to special questions about creation, or about grace, etc. But understood negatively, the sense of that is that the nature of creature, as such, does not essentially demand dependence except on God. And this is true, because by force of this it is not excluded that in fact or according to some mode of production it can have dependence on God and on some creature, as is evident per se.

The Same Assertion is Treated from Supernatural Principles

12. Thus far the posited conclusion has been treated philosophically; but because we have said it also has certainty according to the doctrine of faith, it is necessary to add a few things about this part. Therefore this certainty is collected, first from the manner of speaking of divine Scripture, Gen. 1: "Let the earth bring forth green herb"; and "let the earth produce living soul"; where Basil, homil. 9, notes that from the force of these and similar words natural things received efficacy for continuously effecting the generations and corruptions of things; which Ambrose pursues more widely, lib. III Hexam., from c. 8, and lib. V and VI, almost throughout. Whence, Mark 4, Christ says: "Some fell into good ground, and yielded fruit," etc.; and below: "The earth yields fruit of itself, first the blade, then the ear, then the full grain"; and Luke 21: "Trees when they now produce fruit of themselves," etc.; and Wisd. 16 it is attributed to a miracle that fire, forgetful of its own power, did not consume the just and their garments; and there it is attributed to water that it extinguishes all things, and to dragons that they have poisonous teeth for killing, and to divine power it is attributed, if sometimes they are impeded from these actions. Furthermore there are other truths of faith which cannot subsist without this principle. The first and principal is the truth of free will, which can consist only in power and mode of acting, as we shall show below. Whence the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 4, condemns those saying that created free will does nothing at all, and conducts itself merely passively. By this definition it plainly condemns the first opinion related above and defines our conclusion. And (which convinces the matter a fortiori) not only in natural operations, but also in supernatural ones, or works of free grace, the Council wants human will to have efficiency. From which those testimonies which Gabriel brought to the contrary are understood in passing, in

which specially there is speech about works of grace, which are so attributed to God as primary cause, that our cooperation is not excluded. For in the same place Paul says both that we are not sufficient from ourselves, and that our sufficiency is from God. And he who in one place says that God works in us, in others says that He cooperates with us and that we are cooperators of God's grace.

13. Nor does the reason which is taken from the efficiency of the act of sin have less efficacy; for if the secondary cause does not effect, but God at its presence, we do not make evil volitions, but God alone infuses them into us at the presence of objects, which is blasphemous and erroneous, not only because then we would not sin freely, but also because then we would sin not from ourselves, but from God. Furthermore an excellent theological reason is taken from the definitions of Councils concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, by which they teach that there are in Christ two operations and two principles of operating or operative powers, concerning which Damascene can be read, III lib. de Fid., c. 15. All these and similar things cannot be true, if there is no power of acting in created nature. Finally from the creation of the rational soul an excellent argument arises, because according to the contrary opinion it is no less true that the man generating creates the rational soul than that fire generates fire; because, just as God at the presence of fire makes fire and action is attributed to fire only because it is a condition sine qua non, and when it is posited God infallibly acts, so God at the presence of human seed creates the soul infallibly, and not without that condition. But the consequent is an error in faith.

Second Assertion

14. What efficiency Augustine denies to bodies. I say second: not only incorporeal substances, but also corporeal ones can have physical and true efficiency. This follows from the preceding with almost the same demonstration and certainty; for the experiences,

reasons and testimonies adduced proceed concerning both natural and material causes, as well as immaterial ones. Indeed, if there is speech about efficiency through transient action, it is more known and evident to us that bodies act than incorporeal substances. Wherefore nothing needs to be added for confirmation of this conclusion. Nor is the foundation of the contrary opinion of any weight, because, for one body to act on another, it is not necessary that it be penetratively simultaneous with it in the same place, but it suffices that they be sufficiently proximate, as experience itself shows and must be declared more widely below. For which reason, although quantity is not active, nevertheless it does not entirely impede action, just as matter also is not active, yet does not impede the action of form. For thus quantity seems to be compared to qualities, as matter to form. Whence neither impedes, but rather contributes in its way to action, if not by acting, at least by sustaining and applying the principle of acting in a connatural way. To the confirmation, however, it is responded that corporeal substance according to itself as a whole is not in the lowest order nor does it supremely distance itself from God, but only according to primary matter, and therefore concerning that we confess it has no proper power of acting; but according to form bodies have greater perfection and similarity to God; and therefore according to that they can have power of effecting. But Augustine in the cited words speaks of efficient causes which act themselves in some way, that is, which have dominion over their actions and can apply themselves to acting. For thus he says: "Corporeal causes, which are made more than they make, are not to be numbered among efficient causes, since they can do this which the wills of spirits make from them."

Third Assertion

15. I say third: although created causes cannot effect substance according to itself as a whole or per se in the first place, nevertheless they can generate substance from presupposed

substantial matter by educing substantial form. But this efficacy is to be attributed to corporeal causes rather than to created spirits. The first part of this assertion is most certain, because created causes cannot create anything, as we shall show when treating of creation; but substance per se in the first place and according to itself as a whole, cannot be made except through creation; for it cannot be made from a presupposed subject, because no subject is supposed to the whole substance, since it is a being complete per se; therefore it must necessarily be made from nothing, and thus through creation. And hence it is that a created spiritual substance cannot procreate another similar to itself, either in species or in grade, because such a substance, since it is simple in essence, cannot be made except through creation. And for the same reason material substance as regards matter cannot be effected by a created cause, whether incorporeal or corporeal; and in this sense we say that substance according to itself as a whole and per se in the first place, that is, as regards the whole entity and presupposing nothing of substance, cannot be effected by a created cause; but more must be said about this matter in what follows.

16. Substantial forms are made by corporeal supposits. But the second part of the conclusion concerning the eduction of substantial form through the proper efficiency of secondary causes is not as evident and certain as are the superior ones concerning efficiency absolutely, because the effection of this form is less sensible, and therefore less known to us than the efficiency of accidents, and because in explaining this efficiency there is no small difficulty, as we shall see in the following section. Nevertheless this part is more probable, especially taken absolutely and not descending to particular modes of explaining this efficiency. And it is proved first, because, just as we see fire heat, so also generate fire, and the sun produce minerals, and the earth also by the action of the sun germinate herb, etc. Second, because since these things are not made through creation, but through generation, neither from the part of the thing made nor from the mode in which it is made is infinite power required for their effection;

therefore such power does not exceed the capacity of created causes; therefore it is communicated to them by the first cause and is connatural to them. But more about this part in the following section; for it cannot be exactly proved and defended unless the mode of this efficiency is first declared.

17. Spiritual substances cannot effect substantial forms. But the third part of the conclusion, namely, that this efficiency is not to be attributed to created spirits, is evident from the fact that they are disproportionate to this kind of action; but corporeal causes are more proportioned and accommodated. Among created things, however, it does not suffice that something be more perfect so that it can effect something less perfect, unless it is otherwise established that it eminently contains it; but created spirits, although they are more perfect than bodies, nevertheless since they are limited to their proper grade and each to their proper perfections to be signified, do not eminently contain corporeal things, and since they are not forms in matter, but entirely abstract, they are disproportionate to forms to be induced into matter; concerning which matter we shall also say more below, treating of created intelligences, where we shall show that they can effect neither substantial forms nor qualities in bodies; for they cannot alter bodies at the nod of their will. But if they cannot do this, much less will they be able to induce substantial form into matter; for he who does not have power to dispose matter, much less can have power to inform it. But corporeal agents, since they can alter and dispose matter, are more proportioned so that they can inform it, either by educing from it or by introducing into it substantial form, according to the capacity and quality of the form.

18. Therefore to the foundation of Avicenna concerning the former part we deny that only one intelligence or one effect could proceed from the first cause, because the first cause does not act by necessity of nature so as to be determined to one effect, but is an intellectual agent, having in itself exemplars of infinite things, whose

effection it defines by its will and choice. But the foundation of the second error demands a difficulty pertaining to the following section.

SECTION II

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH CREATED SUBSTANCE EFFECTS ANOTHER

1. Matter is the principle quo of no action. We inquire simultaneously about the principal and proximate or instrumental principle, because one cannot be sufficiently explained without the other. It is established, first, from what has been said that the discussion concerns only corporeal cause, because created spirits cannot effect any substance, as has been said. Again, since in created substance there are matter, form, and accidents, it is established, second, among all that matter is not the principle of this effection; I mean the principle quo or formal principle; for the principle quod is the supposit, just as in other actions. But the material supposit, although it consists of matter and form and subsistence, and in addition has accidents, nevertheless does not have the power of acting from matter, which is not active, as we have often said. We make no mention of subsistence, because that is only a certain mode and terminus of nature, which indeed precedes naturally every action, but does not per se contribute power for acting, as we shall say more extensively below when treating of subsistence. Therefore, the entire controversy is reduced to substantial form and its accidents or natural properties.

2. No accident is the principal cause of substance. Concerning these, it is established, third, that accidental form cannot be the principal principle of producing substance, in which almost all agree. For Major is usually cited to the contrary, In IV, dist. 12, but he does not contradict, nor does any other that I have seen. Nor can there be any reason for doubt, because the principal cause, as we have

shown, ought to be either nobler or certainly not less noble than the effect; for since no one gives what he does not have, how can an imperfect form have in itself or communicate to its supposit the principal power of effecting a more perfect form, which it can contain neither formally nor eminently? But accidental form is more imperfect than substantial; therefore it cannot be the principal principle of educing the latter. And this will be established more evidently from what is to be said, both in treating the first opinion and also in confirming our final assertion.

3. Substantial form is the principal principle quo by which the efficient acts. From this it further follows that if in material substance there is some principal principle quo for effecting substance, this can be nothing other than substantial form; for when the enumeration is made, nothing else remains. And this also seems to be received by the common consent of all, because, since form is the principal act of the supposit and what principally gives being, it ought also to be the principal principle of operating, since operation follows being. Finally, because substantial form cannot be an instrumental principle; therefore it will be a principal principle. The consequence is clear, because neither is there a middle term nor can form be entirely excluded from the nature of principle, since it is the source of all being and of all properties. The antecedent is clear, because substantial form does not presuppose another of which it could be the instrument, since it is the first and principal of all; I speak, however, within the same supposit; for if one lower form is compared to a higher, it could be called the instrument of that, as has been touched upon above and we shall reach in what follows. And hence also almost all hold as certain that accidents are instruments of substantial form for producing substance, because substantial form does not by itself alone and immediately produce similar substance, but using accidents, as seems to be established by experience and is proven by the argument made for Avicenna in the preceding section.

4. With these things therefore established, two things remain to be explained: first, how accident is an instrument for producing substance. Second, how substantial form is the principal principle for educing similar form. Hence there are two principal difficulties: the first is whether accident is an instrument in such a way that it immediately attains the eduction of substantial form itself, or whether it is called an instrument only because it operates dispositively toward the induction of substantial form, which is the effect chiefly intended by the principal agent. The second is, supposing that accident immediately attains, whether with it substantial form also proximately influences or only remotely and as it were radically.

First Opinion Concerning the Efficiency of Accidents in Substance

5. Concerning the first point, there is a first opinion that accidents are instruments only in this latter way, that is, only by concurring dispositively, which can be understood either of accidents that are received in the patient and are the formal dispositions of matter themselves, in which way Philoponus seems to have understood it, II Phys., text. 27, and therefore he reduces these instruments to material cause. In which he speaks both against Aristotle and against reason. For Aristotle reduces seed and similar instruments to efficient cause, and rightly, because instrument is said only of that which influences the effect through some action; and therefore no instruments are properly said of any cause except the efficient. It must therefore be understood otherwise of accidents that are in the agent itself and are faculties through which it proximately operates, and effectively induces dispositions in the patient, through which it gradually prepares matter, until it proximately becomes capable of substantial form; and in this way they are instruments for inducing substantial form, not because they immediately attain or effect it, for their action stops and terminates in the effection of

accidents perfectly similar to themselves; but because as subordinated to their proper form, their action tends toward the production of similar substantial form. Scotus held this opinion, In I, dist. 37, and In II, dist. 17, and more extensively In IV, dist. 12, q. 3, which Ockham follows, In II, q. 23. The principal foundation is that accident, being a being more imperfect than substantial form, cannot in any way effect the latter. Some respond that although accident is more imperfect in the nature of being, nevertheless in the nature of active principle it can be more apt, and in that sense can be said to be more perfect in acting. But this is not rightly said, because the power of acting, especially in accident, is nothing other than its entity; or if it is distinguished in some way, at least by reason, it follows that and is commensurate with it; therefore accident cannot be nobler in acting than it is in being. Otherwise, under the same distinction, someone could say that accident is the principal principle of producing substance, because, although it is not nobler in being, it can be nobler in action, which is absurd. Moreover, we could never from the nobility of action infer the nobility of the efficient cause as to its being. And (as Scotus argues) of God himself someone could say that he is nobler in action, although not in being.

6. The more frequent response of Thomists is examined. The more frequent response therefore is that accident, although it is less noble and therefore by its own power cannot attain the production of substance, nevertheless in the power of its substantial form, of which it is a property and power of acting, can immediately attain the eduction of that. But Scotus presses by inquiring what that power is, in whose force and efficacy accident is said to attain. For either it is something distinct from accident or not. If it is not distinguished, therefore substance cannot be made in the power of that any more than in the power of accident. If however it is distinguished, it is either accident or substance; if accident, the same argument proceeds, whether that is said to be absolute or respective; indeed it will be much less active if it is respective than if absolute. If however it is substance, it will be no

other than substantial form; and thus rather the form itself will be the power of acting and the principle quo by which accident attains the eduction of accidental form[13], than conversely. Thomists commonly respond, from Cajetan, I, q. 53, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1, that when it is said that accident in the power of substance makes substance, that "in the power" is not to be taken transitively, but intransitively, because the sense is not that some power is added to accident by which it produces substance, but that accident through its entity, by the fact that it is a certain power of substance, can attain substance. But this response does not seem to weaken the force of the argument, because when heat by its nature is the power and faculty of substance, when it is said to act in the power of substance nothing else is said than that heat by its nature has such activity; but this seems naturally to be repugnant, for an ignoble form cannot be a natural power sufficient for producing a better form.

7. And, lest we seem to rest in words, to explain the difficulty that is in the thing itself, I ask whether that action by which substantial form is educed from the potency of matter, proceeds immediately from heat alone, for example, but from substantial form only remotely and radically, insofar as heat flows from it; or whether it is action immediately from both forms, from one as from principal and from the other as instrumental. If this latter sense is asserted, indeed the difficulty touched upon in the argument ceases; for in this way there is no inconvenience that a more imperfect form concurs instrumentally to a more perfect effect; and then that "in the power" is excellently explained, for it signifies, that is, aided by superior power to actually influence. But then other difficulties arise that are no less grave. First, because the experiences that seem to prove that accidents attain the effection of substance, prove that accidents alone do this, because either substance is not present, as when accidents of consecrated wine

[13] formae accidentalis, 1960; alit. formae substantialis. "Con esta expresión, la siguiente frase 'e converso' no puede aplicarse a las palabras que inmediatamente le preceden." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 99.

generate wine; and the same argument, though less efficacious, is usually made of glowing iron generating fire. Or certainly, because substance is not applied, as in the sun inducing substantial forms of mineral things in the bowels of the earth, from which it is very far distant. Second, because according to that interpretation substantial form is now posited as the immediate principle of some action that surpasses its perfection. For, because it is disproportionate to this, therefore it received from nature accidental forms, through which it acts. Hence arises a third argument, which Scotus and Ockham indicated; for if this immediate influx must necessarily be conceded to substantial form, the immediate influx of accidental form is superfluous. For if generation is univocal, substantial form, which is supposed to influence immediately, has the perfection and proportion required so that it may be the proximate principle sufficient for producing form similar to itself; for since heat is in this way sufficient for effecting similar heat, why will not substantial form be for similar form, when immediate influx is now supposed not to be repugnant to it? But if generation is equivocal, since the form of the generator is more eminent, by greater reason it will be sufficient for similar action.

8. But if the prior member is chosen because of these difficulties, as it also seems to be more frequently received, the difficulty touched upon remains first in its force, for it cannot be understood how an instrument more ignoble by itself alone and through power connatural to itself, without the partnership of a nobler agent, effects a nobler effect. For what does it matter that that instrument is the power of another? Because from that it has only either that it is separated from another, just as seed from animal, and from that power does not grow, which is as great as is the perfection that it receives in itself, not as great as is the perfection of that from which it receives it; or certainly it has that it is substituted in place of another for acting; as gravity in place of the generator and this is what seems wonderful and repugnant, namely, that nature substitutes an imperfect power so that by itself alone and without actual help of

superior power it effects in place of the principal agent a nobler effect. And besides there are other difficulties against that way of speaking. The principal one is that it follows that substantial forms have no proper activity, but only concur as it were accidentally to every action. For if God, for example, only produced and conserved heat, and afterwards did not immediately influence the action proceeding from heat, he would not be a per se cause, but an accidental cause of that action; therefore similarly if substantial form is so related to every action of heat, it cannot truly be said to be the per se efficient principle of action, but at most will be said to be the remote principal principle and by extrinsic denomination, namely, because the proximate principle of acting takes its place, or (as I shall say more truly) supplies its impotence; for indeed the form itself per se has no activity. But this seems absurd, otherwise substance would never be per se active or generative of its like, nor would there be any action from a created substantial supposit except by reason of accidents; but this is repugnant to the perfection of substance. For, as Scotus argues, In II, dist. 16, if some accidental form is immediately productive of its like, why will not some substantial one also be? It also seems contrary to Aristotle, II Phys., c. 7; for there he attributes threefold causality to form: formal, final, and efficient; therefore, just as the first and second properly and per se belong to form, so also the third.

Second Contrary Opinion Concerning the Activity of Accidents in Substance

9. The second opinion affirms that accidents are instruments of substance for producing substance in such a way that they proximately and per se attain the production of substantial form in the power of other forms, of which they are instruments. This is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 8, ad 2 and 3, and q. 77, a. 1, ad 3 and 4, and q. 115, a. 1, ad 5; and III, q. 77, a. 3; Cajetan, supra; Ferrara, IV cont. Gent., c. 66; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3, a. 2, and In IV, dist.

12, q. 1, a. 3; Giles, Quodl. III, q. 1, ad 2, and in Hexaemer., p. II, c. 11; Henry, Quodl. XIV, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. III, q. 12. And this seems to be the common opinion of the Peripatetics. For Aristotle everywhere signifies that natural action and generation happen through mediate accidents; hence I de Generat., c. 7, he says that action, namely corruptive, is only between contraries; but contrariety is properly only between qualities; and in the book de Sensu et sensibili he says that nothing acts or is acted upon insofar as it is fire or water or something similar, but insofar as it undergoes contrariety, that is, insofar as it is affected by contrary qualities. Where Alexander notes that according to the Peripatetic opinion, fire does not put forth action insofar as it is fire, but insofar as it is hot, that is, not through the form of fire, but through heat. Likewise II de Anima, text. 10, and VII Metaph., text. 31, and lib. III de Generat. animal., Aristotle teaches that seed is the instrument by which one animal effectively generates another. The Commentator also, lib. VII Metaph., comm. 22 and 31, and XII Metaph., comm. 18, says that it is of the same power to prepare matter and to induce form; since therefore it is established that substance uses accidents to prepare matter, it must be said that through the same it induces form.

10. Reasons of the second opinion. The reasons by which this opinion is confirmed are chiefly these: first, because substantial form is not per se immediately active, but through a power that is a quality distinct from it; therefore it does not induce substantial form except through mediate accidental power. The antecedent is clear first by induction; for we see that each substance uses accidents for all other actions, which is true not only of material but also of created spiritual substances; therefore it is a sign that it exceeds the perfection and limitation of created substance to be simultaneously the principal and proximate principle of its actions. Likewise, because substantial form through itself alone is only determined to giving being formally; but for actions it is an indeterminate principle, because almost always it can effect several actions, to which it is determined through accidents;

and therefore it is not the proximate principle of action through itself, but through accidents; therefore the same must be said of the action by which it produces substance.

11. The second reason, which confirms the final inference of the preceding, is that the action by which substantial form is educed is not properly an action distinct from the motion of alteration, which is ordered to it and tends toward it, but is as it were its terminus; and therefore they are not computed as two actions, but as one and the same; but the whole alteration that tends toward generation happens through mediate accidents, as is evident per se; therefore substantial generation itself also happens through mediate accidents. The major is clear, because substantial form, which is educed from the potency of matter through mediate motion, results in matter from the force of motion itself; therefore by the same action, speaking physically, and through mediate the same instrument it happens. And it is confirmed, for accidents are instruments for expelling the substantial form of the corrupted; therefore also for effecting the form of the generated.

12. The third reason is that proper action happens only between contraries; therefore only that is the proper principle of such action which properly has a contrary; but such is quality, and not substantial form; therefore.

13. Various experiences for the second opinion. Fourth and chiefly this opinion is founded on experiences; for substances are often generated through mediate accidents when there is no substantial form from which there can be action, because it either is far absent or is not at all. Scotus responds that form sometimes being distant does not prevent it from influencing the eduction of form, because it can attain distant places by its power and efficacy. And in this way he thinks that forms of mineral things are immediately educed by the form of the sun. When however no proportionate or applied form is found within the sphere of its activity, then he says that the eduction of form happens immediately from the first cause, to which it pertains to supply the defects of inferior agents. And in this

way he says that animals are more frequently generated, not only those that come from putrefaction, but also those that come from seed, in which the power is imperfect and insufficient for educing soul from the potency of matter. But the prior part of this response is repugnant to the Aristotelian principle that agent and patient ought to be simultaneous, concerning which, a little below. The latter part however savors of the opinion of Plato, who says that substantial forms are induced by separated ideas; for if it is true that Plato posited ideas only in the divine mind, it was the same as saying substantial forms are effected by the first cause. Which Philoponus also taught, I Phys., at the end, where he says substantial forms come from the universal artificer of nature. Themistius however, in his book I de Anima, c. 24, and lib. III, c. 52, says they come from the soul of the world. Avicenna however, as we cited above, says they come from the lowest intelligence. From whom Scotus differs in that he says not all forms, but several and more perfect even material ones are made by a separated agent, which also seems a greater inconvenience; for since all these forms are educed from the potency of matter, infinite power is not required for their effection; why therefore do some forms have power for effecting forms similar to themselves, and not others, and especially those that are more perfect? Therefore this experience is what seems most to confirm this opinion; for the reasons certainly are not so efficacious, as we shall soon see.

14. But before we define this point, it is necessary to propose the second, which we touched upon in the reason made above in favor of the prior opinion, and it matters much for understanding and rightly defending the latter opinion, although it seems to have been almost entirely omitted by its authors, namely, supposing that accidents are instruments immediately and per se attaining the eduction of substantial form, whether they are instruments separated from the forms themselves as to causality, or conjoined. And consequently whether substantial form is said to be the principal principle of this action only remotely and radically, or also proximately

and per se actually influencing. And indeed all authors of the latter opinion seem to think that accidents are separated instruments; for the reasons adduced and experiences, if they prove anything, chiefly persuade this, for they seem that accidents generate substance, even when there is no substance that concurs with them. And thus think, besides the cited authors, Paludanus, in IV, dist. 12, q. 4, a. 1, concl. 3; and there Richard, a. 3, q. 2; and Thomas de Argentina, q. 1; Major, q. 1; Hispalensis, q. 1, a. 3, notab. 3; Albert, a. 16. Who all speak of sacramental species, which remain without substance; and they attribute to them that they have the same efficiency in the power of substance, which they can have when they are conjoined, which Giles also declares extensively, theor. 48, de Eucharistia; Zimara also theor. 114, treating at length that proposition of Averroes, that the same is the agent disposing matter and introducing form, thinks that the whole action is immediately from qualities, but from form only insofar as it communicates its power of acting to quality. The same extensively Cajetan, I, q. 53, a. 3. Nevertheless this opinion has the difficulties touched upon above among those confirming the opinion of Scotus in the superior point, because it does not appear how substantial form can transfuse (so to speak) all its power of acting into accidental form, so that even when substantial form perishes (if necessary), and only accidental is conserved, this alone can effect substantial form more perfect than itself, when it does not actually have being so perfect nor is actually helped by superior form.

First Assertion for the Resolution of the Question

15. Because of these difficulties I think it difficult to pass judgment between these opinions; nevertheless I shall briefly propose what I think. I say therefore first that it should not be denied that accidents are instruments for producing substance in such a way that they proximately and per se attain the eduction of substantial form. This is proven first from the common opinion of so many

philosophers, which is not easily to be rejected where evident reason to the contrary does not occur. Second, because experience, on which philosophy chiefly relies, much confirms this and there is nothing that is repugnant, as will be clear by solving objections to the contrary. Third, because otherwise it will often be necessary to attribute the whole efficiency of substance to universal causes, or even to the first, which in philosophy is to be avoided as much as possible, because the right disposition of the universe demands that through secondary causes be done whatever can be done conveniently and connaturally. Fourth finally, because this mode of efficiency is consentaneous to the nature of accidental form, which is given to substance not only for ornament and beauty, but also for exercising its actions, as is established by induction concerning other actions.

16. You will say that there is a disparate reason concerning this action and others; for other actions are accidental, such as intellection, vision, heating, etc. But this action is substantial, that is, per se primarily terminated to a substantial terminus; and therefore, although for other actions accidents are apt instruments, not however for this, because the proximate principle of acting ought to be proportioned to the action, and therefore if the action is of a higher order, the principle also ought to be. As, for example, because intellection is spiritual action, nature would not have given an apt principle for it if it had conferred a material power or instrument, even if the soul, which is the principal principle, is spiritual; so therefore for substantial action accident will not be an accommodated instrument, even if the form is substantial. To this it can be responded from Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 3, that substantial generation is not a proper operation or action, but is the terminus of preceding motion or alteration, and therefore the principle of alteration is the most apt instrument or principle of generation. Which response some moderns so embrace that they almost found in it the whole probability of the opinion of St. Thomas concerning this efficiency of accidents; and they think that before Scotus no one posited this action as distinct

from alteration. I wonder however that they could be induced to this opinion, which seems to me contrary both to the doctrine of Aristotle and to the same principles and to evident reason. For Aristotle, throughout the whole I lib. Phys., and I de Generat., chiefly acts so as to distinguish substantial generation from alteration; and in V Phys., when he says that there is per se motion properly so called to three predicaments, he says that to substance there is not motion, but change, because it is not from subject to subject, but from being in potency to being simply. Hence in the same places he distinguishes the principles of generation from the principles of other motions, which are proper matter, as it is pure potency, and substantial form, and privation.

17. Whether and how generation is the terminus of alteration. Then other authors use words equivocally when they say that generation is the terminus of motion or alteration; for it can be said to be terminus intrinsically and properly, and thus it is plainly false; for such terminus of alteration is nothing but the quality that comes to be through it; indeed in general it is impossible for action to be the terminus of any motion, because it is of the intrinsic nature of action that it be a way and that it not come to be through another action, but through itself. In another way it can be said to be the terminus of successive motion as an instantaneous change extrinsically terminating motion. Which can be understood in two ways. First, that it is a certain indivisible change or a certain changed being that reductively pertains to the same motion and in reality is of the same nature as the changed beings continuing the motion. And this cannot be said of generation with respect to preceding alteration, because it is neither of the same order as alteration nor is it reduced to it in any way. And besides, because change terminating motion within its nature or latitude, confers something toward consummating the terminus of motion within proper nature and entity; as changed being in which first there is not local motion consummates that Where which comes to be through such motion, and in that instant begins to be, when

before it was not yet; and the same is proportionally in alteration, because in that instant some terminus of quality comes to be, which before was not. But through generation no terminus of quality comes to be intrinsically and within proper genus pertaining to the consummation of it, but a new form of higher nature comes to be. Therefore generation cannot be said to be the terminus of motion or alteration in this way. In another way therefore it can be said to be an extrinsic terminus only because of immediate succession or concomitance. And this sense is true; nevertheless this does not prevent generation from being a distinct action; for thus illumination is the terminus of motion, and is proper action. And creation of rational soul can in this way be said to be the terminus of generation as to preceding alteration, which no one will deny to be a distinct action, and a fortiori the same is true of the union of that soul to body, since this is a later action than the creation of soul. If therefore the generation of man is an action distinct from alteration, although it is terminus in that way, the same a fortiori will be in the rest. And this is most necessary, if we suppose (as the said authors suppose) that in the instant of generation the whole preceding alteration and its intrinsic terminus cease to be; for thus generation cannot be said to be terminus except because it immediately succeeds after that alteration; therefore that cannot not be a new action, because immediate succession of one after another does not take away the newness and distinction of action.

18. Hence finally I argue a priori, because generation is really and essentially distinct from the whole preceding alteration; therefore it is per se proper and new action. The antecedent is clear, because it is the eduction of new form really distinct from the preceding and happens in a distinct subject, namely in prime matter immediately; but alteration happens either in the whole composite, or at least in matter, through mediate quantity. Finally, because the whole alteration precedes in duration, and according to probable opinion its intrinsic terminus also does not remain. The consequence however is proven,

because that action is the eduction of new form, which per se primarily tends toward new composite per se one; therefore it is per se new action. Perhaps they will say that it is not proper action, but some resultance from prior alteration. But this cannot be said, especially if we suppose that accidents that preceded in the corrupted do not remain in the generated; for some form is not said to result from some action except insofar as it results from its terminus, because each action proximately stops in its terminus. Hence nothing results from it mediately except insofar as it results from its terminus; if therefore in the instant of generation neither alteration nor its terminus remains, how can substantial form result from it? Perhaps they will say, because it naturally succeeds to it. But this is not to result, for resultance expresses some mode of efficiency through natural emanation, which cannot be between things that proximately succeed themselves, when to one perishing another succeeds; otherwise also from the form of the corrupted the form of the generated could be said to result. Therefore this succession does not take away the necessity of new action, but most requires it, so that from its force form can be introduced by which another is expelled, and consequently accidents, if they depended on it.

19. Hence also those speak less consequently who, when they otherwise think that accidents that were in the generated do not remain in the corrupted, say that substantial form results in matter by instrumental power of accidents that are introduced through motion, when first they arrive at a certain terminus; for if those no longer are, how can they be instrumental power? Likewise those that arrive at a certain intrinsic terminus are not the same as those that were before, and according to that terminus they follow form, according to that opinion; therefore they cannot be instruments for it. And besides, as we touched upon above disputing concerning the matter of accidents, even if the same accidents remain, they cannot be instruments for substantial form, because they have no proper previous action, through which mediating they are elevated to the effect of the

principal agent. Therefore this instrumental efficiency should be attributed not to accidents that come to be in the patient and dispose matter, but to accidents that are in the agent, from which those others proceed. From which also it happens that it cannot truly be said that substantial form results from accidents disposing matter. Finally, whatever may be about the name of resultance, and whatever may be whether accidents of the patient also have efficiency in the eduction of form, it cannot be denied that that eduction is new action and most per se intended, because that is proper action, which happens in the power of substance; for alteration is proper action of accident itself according to itself and is as it were a medium ordered to generation, which is action per se primarily intended. Just as also nutrition is properly and per se action, and augmentation, as Aristotle testifies, is per se motion, although neither happens except with previous alteration and through mediate dispositions with which partial substance can be generated.

20. Otherwise therefore the proposed objection must be answered, by conceding that the action by which substantial form is educed is substantial on the part of the terminus and is nobler than every action or alteration that accident can provide by its power, which not Scotus alone discovered, but before him Aristotle taught, lib. II Phys., text. 14, and lib. VIII, text. 62; Averroes, IV lib. Phys., comm. 129; Simplicius, lib. V Phys., text. 8. And the same many among the Thomists followed after Scotus, as can be seen in Capreolus, In I, dist. 13, a. 3, ad argum. contra 1 conclus.; Soncinas, VII Metaph., q. 22; Ferrara, II cont. Gent., c. 17. And nevertheless these authors say, and rightly, that accident proportioned to substantial form can be from its nature an instrument accommodated to such action; because, although in the nature of being accidental form is of lower order compared to substantial, nevertheless in mode of being they have proportion, if both depend on matter; and similarly they are commensurate in the nature of disposition and form, and by the same reason they can be proportioned in the nature of

instrumental power and action or terminus; for, just as it is connatural to substance to operate through accidents proportioned to itself, so it is connatural to it to come to be through accidental dispositions proportioned to itself as through accommodated instrument. Therefore it is not similar to what was objected concerning material power with respect to spiritual intellection, because there would be no proportion, neither in the nature of subject nor in the nature of disposition or in another genus; and therefore it would not be an accommodated principle. Especially because intellect is not only instrument, but also in its own way principal principle of intellection connatural to itself, as I shall say in the following section.

21. Whether accidents effectively reach the generation of man. But someone might object that, at least in the generation of man, accidents are not suitable instruments so that they can immediately reach the action by which man is generated, because that action is the union of the rational soul to matter, through which the mode of union of the same soul is proximately brought about, which mode is immaterial, since it is really identical with the soul itself; therefore that unitive action is also spiritual, for it is identical with its proximate and formal term; therefore a material accident cannot be an instrument for such an action. I respond first by conceding everything; for in the conclusion we did not say that accidents are instruments for uniting any substantial form whatsoever with matter, but for educing a form that is indeed educible; but for uniting a rational form it suffices that the accidents of the seed concur effectively in disposing and organizing the body, while these dispositions themselves only materially cause and require that union; this is sufficient for man to be said to generate man, although God alone, who creates the soul, also effectively unites it, as Scotus held, In IV, dist. 43, q. 3, a. 3; and Richard considers the same probable there, a. 3, q. 2. Henry also supposes the same, Quodl. XI, q. 14, when he says that the rational soul, created by God alone in a body disposed by a natural agent, unites itself without new efficiency of an extrinsic agent, but as if

through a natural resultance of union from the soul itself; for from that opinion it also follows that the proximate agent in human generation does not immediately reach with its efficiency the union of soul to body, but only remotely by reason of dispositions; which opinion the Conimbricenses also hold, lib. I Phys., q. 11, a. 3. Secondly, if someone wishes to defend that accidents reach this union instrumentally, which Capreolus holds, In II, dist. 15, q. unic., a 3, and more clearly In IV, dist. 43, a. 3, ad argument. Henrici et Aureoli contra 2 concl., it can be responded that this union, although immaterial in itself, nevertheless participates in certain properties of material things, especially that it depends on matter in its becoming and being on account of its essential and actual relationship to it; whence it also has a certain extension from that side; and for this reason it can happen that material accidents are elevated as instruments for bringing about that union, which will not seem difficult to those who believe that a material phantasm is an instrument for effecting a spiritual species.

Second Assertion

22. An instrumental form is not a sufficient reason for acting when not conjoined with a form that is the principal reason. I say secondly: it must not be denied that a substantial form has its own proper and principal efficiency in the eduction of a similar form from the potency of matter, immediately influencing through itself simultaneously with an accidental and instrumental principle, if it is actually conjoined in reality and sufficiently approximated. This brings it about that the accident in this efficiency conducts itself as an instrument conjoined to the form and not as entirely separated with regard to causality. This entire conclusion and its intention and meaning have been sufficiently declared, as I believe, in the preceding sections. And they are further manifested, for when fire, for example, is generated from tow near to it, we say that the generating fire influences the action not only instrumentally through its heat, but also

principally through its substantial form, which action is intrinsically terminated to the eduction of the substantial form; not only mediately and remotely, insofar as it gives to its heat that being and that power through which it causes, but also because it proximately influences in its own genus simultaneously with its heat. And we say this same thing is observed in every eduction of substantial form, if there is no impediment from the side of the agent, either through lack of existence or through distance of place. The foundation of this assertion as expounded has also been insinuated in the preceding sections and consists in two principles. One is that an instrumental form, through itself alone and as if destitute of the actual influx of the principal agent, cannot be sufficient in the nature of a proximate cause for effecting a form more noble than itself. This principle seems to me almost known from the terms, because if that form is not then actually aided by a superior, it influences only through what it actually has in itself; since therefore that is something imperfect, it cannot through itself alone effect something more perfect. Likewise, it is repugnant that heat should effect a substantial form by its own power alone; but when it operates by itself alone without the influx of a superior form, it operates only by its own power, because it has no other except that which is connatural to its entity or which it has from the force of its own proper being. But that it has this being from the form of fire, or that by its nature it is a faculty of that form, or that it is substituted in place of that form so as to act as if in its name, all these things (I say), since they only add certain relations or denominations to heat, cannot be sufficient so that heat alone, destitute (so to speak) of all superior aid, should be a sufficient proximate and immediate principle of such action. Also because otherwise heat would be a power of producing substance in the same way as it is a power of producing heat, which from the very excess of substance is shown to be quite absurd. The consequence is clear, because heat has both insofar as it is a certain power of substance and participates its being from that substance. Finally, since the power of acting of heat under whatever aspect is

nothing other than its entity and perfection, and this is far less than in a substantial form, it cannot be sufficiently understood how the entire power, which through itself alone is sufficient for the eduction of substantial form, should be transfused into heat; therefore heat alone cannot be substituted in place of the entire principal principle.

23. A material substantial form constitutes a supposit capable of effecting. The other principle on which the established assertion rests is that this mode of activity, properly speaking, can belong to a material substantial form, if the general conditions required for acting are not otherwise lacking. But this principle seems sufficiently proven in the reasons made in the last place in favor of Scotus's opinion, which Aristotle confirms not a little in II de Gener., text. 54 and 55, where, reproving those who denied the efficiency of forms, he says: "To this is added that they variously attribute instrumental faculties to bodies by which things are generated, and meanwhile they take away the cause which pertains to form." Nor is it sufficient to say that efficiency is attributed to forms because qualities flow from them, through which alone they exercise all their actions, because, as we said above, this is not proper and per se efficiency, but only remote and radical; for an action which immediately arises from an accidental form alone also depends essentially on that form alone as from a proximate principle, not to mention the concourse of the universal cause. A sign of this is that if God conserves heat, for example, every action which proceeds proximately from that alone can also be conserved, as the authors of the contrary opinion also confess; therefore it is a sign that the substantial form is not a per se principle of such action; therefore if the form can never actually influence with the accidental faculty, it never has true and proper efficiency, which Aristotle reproves above, and this considerably derogates from the perfection of substantial form. Moreover, no repugnance can be shown in this mode of effecting; therefore there is no reason why it should be denied; for by a similar consequence we proved above that secondary causes have the power of effecting, because it pertains to

the perfection of creatures and to the efficacy of the creator that they should have the power of communicating themselves, insofar as is consonant with their natures; therefore the same will have to be said about substantial forms, as regards this efficiency, if it is not otherwise repugnant to them; but no repugnance can be shown, properly speaking, either on the part of the form which is educed, or on the part of the form doing the educing. The first is clear, because that form is both finite and is made (so to speak) in a finite way, that is, by eduction, without any admixture of creation. The second is clear, because that form is not less perfect nor is it disproportioned, since it is of the same order; for it is an act of matter more noble or equally noble; and by its nature it is instituted, and maximally inclined to generate something similar to itself.

24. Response to the reasons of the second opinion. First. Finally, the reasons of the second opinion either do not militate or do not press very much against this activity. For the first reason at most proves that the instrumental activity of accidents is not to be excluded, but it does not prove that this influence of form is impossible or is not necessary. Therefore, a substantial form can be understood to be the proximate principle of some action in two ways: in one way, exclusively (so to speak), that is, without the partnership of another proximate and instrumental principle. And in this way it does not follow that substantial form is the proximate principle of any proper action. And this is what the reasons made in that argument prove at most. In another way it can be understood that substantial form is a proximate principle, that is, immediately influencing through its substance in the action or effect, yet not alone, but as elevating or aiding the instrumental power, and as determined by that power to such action. And in this way we deny that it exceeds the perfection of substantial form to be the proximate principal principle of acting of some action, which we will show to be true not only in substantial generation, about which we now treat, but also in some accidental operations in the following section. Nor do the reasons touched upon

in that argument proceed against this; because this mode of effecting does not exclude the accidental faculty or instrument.

25. Second. Third. The second reason indeed proceeds from a false foundation, as is evident from what has been said, namely that generation is not properly an action distinct from alteration. The third reason is of little moment, both because for efficiency in the strict sense contrariety or privative opposition suffices, especially where the effecting is not through proper successive motion, but through instantaneous change, such as substantial generation is; and also because, although formal contrariety exists between qualities, nevertheless radical contrariety (so to speak) exists in substantial forms; and therefore a quality alone is not always the principle of action, but sometimes also form, especially when through the action not only a contrary quality, but also a form repugnant to another form to be introduced is to be brought in. Finally, although corruptive action exists only between contraries, nevertheless the qualities themselves effect not only formally contrary qualities, but also forms, in which is the root of contrariety and repugnance. Therefore it is a sign that, although action begins from proper contrariety, nevertheless it does not stop there, but extends to the root of that contrariety; what wonder therefore that the form itself can also be in its genus a principle of such efficiency, at least insofar as it attains to substantial form and the root of contrariety? But the experiences which were adduced in the last place do not proceed against this conclusion, which is established only from the hypothesis posited, namely if the form is sufficiently present; but what should be said about those will be established from the following assertions.

26. It is shown that the first conclusion does not obstruct the second. Only Scotus's objection can be brought against these two conclusions; for this second seems to be repugnant to the former, because if substantial form through itself proximately influences the effecting of a similar form, the immediate activity of accidents is superfluous; for if heat by itself alone suffices in the nature of a

proximate principle for effecting similar heat, why will the form of fire alone not suffice for educing a similar form, since we already suppose that it can immediately influence that form? But if that form suffices, another principle is superfluous. It is responded first that it was necessary for accidents to have instrumental activity, because, as we will immediately say, they are given not only for acting in the presence of form, but also in its absence; for this is often necessary for natural generations. Then from this we elicit that the proper power of disposing and preparing matter and the instrumental power of educing form, when that form is educible, are by the nature of the thing conjoined, and therefore, although we might grant that on the part of form, when it is sufficiently present, another active power is not absolutely necessary, nevertheless because this power is otherwise per se necessary and connatural, therefore it then also concurs and greatly aids the action. Finally, it can perhaps be added that even then that power is necessary, because substantial form through itself alone is never a sufficient principle of action, in that it is of itself indifferent and a quasi-general principle of action, and because, just as substantial form on the part of matter requires accidental dispositions, although accidental form does not require them, so on the part of the principle it requires the partnership of an accidental instrument so that it may be educed from the potency of matter.

Third Assertion

27. I say thirdly: accidents are not so conjoined to substance as instruments for educing substantial form that they cannot exercise their entire activity concerning substance, even if they are disjoined or distant from substantial form. This is the clear opinion of St. Thomas, which all the authors cited above follow, both in the second opinion of the prior point, and in the second point. And they prove it by the natural experiences adduced above, and by that which, supposing the mystery of the Eucharist, is taken from the action of the species of

wine. But the a priori reason is that in these accidents, in whatever way their entity is conserved distinct from their proper substantial form, the entire power of acting connatural to them remains, because this in reality is not distinguished from their entity; therefore if they are applied in a suitable way to some patient, they will have concerning that patient the connatural action by which they dispose its matter to a form proportioned to themselves; but with this action, if it arrives at the required term, the instrumental action by which substantial form is educed is by the nature of the thing conjoined, because this cannot naturally be separated from the ultimate disposition; therefore these kinds of accidents can also have this action even if they are distant from their proper form, provided that they have the entire intrinsic perfection or intensity necessary for acting and for sufficiently disposing matter.

Fourth Assertion

28. I say fourthly: when accidents disjoined from their form so effect substantial form that they cannot be aided by their proper form, it is necessary that the influx of the proper form, which is lacking there, be supplied by the concourse of some superior cause, which cause cannot be some created intelligence, but must be some corporeal cause, like the sun or another similar one; or, if this also is lacking or is found insufficient, that entire defect must be supplied by the concourse of the first cause. This conclusion, as regards the prior part, follows by necessary consequence from the preceding; for an accidental form alone and destitute of the aid of substantial form is not a sufficient principle in the nature of a proximate cause of substantial form, as was proven in the second assertion; therefore when the influx of substantial form is lacking, it cannot consummate the effect of the principal agent unless that influx is supplied from elsewhere, because an effect can never be made without sufficient cause. But it often happens that accidents reach a substantial effect by

their action without the influx of their proper form; therefore then that influx is supplied by the concourse of some superior cause, because there is no other principle to which such action can be referred, since an inferior cause does not suffice, for the same reason often repeated, and no equal cause intervenes. This assertion is then declared from a certain common opinion of all philosophers; for all hold that some substantial effects are to be attributed to some superior or celestial cause as to a proximate principal cause, on account of the defect of a particular or univocal cause; thus they say that animals which are generated from putrefaction are made by celestial power; likewise concerning minerals; and many hold the same concerning the form of a corpse. But truly if accidents alone sufficed for effecting substantial form without the aid of a superior cause, it would never be necessary to have recourse in these effects to a superior cause, but it should always be said that each thing is made by its like, either formally or virtually existing in its accidents, without any other influx of heaven or another universal cause, beyond that which it has with other causes. As, for example, if it were true that in glowing iron there is no formal fire, but only intense heat, sufficient for disposing the matter of tow to the substantial form of fire, then, although such iron generated fire, neither heaven nor God would concur with greater concourse than if fire generated fire, and consequently that generation of fire would not be attributed more to the universal cause than if fire generated; therefore, by parity of reason, when gold is generated in the bowels of the earth, the sun does not concur there with any special influx to the substantial form of gold, but the accidents which sufficiently dispose matter to the form of gold (for these are always necessary in the eduction of any form) will in the power of the form of gold induce a similar form; therefore gold is not generated by heaven, but by gold, and a corpse by a corpse, and so of all others; but this is alien to the sense of all philosophers, who say that in those events the universal cause supplies the defect of the particular; therefore the

same must be said whenever a similar defect intervenes. And this will be more clearly declared by discussing some effects in particular.

29. Various modes by which accidents can be separated from their connatural substances or principals. For it can happen in various ways that accidents are separated from their substantial form. In the first way, because they are conserved by divine power outside every substance, as happens in the mystery of the Eucharist. And then the separated accidents, for example, the species of wine, by their proper power and the general concourse of God dispose a drop of water, for example, mixed with them, so that they convert it into wine; yet when they arrive at the instant of substantial transmutation, the same accidents indeed apply all the instrumental efficiency which they can apply by their nature to the eduction of form; nevertheless because the influx of substantial form is lacking, it is necessary that, beyond the general concourse, God apply greater efficacy, by which he supplies the influx of that form. Concerning this matter I spoke in the third tome of the third part, disp. LVII, sect. 1, where I reported the authors who thus philosophize, and nevertheless call that action natural, because that entire concourse is due, supposing the prior miracle; but in all other respects the action is made by power and in a natural manner.

30. Whether glowing iron is truly ignited in some part. In another way it happens that an accident is separated from its proper substantial form, because it exists in an extraneous subject, as intense heat exists in water or iron, or as light exists in air; for we call a subject extraneous not only what is repugnant, but also what from the force of its form does not have such an accident, unless it receives that accident from an extrinsic agent. But an accident so existing in an extraneous subject, if it is of the same species as the dispositions required for introducing form, is rarely powerful enough to effect sufficient disposition to its connatural form; whence it must either have a conjoined form in the nature of an active principle, or generation will follow entirely by accident from the disposition of matter, and then

the power of a superior cause will be more necessary. And the reason is that heat, for example, separated from fire or from an animal, properly speaking, does not suffice for sufficiently disposing matter to the form of fire, because, existing in an extraneous subject, it never has the intensity necessary for the form of fire; nor does it suffice for generating flesh or introducing soul, because in an extraneous subject it is not so tempered as the disposition of soul requires. This reason generally proceeds concerning any similar accident, for in an extraneous subject it either does not attain to the degree which another form requires or does not have conjoined the other qualities required for the temperament of such form; and therefore, properly speaking, it cannot sufficiently dispose to that form, and consequently cannot instrumentally introduce that form into prime matter. Whence, in that common example of ignited iron, the heat which inheres in iron truly does not suffice for generating fire, yet it has conjoined some true fire intimately penetrated into the pores of iron, from which fire is generated; but the heat of iron aids the velocity and vehemence of action. It also happens sometimes from the disposition of the patient that, although the proximate agent introduces only heat in some degree, by accident there results a disposition to a very different form, as if matter is humid and is heated by fire, there easily results a temperament of hot and humid and some form of a mixture requiring that disposition. And in this way very many mixtures are generated, especially imperfect ones; perhaps also minerals are often made in this way. For sometimes it is probable that they are made per se, through the action of their like, as if by accretion and augmentation, not indeed vital, but by juxtaposition. Animals also, which are generated from putrefaction or from rain falling on warm earth, seem to be made in this way by accident. And in such generations by accident it is not difficult to believe that the power of a superior agent is required, from which such forms are introduced; because the proximate agent not only does not have a substantial form similar or equal, but also does not have a quality or temperament per

se sufficient for disposing and preparing matter, and consequently not sufficient for instrumental action. But the dispositions which are received in the patient, as I have often said, do not concur actively, even instrumentally, to introduce their form, because either they do not exist at that instant, but others result from form, or, if they are the same, they have no proper action there, and therefore they cannot have instrumental action; therefore in all these generations, which are made as if by accident, some superior cause is rightly required which introduces form. And nearly the same reason applies to the introduction of the form of a corpse, which is made as if by accident lest matter remain without form, and is made not so much according to the action of the agent killing the animal, for example, which is often only division of the continuum, but is made according to the material disposition which remains in the patient or was present. The same applies when from vehement motion of collision or percussion of bodies fire is excited, by means of vehement heat, which that motion causes in some particle of matter well disposed to that fire. And finally the same reason applies to all generations which happen to be made by accident.

31. But truly if an accident existing in an extraneous subject is not of the same, but of superior nature with respect to the dispositions by which inferior matter is prepared for the form of the thing to be generated, it can happen that by means of that accident the generation of some inferior substance is made, not only by accident by reason of the dispositions of matter, but also per se from the intention of the superior agent. This happens when the principal agent, because it is distant in place, diffuses some power through a medium by mediation (as they say) of a supposit, so that through that power it may be conjoined to the patient by immediacy of power, in the way that heaven acts on these inferior things through light or other influences, which are qualities of superior order and nature than the elementary qualities by which matter is proximately disposed. And concerning this genus of action it can be said that, although the principal agent

seems to be distant in place, nevertheless it does not cease from actual influx, because it is within the sphere of activity and by the mediate diffused power it touches the patient. And thus the action could be understood not to be from accident alone as from an entirely separated instrument, but as conjoined in the nature of causing to its principal agent. But this depends on the difficulty to be treated below concerning the proximity necessary between agent and patient, and therefore let it be deferred until that place.

32. Finally, an accident can be separated from the principal generating agent, although it is not in an extraneous subject, because both the accident itself and its subject is cut off from the generator and constituted so that in acting it obtains its place. And this happens especially in the generation of animals by means of seed, which is most properly a separated instrument, not only in subject, but also in place, and sometimes also in time, for it happens that seed effects generation when the generator no longer exists. From this it is also clearly evident that such an instrument is separated in causality from the animal from which it was cut off, and therefore in this instrument the necessity of some influx of a superior cause appears more clearly, otherwise, since seed is a very imperfect thing, it does not appear how it could by itself alone effect a thing far more perfect as a sufficient proximate cause. For that it is a power cut off from a more perfect thing and left in its place, although it suffices for some instrumental action, as Aristotle also holds, II de Generat. animal., c. 1[14], nevertheless it cannot be enough that it should absolutely be the total proximate agent. Nor is it sufficient if someone should say that seed is an instrument not only by reason of accidents, but also by reason of substantial form, which exists in the spirit enclosed in the grosser part of seed, in which is the seminal and instrumental power. For although this is probable, nevertheless it does not suffice, because that entire substance and its form is much less perfect than the soul, which is introduced through

[14] Also read c. 3, and D. Thomas, I, q. 118, a. 1.

its action; therefore it needs greater concourse and aid of a superior cause, especially in the generation of animals and perfect living things.

33. From what source is the organization of the fetus made. Indeed some add, especially Scotus, In II, dist. 18, that even for the accidental disposition of an organic body that power of seed is not sufficient, because that action is so varied and multiple that it in no way appears by what reason it could be perfected by a simple and imperfect power acting merely naturally. Whence the Commentator, whom Scotus also cites, II de Caelo, comm. 69 and following, says that seed acts and organizes by divine power. And VII Metaph., text. 31, he says the power of seed is divine, artistic, and similar to intellectual power, and therefore (he says) Galen doubts whether that power is creator or not. Which Galen treats in the book de Foetus formatione, where he freely and willingly confesses that, although he had labored much in this matter, nevertheless he found nothing which satisfied him; nevertheless he concludes that the wonderful operation of seed is not without something partaking in reason and intellect. And truly that action is so wonderful that it can scarcely or not at all be understood. If therefore the very action of organizing the body can scarcely be understood in seed without some peculiar concourse and aid of a superior cause, what wonder is it that for educing the very substantial form from the subjected matter it needs greater help and aid? For without doubt there is great difference and wide distinction between these things; for since the organization of body is not substantial, but accidental, it can rightly be understood that there is a quasi-eminent and universal power in seed for all that organization, whether by reason of substantial form or by reason of some accidental faculty; for either can be understood to be an instrument of soul sufficient for effecting the temperament of primary qualities proportioned and connatural to the members of an organic body; only some diverse application seems to be required so that the same power of seed can dispose various members in so diverse a way and reduce them by its power to that wonderful order, which appears in the due

disposition of members. And for this it is perhaps aided by some natural faculty of the maternal womb or by some celestial influx; or certainly (if there is need) by some motion or direction of the author of nature. This especially because seed does not perfect from the beginning, by its power alone, the entire organization of body, but of some principal part, into which the sensitive soul is introduced, which afterwards gradually perfects the organization of its body, as St. Thomas declares at length, I, q. 118, a. 1, ad 4. But truly, as regards the production of the sensitive soul itself, not only is power lacking in seed as regards the mode of action, but also as regards the substance of action (so to speak), and therefore it much more needs actual help, influx and concourse of a superior cause for this action, as will easily be evident to one carefully considering this matter.

34. Objection against what was said above. Only this can stand in the way, that it seems to be both against the due order of nature and against the perfection of these agents that a superior or first cause should always have to supply the defect of the proximate cause in their generations. For when from fortuitous concourse of causes and by accident it happens that some generation is made without sufficient proximate cause, more from necessity of matter than from intention of some natural agent, then it is not wonderful that in introducing form the universal cause should have to supply the defect of the particular. But that in the very mode of generation per se instituted by nature the proximate cause should always be so imperfect or should apply its power in so imperfect a way that it is never found sufficient for the effect, seems to be both a disordered institution of nature and a great imperfection of the particular causes generating in this way. And it is confirmed, for inanimate corporeal agents have, properly speaking, sufficient power for producing things similar to themselves; therefore living things, since they are far more perfect than inanimate things, ought to have that power. It is confirmed secondly, because with the same facility it could be said that such a secondary cause does nothing in the eduction of substantial form, but

the whole thing is done by the first cause supplying the defect of the particular cause. But if this seems inconvenient because it is not consonant with the natures of things, that also ought to seem so.

35. A little question for the solution of the objection. Before I fully satisfy this objection, it is necessary to explain what is the universal cause which supplies this defect of the particular or aids its instrument, which we proposed in the latter part of the superior assertion. In which we first said that this efficiency cannot be attributed to created intelligences, because we think they have no power for effecting anything in bodies beyond local motion, as we will say below treating of them ex professo. Whence the actions of natural agents per se do not depend on the concourse of created intelligences, just as they do not depend on them in being, and therefore when they need greater help and concourse they do not expect that concourse or aid from them, but from some other cause to which per se they are subordinated. Yet there are not lacking those who say that intelligences, although per se they cannot so influence bodies, nevertheless can do so through the heavens, as through their instruments. But how difficult this is to understand and believe, I will immediately say. It remains therefore that such a universal cause is either heaven or the very author of nature, God; for besides these no other superior cause can be devised. And heaven indeed from itself seems a proportioned agent, because, since it is corporeal and is from elsewhere of a certain superior order and perfection, it has more eminent power for altering inferior bodies, as experience itself sufficiently teaches us. And therefore it is not wonderful that it has power also for generating substances; therefore also for aiding accidents to the generation of substances.

36. Two impediments, and these not contemptible, intervene which seem to render this influence of the heavens in the substantial forms of things to be generated difficult. The first impediment is universal, with respect to all things which are generated in earth or other elements, whether they are living or inanimate, because, namely,

either heaven acts for the eduction of substantial forms through its accidents alone, or also through its substantial form immediately. If the first is said, the same difficulty in which we are engaged arises: how those accidents, without actual influx of their own or another substantial form, suffice per se for educing substantial form. Unless perhaps someone should respond that celestial accidents are more perfect beings than are the material forms of generable things, especially inanimate ones. But this is absolutely false; for, as I will show below, substantial form not only by genus, but also universally and in individuals is a more perfect being than any accident. And in some cases it is per se incredible, as concerning the form of gold, silver and gems, etc. This especially because celestial bodies proximately effect these effects by means of qualities which they impress on air and other intermediate bodies, such as light and if perhaps there are other insensible qualities, which are not more perfect than the very form of air, much less than all others. If therefore for this reason the proper and actual efficiency of the very form of the sun or other stars is necessary, excessive local distance seems to stand in the way; for how can the form of the sun immediately through itself effect the form of gold in the bowels of earth so far distant and remote from itself? On account of this difficulty Scotus said that some form can immediately act on a distant thing, which other philosophers can scarcely hear or bear; for this saying of Scotus conflicts with the Aristotelian dogma received by all philosophers. Nor will he who said that, just as the efficiency of accidents of the sun penetrates to the interior of earth, so also the efficiency of the form of the sun, satisfy this difficulty. For the reason is not similar in both cases; for accidents diffuse their power by means of other accidents produced by themselves; but substantial form cannot diffuse its power by means of substantial forms, as is easily evident per se, because it neither corrupts intermediate bodies nor can add substantial forms to forms, as accidents can. But if the form of the sun only diffuses its power by means of accidents, we are devolved into the prior difficulty, because then the form of the sun

itself does not immediately influence the eduction of another form, but only through accidents.

37. This difficulty can be responded to in two ways. The first is that heaven or the sun through its substantial form simultaneously with accidental power influences these inferior things immediately by immediacy of power, even if it is not immediately conjoined to them by immediacy of supposit. But this way of speaking both has no small difficulty and a probable way of defending it cannot be explained until sect. 4, in which we will declare how an agent ought to be conjoined to a patient so that it can act on that patient, and therefore let it be deferred until that place. The second way is that these substantial forms are not effected by the sole principal power of celestial influx, but it is necessary that the author of nature apply greater concourse, by which he supplies the effect of the proximate cause, but these effects are attributed to heaven, either by general reason, according to which it is said that the sun and man generate man, which we will declare below treating of essentially subordinated causes, or sometimes by more special title, namely, because heaven performs the function of proximate cause and applies all the efficiency, which particular causes are accustomed to apply either for disposing material or for educing form through instrumental action of qualities, even if they cannot immediately influence through proper forms. And perhaps in this way the sun effects gold or other minerals.

38. Whether heaven can effect living things. The second impediment, less general, concerns the forms of living things; for since heaven is not animate, even if local distance does not impede it from being able to influence through its form, nevertheless the inferior grade seems to obstruct it from being able to influence these forms of living things. Some respond that although heaven does not live, nevertheless its form by reason of its specific difference is simply more perfect than these living things which are generated by heaven. This response can be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 115, a. 3, ad 3, where he says that celestial bodies by their universal power contain in

themselves whatever is generated in inferior things; and q. 105, a. 1, ad 1, he says that an effect is assimilated to its agent, either according to species or according to virtual containment: "And thus (he says) animals generated from putrefaction, and plants, and mineral bodies, are assimilated to the sun and stars, by whose power they are generated." But first, although with respect to imperfect living things or animals it is probable what is assumed in that response, nevertheless with respect to perfect animals it does not seem likely, because both in operations and in mode of operating they seem to exceed much the perfection of heaven. Then, since the grade of life is, so to speak, more perfect than the grade of non-living things, it seems impossible that a form which is not a soul should eminently contain some soul so that it can be the principal principle of causing that soul; for a form which eminently contains soul also contains the grade of life, not indeed according to its entire potentiality, but according to its actual and precise perfection; but it cannot be understood that a form contained under an inferior grade should eminently contain the perfection of a superior grade.

39. The heavens, together with intelligence, cannot generate living things. There is therefore another response: that the heavens by their proper power cannot effect the forms of living things; nevertheless, because they do not act except as moved by intelligence, therefore by the power of the intelligence, of which they are the instrument, they can effect such forms. Thus responds St. Thomas, I, q. 70, a. 5, ad 3; hence in the earlier passages he seems to speak of the heavens as conjoined to intelligence or insofar as it includes that intelligence. But this response is also difficult for me to understand, because I do not think that intelligence impresses upon the heavens anything beyond local motion, which does not serve to augment active power, but only for its various application, as Aristotle sufficiently indicated in book II of De Generatione, chapter 9, text 55, saying: "For impulse therefore produces continuous generation, because it brings near and removes the sun as the author of things to

be generated." And this is clear by reason, for what is it that an angel impresses upon the heavens beyond motion, since it cannot impress any qualities upon it? For corporeal matter obeys angels only with regard to local motion, as the same St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 110, a. 2 and 3. But if intelligence impresses nothing upon the heavens beyond motion, how can it augment their power to act beyond their proper perfection? For local motion is not active per se, nor does it give the power of acting. Nor are physical agents, such as the heavens, to be compared in this respect with instruments of art, in which motion serves the form of art, because this is nothing other than a mode resulting from the various position or place of some body and its parts which are varied through motion; but truly physical agents induce proper and perfect forms, which do not result from motion per se, but only accidentally, insofar as the power of acting is applied through motion. Moreover, the heavens by their nature are not an instrument of intelligence, because they have neither a natural relation to it nor is any intelligence by its nature conjoined to the heavens or destined for their motion, but only by the choice and good pleasure of the author of nature. Nor do they become an instrument by reason of local motion alone; otherwise whoever applies fire or another acting cause would use it as a physical instrument, and for that reason the applied fire could act something more by the power of the applier, which is plainly false. The consequence is clear, because the heavens have nothing more from intelligence than application, nor does the heavens have anything more or less because it is moved by a more or less perfect intelligence or by any other thing whatever, provided it receives equal motion. Finally, when it is said that the heavens effect living things by the power of living intelligence, I ask whether the intelligence simultaneously with the heavens actually influences and effects the souls of living things through itself and immediately, or only through the heavens, so that the action of intelligence stops at the motion of the heavens, from which the remaining efficient causality arises immediately. The first is false and contrary to the doctrine of St.

Thomas, as we have often said, and largely coincides with the opinion of Avicenna. But if the second is said, the difficulty is not resolved as to how an instrument not having in itself sufficient form can effect an effect without the actual help of a superior and more principal cause. Therefore it will be said more truly and better that the heavens indeed cannot effect an animal by their proper power, as is supposed in the said second response, yet they effect those things by the power of God, as author and general provider of nature, who by His greater concurrence supplies whatever power is lacking in proximate causes.

40. Solution of the small questions. God influences which effects as a particular cause. It must therefore be said that whenever in these lower things there is lacking the influence of substantial form to educate a similar one, this is supplied by the power of celestial causes in those effects which do not exceed their perfection and power; but in those which surpass them, it is supplied by the efficiency of the first cause, to which it pertains to provide the general concurrence necessary to inferior causes, according to their natural capacity and need. Hence not only in events or effects which happen accidentally, but also in those which as it were per se accompany the natures of certain things and follow from their natural mode of acting, it pertains to the author and provider of nature, God, to concur with secondary causes in acting in this way. Therefore sometimes this concurrence of God is owed from the general reason of universal nature, lest the order of the universe be perverted or matter remain without form or pass into nothing, just as water being moved upward to fill a vacuum is only from the cause of universal nature, and therefore is believed to happen from the command and impulse of its author alone, unless perhaps this office has been committed by God to some intelligence, because local motion does not exceed its activity and ministry, concerning which elsewhere. Sometimes however such concurrence is owed from the proper nature and condition of some particular agent, which is not apt to communicate or propagate its nature in another way, as we believe happens in the generation of perfect animals and is most

certain in the generation of man, yet for a far higher and nobler reason. For, because the soul of man is not only more perfect, but also of a higher and superior order than all the rest, therefore for the generation of man not only a greater concurrence of the author of nature is necessary, but also a higher mode of effecting the soul, namely through creation. Hence it happens that human seed cannot operate even instrumentally to effect it, but only to organize the body. But in the generation of other animals, even perfect ones, because their souls are material, they are educed from the potency of matter, and therefore seed can concur at least instrumentally to their production, yet not without the help of a superior cause which supplies the assistance (so to speak) and actual influence of the principal form.

41. The foregoing objection is satisfied. Nor is there in this any imperfection or disorder of nature, as was objected above, but it is the natural condition or need which the mode of generation and propagation brings with it, which such a species by its nature demands. Just as the fact that for the generation of man the infusion of the soul through creation is required is not an imperfection or disorder of nature, but a condition naturally following from such a nature of man, and therefore that action is not extraordinary, but owed from the common law, supposing the institution of such a nature; so therefore in the present case it must be said, not entirely the same, but by proportional reason. Therefore, just as in man it is not from imperfection that one man can effect a soul similar to his own neither principally nor instrumentally, so in other animals it is not from imperfection that they cannot apply the entire principal power necessary for the eduction of their forms, but only instrumental power. For they obtain as it were a middle place, and because in comparison with the rational soul they have less perfect souls, namely material ones, therefore they can apply some efficiency, at least instrumental, to effect them, which man cannot do; but because in comparison with inanimate things the forms of living things are far more perfect, therefore more things are required for their production

and an exquisite and peculiar mode of generation; and hence it comes about that particular causes cannot apply the entire principal power, but only instrumental power to effect them. Nor truly, because sufficient principal power is not found in them, should instrumental action also be denied to them, because they are found sufficiently proportioned to this, and not to that; but nature gave to each corruptible species the power and action to propagate its nature, as much as it could give according to its capacity and mode of operating; and therefore it gave to man that he might act at least by disposing, to others that they might act instrumentally, to others truly that they might act even principally. Therefore that manner of speaking by which St. Thomas and others, as we saw above, call secondary causes instruments of the first, is verified according to a certain greater propriety in living things, especially perfect ones.

42. I know that other ways of speaking can be devised; for, because in more perfect animals seed does not perfect generation except as conjoined to the female, therefore some have thought that the soul of the female itself has a peculiar principal influence in the substantial formation of the fetus. But concerning other imperfect living things, especially plants, some say that the form of the generated thing does not substantially exceed the form of the seed itself, as appears in wheat and other such things. But these and similar views have many difficulties, which it is not permitted to pursue in this place, because they depend much on the science of the soul, and therefore the opinion which we have expounded seems more probable than all, and experience itself teaches that these living things are per se less sufficient and need greater helps, not only to induce substantial form, but also to dispose and organize matter, as is evident in plants; indeed even among inanimate things, simple bodies are generated more easily than mixed ones; therefore there is no inconvenience in confessing that living things need superior concurrence to generate things similar to themselves, although they themselves do not lack some power and action proportioned and connatural to them. And in this way we think

we have abundantly satisfied the foundations of the prior opinion; for they prove our second and fourth assertions, yet they press nothing against the first and third, as we have sufficiently declared in the course of those discussions. But we do not think the second opinion is contrary to the doctrine handed down by us, nor can its foundations obstruct anything, as has been shown.

SECTION III

WHAT IS THE PRINCIPLE BY WHICH CREATED SUBSTANCES EFFECT ACCIDENTS

1. The causes of doubt on both sides. The reason for doubt is that either substance effects an accident by means of an accident, or by itself alone and through itself. If the first is said, an infinite regress follows; for if one accident comes to be by means of another, I ask concerning that other by what principle it comes to be; if by means of another accident, the same question returns concerning that one; but if we stop at something that proximately comes to be from substance, this should have been said about the first, because there is no greater reason for one than for the other. But if, on account of this reasoning, it is said that substance effects an accident through itself, it follows first that no accident is a principle of effecting another. It follows second that powers and faculties for operating in created substances are nothing other than their forms. Or certainly, if to avoid these inconveniences it is said that certain accidents come to be immediately from substance through itself, while others come to be by means of accidents, it will be necessary to give some account of this distinction and discrimination, and to reveal which accidents come to be in one way or the other. And again it will be necessary to explain, when one accident is the principle by which another is effected, whether it is principal or instrumental. From this it appears that an accident can at most act as an instrument of substance, because it is

only being of being (as philosophers say), and from substance and on account of substance as on account of an end it has its whole being. On the other hand, however, it seems that it ought to be a principal principle, since the effect does not exceed the perfection of that.

2. To explain this matter I suppose that accidents can come to be in two ways: In one way, through proper action, as when light comes to be through illumination or location (ubi) through proper local motion. Second, through natural resultance, as relation results from a foundation when the term is posited (if it is a mode distinct from the foundation), or as figure results from division, or from motion or the term of local motion, and the proper properties of things are also considered to come to be in this way. In a third way an accident could be understood to come to be concomitantly with substance without resultance from it, as quantity, for example, with prime matter, which way we now omit, because if it is true, it can be reduced to one or the other of the preceding, as we shall explain, and because in that mode of production, whatever will have been the principle of effecting the substance will be the principle of effecting the accident that comes to be with it.

First Assertion Concerning Natural Emanation

3. I say therefore first: when an accident comes to be through natural emanation, the proximate principle of it according to such a mode of efficiency, whatever that may be, can be substance, if such an accident is immediately connected with it; sometimes, however, it can result by means of an accident, if it has a closer connection with that. This whole conclusion is commonly received, and can first be declared by induction; for the intellect, for example, proximately emanates from the substance of the soul, and quantity from matter or from form. Hence with respect to these properties no accidental intrinsic principle can be assigned; it is therefore substantial. But figure, for

example, or location results by means of quantity, and whiteness results from such a mixture of primary qualities. The reasoning set forth at the beginning also proves this conclusion, because if an accident belongs to substance from within, it cannot always belong by means of an accident, as from its intrinsic principle, but some accident and substance must necessarily be immediately connected; it is not necessary, however, that all intrinsic accidents be of this kind. And the reason for diversity among them is easy, because some of them have a more immediate order to substance than others.

4. I see that it can be responded that although some accident is intimately and immediately connected with substance, it is not nevertheless necessary that it be connected through effective emanation of the accident from substance, but only on account of natural aptitude and inseparability, as we said above that we can probably think concerning matter and quantity. And according to this it will not be necessary for any accident to emanate immediately from substance, but to be received immediately in substance by the same agent by which the substance is produced. Nevertheless the conclusion posited supposes the contrary opinion as more probable, namely that accidental properties, especially those that follow or are owed to a thing by reason of form, are caused by substance not only materially and finally, but also effectively through natural resultance, either immediately, if it is a first property, or mediately, if it is a second. This is held by St. Thomas, I, q. 77, a. 6, where he speaks of the powers of the soul; but there is the same reasoning concerning any form and the properties following that or owed by reason of it. And this is very probable, because since substantial form is as first act, but accidental as second, it is probable that substantial form has some power so that accidents proper to it emanate from it. Likewise, because in this way the natural connection between form and properties, and the essential order among them, is better understood. And this very much confirms the sensible example of water reducing itself to its pristine coldness; for that reduction cannot happen except through natural resultance

from form, as has been shown above; therefore for the same reason the same must be thought concerning any property naturally connected with form, especially if from elsewhere there is no repugnance or dependence on something extrinsic. And in that example of water it manifestly stands that the conclusion posited is true, namely that some accident can immediately result effectively from a substantial principle. For that intensification of coldness can have no closer principle from which it results than the substantial form of water.

5. The nature of natural resultance is declared. Cajetan's opinion. But before we proceed further, it is necessary to declare once what this natural resultance is, namely whether it is true efficiency and active causality or not. Because, if it is true efficiency, proper accidental action will intervene there; for effective causality consists in action, as we shall see below; and thus substantial form will be the immediate and united principle of some accidental action, and actions will be multiplied in the production of form and its properties, and there will be essential action for all these things that are coproduced or cocreated with others, all of which seem alien to the common doctrine of philosophers. But if that is not true efficiency, therefore neither can it be called efficiency, because what is not true gold absolutely is not gold, nor can it be so called except on account of some analogy and proportion, which appears to be none in the present case; indeed it cannot even be understood what this resultance is, if it is not efficiency. Concerning this Cajetan, I, q. 54, a. 3, indicates that this emanation is a natural sequel without mediate operation; he does not however declare what that natural sequel is, or how it happens without action or mediate operation. And q. 77, a. 1, ad 2 and 3, he expressly says that this resultance is through efficiency without mediate action, and he thinks it is the opinion of St. Thomas, there, ad 3, where however he does not say that the emanation of accidents from subject is without action, but that it is not through any transmutation, but through natural resultance.

6. Therefore, if we speak rigorously, I think it truer that this resultance is not without true action, although it is not always considered a distinct action per se, nor as proper change. This, as I think, the reasoning made above sufficiently proves, because either this is true efficiency or none; for no middle can be given. If therefore it is true efficiency, action intervenes. If it is not efficiency, neither is it resultance or causal natural sequel, but only illative, because, one thing being posited, another is posited on account of natural debt. Just as between matter and form of heaven there is natural inference, not however emanation of one from the other. Some seem to assign a middle between these, saying that this is not efficiency, but quasi-efficiency, which consists only in this, that the efficient cause of substance, by reason of it, is determined to give it proportioned properties. But first this is really no efficiency, but only connaturality, which also intervenes between natural passive potency and act. Then the example of the reduction of water forces us to acknowledge greater and truer efficiency. Finally, even with that posited, it is necessary to say, as pertains to the matter, that the efficient cause concomitantly effects the distinct property along with the substance, not however without concomitant action, because it is repugnant for a distinct thing to come to be without distinct action when from that thing the primary term itself of another action is not composed, because action is only a certain mode of the formal term itself and per se, as I shall say below, which reasoning I shall immediately declare more fully.

7. The twofold mode of natural emanation. Moreover I argue in this way: for this natural resultance sometimes happens per se alone and separately from the production of that thing from which it results; sometimes however it is so conjoined with it that it is never posterior, but entirely simultaneous with it, as, for example, when water reduces itself to its pristine coldness, that is natural emanation, as Cajetan acknowledges, in the said q. 54, a. 3, at the end, where he also says the same about the motion of a heavy thing generated in a higher place, which, when the impediment is removed, naturally results from

gravity. But whenever resultance happens in this way, it is most evident that it does not happen without efficiency and true action and change, as manifestly appears in the said examples; and the reason is that there something begins to be in the subject that was not there before. And it begins per se without new production of another thing; therefore it begins through some efficient cause and through proper action and change; hence that is proper cooling and local motion. And the same reasoning applies whenever any accident newly comes to some preexisting subject per se alone or without another prior accident; for, if several things mutually connected come simultaneously, that which is first and the root of others is considered to come per se, the rest concomitantly. You will say: therefore, when relation comes to a foundation from the position of a term, new action per se intervenes there, because only that relative accident then newly comes to such a subject. Some respond by conceding the consequence; others deny, because it suffices that it results from the position of the term. Others think that no action intervenes there, because such relation is not a thing or mode distinct ex natura rei from the foundation, concerning which we shall see in its place.

8. But from this resultance, which is separated in time from production, judgment must be made concerning any other, even if it is conjoined in the same instant; for simultaneity in duration does not remove distinction. Especially because, although these are naturally simultaneous, they could be supernaturally separated, which is sufficient argument of distinction. The assumption is declared; for while God creates the substance of the soul, he could suspend the emanation of powers from it and after some time permit that or give concurrence to such emanation, and then that posterior emanation would be proper efficiency and true action, for the same reason as was said about the cooling of water reducing itself to natural state; therefore, even when it happens simultaneously in time, it is proper and distinct action. Moreover, the a priori reasoning was touched upon above, because such accidental forms or properties are things

distinct from substance; therefore, although they come to be with the substance itself or result from it, it is necessary that they come to be through distinct action, although concomitant or consequent to another. The consequence is clear because those two, namely substance and property, do not come to be equally first as two parts of one composite term, but absolutely substance comes to be first by nature and then the proper accident results or is added to it. As when the soul is created, the creative action[15] is terminated per se to substance alone; for only that comes to be from nothing and per se terminates that action; therefore so that some distinct thing may be added to it, another efficiency is necessary, and consequently new action, although from natural connection it necessarily accompanies another. Add that the proximate principle of such efficiency, according to our opinion, is also distinct; for it is the intrinsic substance itself, which is the term of the prior action. Likewise the material principle is often diverse; as in the said example of creation of the soul, there is no material principle, but the substance itself of the soul is the material principle of its powers. The proper term is also distinct in reality, as we suppose; therefore distinct action intervenes there in reality, although physically, and in the common way of speaking, they are computed as one, because they have intrinsic connection and emanation.

9. A distinction to be noted between the aforesaid modes of natural emanation. In which is to be noted the difference between the two modes of natural resultance that we distinguished above. For when emanation is such that it can never happen per se and separately, but only as connected to prior action and its term, then it is not considered proper and per se action, and much less change, but as it were an accidental complement of the prior action. And therefore concerning such accidents or properties it is said that there is no per se action or motion. But truly when such resultance happens per se and separately, as in the reduction of water, then it is considered per se

[15] creativa, 1960; alit. creaturae. "Esta sustitución hace el párrafo ininteligible." Cf. BHF. t. III, p. 140.

action and proper change tending per se to such accidental term. This difference is not so much in reality as in denomination taken from separation or from concomitance of actions.

Corollaries of the Above Doctrine

10. And from the reasonings made it is gathered, first, that only then is this resultance with true efficiency and action when that which results is distinct a parte rei from that from which it results. For if it is only distinct by reason, although metaphysically one may be said to follow from another, true efficiency cannot intervene there nor physical emanation, but only metaphysical consequence. As if we say that from the fact that form is the formal principle of being it results that it is also the principal principle of acting; and the same is true of all similar attributes, which according to our mode of conceiving are attributed to a thing as its properties, although they are not actually distinguished from it in the thing itself. For in all these true efficiency cannot intervene, because this is not in concepts, but in things themselves. Hence it necessarily requires distinction in reality between principle and term.

11. Which accidents result from substantial principle. Second, it is inferred from the same principles that this natural resultance from substantial principle only intervenes among those accidents that are so connatural that they simply presuppose the substance itself of which they are properties. Which I note because, according to the probable opinion asserting that dispositions temporally preceding form are intrinsically terminated at generation in such a degree as such form requires, and the same in number remain, according to that (I say) opinion, these accidents at the instant of generation do not emanate from form, even if they are properties most connatural to it, as heat is with respect to the form of fire or cold of water, not because such form would not be sufficient for that effection by way of resultance, but because the quality is supposed already

produced per se by the agent through the whole change temporally preceding and terminated at the instant of generation, prior by nature to the introduction of form.

12. A small question is answered. But you will ask, granted that this resultance does not intervene at the instant of generation, whether immediately after it intervenes by way of conservation. I respond that this question is not peculiar to those qualities that precede by natural order, but concerning all properties that result from forms it can similarly be asked whether that resultance is only by way of production in the first instant or time in which the thing is produced or coproduced, or whether it perseveres by way of conservation for the whole time that the property itself lasts, so that just as in illumination not only light perseveres, but also the action of illuminating, so in the soul having intellect not only intellect perseveres, but also the emanation of intellect from soul, and similarly in fire or water not only heat or cold perseveres, but also actual emanation from its form. In which doubt I see nothing that can be defined by certain reasoning, but either can be made probable by conjectures; for after that property is once effected through natural emanation, there is no reason why it should need continual conservation, since it already has perfect being and is in its connatural subject. On the other hand, however, it appears probable that that actual emanation does not cease, because its principle is most present and most conjoined and always has the same power for continuing that. Likewise, it is necessary that that property be actually conserved by God; therefore, since there is an intrinsic and proximate principle there, by which it can be conserved, it is more natural that it be conserved by means of that. Likewise, in this way the greater resistance is better explained, which, other things being equal, can exist in expelling a property from its proper subject than from an alien one. Hence this part seems more probable, which being supposed, it must consequently be said that, although at the first instant of generation of water, for example, coldness does not emanate from its

form, because water already finds coldness produced by the generator, afterward however, when the action of the generator has already ceased, it is conserved by the intrinsic form through natural emanation, in the same way as if it had emanated from it from the first instant.

13. Unity and distinction of natural resultance. Third, it is inferred from what has been said that this emanation or natural resultance is something distinct in reality both from the resulting form and from that from which it results, and also from actual information, for all these can intervene without natural resultance; therefore it is something distinct from them. The antecedent is clear; for cold is in air actually informing it and is accidentally conjoined to its form; and yet it does not emanate from its form; but heat is also conjoined and informs, and moreover emanates from form; therefore emanation adds something. You will say: although this seems so when comparing proper accident to extrinsic, nevertheless in the proper accident itself this resultance or emanation does not seem to be something distinct from it as actually informing. But against this is first, that to inform is one thing, to emanate another; the former pertains to the nature of cause, the latter to the nature of effect. Second, in the example posited above of ultimate disposition, which at the first instant does not emanate from form, there is found a proper accident actually informing and conjoined to proper form and not resulting from it, which however in subsequent time results or is conserved; therefore this resultance is something distinct from proper accident actually informing. Third, it is declared in this way; for this resultance, since it is a certain kind of efficiency, does not happen without concurrence of the first cause; therefore God can suspend this concurrence and prevent intellect, for example, from emanating from soul, and then through his efficiency alone place intellect in soul, because nothing is repugnant to his doing alone what can be done by means of soul, precisely considering the nature of effecting; therefore there the substance of soul and the entity and actual inherence of intellect

remain without actual emanation of intellect from soul, but from God alone; therefore it is a sign that that emanation is something distinct; for whatever is separable in reality, it is also necessary to be distinct. And hence is confirmed what we said above, namely that this natural resultance is not without some action; for that which resultance adds above the entity of accidental form inhering, is only a certain mode of intrinsic dependence of property on its form as on active principle; but dependence on acting principle and action are the same, as we shall see below.

14. An objection is met. But you will object: therefore every action that happens naturally and without freedom is natural resultance of a kind, because just as, the form of water being posited, such property results through true action and dependence, and from one property sometimes another also results, as St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 77, a. 7, so, the sun being posited, for example, light naturally results in air, through illumination. I respond that there is some similarity in this respect; the difference however is, that natural resultance is entirely intrinsic and in some way pertains to the consummated production of a thing, because it only tends to constituting the thing in connatural state per se owed to it from the power of generation; but action properly so called and which is usually distinguished from natural resultance is more extrinsic and supposes, properly speaking, the thing already constituted in its perfect and natural state. Hence also it is commonly said that natural resultance is attributed to the generator and is not from form or intrinsic property except insofar as it takes the place of the generator and is as it were its instrument. Hence is that axiom: Who gives form gives consequences to form, because it pertains to the generator to constitute the generated with due properties; but in the remaining proper actions the thing already operates by proper power, and as to a principal agent in its genus the action is attributed. And hence arises another difference, which we shall immediately touch; for we think enough has been said about natural resultance.

Second Assertion Concerning Proper Accidental Efficiency

15. The conclusion is proved in actions of bodies. I say second: when an accident comes to be through proper action distinct from natural resultance, the proximate principle of effecting it is always some accident. This assertion touches the common question about the distinction of active power from substance in created things, which is usually treated both concerning the substance of angel and its powers and concerning soul and its powers, and also concerning other forms and their active powers. And the conclusion posited is consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas, everywhere establishing distinction in all creatures between proximate faculty of acting and substantial form, as can be seen in I, q. 54, a. 3, and q. 77, a. 1, in which places Cajetan defends it, and Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 4; Soto, in Logica, c. de Propr., q. 2; Aegidius, Quodl. III, q. 10; Hervaeus, Quodl. I, q. 9; and it is proved first by induction made in all effects that we experience. For first we see that elements exercise no accidental efficiency except by means of first qualities, which are manifestly true and proper accidents. Then they do not have even local motion itself except by means of qualities; although that motion pertains to natural resultance, argument a fortiori can nevertheless be drawn from there. Moreover heaven, as far as we can experience, acts through qualities distinct from its substance, namely through light or illumination, and from there we take argument that other more hidden influences happen proximately through accidental qualities; for if that which seems greatest and most perfect of all happens thus, much more do others. Again inanimate mixed things, like metals, gems, and other such things, if they have any actions, manifestly seem to exercise them through accidental powers, a sign of which among others is that those powers can be intensified, lessened and destroyed, in which they depend on the temperament of primary qualities. Which argument

can also be made concerning herbs and plants, which have powers for various admirable actions of attracting or expelling, and some have virtual heat, others cold, etc.; which powers in them are lessened by course of time or change of their temperament, although the substance remains the same; it is therefore a sign that these powers are accidents. The mystery of the Eucharist also confirmed this for us; for we see, the substance having been set aside, the whole power of acting that was in the accidents to have been conserved.

16. Also in actions of spirits. Hence ascending further to actions of soul in any grade of it, as far as we can conjecture from sense, the principles of accidental operations are also accidents, as is clear concerning vital or nutritional heat and concerning the power of attracting food or expelling excrement and similar things; for first the very diversity of actions seems to be sufficient argument of distinction among powers. And moreover here also the argument made has place that these powers are intensified and lessened. Then in operations of senses this seems manifest; for besides diversity of operations the very diversity of organs sufficiently indicates that the proximate powers of those actions are distinct per se, and so are accidental. And in man certainly they must necessarily be distinct from soul; otherwise they would be spiritual entities, which is not probable, as is to be proved more widely in its place. Now concerning spiritual actions themselves and their principles we cannot have such clear experience; nevertheless, because concerning them we cannot philosophize except from those things we experience, observing proportional reasoning, we rightly conclude that the same judgment must be made concerning them.

17. Every active power really distinct from substance. From this induction therefore St. Thomas quite probably concludes that in every created supposit the proximate power of acting and operating is distinct from its substance, and consequently is an accident. But it should be added that every efficiency of substance, besides substantial generation, is efficiency of some accident, because substance cannot

effect substance except through generation; and therefore whatever it effects besides substantial generation, all that is accident; therefore the proximate principle of effecting accident is always another accident. Hence it is confirmed; for the proximate principle of effecting substantial generation itself is accident, and that in two ways. First, by preparing the way to substantial generation, through some accidental action preceding. Second, by cooperating instrumentally with substance itself in the eduction of substantial form, as we saw in the superior section. Therefore much more will it be the proximate principle of effecting every accidental action, whether principal or instrumental, which we shall immediately see. The consequence is clear, because substance is more disproportioned to accidental action than to substantial generation; and conversely a more proportioned principle is accident to accidental action than to substantial generation.

18. The reasons for the aforesaid inference. But the a priori reasoning is difficult to give, although St. Thomas brings forward several probable ones in the cited places, which Scotus and others attack with many arguments. But Cajetan, after Capreolus, defends them quite fully and copiously, but I think that is both laborious and useless, because really those are not demonstrations nor is there reason why they should be sought by a prudent philosopher in such an abstruse matter. For unless it is proved that it exceeds the perfection of created substance to be proximate and unique principle of accidental action, a reason a priori cannot be given by us why these creatures, which now exist and operate, always need an accidental principle for such operations, because we do not know the proper accounts of these creatures so as to take from them peculiar causes of this need or necessity; therefore if we proceed a priori, it is necessary to stop at the common notion of creature as such, as St. Thomas wisely observed. But if foundation is taken from the general notion of created substance, it must consequently be said that it is impossible for God to create a substance that would operate immediately through itself

alone. Which however can hardly be persuaded or proved, because that mode of operating does not seem to require infinite perfection in the genus of being or substance; but every perfection, which does not require this unlimitation, seems communicable to creature; but if it is communicable, whence is it established that it is not communicated? Or how from the general notion of creature can the said necessity be shown?

19. Induction in actions ordered to substantial generation. Nevertheless it must be said that, although this cannot be demonstrated, from the induction made it is quite probably gathered that created substance from its limitation has it that per se it cannot be total and proximate principle of accidental action or form. The reason for which seems to be the disproportion and distance that exists between such principle and such action so that they cannot be conjoined except through some proportioned medium, such as accidental faculty or power. And therefore substance alone that is infinite, which exceeds every proportion and can overcome every disproportion, is sufficient through itself for every such effect or action. And we can confirm this thus, because every operation of substance, besides substantial generation, either tends to substantial generation to be effected or not. Action that is of the prior kind rightly requires proximate accidental principle, because it is accidental disposition to substance. For if the substance that is generated is such that it cannot come to be without previous accidental dispositions, what wonder that the substance that generates it also requires accidental dispositions, which are at once powers of acting and of disposing to generation of similar substance? You will say that this reasoning correctly proceeds concerning univocal agent and of the same nature, not however concerning equivocal, in which there can be power of higher nature. It is responded that if the equivocal agent is finite, as we are now discussing, proportionally the same judgment must be made concerning it as concerning univocal agent; for if it eminently contains the substantial form of the thing to be generated

through its substantial form, it will also contain the accidental dispositions to that form eminently through its more noble accidental disposition or property; for since substantial form is limited and finite in its genus, it cannot per se alone eminently contain perfections of diverse genera nor be per se apt for either action. Which the mode of acting of all bodies, both lower and celestial, sufficiently declares, as was exposed in the induction made above. For just as there is no substantial form, of whatever order or perfection it may be, that does not have in its matter dispositions or properties proportioned to itself, so there is no form that, for disposing other matter to some substantial form, whether equal or inferior, does not use proper accidental dispositions or properties, as proper principles of acting.

20. In operations not ordered to substantial generation. But operations that are not ordered to substantial generation, as far as we can conjecture from experience of things, are only either operations of sensitive and intellective life, or various and diverse local motions. I omit illumination and intentional actions of sensible species, for concerning these it sufficiently stands that they happen from sensible accidents. Nor do I count operations of vegetative life, because all per se tend to some substantial generation. Concerning which there is the same reasoning as concerning first generation; for it also happens, with accidental alteration and disposition preceding, with some local motions also intervening, namely of attraction and expulsion. But other transient actions and operations, even if they happen through eminent powers, always happen either by alteration terminated per se first to some of the primary qualities, concerning which it has already been shown that their proximate principles are some accidents, or they consist only in local motion of attracting or impelling, etc. That therefore accidental faculties are required for operations of knowing and loving in sensitive grade, reason can first be taken from the very variety of operations and from the various disposition that they require in their organs. Likewise, from the fact that such immanent actions are in the proximate principles themselves from which they are

elicited; hence, if those powers were nothing other than the substantial forms themselves, all those operations would remain in substantial forms alone. From which it would further happen that such operations in man would be spiritual, just as the form itself is. Indeed it would also happen that they should always and in all be spiritual; for every form having proper operation and independent of matter as from subject must be per se subsistent and independent also in its being from matter as from subject; for independence in operation indicates what kind of independence there is in being. And this is the most important principle from which we gather the subsistence and immateriality of human soul, namely because its intellectual operation does not depend on body as on subject, although it depends as on one ministering species. If therefore sensitive operation were in the same way independent of matter, every sensitive soul would also be independent, and thus both would be immaterial and spiritual. Therefore from the mode of such material operation it is excellently gathered that substantial form is not per se apt for exercising such operation without mediate faculty, which also must be material and coming to matter as already informed by such substantial form.

21. In intellectual operations. But in intellectual operation this reasoning taken from materiality of action does not proceed; but another proceeds concerning diversity of operations; and in rational soul there is another peculiar reason, because through its substantial entity it informs body; but it does not inform through intellect or will, because these powers are therefore not organic, because they do not inform matter. Which reasoning does not comprehend angels, and therefore in them this matter is more doubtful, as Durandus wished and we shall see below in its place. Nevertheless that general reasoning is also sufficiently efficacious in them, which is taken from diversity of operations; for wherever intellectual operation is accidental, there is great diversity in operations of that grade, especially in works of intellect and affection; therefore, since created substance is of itself indifferent to eliciting and receiving such operations, it is more

probable that it is determined and as it were accommodated to them through proper faculties and powers. Likewise, every intellectual substance, by this very fact that it is created, necessarily has accidental intellectual operation, as is established concerning man and concerning angels we shall show below in its place. It also needs other accidental principles like intentional species and habits; what therefore wonder that it needs accidental power proportioned to operation? Especially because every intellectual nature must have in itself power ordered per se first to operation of understanding or loving, because, since it is instituted for this operation, it ought not be instituted without power ordered per se first to it. But power ordered per se first to accidental operation, since it takes species from that, is also accidental. And to this the reasoning of St. Thomas seems to tend, that the essence of created substance as such is only ordered to its being, but power is ordered to accidental operation, and therefore they are distinguished in the way that powers are usually distinguished through various acts. For although this reasoning seems to suppose that created essence is distinguished from being and is compared to it as receptive or active potency to act, nevertheless, abstracting from this question, the reasoning can be accommodated in the said way.

22. Locomotive powers really distinct from substance. And hence finally it can easily be persuaded that powers that are in created things for effecting various local motions are accidental. First indeed, because if principal operations and more intimate and vital require such faculties, therefore much more do local motions. Second, because in natural things we experience local motion, even most natural, to happen by means of accidental faculty, like gravity or levity; therefore much more, when magnet draws iron to itself or rhubarb expels bile, they do it by accidental faculties; therefore the same will be in all similar. Third, because local motion, although in this it is more perfect than others, that it less transmutes substance or subject, nevertheless in this it seems to be maximally distant from substance, that neither is it ordered per se to it nor does it have convenience or

similarity with it, and therefore it is not wonderful that substantial form per se is not apt for effecting this motion without accidental faculty. Therefore it stands universally that created agents effect accidents through proximate accidental principles.

23. What the authors of the aforesaid inference have asserted, and their foundations. There have not been lacking philosophers and theologians who, at least in part, have contradicted this conclusion, either in treating of the powers of the soul or of the powers of angels, as is evident from Gregory, In II, dist. 16, q. 3; Scotus, q. unica, and In IV, dist. 45, q. 3; Durandus, In I, dist. 2, q. 2, and In II, dist. 3, q. 5; Marsilius, In I, q. 7, a. 7, and In II, q. 17, a. 2; and other philosophers, In II de Anima, with whom the matter must be dealt with there; and concerning angels we shall say something below. I only now note that there is a difference between Scotus and Gregory and their followers, in that Gregory posits no distinction at all in reality between forms and their faculties. Whence it happens that he concedes that the soul through the same proximate principle understands, wills, sees, hears, etc., which is quite absurd. Scotus however, to avoid this, posited a formal distinction between powers and forms. But if by formal distinction Scotus understands a distinction which is not actual in reality, but at most virtual and fundamental, and is completed by the mind, he differs from Gregory and others only in manner of speaking; if however he understands a true actual distinction which exists in reality, at least modal, first he does not contradict the conclusion established, because that mode will be a certain accident, which is sufficient for the truth of the said assertion. Then he undeservedly denies the most proper real distinction, for, as I shall immediately say, the proximate faculty of operating is not some mode, but some proper entity and true form, and therefore if it is distinguished in reality from the substantial form, it is not distinguished as a mode, but as a thing, and thus properly really. Especially because if there are some reasons which prove distinction in reality, they prove real distinction no less than modal; and conversely, if the reasons which are made by him and

others against the opinion of St. Thomas were of any moment, they would proceed equally against modal distinction.

24. I do not however think it expedient now to propose those arguments individually, both because they do not seem difficult to me, and also because they are sufficiently solved by Cajetan and others, and finally because almost all of them tend to this, that they prove that things ought not to be multiplied without necessity; but here they prove that sufficient necessity does not intervene, either by solving the reasons of St. Thomas, or because substance, since it is more noble, will be able to suffice for that on account of which an accident is added. And particularly the reason taken from the prior assertion can press against us; for if powers flow from essence through true efficiency, therefore it contains them eminently; therefore it will be sufficient through itself to effect whatever it can through powers. Nevertheless it is answered that there is sufficient necessity that created substance should have principles accommodated to accidental actions, which necessity is sufficiently proved by the inductions and reasons made above; for demonstration cannot be made concerning all things. Nor does it matter that substance is more perfect, both because that which is more perfect cannot always effect whatever a less perfect thing can, and also because from this at most it is obtained that substance is the principal or radical principle, but not also the proximate; but it is more to be a principle in both ways than in only one. In which sense we can also say that substance with its power is more perfect than substance alone. Finally, the hand is also more perfect than the pen, and yet it cannot write without the pen. To the last objection we can first occur with a sensible example; for water through its form is sufficient that coldness should result from it, and yet without coldness it is not sufficient for making others cold. Therefore the consequence must be denied, and the reason can be given first, because the virtue of a form or principle can be limited, both to the perfection of its own supposit, and to such a mode of action or emanation, just as gravity through itself moves the heavy

thing itself in which it exists, not another. Second, because sometimes the formal power or faculty is so accommodated to action that not just any virtual one suffices, as the agent intellect, either alone or with a phantasm, virtually contains the intelligible species, and yet they cannot through themselves concur to intellection, but through the species which they effect. Third and most importantly, because I do not think that essence contains the properties eminently, but only instrumentally; for therefore, as I said, that effect is attributed to the generator; but it can happen that something is an apt instrument for effecting another thing or another faculty and not for immediately effecting the action of that faculty, as is manifestly observed in the instruments of art.

SECTION IV
WHICH ACCIDENTS CAN BE PRINCIPLES OF ACTION

1. The reason for the difficulty. Concerning the doctrine handed down in the preceding sections, several brief doubts remain to be explained. The first is what has been proposed in the title of this section, which can be understood universally as much concerning the activity of accidents in substance as in other accidents; nevertheless, because an accident does not produce substance except through the prior action of some accident, as has been said, therefore the entire question can be reduced to the proper efficiency that accidents have in other accidents. And from this arises the reason for doubting, because an accident is said to be the proximate principle of producing an accident, so that it may be proportioned; therefore such will be fitting to be an accident which is the principle of action as is the terminus of action; therefore quantity will be the proximate principle of effecting quantity and one place (Ubi) of another place, etc. But on the contrary is the fact that, according to the common opinion of

philosophers, quality alone is the proximate principle of action, and not all qualities, but some, the reason for which must also be investigated.

2. An accident can naturally emanate from an accident. In this matter the distinction placed above concerning activity through natural resultance or through proper action must be premised, and it must be supposed that the discourse concerns only this latter, which may be said once for the entire disputation, because that resultance is computed by the mode of one thing with the production of the thing; but should it be necessary to note something particular concerning it from time to time, we shall not omit it. In the present matter therefore, just as we said above that an accident can result from substance, so from any accident another can result, either really or at least modally distinct, if it is capable of such a property; for thus from quantity results figure or the relation of equality, if it is a distinct mode; and from one relation, as many say, another can result, as from paternity similarity, etc. And the reason is that each essence, whatever kind it may be, can be the principle of its intrinsic property through natural resultance of it.

3. Quality alone among accidents is the principle of true effection. Concerning proper accidental efficiency, therefore, it must be said first that quality alone can be the proximate principle of it. This assertion can first be proved by experience; for all actions which tend toward substance are usually made through qualities, either first or those which eminently contain the first; vital actions also are made through qualities; the faculty also of moving locally is always some power from the category of quality, to such an extent that even for the motion of projectiles philosophers consider it necessary that there be an impressed impetus which is a motive quality. Second, it can be proved by making a brief discourse through the other categories; for quantity is not productive of another quantity, as experience proves. And the reason is first, because quantity follows upon matter, and therefore imitates the nature of it and is for receiving and not for

acting. Second, because quantity is really not producible anew per se, indeed (according to our opinion) not even concomitantly, so that what was not before, now begins to be through the actions of natural agents, because we think quantity is coeval with matter. But it only happens that quantity which previously was of one thing simultaneously with matter begins to be of another; whence if it is added to a preexisting thing, augmentation occurs, either proper or improper, according to diverse modes of that change. Nevertheless that change or addition always happens through prior alteration and generation or co-generation, whose proximate principle is quality, and therefore quantity does not have action of which it can be the principle; for the termini of quantity, which sometimes result when division of the continuum is made, etc., are made more through natural resultance than through proper efficiency, concerning which we are treating.

4. Concerning relation. Again, relation according to everyone's opinion is not active; and frequently the reason is wont to be given, because relation is of minimal entity; and this is confirmed a fortiori from divine relations, which according to their proper nature are not active, as theologians teach, from that certain principle that the actions of the Trinity ad extra are undivided. But omitting divine relations (concerning which I think there is a proper reason because they exist only for subsisting, and subsistence as such is not a principle of acting, but only the terminus of nature, which is the principle of operating, as is discussed more broadly in the matter concerning the Incarnation and Trinity), concerning created relations the reason can be given according to a probable opinion because they add no thing to their foundation; whence they are not active, except by reason of that; but if that is not active, there is no source from which they might have efficiency; but that will never be found active except when it is some quality. It is added that relation, as relation, cannot be the principle of effecting an absolute thing, since they are of diverse orders, and it is a preposterous order that an absolute thing should follow upon a

relative one. Neither can relation make relation, because proper relation is not made per se, but insofar as it results when the foundation and terminus are posited.

5. Concerning action. Whether immanent actions are principles of true efficiency. Furthermore, action is not truly and properly a principle of acting; for, as we shall show below, it is the very causality of the agent, and in this consists its nature; but causality is not a principle of acting, but is from a principle which it presupposes. Likewise, if action is compared to its terminus, it is not a principle of acting that, but the way to it or the dependence of it upon its principle; but if it is compared to other things, it cannot through itself be the principle of anything, because it cannot even be the principle of another action; for naturally speaking, action does not follow immediately from action, but at most by reason of the terminus; neither can it be the principle of another terminus, because no principle reaches the terminus except through an action. And no action can exceed its intrinsic terminus or through itself attain another, because it is identified with that and is only a certain mode of it. But someone will object concerning immanent actions, which sometimes are principles of effecting something; for many say that intellection efficiently produces a word really distinct; others think that cognition efficiently causes love or delight; and truer examples are that immanent acts effectively cause habits, and sometimes one act causes another of the same power, as assent to principles causes assent to conclusion, and intention of end causes election of means. But those are mistaken who think that in this efficiency the immanent act does not conduct itself as a principle of producing something else, but is the very production of it; for it is repugnant that actual production be a thing distinct from the thing produced; but habit is a thing distinct from the act by which it is produced. Likewise, because if act is compared to act, that which proceeds from another intrinsically is an immanent action; therefore intrinsically and per se it is a certain production; therefore the other is not the production of it. Others on

account of this argument limit the assertion, so that it may hold true outside immanent actions. But neither is the limitation necessary, nor can any probable reason for it be brought forward; for why will illumination also not be active, or effects which come from light not be attributed to illumination itself as principle of acting? More truly therefore it is said: just as illumination has its proper intrinsic terminus, to which it itself is terminated, but this is the principle of every further action, if there is any, which follows upon the illuminated thing, so immanent actions, as actions, have their intrinsic termini, which are qualities, and these are the proximate principles of further action, when it happens to follow; but that this is so, must be proved below by disputing more broadly concerning action; now however it is sufficiently confirmed by the argument alone made; for how would an immanent act be the principle of producing habit, which is a true quality, unless it itself were a quality, or why in habit itself do we distinguish the nature of quality from intrinsic production or dependence by which it is made from the act itself, and in the same act shall we not distinguish the nature of quality from intrinsic dependence or action by which it is made from its power when habit and act are compared proportionally?

6. Concerning passion. Concerning the category of passion, almost nothing need be added, because, as I shall show below, action and passion are not distinguished actually in reality, but only fundamentally, where action has passion adjoined; whence, if action is not a principle of acting, much less is passion, and the reasons made can equally be applied. Only it can be objected concerning local motion, which is a certain change and consequently passion; for passion and change broadly taken are the same; but motion causes heat, whence it seems to be the principle of it. Nevertheless it is answered that local motion per se effects nothing, but is only the way to place (Ubi); nevertheless it serves actions as a necessary or useful condition, either for applying the principle of acting or for removing

impediments. And in this way sometimes it accidentally causes heat, sometimes also cold, concerning which elsewhere.

7. Concerning position, duration and habit. Whence quality draws this activity beyond the others. Moreover concerning place or where (ubi) as such, it is established that it is not a principle of acting; for if place is taken for the containing surface, by the same reason it is not a principle of acting by which neither is quantity, because such place is nothing else in the thing itself than surface, but adds some respect or denomination to an extrinsic thing, all of which pertain nothing to the nature of acting. But I said that the discourse concerns place as such or insofar as it is place, because insofar as it is place, either natural or violent, it can have some action in the located thing, but it does not have that except by reason of some qualities, as is established from philosophy. But if we speak of place (Ubi) insofar as it is intrinsic presence or mode of the located thing, so it is now manifest that it is not the principle of any action; it is indeed sometimes a condition of acting on account of proximity, as we shall say later; nevertheless it is not the reason or principle of acting, as experience itself sufficiently establishes. But the reason does not seem to be other than because that is only a certain mode of the present thing and does not bring per se proper entity, and therefore neither does it confer activity per se. Likewise, because it cannot be understood what it acts per se; for it cannot produce another place (Ubi) in another body; for place (Ubi) is not made per se except through local motion; but one thing does not move another locally through its place (Ubi), but either by impelling or attracting or in another similar way. From which a fortiori it is established that neither position nor time or duration or when nor habit or being clothed, are principles of acting according to those precise natures according to which they constitute categories, because position in reality is not distinguished from place (Ubi) except by some denomination, relation or figure; but habit only adds a certain extrinsic denomination; but time, and universally duration, either is not

something in reality distinct from the thing which endures, or at most is a mode, and therefore all these things formally and as such are not active, but the things with which they are identified, can be active; as if the thing which endures, is quality or clothing, it can be active by reason of some qualities. It remains therefore that among accidents quality alone is per se a principle of acting. And the reason can be given because first quality alone besides quantity has proper entity really distinct from substance, and therefore is most properly accidental form and proper act, which is necessary for the nature of principle of acting and so that it may have proper activity. Then it is such entity which follows upon form, and therefore imitates the nature of it and is attributed to it so that it may be for it an instrument or proximate power of acting, especially since substantial form through itself alone is not a sufficient proximate principle of actions of this kind.

8. How many and which species of quality are active. Not figure. You will say: if this reason is valid, it proves every quality to be the principle of some action, because every quality follows upon form, and consequently ought to imitate the nature of it. Especially because, just as substantial form is a certain act, so also is quality; but every act just as it gives being, so also operating. And it can be confirmed, because each thing is for the sake of its operation; otherwise it would be in vain, as is said in II de Caelo, c. 3, and I Ethic, c. 7. Nevertheless it must be said that neither all species of quality numbered by Aristotle nor all qualities contained under individual species are active, but only the first three species as to some qualities contained under them. I declare the particulars: for first, beginning from the last, figure per se is not the principle of any action, as the common opinion affirms, which is taken from St. Thomas, II-II, q. 96, a. 2, ad 2, and lib. II cont. Gent., c. 76, and III cont. Gent., c. 105; and in these places Cajetan and Ferrarius. The same holds Scotus, In IV, dist. 1, q. 4; and Cajetan of Thiene, IV de Caelo, c. ult.; and it is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaph., c. 3, text. 14, and VI Ethic., c. 4, and II Phys., text. 2, in which places he

says that artifacts as such do not have a principle of motion or action. The reason for this is no other than that form, which is made through art, is only figure, which is not a principle of acting. Hence also St. Augustine, lib. X de Civit., c. 9 and 11, refutes the error of those who thought that some power of acting was present in astronomical figures or images, demonstrating from this that all those things are done by pact and power of demons. But the reason is that figure, as is also taken from Aristotle, lib. I Phys., c. 5, text. 46, adds nothing to the thing except a certain composition or order of parts, from which arises a certain mode of quantity, which is figure, and therefore it cannot be a principle of acting per se, both because it is only a certain mode, and also because it is a mode of quantity and a property following upon it. Whence, since quantity per se is not active, neither can figure be. And it is finally confirmed, because there is nothing which figure does per se, because one figure cannot effect another similar one; for neither will a statue make a statue, nor can it make any quality or anything similar.

9. Objection. It is solved. You will say: figure at least serves much for local motion, the acute for cutting, the circular for circular motion, on account of which Albert, IV de Caelo, in fine, signifies that acute figure is a power of acting motion, or at least that it with other conditions, namely, weight and hardness, composes that power; and Durandus feels the same, In I, dist. 45, q. 2, n. 8, where he also adds that the figure of a seal is per se the principle of similar figure impressed in wax. Nevertheless it is answered that figures of this kind are only dispositions on the part of the instrument or body so that it may be moved or move more easily in such a way, either because it itself resists less while it is moved by the artificer, as in the motion of a sphere, or because less resistance is offered to it, as in the motion of cutting; for the more acute the instrument is, the fewer parts it touches, and therefore it finds less resistance. And conversely, when cutting happens without motion of the cutting body through motion of another, as in a river, therefore acute figure is a disposition to that

cutting because it serves so that it may more easily resist the flowing water, in that through fewer parts it directly touches the acute thing, and thus it impresses less impetus. And so also in the figure of a seal, because certain parts are more acute than others and some prominent, others as it were concave, therefore they cut or depress certain parts of wax more easily than others, and from this arises figure, not because one is per se the principle of another, but because, when certain parts are moved according to place, such figure arises. Of which also a sign is that figure arises in wax in a contrary way as it was in the seal. For the parts, which projected in the seal are as it were concave in the sealed thing, and conversely.

10. In the first species of quality some are active, some not. But in the other three species of quality active qualities are found. For habits of powers are principles of eliciting acts, and conversely, acts (which are also placed in the first species and are dispositions) sometimes effect habits. But power is active both of acts and of habits. Passible qualities also are active, as is established concerning heat. But in all these species some qualities are found which are not principles of acting, as in the species of habit, those[16] which are proximately ordered to some being and not to operating, in which order health is usually numbered, which is rather improperly called habit. Whence in natural things perhaps there is no example which some inappropriately employ concerning intelligible species; for those are really principles of acting. But in supernatural things a common example is concerning grace, which is in the essence of the soul; but more certain is concerning character, concerning which elsewhere. In the species likewise of disposition there are many acts which do nothing, when, namely, power either does not need habit, as in vision, or not such as can be effected through acts, as in supernatural acts. Many acts also are not active of other acts nor of habits, as is evident in all the senses, and in the enjoyment of God, and similar things. Power

[16] those, which... are ordered, 1960 et 1605 (B. Colosino); he who... is ordered, ed. Vivès. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 163.

likewise is usually distinguished into active and passive, among which passive as such is not a principle of acting, although it is uncertain whether there is given any quality which is pure passive power, as we shall see in its place, where we shall also treat whether the power of resisting is active or passive power. Among passible qualities also many are not active of their similars, as whiteness and other colors, although they effect intentional species. But others effect both, as light or heat, etc. But it is difficult to give the reason for this variety. The general one seems to be that substance for its complete perfection needs all this variety, and therefore it received diverse qualities from nature, which according to their diversity would be ordered to diverse effects; whence some were instituted for acting, others for informing or adorning substance and as it were finally filling the capacity of it. All of which pertain to the office of form, and therefore qualities which are not active, neither are idle nor do they lack some participation or agreement with form. And thus the reason for doubting is solved. But to explain in particular which qualities are of this or that nature, does not belong to this place.

SECTION V

WHETHER ACCIDENTS BY THEMSELVES, APART FROM THE CONCURRENCE OF SUBSTANTIAL FORMS, ARE SUFFICIENT TO PRODUCE OTHER ACCIDENTS

1. The common way of speaking in this matter is that the accidental form is the proximate principle, while the substantial form is the principal principle of all actions of the supposit, even accidental ones. However, in what this reason of principal principle consists, or what its influence is, either the Doctors do not declare or, if they say something in passing, they suggest that it consists only in this: that the form is the root and principle of the accidental faculty, which has been

given to it by nature so that it might be for it the proximate principle for eliciting action. But in the actual exercise of accidental action, the substantial form is not believed to have proximate and actual influence. And the reason can be given, both from that principle that a created substance cannot be the proximate principle of an accident, and also because for producing an accident, another accident is a sufficient principle.

2. Not accident alone, but substance also proximately influences vital functions. Nevertheless, I believe a distinction should be used; for among these actions, some are vital, while others are not at all. Concerning the former, it seems that should be said that not only the accidental faculty, but also the soul itself through its substance proximately influences them in their proper order. Experience seems to persuade this conclusion; for these vital actions are done in such an intimate way that they seem to proceed actually from the very first principle of life, which is the soul; whence it happens that, although the eye has a present image and receives a species from it, if the soul does not attend, it does not see. Nor does it matter if someone says this comes from distraction of the imagination or common sense, both because I would make the same argument about common sense and imagination. But if it is said that then the sensible species does not transcend the external sense, from this we will take an argument against the former evasion. For if the species of a sensible object that is present and changing the external sense does not reach the internal sense when the soul does not attend, this is because the species of the external sense is not communicated to the interior sense except through the medium of the act of the external sense. From this it happens that the exterior sense naturally senses before the interior cooperates; for this cooperation seems to follow upon the operation of the exterior sense; therefore the reason why in the aforementioned case the exterior sense does not sense does not come from the interior sense, but rather therefore the interior sense is not touched by the species of that object, because the exterior sense

does not perceive it. Therefore another cause must be sought for why then the exterior sense does not produce its act, which does not seem to be other than because then the soul does not influence nor cooperate with it. You will say the reason is because it does not cooperate, not indeed through its substance, but through animal spirits, which are necessary for sense and motion. But, although it is true that these spirits are necessary, nevertheless this very thing confirms the argument and experience adduced. For these vital acts require not only the proximate faculty, but also the concurrence of spirits, which do not flow there by chance, but by virtue of some faculty ministering those spirits to that act; therefore it is necessary that there be some common principle actually using those two faculties, and from natural inclination or sympathy ordering the action of one to the act of the other.

3. Moreover, this is confirmed by another experience, by which we proved above that there is only one soul in man, namely because from excessive attention to the work of one faculty, it is impeded in the work of another, as if a man inspects something too attentively, he will not hear someone speaking; and lest this be attributed to a defect of spirits, even attention of the intellect impedes the operation of sense, and the higher and more perfect it is, the more it also diminishes the motion or representation of the phantasy, and (what is more) it also impedes or suspends even the works of the nutritive part. But if each faculty alone through itself had its own operation, there would be no reason why the operation of one would impede the operation of another; for when powers are multiplied, if one does not depend on another, nor do both depend on one third, whose power, while it is applied to both, is diminished in each, there is nothing why their operations cannot be simultaneously multiplied and exercised equally perfectly. Moreover, an excellent argument is taken from the contrary from the connection of operations; for while the intellect understands, the will is excited to loving, etc.; but this is because the same soul actually operates through both potencies, for

mere habitual rooting or remote emanation from the same soul would not be sufficient for this actual causality or motion and excitation, if each operation proceeded actually from its own potency alone without connection in some common principle. And from this also arises the dependence between the appetite of life and cognition, so that nothing can be loved unless it is first known. But the reason a priori can be taken from the proper mode of vital operation, which requires this intimate connection with its principal formal principle so that it can be done in a manner consonant with its nature and so that its principle or supposit can produce in a vital manner; for as far as experience can reach, actual life consists in this and the primary difference of living things from non-living things. And this is confirmed, for on account of this cause everyone judges that a separated sight cannot see or elicit vision, nor can the intellect understand. Against this opinion, however, some things can be objected, which I prudently omit, because they are either not difficult or they necessarily touch upon many things that pertain to the science of the soul. But what someone can ask, namely for what are accidental and vital faculties necessary, if that form also actually influences, has sufficient response from what was said in the preceding section. For the form is like a universal principle, but potency is necessary as something particular and more accommodated and proper, as was more broadly declared there. We will also immediately resolve other lighter objections.

4. A non-vital accident is not necessarily made proximately by substance. But concerning accidental actions that are not vital, it should be said that they can be made by accidents alone. This is evident in heat, which existing in water and in any other subject, heats without the form of fire. Similarly, whiteness, for producing its intentional species, does not need superior concurrence. Also from this it arises that if a thing has two active qualities, it can equally exercise the action of both simultaneously as of either alone, as water simultaneously cools and moistens as much as it can, etc. Finally, this

is proved by the reason for doubting proposed above, because if the perfection of the effect is considered, for communicating that perfection the power and perfection of a similar or more eminent accidental form suffices; but from the mode of action that intrinsic dependence is not required, and therefore there is no reason why it should be necessary. Whence that reason is solved in passing, insofar as it can be made against the prior assertion. For although it can be doubted whether the operation of life is more perfect in its entity than the faculty from which it proceeds, now however, supposing the potency to be more perfect, we say that on account of the special mode of such operation the actual immediate influence of the principal principle is necessary. Nor does it contradict this mode for the substantial form to influence action, if it has an accidental principle by which it is proximately determined to that action; for an accidental form is not always called the proximate principle because it alone immediately influences, but because it is the principle determining the substantial form to such action. Just as a particular cause is called proximate with respect to the first, not because the first does not immediately influence, but because the particular is in its genus determining the action.

5. To the production of no non-vital accident does substance immediately concur. Whether organization is a vital action. But someone will ask concerning the latter part, granted that the influence of form is not necessary for these actions, whether it is possible and useful, that is, whether heat existing in fire is helped by the form for heating, and consequently whether, other things being equal, it heats more vehemently than that existing in another subject. Against the former part also it can be objected, for sometimes a vital action seems to be exercised by some potency separated from the soul, as in seed. To the former part I respond that no sufficient sign of that influence is found, and therefore it should not be asserted lightly and without foundation. This is also confirmed by the mystery of the Eucharist, where the accidents of wine equally act without the influence of their

form. I see it can be said that God supplies that efficiency on account of faith in the mystery; nevertheless, where no necessity compels, one ought not recur to divine causality. To the latter part, it is probable that seed, as regards the spirit implanted in it, lives with vegetative life, to which pertains that vital mode which seems to be in the generation of a living thing[17], and thus Aristotle seems to think about seed, II de Gener. anim., c. 1, because it has the power of organizing the body and generating, which seems to be the work of the vegetative soul. Nor does Thomas Aquinas seem to disagree from that opinion, I, q. 118, a. 1, ad 1. Second, whatever may be the case about this, it is answered that the actions of the vegetative soul, as to their substance, are of the same nature as those which are done by an extrinsic principle; for all are either local motions, or alterations, or the eduction of substantial form, whence they have the character of vital action only from a peculiar relationship to the soul as to a principle conjoined in the same supposit moving itself. Just as human speech is a vital action, but the speech of an angel in an assumed body is not vital, although they are similar in external appearance. Thus therefore the action of seed, as it is from that, is not vital, but merely natural action; but that in its artifice (so to speak) or in its manner of acting it preserves the mode of life, this should be referred to another superior principle, as was touched upon above.

SECTION VI

WHETHER AN ACCIDENT IS MERELY AN INSTRUMENT IN THE PRODUCTION OF ANOTHER ACCIDENT

1. Some contend that an accident should be called merely an instrumental principle. This opinion is commonly attributed to St. Thomas, who suggests it In I, dist. 3, q. 4, a. 3, ad 2, and therefore his

[17] Vide Vallesium, lib. Controv. medical., c. 8.

followers more frequently adopt it, confirming it with these arguments. First, because an accident is essentially subordinated to substance in being, and consequently also in action. Second, because an accident receives from substance its entire power of acting. Nor does it present an obstacle that the proximate principal cause also receives the power of acting from the first cause; for the second and first causes are of different orders, and it is not repugnant for an inferior principal cause to receive power from a cause of superior order. An accident, however, is in acting of the same order as its substance, and with it constitutes one proximate integral agent, and from it receives the power of acting; but to receive power in this way from another of the same order, constituting with it one proximate agent, is proper to an instrumental cause. Third, because such is the acting as is the being; but the being of an accident belongs to substance, for an accident is the being of a being; therefore the acting of an accident principally belongs to substance; therefore that of the accident is only instrumentally. And this is confirmed by the manner of speaking of all philosophers, who attribute all these actions to substances as the first agents.

2. The contrary opinion is held more frequently by other Doctors, as may be seen in Scotus, In IV, dist. 13, q. 3; Paludanus, q. 4, concl. 1; Maior, q. 1; Aegidius, Quodl. III, q. 1, and theor. 43. To declare the foundation of this opinion, however, it must be supposed that the question here is not about the principal cause as that which operates, but about the principal principle by which. For it is established that in the former way the supposit is that which operates; but if it is taken formally, as it is per se the cause of accidental action, it must be taken as it underlies the accidental form which is the principle of such action; for thus Aristotle said that Polycletus produces a statue per accidens, but the artist per se. In this way, therefore, an accident is called a principal cause as the principle by which, but the supposit as underlying the accident, as the principle which. And thus this opinion is proved, because an accidental form by its proper power effects

another accident; but a principal cause is that which operates by its proper power; therefore. The major premise is evident when heat effects heat and universally one accident effects another similar one, or when a more noble accident effects a less noble one, as light effects heat; for now the perfection of the effect does not exceed the perfection of the accident which is the principle of acting; therefore neither does it exceed its power; therefore then the accident by its proper power is the principle of such action. According to this reasoning, this opinion about an accident must be understood when it operates in this way; for if an inferior accident is elevated to effect another of superior nature, it will not be denied to be an instrument. The second argument is that that is the principal principle of acting to which the effect is assimilated; but through heating as such the effect becomes similar to the cause in heat; therefore heat is the principal principle of that action. Third, because heat separated per se from substance exercises its action with the same force and efficacy, so that it does not need the influence of substance nor of another cause to supply for it, as all acknowledge concerning the accidents of the Eucharist, regarding accidental actions. Fourth, because whiteness, for example, does not produce intentional species as an instrument of substance, since regarding that action substance seems to be related entirely per accidens.

3. This controversy, given what has been said in the second doubt, seems to be able to be only about the manner of speaking; for as to the matter it only concerns what influence an accident requires from substance in order to complete its proper action. But with this established and declared, only about the signification of the name can there be controversy, when it is asked whether it should be called an instrument or a principal principle. Therefore the powers of the soul for vital actions can deservedly be called conjoined instruments of the soul, insofar as they are subordinated to it as to the principal form, so that without actual influence and as it were motion from it they cannot effect their operations, although in another respect they can be

called principal principles, at least partial ones, because, namely, the power which they have in themselves and by which they cooperate toward the effect is from itself proportioned and commensurate to such an effect, because it does not exceed the perfection of the faculty itself; for I speak of connatural actions. Hence also power and form can be compared as universal and proximate principle, both however principal and sufficient and total in their order; nevertheless, because between those two the form is more principal, to which the power is subordinated, therefore this subordination and dependence can be signified by the name of instrument.

4. But truly in other accidents, which do not depend in their action on substantial form in this way, a much lesser notion of instrument is found with respect to such actions. Hence, as regards the matter, they are most truly considered principal principles of such actions, as the arguments made in the latter place convince, because from the force of that perfection alone which they have from their species or entity, they elicit such actions. Likewise, because such a form alone per se suffices to give to the supposit the being per se and formally requisite for such action, as in hot water the being per se requisite for heating is only to be hot. Just as therefore heat is the form per se and from its proper nature giving hot being, so in reality it is the principal principle of heating. Nor does it matter or present an obstacle to this that an accident is in substance and for the sake of substance and from substance, because we do not ask whence or from what causes an accident has the power of acting; for we acknowledge that it has it materially from substance and finally for its sake, and perhaps also efficiently mediately or immediately through natural emanation, but we ask whether it formally has in itself the total power sufficient and necessary for that action. And thus we say it has it, and we contend that this alone is signified when it is called a principal cause not as that which, but as that by which. To this principle it presents no obstacle in any way that an accident is the being of a being, that is, the being of substance, and that its whole being belongs

to another; rather that particle "by which" seems to hint at and signify all these things. Hence also substantial form itself, insofar as it is the principle by which with respect to its supposit, is also in its way the being of a being. But lest there be contention about the name, we will also grant this to the former opinion, that if by the name of instrument or instrumental cause is signified only (as it is indeed sometimes signified) that relation which an accident has to substance, insofar as it is given so that substance may operate through it as through its instrument, and for this it receives power from substance itself and is sustained and depends on it in its being, it can thus be called an instrument, though it is more properly called the power or potency of substance.

SECTION VII

WHETHER AN EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE IN REALITY DISTINCT FROM THE RECIPIENT IN ORDER TO BE ABLE TO ACT

1. We have explained the principles per se of acting of created causes; it remains that we speak about the conditions requisite for acting, which although they are usually numbered as various, nevertheless three seem more serious and difficult, and all others are reduced to these. It must be supposed, however, that every created agent needs a patient for action, because, as has been said above and will also be shown below, it does not act by creating, but from presupposed matter. The conditions therefore requisite for acting must be demanded not between cause and effect; for thus they will not be requisite for acting, but consequent upon action. They are therefore prerequisites between agent and patient or between efficient and material cause. The first condition therefore is the necessary distinction between agent and patient. The second, necessary

proximity, given the distinction. The third dissimilitude and proportion, although this third seems in some way to pertain to the nature of acting, as we shall see later.

2. I omit the condition of existing, because, as I have often said, I do not consider this a condition really distinct from the agent or principle of acting; hence Aristotle deservedly said, IV Metaph., c. 4, text. 16: "Those things which are not, in what way will they either speak or walk?" Moreover, because this condition is included in all the others; for if it is necessary that agent and patient be proximate, much more necessary will it be that they exist; for how will those things be proximate in place which are not in the nature of things? Likewise we showed above that for acting, even through resultance, it is not sufficient to have existed immediately before; much more evidently therefore is existence necessary for proper efficiency. Which no one will deny in natural efficiency; but this suffices for the present undertaking, though it must be understood with proportion, namely, so that what acts through itself exists in itself, but what acts only through a separate instrument exists only virtually in the instrument, because it is said to act only through extrinsic denomination from it; but that virtual existence is nothing other than that the instrument itself exists. Which existence we have shown elsewhere to be necessary also in divine instruments.

3. I omit moreover another condition which is usually required in a material agent, namely, that it be extended and existing in a quantitative manner. For this condition is necessary for these things for acting insofar as it intrinsically pertains to the natural mode of being of them; but whether, with that mode of existing divinely separated, they can act naturally, is not so much a metaphysical question as a theological one, which we have sufficiently touched upon in tome III, III part., disp. XII, sect. first.

The Difficulty of the Present Question &
Various Opinions Are Proposed

4. With these things supposed, in this section the first condition must be treated. In which difficulty arises first from many examples, in which it seems to be shown that distinction in reality between agent and patient is not necessary; first because of natural emanations, for from the same soul the intellect emanates and is received in the same. Second, in immanent actions of knowing, and especially of loving, for the same soul through the same will elicits love and receives it. Third, in physical motions, for heavy and light things move themselves, and living things more properly, and water cools itself, etc. Finally the argument opposes because, although that condition often intervenes in those things which act with transient action, because it is natural for them to act on others, nevertheless there is no reason which necessarily demands that condition. For if there were any, it would be maximally that common one because the same thing cannot simultaneously be in potency to receiving and in act to acting; but this does not seem pressing, because, as Scotus argues, it can be in virtual or eminent act and in formal potency, that is, have eminent power for effecting such a form and capacity for receiving it formally; for in this no repugnance is involved. On the contrary, however, is that axiom handed down by Aristotle, VII and VIII Physic.: "Everything that is moved is moved by another," which is so received that it is held as the foundation and principle of the demonstration by which it is shown that God exists.

5. In this matter some think that this condition is not necessary in all agents, although it intervenes in many. Thus Scotus thinks In I, dist. 3, q. 7, and In II, dist. 2, q. 10, and IX Metaph., q. 14; and there Antonius Andreae, q. 1; Gregorius, In II, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3; Iandun., VIII Phys., q. 12, who rely on the arguments made. Which the Commentator favors, III de Caelo, com. 28, saying the same thing can suffer from itself by equivocal action. Others more frequently accept indiscriminately the axiom of Aristotle and require this condition as absolutely necessary in every agent, not only regarding

transient, but also regarding immanent actions. Which Capreolus, In I, dist. 3, q. 3; and Aegidius, Quodl. III, q. 16, and Quodl. V, q. 15; Ferrariensis, I cont. Gent., c. 23, explicitly declared, where nevertheless he excepts efficiency through natural resultance, which perhaps (if he spoke consistently) would not be necessary. Others truly use various distinctions, as we shall explain in the progress.

Some Suppositions for the Resolution of the Question

6. First therefore it must be established that it is not necessary for an agent to be distinguished by supposit from the patient recipient. This is sufficiently evident from the induction made; and Aristotle expressly teaches this, VII Phys., in the beginning, and VIII Phys., c. 4. Hence he infers that the same thing can move itself, if it is distinguished into a part per se moving and a part per se moved, in which way he says animals move themselves with local motion, and in nearly the same way living things move themselves with the motion of augmentation; for they act directly on nourishment, which they convert into themselves and unite to themselves, and thus are augmented. Thus also it is not inconvenient for the same thing to move itself per accidens, as the soul is moved when the body is moved.

7. Second, it must be supposed that in the same supposit acting on itself, agent can be distinguished from patient in various ways. First, according to diverse integral parts; second, according to diverse substantial and essential parts, as if it acts through form and receives through matter, which two modes can have place in bodies, but not universally in all agents, as we now speak; for spiritual things also act on themselves. Third they can be distinguished so that at least one faculty is of acting and another of receiving. Which distinction can be either complete and real or at least as of the including from the included, of all of which we shall bring examples later.

8. Third, it is fitting to distinguish various actions and to run through individual ones, so that from all we may gather some general rule. Among actions therefore can first be numbered natural emanation or resultance; then physical and material motions, which from their genus are completed by transient action, which, for the sake of clarity, can be distinguished into their species: of alteration, augmentation and local motion; I omit substantial generation, for it is per se known that the same thing cannot generate itself. To these can be added the local motion of spiritual things moving themselves; for this is partly similar to the motions of bodies, because it is related as a transient action, partly dissimilar, because it is not physical motion, that is, extended on the part of the subject. Finally beyond all these is efficiency through immanent actions of sense or appetite, intellect or will.

First Assertion About Natural Resultance

9. I say therefore first: in natural resultance, although it happens that the proximate efficient is not distinct from the recipient, nevertheless simply that effect is reduced to an efficient cause distinct from the patient. The prior part is evident from the argument made above about the powers of the soul flowing from the same; for although in the soul the notion of acting and of receiving those powers can be distinguished, as Ferrariensis noted above, nevertheless, since that distinction is only of reason, it matters nothing for the present, especially regarding the first property, which results immediately from substance alone; for the second perhaps emanates by means of the first, although it is received proximately in substance alone, as St. Thomas holds, I, q. 77, a. 8. And the same is true of substance and powers of angels. In material things, however, almost always the efficient principle (at least as that by which) of this emanation can be distinguished in reality from the notion of receiving the property emanating; for it emanates from form, but is not received in it, since it

is not a subsisting form, but is received in matter or in the composite by reason of matter. Only can objection be made about quantity, if perhaps it emanates from the entity of matter and is received in it, which is uncertain.

10. The latter part of the conclusion is established from the superior section; for we said that a property does not emanate from substance or essence as from a principal agent, but as from an instrument of the generator; therefore that effect must be attributed to the generator as to the more principal cause. But truly the generator is distinct from the generated and from its powers. You will say that the reduction of this effect to the generator is only as to a remote and per accidens cause, which gave the form, from which other faculties emanate; but here, as I said above, we do not inquire about reduction per accidens, but per se and to the proximate cause; otherwise we could easily say that everything that is done is done by another, even distinct according to supposit; by another (I say) either who acts proximately or who remotely gave the power of operating. It is answered that this is not reduction to a per accidens cause, but to a principal per se cause, first indeed from the intention and ordination of nature, for that power is given so that it may operate as the instrument of another, whose place it somehow holds. As projectiles are said to be moved not per accidens, but per se by the projector, who impressed the impetus, not only because he gave the power of acting, but because he gave it with this relation that it would be an instrument which would operate in his place. Then, when the essence does not contain these faculties eminently, but only instrumentally, it is probable that a greater influence of the generator or author of nature is required than if that cause were proper and principal, to which the effect would be entirely attributed, because by this very fact that the proximate principle does not contain the effect formally nor eminently, it cannot be the proper and adequate cause of it, even in the notion of proximate and principal cause. Therefore, if in any whole species that eminent power is not found with respect to properties

naturally consequent upon it, it is necessary that the property which is in the generated be made by a similar property which is in the generator or emanate from the form with some reduction to the author of the whole species as principally effecting.

Second Assertion About Motion & Physical Action

11. I say second: every efficient cause, through physical motion and transient action is distinguished in reality in some way from the material cause receiving the effect. This conclusion is consonant with the mind of Aristotle, who perhaps intends nothing else in the cited place, for he treats of the physical motion of corporeal things, makes induction only in physical motions and always supposes in his reasonings that such motion has parts on the part of the mobile. And since in the motion of alteration and augmentation there is less difficulty, in those the conclusion is first explained briefly. For by the induction made, no proper alteration is found which is made by some agent on itself per se primarily, that is, according to the same part; it happens indeed that the same thing through one part alters itself in another, if they are dissimilarly affected; nevertheless according to the same part it does not happen, as is established by induction in all cases. Only there is the common instance of the reduction of water to pristine coldness, and the same is true of any similar reduction; for in the superior sections we showed that that action is not made by an extrinsic agent, but by an intrinsic one. Nevertheless it is answered that that action pertains to natural resultance, about which we spoke in the first conclusion, and therefore that action is usually attributed to the generator, as Capreolus, In II, dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3; Aegidius, Quodl. II, q. 16; Henricus, Quodl. XI, q. 6 noted.

12. And hence it is easily established that in the motion of augmentation also the same does not act on itself per se; for that motion is not made except with preceding alteration; but alteration is

not made by the same on itself according to the same part; therefore neither augmentation. But the a priori reason for this part seems to be no other than that which Aristotle touched upon, namely, because the same according to the same cannot simultaneously be in act and in potency. To which reason the objection made above strongly opposes, because this reason proceeds at most about univocal alteration, that is, proceeding from a quality of the same nature, but not truly about equivocal alteration, which proceeds from a virtual quality or of superior nature; for then there would be no contradiction that the same part would have a virtual quality and lack a formal one, and therefore would act on itself. On account of which Scotus and others cited above think that the reason of Aristotle is not universal, which is truly to say it is not efficacious. Especially because, as we shall see below, he himself uses that reason also in local motion, in which action is always equivocal; for motive power is always of another nature than the form or term of local motion.

13. By the part per se moving and the part per se moved Aristotle does not understand form and matter. Others use this reason: material alteration which is made by material substance, proceeds actively from form, for matter is not a principle of acting, but is received in the composite by reason of matter, which is the principle of suffering; and thus, even if it happens that the same according to the same integral part acts on itself, nevertheless agent is distinguished from patient regarding the principles of acting and suffering. But this reason is plainly against the mind of Aristotle, who does not treat of the formal principle by which; for it was sufficiently established that matter and form have diverse functions in corporeal things; but he treats of the principle which, either integral or at least partial, as St. Thomas rightly noted, q. 22 de Veritate, a. 3, and is established from VIII Phys., c. 4. Otherwise when he treats of the motion of heavy and light things, it would not be necessary to have recourse to the generator, but to the form effecting and to the matter receiving motion. Nor in animals would it be necessary to distinguish the part

per se moving from the part per se moved, which Aristotle openly understands about integral parts, ibid., text. 28. Nor finally ascending to the motion of heaven, would it be necessary to assign a separate mover of it, but an intrinsic form which would be the active principle of motion, and matter which would be receptive.

14. In accordance therefore with the mind of Aristotle it must be said that the same material composite cannot alter itself per se or according to the same integral part. But the reason for this can be rendered as if declaring or consummating the first reason of Aristotle: because if a substance has in some part a formal and not virtual quality, or has neither, it cannot move itself toward that same quality, as the reason made excellently proves. But if it has in that part a virtual quality, either the formal quality also is connatural to the same part, or it is violent or neutral. If it is natural, it will always have it, because a connatural property always belongs from intrinsic. But if such is perhaps of such a kind that it can be violently removed or diminished, then with the impediment removed that thing will reduce itself to the connatural state; nevertheless that will be through the mode of natural resultance, and the action will be principally reduced to an extrinsic principle, which is the generator. But if that quality is violent, it is impossible that the same thing through the virtual quality of heat formally heat itself with violent and preternatural heating. An example can be pepper, which has the power of heating the tongue or stomach, and nevertheless cannot heat itself, because such heating would be violent to it. But the reason for this is not easily rendered. For what some say, that it is provided by the law of nature lest anything prepare destruction or harm for itself, does not seem to satisfy; for the same living thing, while it is corrupted from intrinsic, prepares destruction for itself; but it seems to matter that this is according to diverse parts, altering one through another, or through the same according to diverse qualities. And it is evident by reason, for that virtual quality is sufficient for effecting the formal in a capable subject, and acts naturally and necessarily; therefore if the subject in which the virtual

quality is, is capable of the formal and lacks it, from the necessity of nature it will effect it in itself, nor on account of that law of nature can it contain its action, unless it is impeded from elsewhere, because it is not a free agent.

15. Add that some hold that the natural heat in living things dries itself and consumes the natural moisture, not only according to diverse parts, but also according to the same, as may be seen in Aegidius, Quodl., II, q. 17, where nevertheless he says that that consumption of moisture is made through natural resultance of excessive dryness from native heat. But I judge this impossible; for since that action is violent, it cannot result naturally from intrinsic, because it is a contradiction in the adjunct, because violent is what is from extrinsic, with the patient not contributing force. Hence I judge that what Aegidius supposes to be false and impossible, namely, that the same homogeneous part of an animal, that is, according to itself as a whole disposed in the same way, in a manner connatural to it, through heat native to it, whether formal or virtual, diminishes moisture connatural to it by violently drying itself, because it is impossible that the same form in the same part of matter requires dispositions either formally or eminently repugnant; otherwise it would involve repugnance in itself and in its inclination.

16. If therefore some substance, either as a whole or in some part, has heat, for example, virtual in such intensity, say as four, either simultaneously it will necessarily have as much formal heat connatural to it, or certainly it will have such a temperament and such natural disposition that it resists and impedes lest that virtual quality exercise its formal action in the same part; and for this reason nothing can alter itself according to the same part from intrinsic by violent alteration. Which is maximally declared in those mixed things which have virtual active qualities of the primaries; for those suppose a temperament accommodated of primary qualities and other dispositions which follow upon them; therefore it cannot happen that in the same part such temperament is dissolved through intrinsic action of that virtual

faculty. And this confirms that example about pepper; for it is so disposed and affected by other qualities and dispositions, that its virtual heat does not have the power of heating it beyond the connatural degree of heat which it requires insofar as it is such a mixed thing. Others think that no other reason need be rendered except that quality is not active in the subject in which it is, even if no other condition is lacking. But this is not proved to me, because it is a manifest begging of the question; for we investigate the cause and reason of this.

17. Another reason can be rendered to prove the same, namely, because perhaps pepper does not have total or integral power of heating, unless it is helped from elsewhere. For it is established by experience that applied to the hand it does not heat, but needs some excitation or alteration and some commixture with the intrinsic heat of the animal, and the same can be said of wine and similar things. Hence, although none of these things can alter itself by its virtual quality per se alone, nevertheless, after it begins to be altered from extrinsic and to be joined with an extrinsic agent, there is no inconvenience that it consequently helps toward its alteration or corruption; for now the integral alterant is sufficiently distinct from the patient. Thus therefore violent alteration can never be of the same on itself through virtual quality.

18. But indifferent alteration, that is, neither violent nor natural, cannot be in that which has virtual quality for making such alteration, because that quality acts naturally and necessarily as much as it can; therefore either it finds in its subject a natural disposition repugnant to its action, and thus its action would be violent, or it finds no repugnant disposition, and thus the emanation will be natural, because it is from internal and native quality and from intrinsic necessity of nature. Hence, if any alteration or action indifferent to quality is given, as is illumination in air, it is always and necessarily from an extrinsic agent. And the reason is clear, because if it is from intrinsic form, either immediately or by means of some quality

connatural to the same form, now it will not be indifferent, but connatural, that quality.

19. From all these things therefore the reason is thus concluded: Every quality is either violent or natural or indifferent. If it is violent and indifferent, evidently it is from an extrinsic agent. But if it is natural, it is from the generator, or if it is said to be from intrinsic, it is through natural emanation, about which there is no discussion in this conclusion. But accommodating this discourse to the reason of Aristotle, it must be said that that principle "the same cannot simultaneously be in potency and in act" is true, even about virtual act, with a double limitation applied. One is that there be discussion about act which is the principle of physical motion and merely natural, so that we exclude immaterial and vital actions, about which there is no discussion now. The other is that it be understood about a thing existing in its natural state; for in a preternatural state it happens indeed to be in virtual act and formal potency, as is in hot water, which is virtually cold; nevertheless the action of that power is only natural resultance and is attributed to an extrinsic agent, as has been said. Hence if anyone wishes not to call this virtual containment, but instrumental, the prior moderation will be sufficient.

20. From these things it is easy to prove the conclusion in local motion, applying the discourse made and the induction, which from Aristotle, in the cited place, can be made in this way. Either a body is moved naturally, or violently, or by indifferent motion. In the second and third way motion always comes from an extrinsic cause; for under these two members we comprehend all motions which Aristotle called beyond nature, whether they are against nature, which we call violent, or they are entirely outside what is due or outside the intrinsic principle of proper nature, as is the circular motion of fire in its proper sphere, and if there is any other similar. But natural motion is either of animals moving themselves or of inanimate things tending to their proper places. But in both the efficient is distinguished from the patient; for inanimate bodies are moved by the generator to their

natural places; but in animals the part per se moving is distinguished from the part per se moved, and thus the whole does not move itself except as it were per accidens.

Difficulty Concerning the Motion of Heavy and Light Bodies

21. Concerning this induction, three principal difficulties especially occur. The first is that common one about the motion of heavy and light bodies; but because it is purely physical and, although it is treated with great contention among those holding diverse opinions, there can scarcely be disagreement in it except in the manner of speaking; therefore, setting aside arguments, I will briefly note the point of difficulty and how I think one ought to think and speak about it. Many therefore say absolutely that heavy and light bodies are moved by themselves to their places: Scot. In II, dist. 2, q. 10; Gregor., dist. 6, q. 1, a. 3; Mairon., dist. 14, q. 6; Abulensis, Matth. XXII, q. 224; Buridan., Iandunus, Niphus, Saxon., VIII Phys. Others think that these bodies behave in a merely passive way toward these motions; but they are moved either by the heavens, or attracted by their natural places, or by the medium or by the contrary place expelling them. Richard relates these and other views, In II, dist. 14, a. 2, q. 4; Zimara, II de Anima, text. 54; Gregory above; which I omit as improbable. The common opinion therefore is that they are moved principally by the generator. This is taken from Aristot., cit. loc., especially VIII Phys., a text. 29, and IV de Caelo, c. 3; and the Commentator holds the same view in these places, although he sometimes seems to vary. The same is held by D. Thomas, in the same places, and I, q. 18, a. 1, and I cont. Gent., c. 97; Caietan., and Ferrariensis, in these places; and Capreol., In II, dist. 6, a. 3; Aegid., Quodl. V, q. 16; Albert., VIII Phys., tract. II, c. 4. And more frequently expositors, VIII Phys. And this opinion, correctly explained, is true; many however, even Thomists, err greatly in explaining it.

22. Various modes of explaining the common and true opinion. For some think that this motion is from the generator in such a way that in the mobile itself there is no intrinsic active power of motion, but only natural passive potency, by reason of which such motion is owed to them. Against this opinion are the evident reasons of Scotus and others[18], because it is evident that the generator cannot immediately impress this motion through the form or qualities which it has in itself without a quality impressed upon the mobile itself, from which that motion effectively remains, because it happens that the generator does not exist or is so distant that it cannot immediately move. Others indeed use a distinction; for when a heavy body (they say) immediately after it has been generated begins to move downward, then it is immediately moved by the generator, itself behaving only passively, because then the generator could through itself impress the motion. But truly when a heavy body is moved after some time has passed since generation, then they say it is not moved by the generator, but by itself actively. Thus Soncin., IX Metaph., q. 8; and he attributes this to the Commentator; and the same is followed by Caietan. Thiennensis, VIII Phys.; and Paulus Venetus, in Summ. de Caelo, c. 24. But in my judgment this distinction is improbable, both because this motion is always of the same nature and occurs from the same natural principle, and also because, even if a heavy body begins to move immediately after the instant of its generation, it is not yet moved intrinsically by the generator, because there is not yet motion; but immediately after that instant, it can happen that the generator no longer exists, or at least a little later, while the motion still endures; and although it exists, nevertheless immediately after the instant of generation it already is distant from the generated thing; for I suppose the generator remains in its place; therefore it cannot through itself immediately effect motion in the generated thing. Therefore it is only said to move because in the instant of generation it impressed an impetus, by which it is moved immediately after; but that impetus is

[18] Scot., II Phys., q. 1, lib. VIII, q. 3; Iavel., q. 9.

nothing other than gravity; for whatever else might be imagined is vain. Because the generator through itself impresses only what through itself follows generation; but generation of a heavy thing through itself is followed by nothing other than gravity, as far as the present matter pertains; therefore from the intrinsic gravity of the heavy thing itself that motion then occurs, in the same way as it occurs after any amount of time. And this is maximally consonant with reason, since gravity is always the same and has the same power, and distance of time is irrelevant.

23. The difficulty is resolved. Aristotle attributes the motion of heavy and light bodies to lightness or gravity as the proximate principle. It must therefore be said that whenever an inanimate thing tends toward its natural place, intrinsic gravity or lightness is the proximate, though not the principal, efficient principle of that motion. This is almost evident from experience and from the reasons made against the previous modes of explaining the common opinion. Likewise, because since motions belong to these bodies through themselves and necessarily, it is necessary to assign some active principle of that motion, also belonging to them through themselves and necessarily; but there is no other besides intrinsic form and gravity; for the generator, as we were saying, happens to not exist at all, or to be very distant, and all the remaining causes either are nothing, or at least are merely contingent. And this is without doubt the opinion of Aristotle; for in book VIII Phys., c. 4, text. 32, when he had distinguished twofold potency, namely, remote and proximate, he adds: "The cold is potentially hot; when however it has been changed, it is fire; but it burns, unless something prohibits and obstructs"; and he adds: "The matter stands no differently in heavy and light things, for from heavy becomes light, as from water air, for this was first potentially and now is light, and immediately it will act, unless something impedes." And below: "But if that which impedes has been removed, it will act." And in the IV book de Caelo, c. 1, text. 2, he says heavy and light things have in themselves seeds or incitements of

motion; and more clearly, c. 3, text. 25, he compares heavy and light to a healable body, saying, as this tends toward health, so those tend toward their places. But he adds a difference, saying: "This however is excepted; for these, heavy (he says) and light, seem to have in themselves the principle of change, but those not in themselves, but outside, like the healable and growable"; where it is necessary to speak of an active principle, for the passive is also in the healable subject. Whence concerning that and the growable he adds: "Although these also sometimes change from themselves, and with a small motion made in external things, one approaches health, the other growth." Likewise IV Phys., c. 9, text. 85, he says dense and rare, insofar as they are endowed with gravity and lightness, are productive of carrying; but insofar as they are hard and soft, they do not have a principle of moving, but either of resisting or of suffering alteration.

24. Testimonies of Aristotle adduced to the contrary are explained. Nor does it obstruct that the same Aristotle, II de Gener., c. 2, text. 8, says that gravity and lightness are not principles of acting; for there he also says they are not principles of suffering; for he speaks of a principle of acting or transmuting another, or of suffering from another an action or passion which tends toward generation or corruption, about which he was speaking there. Likewise we can say he speaks of a proper and principal principle, to which action is simply attributed, and consequently of proper efficiency and action. For this, which belongs to gravity or lightness, is rather a certain natural resultant; in the mode by which it is efficiency, there is no doubt that gravity is the principle of it. Which is also the opinion of D. Thomas, in I-II, q. 36, a. 2, and in III cont Gent., c. 23, reason 4, and in other places which Capreol. notes, sup., and Bergomensis, in Concordant., dub. 690 and 691. Who also reconcile those places with others, in which D. Thomas seems to deny that these bodies have in themselves an active principle of motion, namely, that there he understands a principal principle, here an instrumental one, or there a principle which, here a principle by which.

25. Whether the form of a heavy or light thing influences its natural motion. But you will ask whether this internal principle is gravity alone, or also the substantial form: for authors speak variously. It is answered that if we speak of a principle through itself proximately and actually influencing, that is gravity alone, because in it there is sufficient force for effecting that motion and its term no less than there is in heat for heating. This is declared from the mystery of the Eucharist, for the species of bread have equal gravity and will be moved downward with equal motion without the form as if the substance of bread were present there. But if there is discussion of a remote intrinsic principle, thus the substantial form is the principle, because from it gravity flows and results naturally, like other natural properties.

26. Such motion is to be attributed principally to the generator. Nevertheless it must finally be added that this natural motion is principally to be attributed to the generator, which impressed the form and, through it, the gravity from which the motion results, just as motion which flows from an impressed impetus is attributed to the one projecting and impressing the impetus. Because as impressed impetus, although it is a true motive power and has in itself sufficient force for that motion, nevertheless does not move except as an instrument of the projector and in its place, so gravity does not move except as an instrument of the generator and in its place. This is the mind of D. Thomas and other authors, whom I cited in the last opinion; and of Aristotle in the cited places, who in this sense often elsewhere says inanimate things do not have in themselves a principle from which motion comes, and he always assigns this difference between them and living things, as can be seen II de Caelo, c. 2, text. 9, and I de Anim., c. 2, text. 19, and lib. II, c. 2, text. 13. And this difference of living from non-living things has been received by common consent of all, as D. Thomas notes, I cont. Gent., c. 97. But the reason of this attribution is because the perfection of these inanimate things does not consist in motion to their places, but in

being or remaining in their places; which state or perfection, properly speaking, can belong to these things in the same moment in which they begin to be from the force of their generation; and therefore, just as other properties and natural dispositions which properly belong to a generated thing from the force of generation are considered to be given by the generator, so also natural place. And hence it further happens that, for whatever reason the natural place is either impeded or taken away, the way or return to it is always attributed to the same generator, because it always happens by the same principle and the same natural denomination, and because it belongs to the same to confer the term and the way or motion to it. And in this way D. Thomas explained this matter, III cont. Gent., c. 23, saying: "Form is the principle of local motion insofar as some place is owed to some body according to its form, toward which it is moved from the force of its form tending toward that place, which because the generator gives, it is said to be the mover." So also above we were saying the reduction of water is attributed to the generator, because natural and perfect coldness, properly speaking, is owed to water from the force of its generation and form. The only difference is that that motion of reduction of water to coldness is immediately from the substantial form; but this reduction to natural place is through a mediating motive power. But the reason of this is only because coldness is a first passion; but being in such a place is not a first or immediate passion, but belongs mediately by reason of another, say gravity or lightness; but this does not prevent either from being a natural emanation from the force of generation.

27. Which actions of inanimate things are attributed to the generator, which are not. And from this reason is gathered the difference on account of which actions of inanimate things upon external matter are not attributed to the generator, as when fire heats, etc., although they follow naturally from the form and faculty given by the generator. Likewise, why the motion of growth, by which the generated thing tends toward perfect quantity, is not attributed to the

generator, but to the generated thing itself. For the reason is because these are not natural properties or perfections owed to the generated thing in the instant in which it is generated, from the force of its generation. You will say: when hot water heats, not fire alone is said to heat, but also the water itself; and a stone, if descending it impels something else, is truly said to move it; therefore it will also truly be said to effect its own motion, and thus to move itself as a supposit sustaining in itself the proper principle of that action. For by this reason alone the action of heating is attributed to hot water. It is answered that in some sense it is not inconvenient to admit that manner of speaking, as Ferrarien. noted, I cont. Gent., c. 97, and Capreol. signified above, namely, insofar as it denominates quasi-materially the supposit having in itself the proximate principle of such motion. Because however that principle acts in place of another, of which it is the instrument, therefore, simply and absolutely speaking, the action is referred back to that, as is clearly established in the example of projectiles.

28. An objection is satisfied. You will finally say: although this given congruence sufficiently declares that mode of philosophical speaking to be reasonable and to have some foundation in reality, what however does it matter for declaring real efficiency and the conditions necessary for it? For from what has been said it is sufficiently concluded that truly active power, so as to effect something in some subject, does not necessarily have to be in a distinct subject, nor in a distinct part of that subject. It is answered that this was deservedly and wisely considered and declared by philosophers so that they might signify that things lacking life have not received from nature the power to perfect themselves, properly speaking, but the nature of these things only requires that they be generated in their natural perfection. And hence they established the difference between living and non-living things, which Plato also attained in Phaed., and dial. 10 de Legibus, that living things are so instituted by nature that they could perfect or actuate themselves (we speak properly of created things),

but non-living things through themselves have only rest in that perfection which they receive from the generator, unless they are impeded from elsewhere. Because however they are optimally instituted, they receive that perfection with the due connection of their essence and properties among themselves, which whole is deservedly attributed to the author of such things or the generator. And therefore, whenever things of this kind are accidentally impeded from their natural state, and afterwards, with the impediment removed, return to it, such return is not considered to be through proper action, but through natural resultance, and therefore is attributed not so much to themselves as to the generator.

Difficulty Concerning Animals Moving Themselves in Place

29. The second difficulty concerning the same induction of Aristotle is about the motion of animals moving themselves; for in them the agent does not seem to be distinguished from the patient. Aristotle dissolves this difficulty saying that an animal does not move itself through itself primarily, that is, so that each part moves itself, but through one part, namely, integral and organic, it moves another, as experience itself seems to show, and thus the agent is distinguished there from the patient, at least according to parts. But the difficulty is pressed; for this process between the moving and moved part does not proceed to infinity; it is not between proportional parts, but equal or of some certain magnitude; nor does that process have place in causes ordered through themselves; one must therefore stop at some first moving part; but that cannot move unless moved; for this Aristotle himself teaches about all corporeal movers, VII Phys., c. 1, text. 3, and it is maximally true in a body moving another as if by impelling, in the way one part of an animal seems to move another. I therefore take the first moving part in an animal and ask by what it is moved. Not by another, since it is first moving in that order; therefore

by itself. For there is no other principle to which it might be reduced; for that motion cannot be attributed to the generator, since it is vital and is not through natural emanation, but from the appetite of the animal. Nor will he satisfy who responds that the motion of that part is from the soul as informing that part, but is received in the same part by reason of matter, because, as I was objecting above, in this way any body could be said to move itself by reason of form and to be moved by reason of matter.

30. The same difficulty exists concerning the motion of the heart, which is perpetual while the life of the animal lasts and is between two terms, and is composed of pulse and contraction. Whence, although it always endures in that way, nevertheless it is not perfectly continuous; for between dilation and contraction some rest necessarily intervenes. Of this motion therefore there is no other efficient cause besides the heart itself, which since it is homogeneous, cannot be distinguished into a part moving through itself and moved through itself, but the whole moves itself through itself primarily. Nor can that motion be attributed to the generator, for the same reasons just touched upon, namely, because it is vital motion and the perfection of the living thing consists in it, otherwise the motion of growth should also be attributed to the generator.

31. What is the locally motive power of an animal. To the former difficulty: if it were true, as some think, that the active power of animal motion is no other than appetite, which immediately by its act excites the nerve, which is the first part that moves others, thus the response would be easy; for appetite, if it is sensitive, is in the heart; if rational, in the soul itself; and through its act formally immanent and virtually transient it moves the first part of the animal; and thus the agent is distinguished there from the patient, because either appetite is in a distinct part of the animal, or certainly behaves as a certain separated mover. Nevertheless this response supposes a false opinion; for in reality the motive power of an animal, insofar as it is active, is distinct from appetite, as is proved more extensively in the science of

the soul. There are truly those who[19] think this motive potency is either the soul itself according to its substance, or certainly is in it alone; who consequently say that the soul alone, as informing the nerve, moves it through itself or through a power which is in itself, and through the nerve, as through an instrument, moves the proximate part, etc. And to the objection made above it can be responded, according to this opinion, by conceding that in that first part of animal motion or in the nerve an integrating part moving through itself and moved through itself is not distinguished, but only an essential part. Nor is this inconvenient because there the soul, in that it has in itself the whole power of moving, behaves as if it were a mover that is also separated. And thus this does not repugn the intention of Aristotle. Indeed it could be said that it suffices that no corporeal mobile, integral and total, moves itself through itself primarily, although according to some part beginning the motion it moves that without another instrument, but only by reason of its form, as we will say below concerning the motion of the heart. In which sense this response could probably be defended, even if the motive potency which is in the nerve is not in the soul alone, but in the part itself as composed of body and soul, which seems more probable, especially in brute animals.

32. Further we can add that the first instrument of animal motion is the muscles, which are compacted from nerves and certain ligaments and flesh, as Galen explains more extensively, XII de Usu partium, c. 3. But this instrument is not so moved by itself that others do not concur to its motion, by reason of which it can be said to be moved by another. For first it cannot begin motion without another part of the animal remaining unmoved, on which it rests; in every motion of an animal experience itself establishes that motion of one part cannot happen unless another is at rest; therefore that resting part also pertains to the instrument of motion and is said to be a mover through itself unmoved, and thus by reason of it the mover is

[19] Toletus, lib. II de Anim., c. 4, q. 9.

distinguished from the first part of the animal moved simultaneously and moving, which Albert noted, lib. III de Anim., tract. IV, c. 8. We can likewise add from D. Thomas, the Commentator and others, III de Anim., c. 10, that the heart is also in some way the foundation of this motion, both because nerves are made from it, and especially because it concurs through mediating animal spirits to move the muscle; for it is also established by experience that this motive power cannot be exercised without spirits, which spirits the heart or brain (according to various opinions of philosophers) sends to that part where motion is to be begun; therefore it is likely that those spirits also serve in some way as instruments of motion; but the spirits themselves are moved impelled or agitated from the efficacy of some power existing in the heart or brain, which itself remaining unmoved impels the spirits, with appetite intervening. Just as expulsive power naturally expels excrement, remaining unmoved. Nor is it necessary that every body move actually moved, but it suffices that otherwise it be mobile, or certainly that it be moved accidentally to the motion of the whole; but concerning that axiom we will speak again below.

33. What kind of motion the motion of the heart is is explained. To the latter part of the difficulty, because the motion of the heart, since it is natural, seems to be composed of contraries (for it consists in continual approach and recession between the same terms, not in the manner of circulation, but through dilation and constriction), therefore that motion seemed admirable to all philosophers. Whence some[20] said it is not from particular and intrinsic nature, but from universal nature and an extrinsic mover. D. Thomas calls this opinion ridiculous, Opusc. 15, and deservedly, because the end of that motion is not something pertaining to universal nature, but to the particular nature of the animal itself, namely the cooling and moderation of the vital heat of the heart itself, through air attracted by respiration; and therefore it is absolutely

[20] Vide Zimaram, Theorem. 94, et Themistius, 1 de Anim., in Paraphr., c. 17. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 195.

necessary for the conservation of life; it is therefore not from universal nature, but from the particular nature of the animal itself; therefore it is necessary that in the very nature of the animal there be a proper principle of that motion, because those things which are intrinsically necessary and perpetual ought to have an internal principle in that very nature.

34. D. Thomas therefore says, in the cited work, that that motion effectively comes from the soul itself, insofar as it is the natural form of the body. Because however the objection touched on above immediately occurred, that this is not sufficient for distinguishing a moving and moved part according to the sense of Aristotle, from which it follows that the whole heart moves itself through itself primarily, D. Thomas adds that that motion should be attributed to the generator, because in the manner of a proper passion it results naturally from the form itself, which opinion Capreolus and Ferrariensis follow above. This certainly has no small difficulty, first in explaining how from one and the same faculty acting naturally such varied motion can result: because a power acting naturally is determined to one thing; but dilation and contraction or approach and recession from the same term are contrary motions. For it is not similar concerning the motions of animals, which can also be called natural, insofar as they happen by a certain necessity of nature; for those proceed from appetite, which follows cognition, and can be varied according to various apprehensions, which are also varied according to various applications of objects; but the motion of the heart does not proceed from appetite, but from mere natural property. Nor does it seem similar to what D. Thomas adduces concerning the circular motion of heaven, in which approach and recession according to diverse parts to some partial term is included: both because in circular motion that is found without any contrariety of motions and with true continuity of parts of motion; but here there seems to be true contrariety between parts of this motion, whence true rest intervenes between them. And also because that circular motion is not

from an internal active principle, but from an extrinsic mover. But this difficulty proceeds equally, whether we say that motion happens from the generator through natural resultance, or from the animal itself through proper action; for it always happens from a faculty acting naturally. And therefore nothing else occurs to be said except that the sensitive soul, in that it is a nobler form, can have natural faculties which in their mode of operating surpass inferior forms; of this kind is this motive faculty which is in the heart; and therefore it is not entirely determined to one thing, except within its own sphere, that is within those terms to which it approaches through dilation, but recedes through contraction. From which parts the integral motion is composed, which is physically one, although it is not mathematically continuous.

35. Nevertheless, with this supposed, it is difficult to attribute that motion to the generating agent. First, because it is a vital act; but an act of life is from an intrinsic principle, whence it ought not to be reduced to an extrinsic one. Perhaps there may be someone who denies that motion to be vital, because it does not occur through appetite and cognition. This, however, is improbable and contrary to all philosophers; for although they may doubt whether that motion is from the soul as vegetative or as sensitive, as Zimara discusses at length, Theor. 12, nevertheless all agree that it is from the soul insofar as it is soul, since it is as it were the foundation of life. Second, it seems absurd to attribute my respiration to the generating agent and to say that I do not breathe; yet respiration is also a natural action, which occurs without the intervention of appetite, indeed it occurs from the very motion of the heart and lungs. Third, one can scarcely give a reason why nutrition also should not be attributed to the generating agent; for it too is merely natural and begins extrinsically only from the instant of generation, and perpetually endures of itself, and, as nutrition (otherwise as augmentation), does not tend toward some perfection owed from the force of generation, but toward conserving life, repairing what is lost. Thus therefore that motion of the heart

begins extrinsically from the instant of generation, and always endures of itself, and does not tend toward some place owed to the animal or heart from the force of generation, but occurs from the living thing itself for the conservation of life, which that motion serves, at least as a cause per accidens, either to remove and expel certain corrupting things, or to attract something cooling. And therefore I do not think it inconvenient to attribute this motion to the animal itself and to assert that according to the same integral part it moves and is moved, and it is sufficient that the reasons of acting and receiving are diverse; for Aristotle only said concerning the motion of the whole animal that it occurs through the motion of one part into another. According to which response it must consequently be admitted that it is not necessary for the agent and patient as such to be distinguished in this physical motion, because it is vital and only partial, which is no inconvenience, as will be more apparent below from the third assertion, and it seems to be sufficiently consonant with the mind of Aristotle, in the book On the Common Motion of Animals, at the end.

Difficulty Concerning the Mover of the Heavens

36. The third difficulty is that Aristotle only makes an induction concerning sublunary bodies; but he omits the celestial ones, or rather from those he makes an argument to these; but it does not seem efficacious, at least for inferring that the heaven is moved by another mover as such, but at most by another as that by which, that is, by its proper form. For what if someone should say that the form of the heaven is a certain special genus of soul, to which such motion follows by natural necessity, not through one integral part into another, but in any part through itself, by means of form alone and natural faculty, just as we were saying a little before concerning the motion of the heart? It is answered that it is true that Aristotle did not assume celestial bodies in his induction, but argues from inferior

things, which are known to us, to superior ones, which are less known. But it will be a most efficacious argument if we suppose that motion not to be so natural to those bodies according to their proper and particular natures, as is the motion of the heart or of heavy and light things, because that motion is neither ordered toward the conservation or some perfection of those bodies, nor toward some place naturally owed to them. Thomas uses this reasoning in III cont. Gent., c. 23, rat. 4, to prove that the motion of the heaven is not from an intrinsic form. For then motion flows naturally from form when the place compared through such motion is owed to the mobile by reason of its form, as is evident in all natural bodies; but the place which the heaven acquires through circular motion is not owed to it by reason of form, because it makes no difference to the perfection or inclination of its form to have this location rather than another, namely in order to its diverse parts, for example, to have the sun in this hemisphere rather than in another. It is added that the form of the heaven cannot be said to be a soul on account of local motion alone, as was touched upon above and will also be said below, when treating of intelligences. Whence even if someone should contend that motion to be so natural to the heaven as other motions are to natural bodies, nevertheless that motion must be reduced to the author of the heaven as to him who impressed the impetus for that motion, just as heavy and light things are said to be moved by the generating agent. But if someone should deny that the heaven has an author, but exists of itself and has inclination and natural faculty for that motion, such an error would have to be refuted by other metaphysical principles; for this cannot be done from physical motion alone, as we shall say more broadly below, although it is per se incredible that a thing which needs motion, either for its perfection or even for its action, should have being of itself without the communication or production of another.

37. From the preceding difficulties a conclusion is drawn, and is proved by reason. From these things therefore it seems to be sufficiently established by induction that every corporeal and physical

local motion requires a mover or efficient cause distinct from the moved thing. But the reason for this necessity can first be given in that principle of Aristotle, that nothing can simultaneously be in potency and in act. This however must be limited and accommodated in the way we said concerning the motion of alteration. Although indeed it may still have less force in local motion, because local motion or its terminus, properly speaking, is not a principle or virtue or act from which similar motion proceeds, but some motive faculty of higher reason than the motion itself. But that principle would be efficacious in bodies, if another axiom sufficiently received and attributed to Aristotle were true, that a body does not move locally unless it is also moved locally; for whether that motion is required as a reason of moving or as a condition, it is already supposed that the body ought to be actually moved in order that it may move. And thence it is excellently inferred that it cannot be mobile from itself, because it cannot simultaneously be in act and in potency. Nevertheless that axiom is not received by all[21] and seems to suffer some instances; for a magnet remaining unmoved attracts iron, etc. But it must be said that one body can move another in two ways. First, per se and immediately, impressing nothing other than motion; and then indeed it never moves unless moved locally. Second, it happens to be moved locally, with alteration preceding, and in this way a magnet attracts iron; and then indeed it happens that one body, remaining unmoved, moves another. Then however, at least for that reason that the motion occurs through mediate alteration, it will be necessary for the mover to be distinguished from the mobile; and thus the reason made will be efficacious in local motion, either immediately by reason of itself (so to speak), or mediately by reason of alteration, if it occurs through that mediation.

38. Another reason of Aristotle is examined. But Aristotle adduced another reason, VII Phys., text. 2, to prove that a body cannot move itself locally per se primo, which in sum is this: Everything that

[21] Vide Zimaram, Theorem. 94. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 199.

is moved is divisible into parts; therefore it cannot move itself per se primo. The consequence is proved, because what moves itself per se primo does not rest because another rests or ceases to move; for since it moves itself, it does not depend on another in its motion. But truly, since the mobile has parts, with a part of it resting, either the whole rests, and thus it is not moved per se primo, but by that part, with which resting, it ceases to be moved; or it is still moved, and thus it also follows that it does not move itself per se primo, but by that part by which it is said to be moved, with another resting. Concerning this reason much has been written by expositors, and many think it to be a demonstration, like Alexander, Simplicius, Averroes, Thomas, who differ. For Averroes thinks it to be a demonstration a posteriori only, but Thomas wants it to be a priori, signifying that the divisibility of the mobile is the cause on account of which it cannot be moved per se primo. But to others the reason seems sophistical and inefficacious.

39. And indeed there seems to be an equivocation in that term per se primo. For something can be understood to be moved per se primo in two ways. One is, that the motion of the whole mobile so belongs to the whole that it depends on no other, even on parts. And in this sense the reason correctly proves that a body cannot move itself per se primo. But this has no bearing on concluding that a distinction between mover and mobile is necessary, because that dependence of the whole on parts can be only material and not effective, unless perhaps respectively, that is, insofar as each part moves itself, as will be declared immediately. Therefore in another way something can be said to move itself per se primo, because according to every part of itself it moves and is moved, so that no part moves another, nor the whole as such, but each moves itself, and thus partially concurs to the motion of the whole, which arises from the motions and movements of all parts. And indeed, if something moves itself in this way, it will most properly be said to move itself per se primo such that in it the mover is not distinguished from the mobile. But that no body can move itself in this way cannot be efficaciously concluded from the aforesaid reason,

even if both members of that reasoning are granted. For first it can happen that, with a part resting, the whole entirely rests according to every part of itself, not because the whole would be moved by one part alone, but because while one part ceases to move itself and rests, it resists another and impedes it from moving itself, which can be seen not only in diverse parts, but also in diverse mobiles; for if two stones are moved downward one after another, if the first is detained it will also impede the other from descending, not because it was moving it before, but because it resists the motion by which it was moving itself. Then it can happen that, with a part resting, the whole does not rest according to every part of itself, but only according to that which is said to rest, but according to others it is still moved; as when, with the root of a tree resting, the remaining parts are agitated. And from this it also does not follow that the whole was previously moved by that part alone, which still moves itself, but it only follows that it concurred to the integral motion of the whole together with other parts.

40. The Aristotelian axiom is explained. Whence that axiom: What moves itself per se primo does not rest at the rest of another, must be limited by a double distinction. For per se it is true that one mobile does not rest when another from which it was not being moved rests; but per accidens, and because an impediment is placed, it can happen that it rests. Again, if that other which rests is not entirely extrinsic, but a part of the mover and mobile, it can correctly happen that, with that resting, the whole ceases to be moved per se primo, that is[22], according to every part of itself, not because the whole was not moving itself per se primo, but because it was being moved partially by that part; for these two do not conflict with each other, as is per se manifest. Therefore that the whole as whole depends on parts does not prevent the motion of the whole from proceeding per se primo

[22] id est, 1960; id non est alit. "Algunas ediciones intercalan la palabra 'non' por considerarla imprescindible para el recto sentido de este párrafo. Sin embargo, en otros pasajes, p. ej. en el número 52 de esta misma sección, Suárez usa la misma expresión sin la negación." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 202.

from the same whole. And it is openly declared, for otherwise in the same way it would be proved that a body cannot be moved per se primo by another, which is openly false; for the heaven is moved per se primo by an intelligence, and earth is moved per se primo, when it is carried downward, although by a generating agent. And the consequence is evident, for in these also it is true that if a part of the heaven rested, the whole would rest, or at least would not be moved per se primo as before, because the motion per se primo of the whole depends on the motion of the part materially, as on an integral part. Just as on the contrary the whole earth rests per se primo in the center, and yet if a part ceased to rest, the whole would no longer rest per se primo, not because the whole was resting effectively from the part, but because the rest of the whole arose quasi materially from the rest of the part. And while the whole water is cold, it can be said per se primo that the whole is becoming cold; and yet if a part begins to be heated, the whole is no longer per se primo cold, as before, not because the whole was actively becoming cold from the part, but because coldness as belonging per se primo to the whole arose quasi materially from the coldness of the parts. Therefore from the dependence of the motion of the whole, as per se primo moved or moving, on the motion or movement of individual parts, it cannot be concluded that the whole is moved by a part except partially and (so to speak) respectively, that is, insofar as each part moves itself, which dependence does not prevent the same thing from moving itself. Whence I do not see how by that reasoning the said axiom is demonstrated. Therefore the other proofs adduced are more probable.

Third Assertion Concerning the Motion of Spiritual Things

41. A spirit can move itself locally. I say third: the efficient cause through motion or action in some way transient, in a spiritual thing is not always distinguished in reality from the material cause or

that receiving the motion, except at most as to the reason of acting and receiving. This conclusion is especially posited on account of the local motion of angels, which I call in some way transient, because, as much as is from the nature of such motion, it can be done by one agent in another suppositum, and because truly it is not per se an immanent act in the potency through which it is proximately effected. Therefore by this motion it is certain that an angel, intelligence or separated soul can move itself, effecting motion in itself; for, as we shall touch upon below in its place, the motion by which a spiritual substance is moved is not in another distinct thing, but in the very substance which is moved. And it is almost evident from the terms, because a thing is not said to be moved by extrinsic denomination, but by true real change, which must necessarily have some efficient cause, and no other than the very spiritual substance moved, when it moves itself. Then therefore the efficient cause cannot be distinguished from the recipient in suppositum, because we suppose the same suppositum moves itself; nor can it be distinguished into a part per se moving and moved, because it has no parts; therefore at most it can be distinguished as the reason of effecting from the reason of receiving motion or its terminus. In this also there are various opinions; I suppose however as more probable that motion is immediately received in the substance of the angel; for, just as a body is present to place through quantity, so an angel immediately through its substance; for it has no quantity nor can another accident be feigned in it through which it might be capable of local presence. But I speak of the proximate and immediate subject of that presence, whatever it may be whether some action or contact of power with respect to body is required for that action; for this does not matter for the present, since what occurs in the angel through local motion is not action in body, but is its real presence; but this immediately affects the substance of the angel; therefore the same substance is the reason of receiving such motion, because motion and its formal terminus are in the same proximate subject.

42. What is the proximate principle of local motion in spirits. But concerning the reason of effecting that motion there are various opinions; for some posit that it occurs immediately through the will; whence supposing, as we suppose, that the will is a thing distinct from the substance, it happens that the proximate reason of effecting that motion is distinct in reality from the reason of receiving. But those who deny that the power of will is distinguished in reality from the substance, perhaps would say that the actual volition of moving oneself is the proximate reason of effecting that motion, and that it is distinct from the substance. But others do not think that will or volition is the proximate principle per se of effecting that motion, but that there is a peculiar motive power, but volition is the application or command of that motive power, which, just as in us and other animals is distinguished from appetite, so in angels from will. But some think that power is not distinct in reality from the substance. According to whose opinion also the reason of acting and receiving this motion are not distinguished in reality, but only in reason. But we think it more probable that motive power, even if it is believed to be distinct in reality from the will, is also distinct in reality from the substance of the angel, from the general principle posited above, that the proximate faculty for accidental action in a creature is an accident distinct from the substance; and thus we conclude that the proximate principle by which of effecting that motion is distinct in reality from the subject in which it is received. And the reason is because this principle is a merely active potency, which does not act except in a presupposed subject; therefore it requires in that a passive potency distinct from itself. And this confirms that definition of Aristotle, IX Metaph., saying that active potency is a principle of transmuting another insofar as it is another, concerning which we shall say more a little below.

43. Nor does that principle of Aristotle oppose this conclusion: Everything that is moved is moved by another, nor the reasons by which it is confirmed by him; for, as I noted above, Aristotle spoke of physical and material motion; but this motion of

intelligences is not of this kind, and it is a sufficiently doubtful matter whether Aristotle knew that motion or rather thought intelligences to be entirely immobile. Whence his induction does not comprehend intelligences, as is evident per se. Nor also that reason, which supposes the mobile to be divisible into parts. But the other reason, that a thing cannot simultaneously be in potency and in act, is excellently dissolved here through the distinction of virtual act and formal potency; and at most it proves the distinction of the principle by which of acting from the subject receiving. For an angel existing in heaven is in formal potency to be on earth; yet actually it has the power by which it can move itself and make itself present to earth. Nor do the limitations posited above have place here, with which we said that principle to be true even of virtual act; for one limitation was that it should be understood with respect to physical motion; but this motion of which we treat is not physical. But the other, namely that it is necessary for the thing to be in a preternatural state, is not necessary here, because in this living things surpass those which do not live, that they can move themselves even when they exist in their natural state; and therefore in the same they can have virtual act simultaneously with formal potency for some motion.

44. Three orders of things moving themselves locally from an intrinsic principle. Whence from the reasoning made up to this point it is permitted to gather three orders of things moving themselves locally in some way from an intrinsic principle. The first is of those which are only so moved when they are in a preternatural state, and in these although the principle of motion is in them, nevertheless not as their own, but as an instrument or power of another; and of this kind are inanimate things. But others are things which properly move themselves from an intrinsic principle as their own, nevertheless not perfectly and per se primo, but through one part moving another, and thus quasi per accidens moving the whole; and at most they can move one part of themselves per se primo, namely, that which is as it were the foundation of the motion of others. And of this kind are corporeal

living things. But in the third and higher order are things which not only move themselves through an intrinsic principle as their own, but also move themselves per se primo according to their whole selves, because they have no parts, and therefore in them the principles of acting and receiving as such cannot be distinguished, but at most the principles by which. And this is consonant with the perfection of these things, because among living creatures they possess the most perfect grade.

Fourth Assertion Concerning Immanent Actions

45. I say fourth: in the efficient cause of an immanent act not only are the principles as such of acting and receiving not always distinguished, but rather it is not always necessary that the principles as by which be distinguished in reality, although it often happens thus. The first part of this assertion is manifest and follows from the very nature of immanent action; for it is received in the very operator, and therefore it is not necessary that the agent suppositum be distinct from the recipient, nor even that it act and receive according to diverse parts. Both because it often has no parts; and also because this action is received in the same potency from which it is elicited; and therefore even in a suppositum having parts it occurs and is received in the same part. And hence can be given the reason in general for the second part of the conclusion; for, since immanent action not only remains efficient in the same suppositum, but also in the same potency, nothing prevents that also in the proximate principle by which, acting and receiving it, no distinction in reality is found.

46. But so that this part and the whole conclusion may be more broadly declared and proved, it will be necessary to distinguish these immanent actions more particularly and to declare how in individual cases the assertion has place. Therefore all these actions either pertain to cognition or to appetite; and they can be either in the

rational part, or in the sensitive. Again in all those can be considered either the principal or substantial principle by which, or the proximate or accidental. Therefore in these actions insofar as they are in the sensitive part the principle by which principal of acting and receiving can easily be distinguished; for the former is the soul, as is manifest from the definition of soul; but the latter is the body. For, according to true doctrine, these sensitive operations, since they are material, are received in the body or in the whole composite by reason of matter. But as these operations are found in the intellectual part, the principal principle of acting and receiving is not distinguished in them, except only in reason; for the same simple substance of angel or soul exercises both functions. For what some say, that in the very substance those two are distinguished, because it acts through being as through act and receives through essence as through potency, both falsely supposes a distinction in reality between being and actual essence and, even with that admitted, is not consequently said; for, supposing that opinion, being is not the reason of acting, but is a condition without which the essence would not act; similarly however it is a condition without which the essence would not receive the operation; but the essence itself existing or having such condition is the principle of acting and receiving such operation. Whence in the soul of Christ, even if, according to that opinion, it does not have created existential being, nevertheless the principal principle of eliciting created intellection is not the uncreated being itself, but the substance of the soul itself according to its proper essential being.

47. In cognitive operations whether the reason of acting is distinct from receiving. Not species alone, but intellect also effects intellection. But truly in the proximate and accidental principle there seems to be another reason concerning actions of knowing than concerning actions of appetite, both in the rational part and in the sensitive. For in actions of knowing the proximate principle of acting is always or almost always distinguished from the proximate principle of receiving. The reason is because for effecting this action besides the

vital faculty a species is required supplying the place of the object and concurring to the act in place of that. And thus the principle of acting is the potency as informed by the species, but the principle of receiving is the potency alone, because the object or its species does not help for receiving, but only for acting; wherefore the proximate principle of acting and receiving is distinguished in some way. But I say in some way, because they are not distinguished except as including and included; for the opinion of those is improbable who think the whole reason of acting is the species and the potency is only the reason of receiving, which Scotus rightly attacks, In II, dist. 3, q. 8; undeservedly however he attributes it to Thomas, who nowhere insinuated it; and it is very improbable, because an act of life must necessarily be actively from an intrinsic vital faculty. Therefore it is certain that the same cognitive potency, in which the act of knowing is proximately received, is simultaneously the proximate principle of effecting the same act; it differs however, because of receiving it is the adequate proximate principle, but not of acting, but together with the species, according to the more probable doctrine, concerning which can be seen Capreolus, In II, dist. 3, q. 2; and Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 7; Aegidius and Ferrara, in places immediately to be cited.

48. In the intellection by which an angel understands itself, what distinct reason of acting and receiving. Only an instance can be brought of that act, by which an angel sees itself without the aid of a species through its substance, according to the truer opinion, although others think otherwise, as we shall see below when treating of intelligences; therefore that intellection has the same adequate principle of acting and receiving, namely, the substance and intellect of the angel. Perhaps someone might respond that act is attributed to the generating agent or author of nature, because it is merely natural and necessary from an intrinsic principle to the convenient state of nature from the first instant of creation. But this attribution in proper vital acts does not seem to be so extended, especially speaking in physical rigor, for morally it can more easily be employed, as I shall say

a little later. Therefore I do not think it inconvenient to admit that in these acts, if it is necessary, as I signified in the assertion and will be more declared immediately. In that act however there is not such absolute necessity, but some distinction in reality can be understood between the proximate principle of effecting and receiving that act; for since the substance of the angel concurs to other intellections in only one way, namely as principal principle, to that it concurs in a double way or title, namely, as principal principle and as object and as it were ultimate form of its intellect in intelligible being. And thus the proximate principle of that act is not the intellective potency alone, but as constituted in its way in first act through its substance conjoined to it in the character of an intelligible object in act. But the potency proximately receptive and the whole reason of receiving that act is the intellect alone; nor under this aspect does the substance have greater concourse to that act than to others. Thus therefore it happens that even in that act the adequate proximate principle of acting and receiving are distinguished as including and included.

49. Whether cognition of object effectively influences volition. But concerning actions of appetite and will there is a special difficulty, because these potencies do not need species, and thus they seem through their entities alone to be principles of acting and receiving their acts. Therefore some say that cognition of the object concurs effectively to acts of appetite. Thus Soncinas, IX Metaph., q. 10, 11 and 13, which also many theologians hold, as is more broadly transmitted in I-II. This opinion however is not approved by me; for I think that knowledge of the object only concurs to the act of appetition as a necessary condition through the mode of application of object, because the will is not moved except by the goodness of the object. Wherefore, if that motion, as it is from the object, is not effective, as truly it is not, but final and metaphorical, which also Soncinas admits above, q. 12, and others, as it is from cognition there is no reason why it should be effective, because with the good object presented the appetite does not need an extrinsic agent to be carried

toward that, but can be carried from natural inclination, or rather the soul, as[23] living through that.

50. Whether appetite of end is to be attributed to the generating agent. Others say that appetition of the end, although it is done by the will alone, is nevertheless to be attributed to the generating agent or author of nature, but appetition of means does not occur from the will alone, but through the mediation of appetition of the end, but is received in the will alone, and by this reason the principle of acting and receiving is distinguished in this act. For either the internal principles themselves are distinct in reality in some way, or certainly, if they are not distinguished in the proximate agent itself, the action is attributed to an extrinsic agent. Thus think the Thomists concerning intention of end, Cajetan, I-II, q. 9, a. 4; Ferrara, III cont. Gent., c. 89, where Thomas signifies this; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 25; and there Aegidius, q. 5. But although this attribution according to a certain moral consideration can be sustained, because man does not so move himself morally in intention of end as he does in consultation and election of means, concerning which elsewhere, nevertheless as to real efficiency it does not seem to be proved nor should it be denied that man himself is he who by proper power, and not as instrument of another, effects intention of end; especially in acts contained within the order of nature, which the will elicits by proper power with general concourse alone; therefore this action cannot be more attributed to God than the heating of fire. Especially because it is not only a vital action, but also often free, whence it is in no way done through natural resultance nor is it owed according to that connatural state which the thing postulates in the instant of its generation.

51. Wherefore Scotus rightly, In II, dist. 25, and Henry, Quodl. IX, q. 5, and others, deny that act to be attributed to the generating agent. And the same must be said of many other simple acts which the will elicits from itself without another prior act, as is desire or complacency, or simple love of some known good. It is added

[23] ut, 1960; alit. aut.

that that reasoning has no place in sensitive appetite, which does not operate for the sake of an end formally; whence in it there is not properly election, which proceeds from intention of end, as from proximate reason of acting, but all acts of appetition proceed proximately from the very natural inclination of such appetite; therefore either it must be said that all acts of this appetite are attributed to the generating agent, which is ridiculous, or certainly it must be admitted that the very same potency through itself is the proximate principle of acting and receiving such act. And thus Scotus, Henry and others cited above admit, and at length Antonius Andreas, IX Metaph., q. 1. Nor do I see what inconvenience follows thence, so that to avoid it Soncinas, Javellus and others so scrupulously inquire in every potency acting and receiving some co-principle of acting and not receiving, and therefore take refuge in the efficiency of knowledge with respect to love; which if it is not shown necessary by other reasons, is undeservedly asserted on account of this cause. For they bring no other inconvenience, except that the same according to the same would be agent and patient, and consequently according to the same would be in potency and in act, which is a contradiction in terms. But this inconvenience, if the things said above are considered and the terms understood, is nothing; for there is no repugnance that the same faculty be in first act and in potency to immanent second act, because first act does not formally include second, but power for eliciting that, which the same faculty that is receptive potency of the same act can have; and this is consonant with the nature of such act, since it is immanent; and this is what others say, namely, that the same faculty can be simultaneously in virtual act and in formal potency. Whence, just as by the same act according to reality a thing is constituted actually acting and receiving, and just as the same thing is action and passion according to diverse relations, so by the same faculty according to reality a suppositum can be constituted in the character of agent and patient in potency; wherefore in this sense it is not inconvenient that the same according to the same be constituted

agent and patient, if it is taken with proportion, that is, both in potency or both in act, and that "according to the same" only reduplicates or designates the same thing, but not the same relation or the same formal reason conceived and made precise by mental operation.

Corollaries of the Superior Doctrine & Formal Resolution of the Question

52. From what we have said thus far, in order to respond formally and universally to the proposed question, it follows first that it is not of the nature or necessity of an efficient cause, as such, that it be distinguished in supposit from the patient. This has already been supposed and proven at the beginning, and it is more evident from the entire discourse that has been made. Therefore, if in some cases such a distinction is necessary, this does not arise from the general nature of the efficient cause, but from the special nature of such a cause. For example, in efficiency through substantial generation, a suppositional distinction (so to speak) between agent and patient is necessary, because it is necessary that they differ in being simply and in substantial forms; and the same distinction is necessary between any generator and the generated, because the same supposit cannot generate itself, since in order to generate it must necessarily be presupposed. But truly, with regard to nutrition or substantial accretion, if the patient is considered at the beginning of the action or alteration, it must also be a distinct supposit, because it is necessary that it be a dissimilar substance; but in the very instant of accretion it is no longer a distinct supposit, but a new part of the same supposit, because through that action it is converted and united to the pre-existing supposit. However, an efficient cause through accidental action or motion, in inanimate things, is usually distinct in supposit, especially when the patient is moved primarily through itself, that is, according to all its parts; nevertheless, this does not arise from the

necessity of the efficient cause as such, but from the imperfection and proper condition of inanimate things, as has been declared. Similarly, it must be observed that this should be understood concerning the particular and per se cause; for if we speak of the first and universal cause, it is clear that it must be distinct in supposit from the effect and from the patient subject, if it acts through change, because it cannot act upon itself, since it is pure act. And similarly, if the cause is accidental and remote, that is, one which produced the proximate cause and gave it the power of acting, thus it will also be a distinct supposit, because it is supposed to have substantially produced the proximate cause. Hence that axiom of Aristotle: "Everything that is moved is moved by another," although understood of the proximate and per se mover, is not always verified of another supposit, nevertheless understood indifferently of some mover, whether proximate or remote, particular or universal, it will always be found that any mobile thing is moved by some distinct supposit, or (to use metaphysical terms) any patient suffers from some suppositionally distinct efficient cause. This, however, cannot be demonstrated through a purely physical medium, but through a metaphysical one, namely, because no particular acting cause has from itself the power of acting, but from another supposit, nor can it act through itself without the concourse of a superior cause, as will be established below from what we shall say about God and the first cause.

53. Inference from what has been said. Second, it follows from what has been said that it is not of the nature or necessity of an efficient cause as such that it be distinguished from the patient according to diverse substantial parts, whether essential or integral, but in agents in which this necessity is found, this arises from some peculiar reason, not from the force of efficiency as such. All these things are established from what has been said; for the prior part was demonstrated in the third and fourth conclusions, the rest in the preceding sections. For the fact that in material living beings a distinction of integral parts is required for moving themselves by the

first vital action, which is through nutrition, arises first from the nature of material alteration which intervenes there, according to which the same thing cannot act upon itself, nor the similar upon the similar, as is said in Generation I, text 48, and its reason was declared in the first and second assertions; it arises second from substantial accretion; for the same part cannot substantially form itself, as is evident per se. Third, it arises from the fact that for true growth it is necessary that new quantity be added to the pre-existing, because the same part cannot increase itself through its quantity alone. Hence, in the way that imperfect growth can be found in inanimate things through juxtaposition, it is necessary that the action be done according to diverse parts. And the same is true of alteration, if it happens that an inanimate thing alters itself so that action is attributed to it; this can only happen according to diverse parts, if it happens to be unequally affected, which is accidental in such things. Again, that in animals moving themselves locally this is done through the distinction of the integral part that moves and the part that is moved, does not arise from the nature of the efficient or mover as such, but from the fact that such an efficient and such a living being is imperfect, and therefore does not participate in the intrinsic and natural power to move its whole self primarily through itself, which perhaps also arises from the materiality of the body itself, which cannot be so moved by the soul, but through parts and diverse organs or instruments. From this, however, it becomes probable that it does not contradict this living being that it could move some integral part of its body primarily through itself, that is, not through another prior integral part, but through itself. Nevertheless, in that very part, and universally in every material agent, the essential principles of acting and being acted upon will be distinguished, which does not arise from the precise nature of the particular efficient cause as such, but from the particular imperfection of material substance, which is not active according to its whole self, but only by reason of form.

54. Third, it follows from what has been said that it is not of the nature of the efficient cause as such that the principles of acting and being acted upon be distinct in the thing, either by subject or by integral or partial entity, but whenever this is found (which is frequent) it arises from some particular reason. This whole point is also evident from what has been said; for this condition is sometimes absent; therefore it is not per se and universally necessary from the force of efficiency. Therefore, that the principles of acting and being acted upon be distinguished by subject is necessary only there where the action must be exercised either by a distinct supposit or through really distinct parts, and from this arises that necessity. This necessity is indeed universal in univocal action, from that principle that the same thing cannot simultaneously be in act and potency. But in equivocal action that principle does not press so universally, nor any other that is universal, and therefore in diverse causes it arises from diverse principles, as has been explained. Again, that those principles of acting and being acted upon should be really distinct in their whole entity, even if it happens that they are in the same subject and in the same integral part of it, either arises from the fact that those principles are substantial and proper to material things, namely, matter and form, or certainly, if they are accidental principles, especially that which is the principle of acting, this arises from the fact that the action is not immanent, but from its genus is transient, as is evident in the motion of a heavy body, insofar as gravity is considered as the active principle of it. And the same is true a fortiori in the motion of the heart, and more clearly in the motion of an angel moving itself. Moreover, that the proximate principle of acting and being acted upon, when they are distinguished neither by subject nor by integral entity, at least differ in some real aspect which the principle of acting includes and not the principle of being acted upon as such, is found in certain agents with immanent action, but nevertheless does not arise from the common nature of the agent as such, as is established from what has been said, nor even from the common nature of immanent action as such,

because there is no reason why immanent action as such should demand that distinction; indeed, it will be somehow more immanent if it remains in the very same principle from which it is proximately elicited. It arises therefore from the fact that such action occurs through a certain assimilation, and therefore requires, beyond the intrinsic faculty, a proper principle of such assimilation. And thus it remains that in immanent action which does not require that assimilation, nor from any other particular condition of its own demands any cooperating principle in the manner of an efficient cause, but only concurring in the genus of end or extrinsic form, with respect (I say) to such action, it is not necessary that the principle of acting be distinct even in partial entity from the principle of receiving. And this mode of acting is indeed quite consonant with the will, both because of its freedom and because of the common nature of appetite, to which it belongs that it can be carried toward a subject proposed to it from its inclination and efficacy alone. But here some diversity could be considered in the principle of acting and of receiving the act of appetite; for, as I said above, not only the power but also the substantial form concur effectively and immediately in their order to the act of life; but truly, to receive the act, it seems that only the power concurs proximately and immediately. But this difference is both uncertain; for perhaps an accident, and especially a vital act, not only reaches by inhering in the accidental power, but also in the substance itself. And whatever is asserted in this matter for other reasons, it is not necessary for the present cause, because truly there is no inconvenience that the same faculty which is the proximate principle of receiving an immanent act should be through itself sufficiently constituted in first act as a sufficient proximate effective principle of the same act.

55. First objection against the aforesaid. Second. Nevertheless, there are some objections against the ultimate part of this resolution. The first and principal is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, text 2, where he says that active power is a principle

of transmutation in another, as it is other; therefore it contradicts that active power should adequately be a principle of transmuting itself. Hence he immediately adds that the power of being acted upon is a principle of passive change from another insofar as it is other. And in Metaphysics V, chapter 11, text 17, he defines active and passive power in the same way; therefore from the precise nature of agent and patient a distinction between them is required, at least as to the principles of acting and being acted upon. Hence Aristotle, in Generation, chapter 7, considers it a great absurdity that the same thing should be acted upon by itself. And in Metaphysics I, chapter 3, he posits this principle: "Nor does that which is subjected effect its own change"; and he says this was the beginning of finding an efficient cause distinct from the material. The second objection is common, because the same thing cannot be really related to itself; but an efficient cause is really related to its effect; therefore the same thing cannot really act upon itself according to reality. And it is confirmed, for if according to the same reality it is simultaneously in active and receptive potency, why does it not always change itself? It is confirmed second, because an agent must approach the patient; but the same thing cannot approach itself according to the same respect.

56. The definitions of active and passive powers handed down by Aristotle are explained. A relation based on action exists between effect and cause. Why active powers sometimes cease from actual operation. To the passages of Aristotle it can be responded first, that in those definitions he speaks of purely active and purely passive power, but beyond these there are certain powers simultaneously active and passive, concerning which the given doctrine proceeds when they are completely active of their acts. Hence second it is said that Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, declared the same thing more clearly, when he said that active power is a principle of change in another or insofar as it is other. And in this way it can be said that the will, insofar as it affects its act, is a principle of acting in itself, not insofar as it is active, but insofar as it is in potency. But I think more truly that Aristotle was speaking of

physical transmutations, which occur through transient action, as I shall show more extensively below when treating of power as it is a species of quality. And Aristotle speaks of the same change in Generation I; for there he disputes about that change which tends toward generation and corruption. Similarly he speaks in Metaphysics I, where universally he speaks of how it is evident that matter and efficient cause in generations and physical changes do not concur in the same cause. To the first argument it is responded that there is no real relation between agent and patient, but between agent and effect; and in this way, even if some power acts upon itself, it nevertheless acts an effect distinct from itself, between which and itself there can be a real relation. To the first confirmation it is responded that if a power acts naturally, the reason it does not always act is that it does not always have an applied object, which it needs not as a cooperating cause, but in another genus of final or extrinsic formal cause; just as fire cannot act without combustible material, not because it needs this as a cooperating cause, but as matter. But if the cause is free, even if all other things are applied, it can refrain from acting solely from its natural perfection. To the second confirmation it is responded that identity is the highest or more eminent proximity, if otherwise there is no lack of power for acting and capacity for receiving.

SECTION VIII

WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE MUST BE SIMULTANEOUSLY JOINED OR PROXIMATE TO THE PATIENT IN ORDER TO ACT

1. This question is treated professionally by Aristotle concerning physical motions in Physics VII, chapter 2; nevertheless, the question is more universal and properly metaphysical, for it encompasses every efficient cause. Hence it is customarily treated by

theologians both concerning God (I, q. 8, and In I, dist. 37) and concerning angels (I, q. 52, and In I, dist. 37, and In II, dist. 2). We, however, treat here of finite causes, for we shall speak of God later. The question is treated concerning transient action by which one thing acts upon another; for in immanent action, and whenever a thing acts upon itself per se primo, that is, according to the same part, it is clear that the agent cannot be distant from the patient. When, however, one supposit acts upon another, or the same supposit acts through one part upon another, they can be either immediately proximate, or some body or part of a body or some space can be interposed between them. And there is no doubt among philosophers that an efficient cause can act upon a distant thing through a proximate one; but the difficulty is whether, when a cause acts proximately and immediately through the power which it has in itself and not through another which it diffuses, it is necessary that it immediately touch by its quantity or presence that thing upon which it acts, or whether it can immediately act upon it even if it is distant in space. Connected with this difficulty is another, namely, when a cause acts through a proximate and non-distant thing, how it reaches the distant through the proximate.

The First Opinion is Reported & Established

2. There are therefore two celebrated opinions in this matter. The first is that an efficient cause can act upon a distant patient, and thus immediate proximity is not required, but only within a certain sphere of activity; for there is no doubt that finite power has a certain limit in the space or distance which it can reach, because, as experience shows, a thing acts more strongly upon what is near than upon what is distant. Therefore greater power is required for acting upon a distant thing; since therefore the power is finite, it also has a limited sphere in this regard, in which all agree. Nevertheless, within that sphere this opinion says that an agent can immediately effect

something in a distant patient. The same view is held by Avicenna in his book On the Soul, section 4, chapter 4, citing Hippocrates in the same opinion. Likewise Alexander of Aphrodisias, Metaphysics I, commentary 18; Scotus, In I, dist. 37, and there Ockham, and Gabriel, Bassolis, Maironis, and other Scotists. Although Scotus admits concerning physical causes that they never act at a distance through one form or quality without acting through another upon something proximate, although it is not necessary that they reach the proximate and remote through the same power, which whether it is consistently said, we shall see later.

3. The preceding opinion is established by various experiences. This opinion is proved by induction through all genera of actions. First, in substantial generation, the sun generates various mixtures on earth, such as minerals, or even animals which are generated from putrefaction; but that action must flow immediately from the substantial form of the sun, for accidents diffused through a medium either do not attain substantial generation or are not sufficient for it.

4. Second, in the motion of alteration certain things seem to alter a distant thing without altering the proximate one. The first example commonly adduced is of imagination, which is said to have efficacy for inducing a new quality by altering a distant member or another thing, as Avicenna relates above from Hippocrates. The second example is of the fascination of the eye; for sometimes the eye harms by altering a distant thing, as experience testifies concerning the eyes of certain women, as Aristotle also notes in Problems, section 20, problem 34; Alexander, book II of Problems, in 50; Albert, book XXII On Animals, chapter 5; Marsilio Ficino, book XIII On the Immortality of the Soul, chapter 4; and concerning the basilisk Isidore affirms in book XII of Etymologies, chapter 4, that it kills serpents by its smell, destroys a man by its sight, and harms flying birds, although they are far distant. Pliny relates almost similar things in book VIII of Natural History, chapter 31, where he attributes the same power to the

catoblepas, which kills a man who sees its eyes; and in chapter 22 he similarly says that the sight of wolves is harmful and takes away a man's voice for the present. The third example can be of the torpedo fish, which numbs fishermen's hands from afar; and Aristotle in book IX of Natural History, chapter 37, says: "The torpedo fish affects those it seeks with the faculty of numbing which it has in itself, and thus it catches them and feeds, and for this purpose it hides itself in sand and mud." This is a sign that it does not act through a medium; and there he relates other similar experiences. The same is related by Pliny in book XXXII, chapter 1, where he expressly says that the torpedo accomplishes this from afar and at a distance, even if it is not touched by spear or rod. Let the fourth example be of a certain herb called aproxis, whose root conceives fire from a distance, as Pliny relates in book XXIV, chapter 17, where he relates the same of naphtha, a certain kind of bitumen, concerning which the same Pliny in book II, chapter 108. Fifth, it often happens that a distant thing is more vehemently altered than a proximate one; therefore it is a sign that the agent acts immediately upon the distant by its own power; for through a quality which is weakened in the medium, it could not effect a more intense quality in the extremity. The antecedent is evident from many experiences, for fire more vehemently heats water existing in a cauldron than the bottom of the cauldron, and oil placed on papyrus makes it boil much more vehemently than the papyrus itself, and it heats tow somewhat distant so much more intensely than the intermediate air that sometimes it inflames it; and the sun more vehemently heats a mirror or earth than the intermediate air. Nor is it to be wondered at that an agent sometimes acts more upon the distant than upon the proximate, if the disposition of the patient is unequal. And this same thing is confirmed by other examples; for the sun more clearly illuminates those parts of air which it reaches through a window or regards through a straight line than those which are to the side or at an oblique line; therefore it is a sign that it does not illuminate those which are in line only through the parts of

intermediate air, but immediately through itself. The consequence is evident, because with respect to the parts of intermediate air equally proximate and equally applied are other parts of air, which are either in line with the sun or only to the side; if therefore the illumination of remote parts is made only by means of the proximate part, the remote parts which are equally near to the more proximate would be equally illuminated, even if they have a different aspect with respect to the sun; for that part, as far as it is concerned, acts equally toward every part proximate to it. A similar experience is of a hand or other thing placed before fire or sun through the window of a furnace, for example, which feels more vehement heat when directly opposed to the fire than when placed to the side, even if it is equally proximate with respect to the intermediate air; therefore it is a sign that fire immediately reaches the distant hand, if it is directly opposed through an unimpeded medium. A sign of this also is that if something is interposed or the window of the furnace is closed, the vehement sensation of heat which came from the action of fire suddenly ceases, and yet the medium still retains all the heat which it had conceived; therefore it is a sign that the action came immediately from the fire, and not only from the medium.

5. Third, experiences are principally adduced concerning local motion, which is made in various ways by a corporeal mover (for I shall speak of the incorporeal below), namely by impulse, traction, carrying, and rolling. And concerning impulse indeed, experiences of projectiles are commonly adduced, both heavy and light, whose motions are reduced to propulsion, as St. Thomas notes in Physics VII, chapter 2. But these are of no moment; for the proximate instrumental principle of that motion is not only proximate, but also existing in the mobile; but that impulse is either communicated by generation, concerning which whether it requires proximity has already been proposed, or is impressed through some quantitative contact, for a corporeal mover cannot immediately propel a mobile from itself unless by touching it; but what is impressed through that contact, or

what impulse is, is not to be declared in this place; it is treated by Aristotle in Physics IV, chapter 8, and Physics VIII, the last chapter, and On the Heavens III, chapter 2. And hence it is also evident that rolling, since it includes propulsion, requires the same proximity which propulsion requires. Concerning carrying, it is evident per se that it requires contact, since that which is carried is moved quasi per accidens to the motion of the carrier. Therefore only in traction are examples adduced in favor of the said opinion. The first is of a magnet attracting iron distant from itself. The second can be of amber elevating chaff. The third is of almost the same nature, which is commonly adduced concerning the remora fish, otherwise called echeneis, which detains a passing ship, as Aristotle relates in Natural History II, chapter 14; Pliny, Natural History IX, chapter 25.

6. Fourth, induction is made in the actions of the powers of the soul; for phantasy existing in the brain immediately moves the appetite which is in the heart, and appetite immediately moves hands or feet. Similarly, external sense by its act seems to impress a species upon imagination. For it is not probable that something acts through the whole medium, as for example, if the foot becomes warm, that the species of heat continuously ascends up to the head, where phantasy or common sense is.

7. Fifth, the same induction is made in the action of intelligences, which can only be twofold, namely either local motion, whether of a body or of another spirit, or speech, which is only toward another intellectual thing. This latter action therefore, according to the opinion of all, can be made toward a distant thing, as is evident from St. Thomas, I, q. 89, articles 7 and 8, and q. 108, article 4, and q. On the Soul, article 18, ad 13, and it is not made without some efficiency, because through it the angel to whom another speaks receives the faculty of understanding what he could not before, namely the free thought of another; but he does not seem to be able to receive a new faculty without something new being made in him. Especially since he not only receives the faculty, but is also excited to hearing; but he

cannot be excited unless something is impressed upon him. Hence St. Thomas, I, q. 107, article 1, ad 3, says thus: "Just as sense is moved by the sensible, so intellect by the intelligible; just as therefore sense is excited by a sensible sign, so the mind of an angel can be excited to attending by some intelligible power." Just as therefore a sensible sign does not excite sense unless by impressing something upon it, so angelic speech does not excite the hearer unless by impressing something upon him, for example, some intelligible species. Hence the same St. Thomas, q. On the Soul, article 20, ad 11, treating of a similar action by which intelligences effect species in a separated soul, says: "Since such action is not situational, it is not necessary here to seek a medium carrying situationally, but the same order of nature operates here," indicating that this action does not require proximity, but subordination. For he said in similar words and by similar reasoning in I that the speech of an angel is not impeded on account of distance. Concerning the other action of intelligence, which is local motion, that it also can be made toward a distant thing, Durandus, Gabriel, Ockham, Scotus, and Hervaeus teach in I, dist. 37. And it seems probable from the same foundation, that an angel from itself has no position nor acts in the manner of a corporeal thing, but through intellect and will; therefore its efficacy does not require situational proximity, but power of will. For since it moves only by willing, what necessity is there that it be substantially present there where it wills to move?

8. Sixth, a reason can be formed in this way: because the active power of a creature has some (so to speak) quantity of perfection; therefore it is not probable that it is so limited that it cannot immediately act through itself except in a point or indivisible surface; therefore it can act immediately within some quantitative or quantifiable distance; therefore it can immediately reach even the distant parts of that sphere or space. This reason is declared and confirmed first: for when fire heats water through intermediate air, it has immediately proximate to itself only the ultimate surface of the air

near to it; therefore, according to the opposite opinion, it will act immediately through itself only upon that, indeed it will act immediately upon that through only the heat which it has in its ultimate surface; and through the surface it will act upon the immediate part, and through the more proximate part upon the more remote, quasi dividing the action through all the proportionally proximate and remote parts; but this mode of acting seems per se incredible and has no small difficulties. First, on account of the reason given, because it seems irrational to restrict all power of acting, however great, to the very space in which the agent is, or at most to the ultimate surface contiguous to it; for the power of acting can be greater and lesser, and its efficacy consists not only in the effect, but also in the mode of acting and in the greater sphere of activity. Likewise, I take the surface of air proximate to fire and inquire upon what it acts immediately. It will be said to act immediately upon the part proximate to it; hence since none is adequately proximate according to its whole self, consequently it must be admitted that it does not have an immediate subject, either indivisible or of definite magnitude, upon which it acts immediately as a whole, but only acts immediately upon the proximate as taken quasi confusedly; but this seems inconvenient, namely that a determinate action, which is made in an instant, for example, by heat or light which is in this surface, does not have a determinate subject in which it is made per se and immediately. Likewise, that mode of acting quasi by enumerating all proportional parts, acting through these upon those, since those are infinite, scarcely appears intelligible, especially in an action which is not successively extended through the subject, but is made after the manner of one thing all at once and in an instant.

9. Finally, it is confirmed second, because from that principle it follows, speaking per se, that natural agents do not have a sphere of activity nor a limit in it. The consequence is evident, for if we consider that upon which they can immediately and per se act, they have no sphere, but only the surface proximate to them. If however we

consider all that upon which they can act mediately, reaching the remote through the proximate, there is no certain sphere nor any limit of that action; for whatever limit is designated to which the action intrinsically reaches, through that it will be able to proceed further, because in that limit there is some power of acting; therefore that power will act upon something proximate to it. But I say speaking per se; for from the resistance of the patient it can happen that such weak power reaches that limit that it cannot overcome the resistance of the proximate part, neither per se nor in virtue of the most distant agent; but this is accidental on account of resistance. Although even that is most difficult to explain, namely how a quality received in a medium can overcome in virtue of a remote agent the resistance of a part proximate to it, which it cannot overcome per se and by its own power, if the remote agent per se immediately does nothing to the remote resistant part, but only through power received in the more proximate part. But concerning this later; now however the argument presses, speaking per se, and with resistance removed from the medium. And thus it happens that the sun can in an instant illuminate air to infinity, which is plainly false, because now it illuminates the proximate part more than the remote part of air, as is evident in a lamp; therefore, if the action is extended too much, it will finally be finished. Add that neither can the reason of this effect be given; for why does a lamp less illuminate the remote part than the proximate, if it does not illuminate that as well as this per se immediately? But from this point the reason is excellently given; for since the power is finite, it does not equally overcome a thing near to it and distant, and therefore greater proximity contributes to greater perfection of action; but truly if it only acts upon the remote through the proximate, it will communicate to the remote part the whole intensity of quality which it communicates to the proximate, because that quality is active of its like, and the remote part is capable of that and is immediately proximate to the proximate part; therefore it is a sign that the action is

not made in that way, but that the agent immediately reaches the whole sphere through itself.

The Second Opinion is Reported & Declared

10. The second principal opinion is that in every efficient cause there is a necessary condition for acting, that it be proximate and non-distant from that thing upon which it acts first and immediately, so that if both, namely agent and patient, are quantitative, they are contiguous, and the action begins from the ultimate surface in which they touch, and thus contact of power always supposes quantitative contact; if however the agent is spiritual, it is proportionally proximate according to substantial presence. This is the opinion of Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 2, and On Generation I, chapter 6, which St. Thomas everywhere defends, especially I, q. 8, article 1, and Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 68, in which places Cajetan, Ferrariensis and other Thomists; Capreolus, In I, dist. 37; and there Durandus, question 1. And the same is signified by Richard, article 2, question 1; Albert and others suppose the same when they infer the presence of God from His operation. The same Albert, Physics VII, tract I, chapter 4, where the Commentator, Aphrodiseus and others commonly. The holy Fathers also favor this opinion, indeed also Sacred Scripture, while they signify that even in God Himself immediate presence is rightly gathered from immediate operation. Concerning which argument we shall speak extensively later, when treating of the immensity of God. But this opinion is not proved by Aristotle by any reason, but by induction and experience alone, which is sufficiently known to the senses, as much as can be from frequent sensible effects. But the induction will be perfect if we show that natural action never happens otherwise, or at least that no experiment can persuade this; but this will be established by the solution of objections. And thus the argument is concluded; for the mode of acting common to all natural agents is founded in some intrinsic and

natural necessity; but this mode is through immediate contact and proximity; therefore it is a sign that this is a necessary condition for every natural agent in order to act.

11. Various reasons for the necessity of the presence of agent to patient. The reason of this necessity is given by some, because, just as a thing cannot pass from place to place except through a medium, so the action of an agent cannot be immediately transmitted to a distant thing unless it first reaches the medium, and through that quasi continuously arrives at the distant. But this reason is ineffective with me, because action does not pass the same in number to a distant thing through a medium as the same body in number passes to an extreme place through a medium; hence it is not correctly said that action passes to the extremity, but that by the power of the agent it is educed from the potency of the distant subject; in which, from the force of that reason or similitude, no repugnance appears.

12. Others take the reason from the limitation of a finite agent, which on account of the defect of its power needs the presence of the patient for acting. And this reason can be confirmed, because if an agent could act upon the distant, by the same reasoning it could act at any distance; for if it does not need action upon the medium, what does it matter whether the patient is more or less distant? But first, the authors of this opinion, and especially St. Thomas, do not limit it to finite agents, but requires this condition also in God; therefore it does not arise from limitation of power. Then from limitation of power at most a limited sphere seems to arise. But why from any limitation of power should such limitation to the proximate and immediate patient be inferred, if the nature of the efficient cause as such does not require that condition? Especially because not every power is equally limited, as we argued above. And by the same reasoning the inference which is made in the confirmation does not appear effective; for those who deny that supreme proximity is necessary simply for action, do not deny that it is useful so that the agent may act in the best way; indeed they also assert that it is necessary so that it may act with all its power

and as much as it can; and hence they think it arises that, other things being equal, natural agents act uniformly and non-uniformly through spaces; and thus nothing follows of those things which are inferred in that confirmation. For without doubt it is evident from the very terms that it is of greater power to overcome a distant thing than a proximate one; and in the same proportion it will be of greater power to overcome a thing more distant than less distant, just as it is of greater power to throw a stone to a more distant place. Hence Capreolus above, to the eighth argument, says that the reason of this is not to be taken from some imperfection or order of the power of the agent and recipient, but from the fact that the agent is in some way the act of the patient itself and the patient is in some way in potency to the agent; but act and potency from their nature demand to be non-distant, so that they may exercise the relation of act and potency between themselves. Which reason, although it may not suffice for convincing a stubborn intellect, nevertheless, with sufficient experience of the matter supposed, seems to me to come closer and more indicate the proper cause of this necessity. But in order that we may declare this matter more fully and defend the opinion of Aristotle, it is necessary to explain the modes of proximity and distance and the various modes of acting through the proximate upon the distant.

Resolution of the Question

13. Various modes of distance and non-distance of agent from patient. It is therefore to be noted that the patient can be distant from the agent because between them a completely empty space intervenes, which although it does not happen naturally, nevertheless they could be so understood, and it is necessary to say how they would then behave in action, because it will contribute not a little to explaining the matter. Second, the patient can be distant from the agent, with some intermediate space interposed not empty, but full of such a body that it could act nothing upon it. Third, it can be

understood that the agent acts something upon the medium, but not through the same power, as if it acts upon air through light, but upon earth through substantial form. Fourth and finally, it can be understood that the distant patient is joined to the agent through a medium upon which the agent also operates and through the same power. But this itself can be understood to happen in various ways. First, that the remote agent immediately brings action only to the patient proximate to itself, and through the quality impressed upon that, action is made upon the remote patient, so that the relation per se and immediately of that action, as it is in the remote patient, is only to the power or quality impressed upon the proximate part, but to the agent itself not except remotely and insofar as it gives or conserves that power. Second, it can be understood that the agent acts upon the remote, through power conferred upon the proximate part, simultaneously and actually influencing with that upon the remote part, so that neither without that and through that can it reach the remote, nor also does that alone, although conserved there, suffice for the action which is made in the remote part without actual influx of the agent itself. Third, it can be understood that the action of the agent is diffused from necessity to the remote through the proximate, not from necessity of causality of the proximate part of the patient upon the remote part, but only from necessity of order (so to speak), which necessity can arise either from the part of the agent, which by its nature determines for itself this mode of acting quasi through an uninterrupted line, or from the part of the patient, which when applied to a natural agent necessarily suffers first in the proximate part than in the remote.

First Assertion

14. With vacuum intervening, no action at a distance. Why all bodies abhor vacuum. First therefore it must be said that an efficient cause can act nothing upon a distant patient, if empty space is

interposed. This assertion is commonly received, so that not even the authors of the first opinion seem to deny it; for Scotus, even if he admits some generative action from distant matter, nevertheless says that some other action must be diffused through a medium, although he admits this only concerning natural agents. But this assertion cannot be proved by positive (so to speak) experience, because such vacuum between bodies is never given; it can however be proved by negative (so to speak) experience and the universal providence of nature, or rather of its author, who so established things and impressed upon them such propensity or motion that they completely avoid vacuum, even if it is necessary to desert their proper places. But the most powerful reason of this seems to have been that certain bodies might be able to exercise their actions through others and distant bodies might participate the influx of other, and especially celestial bodies through intermediates. Which Aristotle signified not obscurely, text 1 of Meteorology, saying: "It is necessary that it (that is, the lower world) be in some way proximate to the highest revolutions of heaven (that is through intermediate elements), so that all its faculty may be constituted and governed from there." Nor will he satisfy who says that nature did not abhor vacuum and so carefully procure the contiguity of bodies on account of necessity simply, but only on account of greater convenience and utility. Both because such solicitude of nature indicates greater necessity, and also because if it were true that natural agents could reach the distant without a medium, often it would be more useful for action to have no real medium interposed, because the sphere would be more expedited and less power of the agent would be occupied around it, according to what will be said immediately.

15. Second, it can be proved by another experience which, although it is taken from a completely opposite thing, nevertheless seems to have the same root, namely that if the space interposed between agent and patient is filled with some body which interrupts the action of the agent, the action upon the distant patient is

completely impeded, even if otherwise it is constituted within the sphere of activity of the agent; therefore by the same reasoning, if the medium were completely empty, the action of the agent could not pass to the distant patient, because the action would not be less interrupted through vacuum than through that plenum. It can be responded that that interposed body does not therefore impede action upon further bodies because it interrupts the action of the agent, but because all the power of the agent is occupied (so to speak) around that body, whence it happens that its sphere is terminated there. For they say that the sphere is not always the same or of the same magnitude or distance, but according to the capacity or resistance of the medium. For it can happen that a foot-long body on account of its density resists more than a large rare body, and therefore finishes and terminates the sphere of the agent in itself. But although this response can have some appearance of truth when the interposed body truly has the nature of a patient, in overcoming and (so to speak) penetrating which the power of the agent is occupied, nevertheless, when the interposed body is completely incapable of such action, so that the power of the agent is in no way applied to it according to that action, how can it detain that or resist the agent lest it effect upon further bodies? An example is in the sun illuminating, whose action is impeded by an opaque body interposed in a window, which is incapable of light, and does not resist illumination of itself positively, but negatively through incapacity; how also can vacuum be said to resist, although from diverse principles; therefore the illuminative power of the sun is not occupied quasi by striving and acting around that body, but only does not act upon it, just as it also does not act upon vacuum; therefore that body does not otherwise impede the passage (so to speak) of that action than by interrupting the continuation and quasi line or ray of it; therefore equal impediment will arise from interposed vacuum. And this experience seems to me very effective for proving the conclusion posited; but concerning its reason we shall speak below.

Second Assertion

16. What cannot effect upon the full medium, will not effect upon the distant patient. Hence it is said second: when the patient is distant from the agent through an interposed real medium, the agent can effect nothing upon the distant patient, if it cannot also act upon the whole medium. This is manifestly evident from what has been said. First, because if the interposed medium were not necessary for sustaining and quasi carrying the action of the agent, that medium would relate itself completely per accidens to the action; it would therefore be impertinent whether that medium were real or empty. Second, this is proved by experience of a dense body interposed, which only impedes further passage of action because it is incapable of the action of the agent. Third, because the reason which we gathered from vacuum was only because in it the action of the agent is interrupted, and this was sufficient impediment of action; but this same interruption intervenes when the medium proximate to the agent is not capable of its action or influence; therefore. And thus we see that the sun does not illuminate the earth unless by illuminating all intermediate bodies; which if sometimes the moon is interposed, which the sun cannot penetrate with its light, the action of illuminating the earth does not reach.

Third Assertion

17. By what power something acts at a distance, it must also act upon the medium. I say third: in order that an agent may effect upon a distant patient it is not sufficient that through another power or completely distinct action it acts upon the medium, but it is necessary that through the same or subordinate power by which it acts at a distance it begins to act upon the medium proximate to itself and through all that it diffuses the action or influence up to the distant

patient. This assertion is directly against Scotus and others; it is proved however from what has been said, because, in order that an agent may act at a distance, it is necessary that it act upon the proximate first in time or nature and continuously upon the whole medium; therefore it is necessary that that continued action flows in some way from one and the same power of the agent. The consequence is evident, because if there are two powers and from them emanate two actions, formally there are two agents there, although materially there is one by reason of one supposit or subject; therefore it is not sufficient that through one power it acts upon the proximate so that through another it can act at a distance. The consequence is proved, because those actions relate themselves only concomitantly, and one cannot be said to be continued through another and to be made without interruption. As, for example, although fire can act through heat and dryness, in order that through heat it may act upon a distant patient, it is not sufficient that through dryness it acts upon the proximate medium, because this is per accidens to the action of heat as such; it is therefore necessary that through heat it acts upon the proximate, because that is per se necessary for the continuation of action. Indeed, although it can happen that the action of one power is necessary from the part of the patient so that the action of another power can pertain to it, as, for example, if the action and disposition of dryness were necessary for the action of heat, it would not be sufficient that one power should pre-act by disposing so that another might immediately act at a distance by acting nothing upon the proximate, because that disposition is merely material, and it is impertinent that it should come from another concomitant power in the same subject, because through this the action of the other power is not made continuously through the whole medium; which nevertheless to be necessary for action has been shown by the two preceding conclusions.

18. Notable points. There are however two things to be observed. One is, when we say that the action must be from one power, the sense is not that that power must be one form, or one

entity, but must be the adequate principle of one action, even if it coalesces from several forms, whether acting equally or subordinately. The other thing to be observed is, when we say that the action upon the proximate and remote must be quasi by continuation one, it must not be understood of rigorous and physical continuation, such as is in illumination if the medium is continuous, but it is sufficient if there is continuation according to a certain subordination and causality. For it is not necessary, when an agent operates up to some distance, that in all that it produces a quality of the same nature; for it can effect a certain quality in a body proximate to itself, but a diverse one in the more remote; as the sun, for example, in the celestial bodies which it has under itself, produces only light; but in air up to earth it produces heat with light; but in earth according to its depth it does not produce light, but only heat, and through intermediate heat it effects other forms. The same can be considered in other stars, which have their proper influences, which they diffuse up to the penetralia of earth, yet they do not act the same in all intermediate bodies, but in each they operate, according to its capacity, that which is proportioned to its disposition. Since therefore the qualities or terms produced in diverse bodies are distinct, efficiency cannot be diffused through the mode of one continuous action; it is necessary however that through the quality produced in the near body it produces another in the remote, and through that similarly in the more remote, and in this way the action is said to be continued through subordination and causality. For since it is necessary that action be made continuously through the mode of one, as has been shown in the assertions, and continuation in the same species of action or quality is not necessary, it is necessary that it be through emanation of one from another; otherwise the action which is made at a distance will have no connection with the action which is made proximately, but both these actions will relate themselves completely per accidens; which cannot happen is proved by the reason made in the third assertion.

Section VIII

Fourth Assertion

19. Some agent can act immediately upon an extended space and all its parts. I say fourth: although it is necessary that an efficient cause be proximate and not distant from the patient upon which it first acts, it is not certain that it always acts through what is proximate upon what is distant as through an instrument or power of acting. Rather, it is probable that sometimes it acts upon some whole patient immediately through its own proper power. Similarly, when it acts through what is proximate as through an instrument upon what is distant, it is not necessary that it act through that as through an instrument separate in causing, but as through something conjoined, so that together with the power diffused through the medium, the agent itself flows immediately in one and the same action. The first part is the very conclusion of Aristotle and the common opinion, which we defend, and besides his induction it is manifestly proven from the preceding assertions and their proofs, by which it was shown that an agent cannot diffuse its action all the way to a distant thing except by way of one uninterrupted action. Therefore, it is necessary that the action be begun from a patient entirely near and not distant, otherwise it would begin interrupted from the start. And this is not a little confirmed by certain experiences by which we see an agent intending by itself an action only upon something remote, and nevertheless not exercising it except through a medium, although that action, as it occurs in the medium, is entirely useless except to serve at least for this purpose: that through it the action may be carried to the distant patient in which the agent has the effect intended by itself. For example, a visible object does not diffuse species to the eye except through a medium. There are several evident signs of this: one concerns the mirror in which reflection of species occurs, which also happens in water; but this could not happen unless species were multiplied all the way to those bodies. Another is that according to the disposition of the medium, species are either disturbed or

conveniently carried. Likewise, there is what was touched upon above: that for whatever reason some part of the medium is incapable of species, the action is impeded from reaching the eye. But this action of species is by itself and from the intention of nature entirely ordered toward the eye, because in that alone can species have the effect for which they were instituted. Therefore, such action of species in the medium would be useless unless it were necessary so that through it the action could reach the distant eye. Therefore, it is a sign that such action occurs because of this necessity. The same judgment should be made about every similar action, even if it is not known through such certain experiments.

20. Inference from all that has been said. From all these things, therefore, I gather that the natural mode of acting of an efficient cause is as if through a continuous line of its action from what is proximate to what is distant. And this ought to be a sufficient reason for the conclusion, given the experiences adduced, even if another reason were lacking, because this cause determines for itself such a mode of acting from its very nature. For we often judge thus about the natures of things from what we experience, even if we cannot render a further reason for that natural condition. As, for example, an object of sight only multiplies species through a straight line, but an object of hearing also through an oblique one, and enters through whatever pores, as experience establishes, from which we rightly gather that this is the natural mode of acting of such objects. The sufficient reason for this is that such a property follows from the nature of each sense. Nevertheless, we try to investigate some reason for this nature when we say that sound is a certain quality following motion and imitating its nature, and therefore can enter through whatever paths, while color acts in a more quiet and subtle manner, and therefore diffuses species only by a straight path. Thus, therefore, in the present case, if we wish to investigate some reason or conjecture for that natural condition of agents, certainly that which was touched upon by Cajetan is not to be despised. For every act requires conjunction with a potency in order

to exercise its causality upon it. Just as formal act requires intimate union, so efficient act requires at least non-distance, not because of imperfection, but rather because of the perfection that the notion of act or actuation includes. Or if this is to be referred to some imperfection, it should be taken from the side of the effect, which, since it is dependent on its cause, demands conjunction and non-distance from it so that it may flow from it, just as a stream requires conjunction with its source in order to flow from it. In this matter, a certain latitude can also be considered according to the various perfections of causes. For corporeal causes and effects cannot according to themselves be entirely immediately present or non-distant to each other, and therefore they approach at least according to their extremities. But created spiritual things are according to themselves entirely conjoined or present to the effect or patient, although it is not always necessary to be intimately present to the whole patient and all its parts. For they can be present to one part and through it act upon the whole, just as an intelligence moving the heavens is thought to be in the East. But truly God, wherever he acts, is present as a whole and in the whole, not only from immensity, but also from the perfection of acting, as we shall see below in its proper place. But I said that this mode of acting by beginning action from a non-distant patient is connatural to the efficient cause, because now we are not disputing whether God can supernaturally change this mode of acting. But we believe that this does not conflict with divine instruments, even if it cannot be connatural to any created agent; concerning which matter I spoke in tome I of the third part, disputation 31, section 7.

21. And from this it can be further understood that from the necessary proximity between patient and agent it does not immediately follow that it is also necessary for the agent to act through the proximate part of the medium upon the remote part as through an instrument. For it will be sufficient if it acts through it as through a medium necessary for the continuation of action, or so that action

may occur without interruption, because neither experiences nor reasons adduced thus far prove more. Therefore, when action through a medium is varied in the proximate patient and the remote according to various qualities and terms of action, then certainly it seems necessary that the power diffused in the proximate medium be an instrument for acting upon the remote, as we were saying recently, because otherwise there would be no continuation nor subordination per se between those actions. But truly, when the action is entirely of the same nature in the proximate and remote part of the medium, it does not seem per se necessary, at least from the force of the necessary proximity between patient and agent, that the proximate part be an instrument for acting upon the remote; because that action per se has its continuity and integrity, which is necessary from the natural mode of operating of such a cause, as we showed. I said "insofar as it is from the force of necessary proximity"; for if the quality diffused through the medium is active of something similar to itself, it follows from the nature of the thing that existing in the proximate part it can help in acting upon the remote, either by way of instrument or by way of partial agent. This, however, can be as if accidental and only accompanying the action of the first agent.

22. Therefore, if it should happen that the quality diffused through the medium is not active of something similar to itself, then it would not be necessary for the proximate part to be an instrument, but only a medium for action. Whether this sometimes occurs in this way is not certain to me; however, I do not see any repugnance from the force of that condition necessary for acting which we now treat, namely, proximity. And there could be an example in the object of sight, for it seems thus to multiply species through the medium all the way to the sense, so that the species received in the transparent medium is not effective of something similar to itself. This seems to be proven from the fact that beyond a certain distance an object cannot make a species of itself, which would not happen if the species received in the medium made something similar to itself. This

argument was touched upon in the foundations of the first opinion and we shall see in the responses how effective it is. Another example can be about the impetus that is impressed upon a thrown stone; for the contact of the thrower is only in one part of the stone, and yet the impetus is not received in that part alone, but in the whole thrown body. Nor does the part of impetus impressed upon a part effect another similar one in the nearby part, both because impetus is not effective of another impetus, but only of local motion, just as gravity is not effective of gravity, but of local motion; and also because impetus is not impressed except through strong contact, but one part cannot touch another continuous to itself in this manner. Therefore, it seems probable that impetus is impressed upon the whole movable thing and all its parts immediately by the thrower, through contact made in only one part of it. But whatever may be the case concerning special examples, nevertheless, speaking in general, to preserve that axiom about necessary proximity between agent and first patient, we are not compelled to say that the efficiency of one part of the patient upon another is necessary. Whether certain experiences or reasons sufficiently show that this efficiency does not always intervene or is not per se necessary, we shall see when treating the arguments of the first opinion.

23. The proximate parts of the medium do not act upon the remote without the help of the primary agent. Finally, the last part of the assertion also depends partly on this; for even if the proximate parts of the medium act upon the remote, it seems to be proven by experience that they do not act by power alone received in themselves, nor are they entirely destitute of actual influx from the first agent. Otherwise, the action of the same medium would not be so vehement in some parts and so remiss in others equally proximate to themselves, but unequally applied with respect to the first agent, which must be examined more closely in the solutions of arguments. But now we only say that from this proximity and necessary condition for acting which we now treat, it does not follow that the agent acts upon the

distant part only through power received in the proximate part as through an instrument quasi separate in causing, that is, acting per se alone without actual influx of the principal agent: both because this is not necessary so that the patient be absolutely proximate to the agent, from which action flows continuously and without interruption; and also because then from the agent itself and the power received in the medium there is quasi composed one integral agent which touches the other part, and therefore can act upon it through its whole power. I declare this by this simile: when fire heats the air proximate to itself, it does not act upon it through the heat alone which it has in the ultimate surface by which it touches the air, nor through some single nearby part alone, even if it be imagined in whatever quantity, which cannot be determined except merely gratuitously. Therefore, it acts immediately through all the heat which it has in itself and in all its parts (for I suppose all are within the sphere of activity), and yet not all parts of the acting fire are immediately proximate to the patient air. But truly, because from all there coalesces one agent, which through its contiguous terminus is to the patient air, this suffices so that all those parts through the mode of one integral agent immediately flow into the patient. The same would be the case if two fires, discontinuous between themselves, were applied to the same part of the patient, so that from both simultaneously through the mode of one integral agent one action flows. Therefore, similarly it can be understood that an agent conjoined to the first part of the patient, already affected by its quality, acts and flows through the mode of one into the further patient, whether they concur as two partial agents or as principal and instrumental agent. But all these things will be more clearly elucidated in the responses to the first opinion.

Solutions to Arguments

24. What agent is present to substantial generation. To the first experience, therefore, concerning substantial generation, the

common response is that accidents which are proximately present effect substantial generation in virtue of the substantial form, although it is distant. This response has the difficulty touched upon in section 3, because, although accidents can be instruments for effecting substance, they cannot nevertheless be sufficient principles if they are separate as regards causality. And therefore, if a substantial form distantly removed can in no way flow actually with accidental power to substantial generation, it cannot be a sufficient principle of such generation through accidents alone. Therefore, it can probably be said that that instrumental power diffused from heaven all the way to the place of earth in which substantial generation occurs does not act as a separated power, but as conjoined in causality, and the form of heaven actually flows with it, if otherwise the effect does not surpass in perfection the very form of heaven. Nor does it follow from this that heaven acts immediately upon what is distant, because it does not act except as conjoined to its power diffused through the medium all the way to the distant patient. You will say: the form of heaven and the accidental power of the same heaven are diverse powers of acting; but the whole alteration preceding was made by heaven through accidental power only; therefore, that does not suffice so that the form of heaven can afterward flow through its substantial form to the substantial generation of another. I respond that the form and accidental power of heaven are not two powers only concomitantly and quasi accidentally conjoined, but are subordinated as principal and instrumental principle. And therefore, although the substantial form attains the generation which occurs in a distant place, it does not act formally and properly upon what is distant, because it is conjoined through its power as medium. And this will be easier and clearer if one holds that the substantial form of heaven not only concurs per se as principal principle to the eduction of substantial form, but also to the previous alteration, which we said above is probable. But if perhaps this does not please someone, it must necessarily be said that heaven only concurs instrumentally to these generations through accidental

power diffused through the medium, but is helped in accomplishing these generations by some superior agent.

On Alteration of Body through Imagination

25. To the second concerning alteration, the assumption is denied, namely that some cause alters a distant thing without altering what is proximate. And to the first example concerning imagination, the response is that it is either speech about the body of the very animal whose phantasy it is, or of another. Speaking of an alien body, I deny that another's phantasy has power to alter it; nor has any probable experiment yet been brought forward which shows this; nor from the force of reason is it probable, because the act of imagination is immanent and there is no source from which it would have power to naturally alter an alien body. But if it be speech about the proper body of the very animal which operates by imagination, it must be said that imagination does not move the body except through the mediation of sensitive appetite, at whose motion humors and vital spirits are excited, through whose mediation the body is altered. But the motion of appetite through imagination is not alteration, but a certain vital affection, concerning which I shall speak below. But appetite, since it is in the heart, which is the principle of animal motion and vital spirits, will easily be able to excite motion or alteration of this kind, acting nothing immediately upon what is distant, but through the mediation of proximate parts; although even in that motion a special reason intervenes, because it occurs through natural sympathy of powers rooted in the same soul, as will be said below and more extensively.

On Fascination

26. To the second example, there are those who deny that power of fascination. But there is no reason why we should deny an experience approved by philosophers and physicians, and received by

almost common sense. We confess, therefore, that fascination occurs naturally; but its mode is declared by St. Thomas, I, q. 117, a. 3, ad 2, and III cont. Gent., c. 103. And first it must be said that fascination does not occur by the very act of seeing as a principle by which alteration is made in another, because an immanent act, as we were saying above about the act of imagination, is not per se active upon anyone. Then it must be said that that alteration occurs from some poisonous quality existing in the eye or in the internal disposition of the body, complexion or humors, which is communicated to the vital spirits, which are moved by imagination and attention of mind and reach the eyes. Again from this it happens that through those spirits as media the proximate air is infected and alteration reaches to a certain distance, and thus harms another, although he is somewhat distant. And perhaps sometimes it happens that the very infected spirits are emitted all the way to that person upon whom the gaze is directly directed, and thus more easily and vehemently harm; and Aristotle above signifies that sometimes fascination occurs by the very corrupt breath and transmitted all the way to another person. By these modes, therefore, fascination can occur naturally without immediate action upon what is distant. I omit (which St. Thomas warns above) that sometimes such harm occurs from the malice of demons, who by hidden pact cooperate in inflicting such damage. St. Thomas also warns there that this alteration more easily happens to infants and children, because on account of their tender body they more easily suffer any external impression. More about such action can be read in Pliny, lib. VII, c. 2, and lib. XXXIII, c. 10; Abulensis, paradox. 4, c. 16; Richard., Quodl. III, q. 12. The same, with proportion preserved, must be said about whatever harm that is inflicted by poisonous animals, either by sight or smell. And the same is true of the third example of the torpedo, about which Pliny expressly says that it affects limbs by odor and a certain aura of its body; therefore, it does not act immediately upon what is distant, but either by altering the medium or also by breathing some noxious vapor. Nor does it matter that it is

said to hide under sand or mud, because it is not necessary that we understand it to hide entirely under earth, so that it does not leave either head or mouth open for harming.

Whether an Agent Can Act More Intensely upon What Is Distant than upon What Is Proximate

27. Why the bottom of a cauldron is colder than the boiling water placed above it. In the fourth and fifth examples it must be declared whether and by what reason it happens that an agent acts more vehemently upon a distant thing than upon the proximate medium, and whether then that more vehement alteration occurs immediately upon what is distant without cooperation of the medium. And indeed Aristotle, sect. 24 Probl., q. 5 and 8, notes that when water in a vessel is heated, in the beginning of heating, while the water is still cold, the bottom of the vessel is felt to be hotter; but afterward, when the water is already boiling so that it burns the hand, the bottom of the vessel is more temperate, so that it can be sustained by hand. But he assigns the reason, because in the beginning of action, while the water is cold, all the heat is confined in the bottom of the vessel nor is it permitted to ascend; but truly when the water is already hotter, the heat is quasi permitted to breathe and ascend, and from this it happens that the bottom of the cauldron is tempered. For which cause he says there that baths are hotter in winter than in summer. And from this it consequently happens that, as the action proceeds and the water is excessively heated, and rarefied by heating, the hotter parts ascend upward and the thicker and colder descend downward and adhere to the bottom of the vessel and temper it, and therefore it is judged less hot. But here by the name of heat is not to be understood the quality or accident of heat alone; for this can neither ascend nor descend, nor be detained lest it ascend except by reason of the subject; but exhalations or hot vapors are to be understood which are excited by the action of fire. For that ascent or descent cannot be declared

metaphorically only, that is, that heat is said to be impeded lest it ascend only because the patient resists lest heating proceed further toward the upper part. For in this sense the reason would be of no moment, namely, that the bottom of the cauldron is hotter in the beginning because then heat is impeded lest it ascend further; for that the action proceed further per se impedes nothing from that lower part remaining equally hot, as is per se known. It is necessary, therefore, to understand properly about certain hot exhalations, which while they are detained by reason of the proximate body, namely cold and dense, cause the heat of that part to be both greater and more vehemently felt; but while, with the proximate body heated and consequently rarefied, they are permitted to ascend, less heat is felt in that lowest part; especially since in the pores, where those exhalations were, in place of them succeed colder parts of water, which, as they are heavier, so naturally descend more, and from this respect also that heat is more tempered.

28. But from this reason of the Philosopher thus explained, it is easily understood that from this experience one does not have that an agent acts more intensely upon what is proximate than upon what is distant, except by transmitting some proportionate agent which proximately effects that intensity. For in the said example, while in the beginning of action the bottom of the vessel excessively heats up, this comes from the nearby fire and from ignited or hot exhalations enclosed in the very pores of the bottom; but while, as the action proceeds, the upper parts of water seem hotter, this comes not only from the remote fire, although its action helps much, but also from hotter vapors ascending and penetrating the water itself, and for this cause it heats it more vehemently. It is also added that the water itself, while it begins to be more heated near the bottom of the vessel, immediately ascends having been made lighter; but that which was above descends, being heavier and colder, and thus it happens that the more distant part of water is hotter, not because, being thus distant, it is more heated, but because it was previously proximate, and there

more heated. But never does that part of water which proximately sits upon the bottom of the vessel heat up more vehemently than the very vessel or its bottom, through which the action is transmitted, unless perhaps at the end of action, when the water is already entirely overcome, so that it happens that the whole exhales and is corrupted. This comes from the fact that by reason of its humidity it is more easily changed into air or into some imperfect mixture. Likewise, because since it is less dense than the vessel, hot vapors or exhalations ascending more easily penetrate it. It also helps if there is any air surrounding it. And thus always the whole action and its intensity occurs through some medium.

29. Why papyrus is less hot than oil placed upon it. Why tow is inflamed, with air lying between it and fire not being inflamed. In the same manner it must be said to similar experiences adduced above, namely about oil which seems to heat more vehemently than the papyrus through whose mediation it is heated. For oil, as soon as it begins to be heated, is also easily rarefied and penetrated by ascending vapors, and it itself also, having been made subtler and lighter, immediately ascends; but thicker and more humid parts descend; and thus the same happens in this example as in the superior one. But concerning tow, that it is inflamed through interposed air, with the air itself not being inflamed, is not so manifest by experience; for perhaps the air is inflamed first, although it is not so perceived by sense as in tow, because of the latter's density. And the same can be said to the example of the root of the herb approxis and of bitumen naphtha.

30. Response to the objection. But it could be responded otherwise by admitting what is assumed in the argument: that remote matter is sometimes inflamed with proximate matter not being inflamed, and saying this comes from the disposition of matter without more intense action of fire upon what is remote than upon what is proximate. This will be declared easily if we suppose it is not necessary that maximum heat precede in some matter so that it be inflamed, but it suffices that intense heat precede in that degree with

which the form of tow, for example, cannot be conserved, and if sufficient dryness is adjoined to it, it sufficiently disposes for the introduction of the form of fire. Thus, therefore, it can happen that the intermediate air is hot as seven and is not inflamed from defect of dryness, but tow, as soon as it reaches that degree, is inflamed; and thus the action of fire heating was never more intense in remote matter than in proximate, but had another effect because of another disposition of the patient. You will say: in that instant in which that matter is inflamed, it is already hot as eight. I respond: if it is so (for it is not certain about the first instant), nevertheless this does not come from the action alone of distant fire, but is through natural resultance from the form already conceived. This resultance, if some resistance in matter does not remain, occurs in a moment; and thus it must be said to occur if we posit that all accidents perish in corruption. If nevertheless some degree of contrary quality can remain, some succession will intervene, very brief however and imperceptible, because the resistance is minimal and the activity great. But what about the action of the substantial form itself, which occurs in distant matter, not in the medium? It is commonly said to occur through natural resultance, given sufficient disposition, or to occur from accidental dispositions existing there, in virtue of the substance. But we must respond, according to the first assertion, either that the form of fire together with its power can reach there and simultaneously flow to the eduction of that form, or certainly, if the substantial form does not have this power, it is necessary that through some superior cause that concourse be supplied, just as when it happens that some thing is so heated by motion that it is inflamed, the introduction of that form is attributed to some universal cause.

31. Another mode of explaining the adduced experiments. Another mode of responding to these experiences can be by admitting that an agent can more intensely make some quality in a distant patient than in what is proximate, yet not by acting immediately upon what is distant, but through a medium. But this mode of action can be

conceived in two ways. First, so that the medium does not serve as a co-efficient instrumental or partial agent for acting upon what is remote, at least as regards that degree of greater intensity which occurs in the remote part. But this manner of speaking is not sufficiently consistent with the opinion which we defend; for it plainly follows that that action, insofar as it is intensity in such a degree, occurs from the remote agent immediately in the distant patient without any action around the medium or through the medium; because the remiss action which occurs in the proximate medium per se does not contribute nor is continued with the action upon what is distant, except at most up to a similar degree. Therefore, that greater intensity which occurs in what is distant is immediate action upon it without medium. Just as, if the whole medium and distant patient were previously hot as four without action of fire, and then fire applied immediately intended that heat in the distant patient and not in the medium, without doubt that action would be immediately upon what is distant. Therefore, the same will be the case even if heat as four was made by the same fire. In another way, therefore, it can be understood that an agent through power impressed in the medium effects more intense quality in the remote patient than in the medium itself, because of greater capacity or disposition and less resistance. But this power can sometimes be a quality of different nature from the other which is intended, and then it is not a difficult matter; as in the example posited above of mirror and air heated by the sun, because that heating occurs through the medium of light, it can happen that, through the light of air as a power of acting, the sun more vehemently heats a distant mirror or another similar thing than the proximate air, because of the greater capacity and disposition of the patient; and in this I see no repugnance. Just as an acting cause can have some effect in what is remote through diffused power which it does not have in what is proximate, as all concede, and notably St. Thomas, In II, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2, ad 6, and Comment., IX Phys., and lib. II de Caelo, com. 34, so by greater reason it can more intensely alter the remote part

than the proximate. Finally, in another way this can be understood to occur through quality of the same nature, as, for example, that the sun, through air remissly illuminated, more intensely illuminates a distant mirror, so that the light of the intermediate air, even if it is in itself more remiss, as conjoined to the first agent concurs either instrumentally or partially to the light to be effected in the mirror, even as regards the greater degree of intensity. And this mode is more difficult to believe, because it supposes that a remiss quality, at least as conjoined to the prior agent, can concur to the intensity of quality of the same species in that degree in which it is dissimilar and exceeded by it. Whether this can happen, we shall examine in the following section, where we shall say more about that example of the mirror and its reflected action.

Why an Agent Operating through a Straight Line Works More Effectively

32. To the other experiences which are brought forward in confirmation of that second argument, I respond that they persuade the second part of the last assertion quite probably. Nor does any other probable response or evasion occur to me; for I do not see why the presence of the sun through a straight line with respect to this part of remote air conduces to its greater illumination, unless because the sun itself with the air more proximate to itself simultaneously flows into it, but into another part of air not so directly opposite to it, but to the side, for example, of a window, it cannot so flow, even if with respect to the medium itself that part is equally proximate. Perhaps someone will say that light received in the medium acts in virtue of the sun upon another part of air through a straight line objected to the sun, but upon another falling to the side it acts only by its own power, and therefore illuminates that part more than this. But this is said merely gratuitously and voluntarily and it cannot be understood what thing underlies those words nor in what that difference consists, if the

sun itself does not actually flow per se into either of those parts. For, this being supposed, what is it to act in virtue of another except to act as power diffused from it and holding its place? But that power received in the medium is one and the same; therefore, with respect to whatever part of the medium it acts as power diffused from the sun and in place of it; therefore, it acts equally in virtue of the sun. Nor can it be explained what that situational position (so to speak) or presence of the sun contributes so that on account of that cause it is said to act in virtue of the sun upon one part and not upon another, if by reason of that application the sun itself per se does not flow more.

33. Which finally I thus confirm and declare; for when an accident acts in virtue of another without actual influx of it, if such an accident is conserved without the other in virtue of which it is said to act, it can have the same action. This is evident in gravity or impetus moving in virtue of the generator or impressor, and the same is true of the heat of water, if heat is said to heat in virtue of fire; indeed, even those who say that maximum heat effects the form of fire in the said manner in virtue of fire without other actual influx of it, consequently say that heat separated equally as conjoined to fire can in virtue of fire effect the form of another fire. Therefore, in the present case, if light received in the part of air nearer to the sun effects light in another part in the said manner in virtue of the sun, therefore if that light were conserved in one part, with the sun removed from the middle, it would in the same way illuminate the same part which it now illuminates. But the consequent is plainly false, both because otherwise even now it would equally illuminate the part of air near to itself not objected to the sun, because the sun is not now more nor so absent from that part than it would be absent from the other, if it were entirely removed, and also because in fire and heat the opposite is established by experiment, as was proposed in the same confirmation which we treat. Therefore, it seems that it must necessarily be said that the sun actually flows with the proximate part of the medium to illuminate the other directly objected to itself, but cannot equally flow

into another part existing to the side, even if it is equally proximate to the air medium itself, and from this it comes that those parts are not equally illuminated or heated.

On the Action of Magnets & Similar Things

34. In the third argument concerning local motion, the first and principal experience concerns the magnet; about which, as about many other experiments that we treat here, the Coimbrans gather much learned material in book VII of the Physics, chapter 2, question 1. Briefly, however, as far as concerns the present matter, we admit that attraction is brought about effectively by the magnet. For Alexander, in book II of Natural Questions, chapter 3, thought that iron is not drawn by the magnet except as by an end, and that it moves itself to the magnet by an internal and innate power, as if by a natural weight. However, this is rejected by Albert in II Metaphysics, treatise III, chapter 6; Saint Thomas in VII Physics, lecture 3, text 10; and Galen in book III On Natural Faculties, final chapter. First, because natural motion from an intrinsic power occurs from any distance, as is evident in earth and fire; but iron does not tend toward the magnet from any distance, but from a certain and definite one; therefore it does not tend toward it, but is drawn. Second, because iron does not move toward the magnet unless they exist in due proportion of quantity; for a mass of iron will not be drawn by a small magnet; therefore this is on account of action, which does not follow from a proportion of lesser inequality. Third, because it is said to be established by experience that if a magnet is anointed with goat's blood or garlic juice or onion, it cannot attract iron; therefore this is because its attractive power is thereby weakened.

35. It must subsequently be added that the magnet impresses upon iron some motive quality by which it draws it to itself. Thus all authors teach; for just as projection occurs through an impressed quality, so also does attraction; there is, however, a difference, because

impulse is impressed through immediate quantitative contact, but not this attractive quality; and the reason is that they are instituted by nature for contrary effects. For through impulse the mobile thing is separated from the mover that touches it; but through attraction the mobile thing is drawn toward the mover or even until it touches it. Moreover, such is this attraction of the magnet that it not only draws iron to itself by itself, but also communicates to the iron itself a participation of its power; for attracted iron draws other iron to itself and that attracts another, so that a chain is made from them, as Augustine relates in XXI On the City of God, chapter 4, and we too have sometimes experienced; this therefore is a clear sign that the magnet impresses upon iron a quality which both has the power of moving the iron itself and of producing another similar one by which iron draws to itself.

36. Finally, it must be added, so that we may respond to the proposed argument, that the magnet does not impress that quality upon iron except through a medium, namely by altering that medium all the way to the iron; for although this alteration of the medium is not perceived by sensible experiment, nevertheless, since it can easily occur, we gather from other experiments and reasons that in that alteration too the natural mode of acting of an efficient cause is preserved. Nor does it stand in the way that the medium itself is not drawn to the magnet; because it is not necessary that a quality diffused through a medium have the same effect in the medium that it has in the distant patient; just as it was said above that it happens on account of the diverse disposition of the patient that power diffused through a medium produces in a distant body a new quality or intensification of quality, which it does not produce in the medium itself. Thus therefore it can happen in the present case, either that the quality diffused through the medium is not of the same nature as that which is impressed upon the iron itself, or certainly that, although it may be in itself of the same species, it does not have the same effect of drawing in

the medium that it has in iron, on account of the peculiar proportion or disposition of iron.

37. Only another experience can stand in the way, by which it is established that a magnet alters iron even with a dense medium interposed, as is also perceived by experiment and Augustine relates above, saying that with iron placed over silver and a magnet beneath, the iron is moved according to the motion of the magnet, with most rapid course and return, as the magnet is agitated by someone, with the silver (he says) suffering nothing in the middle. For it does not seem likely that a magnet could alter and penetrate so dense a medium entirely. But nevertheless, when Augustine says "with the silver suffering nothing," he clearly understands this of that sensible passion, such as was the motion and agitation of the iron; but concerning invisible alteration, Augustine disputes nothing there. Nor is it so difficult to believe that a magnet penetrates an intermediate body with its alteration, either because it is porous, as wood is, or because it has small depth, such as perhaps was that silver which Augustine mentions; just as also celestial influences penetrate even the densest bodies and at great distance, on account of their great power of acting. For this power of the magnet is thought to be a certain participation of celestial property, as Saint Thomas says in question 5 On Truth, article 10, reply 5; question on the Soul, article 1. Perhaps also it can happen that that action, although it may not penetrate the entire dense body, may continuously reach all the way to the iron through the intervention of surrounding air. And in the same way we must judge concerning amber lifting chaff, and the same is true of quicksilver attracting particles of gold, and of any other similar thing, whether medicinal root or herb, which has the power of attracting something or even expelling it.

38. Concerning the remora that retards a ship: What pertains to the retention of the echeneis, although that is otherwise a wonderful effect of nature, is most difficult to explain by what power so small an animal can retard so vehement a mass; nevertheless in the

present case it brings no difficulty, for Pliny expressly says that it does this by no labor of its own, not by retaining or in any other way than by adhering; therefore it does nothing at a distance. But what it impresses upon the ship to detain it, Scaliger treats extensively against Cardanus in exercise 218, and against him the Coimbran above, article 5. But I judge the matter to be most hidden, which must necessarily be reduced to some power of a higher nature, which has such and so great a force for resisting the impulse of the ship that it cannot be weakened by it. Whether this is done by this animal impressing some quality upon the ship that weakens the force of that impulse, or only by adhering through a power innate to it, just as a man detains a proportioned stone lest it fall, or finally whether this fish has such power of stopping itself and as it were adhering to its place so that it cannot even be carried away or moved by the impelling ship, is uncertain to me. In whichever of these ways it may happen, there is no doubt that it proceeds from a wonderful and hidden power, perhaps with the aid of some special and connatural celestial influence. Indeed Ambrose adds in book V of the Hexameron, chapter 10, at the end, imitating Basil in homily VII of the Hexameron, that by the gift and power of the creator so small an animal has received so great a power.

On the Action of Phantasy & Similar Things

39. In solving the fourth difficulty, those labor who think that knowledge existing in the phantasy effectively concurs by its own physical influence to the act of appetite. Whence some place both powers either in the brain or in the heart, so that they may be near and able to act upon each other, although the truer doctrine holds that phantasy is in the brain and appetite in the heart, as must be shown more extensively elsewhere. Others speak of I know not what qualities that are diffused from the brain, by the mediation of an act of phantasy, all the way to the heart so as to change the appetite. But this is similar to a fiction, because those qualities are neither species of the

object nor of the very act of phantasy: for they would be useless, since the appetite cannot use species; nor can they be certain qualities as it were carrying to the appetitive power the knowledge of the object, which is in the phantasy; because the appetitive power itself never perceives that knowledge; nor can the knowledge of one power be manifested to another, either formally or objectively, except through another species or knowledge of itself. Finally others, convinced by the argument, confess that knowledge existing in the brain influences appetite by immediate action through its own efficiency. Nor do they think this is inconvenient, because those two faculties are joined in the same soul, which is the principal principle of that action; for just as principal power can cooperate with its instrumental power, even if it is diffused to a distant place, so conversely some instrumental power will be able to cooperate with the principal power, even in a distant place, if the principal power itself is diffused to that place, provided that in that part also, where the action occurs, there is another instrument more proper and proportioned to such action. This response, supposing that first foundation, is among the rest less improbable, and it is customary to apply it to divine instruments, that they can reach immediately to distant things, because the principal power is present there. Absolutely however (whatever may be the case concerning miraculous actions) it does not satisfy, because efficiency from some form or quality or act is already admitted, which passes to what is distant as if by a leap without continuous action through a medium.

40. And therefore we will more easily escape these straits by denying that knowledge concurs actively to the act of appetite, but only as a condition representing the object, which being posited, the appetite effects its act through natural sympathy of these powers. And the rooting of those faculties in the same soul contributes excellently to this; for that soul, or the supposit through it, is what principally operates and uses these faculties, and therefore, while through one it perceives an object suitable to itself, through another it desires that object; not indeed because through one it acts effectively upon

another, but because from an object apprehended through one it is excited to operate through another, which excitation is not through real and effective change, but through metaphorical or final change, and therefore does not require local proximity, but animal proximity, so to speak. And the same must be said proportionally concerning appetite and motive power; for although it could be said that all motion begins from the heart, and proceeds by means of spirits and nerves all the way to the part in which motion is exercised or appears, nevertheless, as pertains to the present matter, the application of motive power through appetite is not through proper and physical action of one power upon another, but through subordination of powers in the same soul; in which way also intellect and sense are applied to operate through will and appetite, concerning which philosophers treat more extensively in books On the Soul, and theologians in I-II. But concerning the efficiency of sensible species in internal senses, through external mediation, the account is different and far diverse, for here truly proper efficiency intervenes, which must occur through a medium, as visible species are said to tend from the eye all the way to common sense through the optic nerve; for this action of such species is not properly vital or immanent, but proceeds from something extrinsic through those instruments, and therefore is properly diffused through a medium, just like other natural actions.

On the Action of Spiritual Things Upon Bodies

41. Thus far we have spoken concerning corporeal agents and patients among themselves; but in the fifth argument we treat of the action of spiritual things upon bodies and among themselves. And as to the first part concerning the action of spirits upon bodies, speaking consistently, it must be said that immediate proximity of an intelligence to a body is necessary so that it can move it locally; for I suppose that a created spirit can exercise no other action upon a body, which I shall show below when disputing about intelligences.

Whence, if an angel can impress impulse upon some body through another body which it does not move locally, thus indeed it will suffice for it to be present by immediacy of power for moving some body locally; nevertheless it will be necessary that it be present by immediacy of supposit to the body in which it first began to impress that power. If however (which I judge more probable) an angel cannot impress that power through intermediate bodies that are not moved, it will be necessary that the moving angel be proximately present by immediacy of supposit to that body which it immediately moves. And in this way philosophers say that each intelligence moving heaven is present to that orb which it moves. Thus also theologians say that angels are suppositally present to those bodies which they assume and in which they appear. And whenever Scripture says that an angel moves or carries some man, it signifies there that the angel is substantially present either with the thing which it moves, or is moved with it. This would not be necessary unless it were required that the angel be present where it moves. And Saint Thomas clearly supposes this in I, questions 52 and 53, and 55, article 2, reply 3, and question 113, article 6, reply 3, and more clearly in places to be cited below.

42. Nor does it stand in the way that a spiritual thing does not have location; for it has substantial and real presence that is definite, according to which it is necessary that it be joined to the patient when it acts upon it. Nor do I now dispute whether operation is the reason of that presence, which some theologians seem to assert, or conversely, whether that presence according to itself is prior or even independent from operation, which more affirm and seems more probable to me; but I assert that substantial presence is necessary for operation, which perhaps Saint Thomas called spiritual touch to a body in question 6 On Power, article 7, reply 1.2; and more openly in question 16 On Evil, article 1, reply 15, he says that an angel does not act immediately upon any body distant from itself, and he cites Damascene saying: "Where an angel is, there it operates." He should

be consulted in book I On Faith, chapters 16 and 17, and book III, chapter 2.

43. Nor does it stand in the way that an angel moves through intellect and will, because, as I shall say below in its place, it does not move through these powers as proximately eliciting motion, but by directing and applying the executing power, which must be conjoined to the patient. Saint Thomas insinuates this response in the place just cited from On Power; for when he had objected in argument 12 that mover and moved ought to be simultaneous, but an angel is not simultaneous with a body from the fact that it wills it to be moved, he responds: "The command of an angel requires execution of power; whence it is necessary that there be a certain spiritual touch to the body which it moves"; and in Quodlibet VI, article 2, reply 2, which was similar: "The command of an angel requires execution of power." And it is further declared, because if efficacy in moving were to be weighed from the mode by which will attains its object, just as the will of an angel can indifferently will what is near and distant however much, so with the same efficacy it could move a near body and one distant by any distance; but the consequent is clearly absurd, because, since it has finite power, it is not likely that it can equally operate upon a thing distant by any amount, but has a limit in the sphere of its activity. Therefore, just as motive power is related differently to its subject than will to its object, so also in the absolute condition of proximity and distance; for moving power acts really and transiently upon the subject which it moves, and therefore it is necessary that it be really undistant from it; but it is otherwise with will as it is occupied with an object upon which it does not really act nor change it.

On the Action of Spirits Among Themselves

44. The other part of that argument concerned the action of one angel upon another or upon a separated soul, which action can

also be either speech or local motion. Concerning this the reasoning is the same as concerning the motion of a body; nor do I see what reason for difference can be assigned. Whence Saint Thomas, in the place just cited, generally says that the substance of an angel ought to be conjoined to the things which it moves; for he did not say to bodies, but to things, so as to indicate that the doctrine is general. But I suppose that there is speech when one angel truly and physically moves another by effecting motion in it, for if it only moves morally through command, it requires only that presence which suffices for command, concerning which the reasoning is the same as concerning speech, for command is made through speech.

45. How angels mutually converse: Concerning the speech of one angel to another, we cannot speak here professionally, for it is a theological matter and difficult to explain; speaking generally however, the process can proceed in one of two ways. One is that the speaking angel does nothing to him to whom it speaks, and thus the response is easy in the present case, because that angel to whom another speaks is not related to it as subject or patient to agent, but only as object to an immanent act, and therefore it is not surprising that speech can be immediate to an angel however distant. According to this way of speaking, however, it must be responded to the argument made that the speech of one and the excitation of another do not occur through transient action from one to another, but as if through a certain natural sympathy; because while one angel wills that another perceive its act or concept, immediately the other uses the species which it had of that act or concept to attend to the speaker. Nor do I see in what other way that opinion can be explained; but immediately from this it appears how great a difficulty there is in it, namely that faculties rooted in diverse essences or substances have among themselves natural sympathy and connection and concomitance in acting, not causal[24], but infallible and per se, without action of one upon another. To this

[24] causal, 1960, Vivès edition; casual, other readings. "We consider this reading more in consonance with the context." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 259.

difficulty is added another: if an angel has innate species of the acts of another, why cannot it intuit them immediately as they are, if it wills, even if the other does not excite it and as it were apply it through its ordering or will? Again there is added difficulty concerning illumination by which one angel not only speaks but also teaches another; for this, even if that sympathy is admitted, does not seem to suffice. Finally, whatever may be the case concerning speech taken in strict sense, the difficulty can be extended to every action of an intelligible species; for it is probable that one angel, insofar as it is an actually intelligible object, can, as far as concerns itself, impress a species of itself or of its acts upon another angel, if it lacks such a species. And whatever may be the case concerning angels among themselves, with respect to the soul which is separated from the body, this is more accepted; therefore, supposing such action, the difficulty remains complete if it is not impeded by distance.

46. The other way of speaking therefore can be by admitting some intellectual action of one spirit upon another through real affection of some intelligible species, or of some intensification or modification of it. This being supposed, it can still be responded to the difficulty touched upon in two ways. First, by excepting this action from the general rule given. Saint Thomas insinuates this way in the cited question On the Soul, and in Quodlibet VI, article 10. And he signifies the reason in both places, because the same thing is order in angels that location is in bodies, and therefore purely intellectual action does not depend upon location or medium, but upon the order of nature. And in I, question 107, article 4, he adds that the operation of intellect abstracts from place and time, and therefore speech which occurs through it is not impeded on account of distance. And this can be confirmed, for it seems incredible that one angel cannot speak to another unless they are undistant in supposit and substance, for that action cannot be carried through a medium. But this opinion truly seems to weaken the principle posited and the entire reasoning of it. Also, although there is no location in angels, there is nevertheless

substantial presence; therefore the difference assigned is null for excluding the necessity of this presence for the said action; otherwise neither would undistance between angels be necessary for one to move or detain another locally. Also, according to that reasoning, God by virtue of the action by which he creates or illuminates an angel would not be intimately present in it through essence, but only by reason of immensity; which is against Saint Thomas and the truer doctrine, as we shall see below. The consequence is clear, because God also acts upon an angel as spirit upon spirit; therefore the reasoning is the same concerning him. Therefore, on account of these things, the final way of speaking will be probable, that for this action too and for angelic speech, if it requires that action, undistance is necessary. Among these opinions I leave to others the judgment which is simply more probable; I only assert that this third is more consistent with the matter which we now treat, unless the first is chosen, whose difficulties it is most difficult to satisfy.

On the Sphere of Activity

47. The final difficulty proposed in the sixth argument is most easily solved from the second and third part of the final assertion, which it probably supports, and proves nothing against the previous assertions. For although we grant that each agent has a natural sphere of activity of certain magnitude, into which it can act by itself and by its own power and action, it does not follow that it can immediately act upon the remote part of that sphere without acting upon the near part, because it cannot act except by continuous action, beginning that action from a patient near and undistant to it, and continuously diffusing it through the entire sphere; for any efficient cause determines this mode of acting for itself. Nor is it inconvenient that all causes, even if they are unequal in power, equally determine this proximity of patient for themselves, because this does not proceed only from limitation or imperfection of power, but from the nature of

this causality; but limitation of sphere proceeds from limitation of power, and thus according to the inequality of power there will also be unequal sphere, if other things are equal. But that argument seems rightly to prove that natural agents are not limited to acting by themselves and by their own power only upon the ultimate surface of a body contiguous to them, but within some certain space, which they can reach by their power, even if through the possible or impossible one part of the medium does not act upon another; which we asserted in the final conclusion.

48. But that argument does not prove (although it also seems to tend toward this) that that mode of acting through the near part upon the remote through the entire space is impossible, so that however much we may divide the remote part from the near by proportional parts, indeed even the proximate surface from the remaining magnitude, the effect can always proceed actively to the remote through the proximate, because in this mode of acting no repugnance is involved, because quality received in the medium or in any part of the medium, or in the surface, can be active, and the patient is also apt to receive such quality, and the remote part is in due proportion with respect to the nearer so that it can be acted upon by it; because action proceeds uniformly or difformly from the beginning of the sphere to the end; therefore all things necessary can concur so that action always occurs through the proximate upon the remote. For the infinity of proportional parts cannot stand in the way, because similar infinity exists in the succession of action. Therefore we do not assert that this mode is impossible, but we assert first that it is not necessary that every agent require proximity and undistance of the patient upon which it first acts. Nor does it suffice for defining the sphere of activity of an agent by itself from the force of the quantity and limitation of its power. We assert next that, even when action proceeds in that way through the near part upon the remote, it does not so occur from one part to another but that the agent simultaneously and actually acts with all parts within the sphere of its

activity, and therefore action upon the remote part through the proximate is more efficacious than if the proximate part alone through power received in itself were to act upon the remote. And both of these assertions are in the final conclusion, and seem to be sufficiently proved from all things said and contained in that final difficulty.

SECTION IX

WHETHER AN EFFICIENT CAUSE REQUIRES A PATIENT DISSIMILAR TO ITSELF FOR ACTING, AND IN WHAT PROPORTION

1. Difficult reasons for doubt. First. The reason for the difficulty can first be taken from what was said in section 4, where it was shown that sometimes an agent acts upon itself even according to the same part; but the same thing cannot be dissimilar to itself according to the same part; therefore it is not necessary that the patient always be dissimilar to the agent. Perhaps it will be said that when something acts upon itself, it always operates through the power of another nature from the form upon which it acts in itself, and thus in the beginning of the action it is dissimilar to itself, insofar as it does not have that form formally, but only virtually.

2. Second. But I argue against this secondly, for sometimes something acts upon itself even through the same quality formally; for heat or cold of some body, when it is surrounded by a contrary agent, is accustomed to intensify itself and as it were fortify itself to resist or overcome the other, as is evident in the heat of the stomach, which for this reason is stronger in winter time, as experience shows, and Hippocrates testifies, aphorism 15. The same is evident in air existing in caverns or lowest places, which is warmer in winter time. Nor can this be attributed to an external agent, since that would be contrary and could not intensify a quality opposed to itself. Neither can it be

attributed to natural emanation from an intrinsic form, both because this from itself is always the greatest that can be, since it is merely natural; nor is there any reason why it should be increased on account of the surrounding contrary, indeed it should rather be impeded thereby; and also because this mode of action is found not only in natural, but also in preternatural subjects, for even water in wells becomes warmer in winter time.

3. Third. Thirdly there is a similar argument, because sometimes one thing acts upon another similar to itself in quality and intensity, even if the action occurs through the same quality. The assumption is evident from the common example of iron, which although it does not have the highest heat in itself, but as six, for example, intensifies similar heat in straw or tow, so that it burns it. And in the same way the heat and light of a medium is accustomed to be intensified through reflection from the heat or light of an extremely distant body, even if that is not more intense in itself intensively; as when the sun directly heats air and earth, the heat of the air is intensified from reflection of the earth, and similarly the light of the air is intensified from reflection of a mirror, etc., although neither the heat in the earth nor the light in the mirror could be more intense than in the air from the action of the sun, since they are more distant from the sun than the air.

4. Fourth. Fourthly, if for some reason this dissimilarity were necessary, it would be especially so that the agent might surpass the patient in the power of acting; but for this reason it is not necessary, both because it can happen that that superior power comes from elsewhere, namely from greater density or from other conditions of the subject; and especially because that excess on the part of the agent does not always seem necessary, otherwise the patient could never react upon its agent. For either it is surpassed by that in power, or not; if it is not surpassed, and nevertheless suffers from it, then excess of power is not required in the agent; if indeed it is surpassed, and nevertheless reacts upon it, therefore excess of power is not required

for reacting; but reaction is true and proper action and effective causality; therefore this does not always require excess of power; therefore neither dissimilarity in form or reason of acting. Finally it can happen that action is coeval with the agent, as illumination with the sun; but then dissimilarity never intervenes between agent and patient, because they were always similar.

Observations for the Resolution of the Question

5. Dissimilarity between agent and patient: to be considered for the beginning of action. It should be noted that when we inquire whether an efficient cause requires a patient dissimilar to itself, the discussion is not about the end of action, but about the beginning, or about the disposition and proportion that ought to precede between agent and patient for action, because here we inquire about the conditions required for acting, not those that follow upon action. And moreover, because at the end of action the patient will not so much be compared to the agent as the effect to the cause. Whence it happens that dissimilarity in the terminus of action cannot be of the nature of an efficient cause, since rather the intention of the agent is to render the patient similar to itself. But if it sometimes does not perfectly achieve this, it arises from imperfection of the effect, and this sometimes arises from weak power of the agent, which cannot overcome the resistance of the patient; sometimes from incapacity of the patient and nobler power of the agent, which is universal or an equivocal cause acting through a form of higher order, which the effect cannot receive according to the same nature, and therefore becomes similar according to some analogy or common nature, but not perfect.

6. The action of a thing that acts can be coeval. Again it should be observed that when we inquire about the dissimilarity that ought to precede between patient and agent, the discussion is not about precedence in time or duration, but in order of nature and causality; for that priority, although it often intervenes, is not

necessary per se, as the final argument made at the beginning rightly proves. For it should not be doubted that action can be coeval with the agent, when it does not require succession and occurs without resistance. Whence, if that is natural action and from its species is such that it can render the patient perfectly similar to the agent, it will perfect that similarity from the beginning; for a natural agent, as soon as it exists, acts as much as it can; and therefore if it acts without resistance, it produces a perfect effect from the beginning; therefore according to real duration in that action the patient is never dissimilar to the agent. Nevertheless, however, in order of nature it can be understood as dissimilar, because such a patient from itself, setting aside the action of the agent, would not have similarity with it. And thus that action does not occur concerning the patient as already similar, but rather renders it similar; and thus it is formally made from the dissimilar.

Resolution of the Question

7. Everything acts upon what is dissimilar in form, and similar in matter. Thus therefore with the sense of the question explained, its resolution is easy; for it must be said that an acting cause cannot act upon a patient, except insofar as it is dissimilar to itself in form or terminus of action. This is like a first principle in philosophy; Aristotle hands this down, I On Generation, c. 7, text. 46, where he says that the greatest part of the ancients affirmed with the highest consensus of mind that nothing similar suffers anything from something similar, because one is no more agent or patient than the other. And text. 48 he confirms the same, because otherwise for the same reason the same would be affected by itself. Which in what follows he declares saying this dissimilarity is necessary according to form or species, for in matter or genus as subject similarity is rather required between agent and patient, which we shall declare a little below. Aristotle supposes the same principle in the same I book On Generation, c. 9, while he

says the agent acts insofar as it is in act, but the patient suffers as it is in potency. Which he also teaches throughout book I of the Physics, and book III, in the beginning, and book VII, from text. 35, and book VIII, from the beginning. And the expositors in these places generally think thus, although some do not rightly declare this in some particular actions, as we shall see in responding to the difficulties.

8. Reason of the conclusion. Absurdities from the opposite of the conclusion. But the reason has been touched upon because the agent acts insofar as it is in act, and for acting requires a patient that is in potency; but that which is in potency, as such is dissimilar to that which is in act, as such; therefore. The major is established as to the prior part, because to act is to communicate or give being, and therefore it is necessary that such being be supposed actually in the cause, either formally or eminently, according to the mode and dignity of the agent; for no one can give what he does not have in himself in some way. And by almost the same reason the other part of the same proposition is proved, because while the agent communicates its being to the patient, it leads it from potency to act; therefore the patient, as it is subjected to such action, is supposed in potency. And therefore in I Physics privation is placed among the principles necessary for generation from the part of matter, which principles in every change or action that occurs from a subject are proportionally necessary. Aristotle also excellently confirmed the conclusion from inconveniences, because otherwise there would be no reason why from two similar things one would act upon the other rather than conversely. Likewise, because the same could intensify itself. Likewise, there would be no end of actions, but after perfect struggle between contraries, and compared victory and assimilated patient, then the action would begin anew. And finally, as Aristotle says, in this way nothing could be preserved either from destruction or from motion.

Corollaries from the Preceding Resolution

9. And from these reasons it follows first that the dissimilarity per se necessary between acting and patient cause is only that which is between habit and privation, or between a thing constituted in act or existing in potency; for if capacity for receiving a form is supposed in the patient, and the agent has power for producing it, it requires no other dissimilarity on the part of the patient, except that it lacks such a form; because neither from the nature of motion or action nor from any other general principle can any other be required in general. Whence, that in generable and corruptible things there is found not only this dissimilarity, but also positive opposition and contrariety, is not from the nature of efficient cause as such, but from the fact that such things are so instituted that they can have mutual struggle and action among themselves, and be generated and corrupted from each other according to species. But it should be noted that among efficient causes some are univocal, others indeed equivocal, which terms we have already explained above; but we are treating of principal causes, for from these it is easy to accommodate the doctrine to instrumental ones. In univocal causes therefore the said condition most properly and formally intervenes; for since the agent introduces into the patient a form of the same nature as that through which it acts, it supposes in the patient a lack of it, and consequently supposes formal dissimilarity with it.

10. But an equivocal cause does not induce in the patient a form of the same nature, and therefore formally similar to its form through which it acts, and therefore it does not properly suppose formal dissimilarity in the patient, that is, lack of that form according to the species which it has in itself, but it supposes dissimilarity between the patient as it is supposed to action and as it is perfected through action, and consequently it also supposes in the patient lack of that similarity which can intervene between some form formally taken and another which eminently contains it. And the reason is clear. First, an equivocal cause does not make formal similarity, but only eminential (as I may say); therefore it prerequires only

proportional dissimilarity; for only privation of the form that terminates the action of the agent is necessarily supposed for action. For indeed, for action it is not required that the patient lack the form which is formally in the agent, if it is not going to receive it formally or of the same nature; but it is only fitting that it lack that form which is to be introduced in it and will be the terminus of action, even if in the agent it is only virtually or eminently, because the privation required for action is not formally opposed to the form that is the principle of action, but to that which will be the terminus ad quem of action, since such privation has the nature of a terminus a quo. Thus therefore the dissimilarity necessary between this kind of agent and patient need not be formal, but eminential suffices, as has been declared. And by this reason one heavy thing can move another downward, even if they are similar in gravity, or even if they move downward together and in this also are similar, because the formal terminus of that motion is not gravity, but Where lower, which is somehow contained virtually in gravity, and therefore privation of it, not indeed privation of gravity, is necessary for that motion. And the same is true of all similar cases, especially in immanent acts, in which action of a potency is always equivocal, of which it is commonly said not so much to tend to produce something similar as to produce something proportional, that is, a second act consonant with the first and which is its perfection, in which it is contained not formally, but virtually and eminently. And therefore in that action also, between the active and passive principle, insofar as they are such, only the said eminential dissimilarity is supposed, namely, that in one is contained eminently an act which the other does not have formally, until it receives it from the active principle, which dissimilarity is always found, whether those principles are distinguished in reality or only by reason, as will be more evident in the solution to the first.

11. From which principles there is no action between two things. First. Second. Secondly it follows from what has been said that for efficiency there is per se required that the acting cause have power

over the patient and concerning its capacity, because otherwise it would be impossible for action to follow. This follows from what has been said; for on account of this cause the aforesaid dissimilarity between agent and patient is necessary, so that in the agent, insofar as it is in act, there can be power for subjecting the patient to itself, which is only in potency. And it is confirmed, for just as it is impossible for a form to inform matter unless it has informative power proportioned to the matter, so neither can an agent in its genus actuate a subject unless it has power over it, because in general a second act requires a proportioned first act. But that this may be declared more fully, it should be noted that from four principles it can arise that between some two things action does not follow, I speak of natural agents. First, if there is no active power in them. Second, if there is power in one, but in the other there is no capacity for that form which the other can act, on account of which cause fire cannot heat heaven; and therefore Aristotle did not posit negation as a principle of generation or change, but privation, because it ought to be in a capable subject. Therefore also he said, in I On Generation, that dissimilarity in form and similarity in matter is required between agent and patient, by reason of which the patient is capable of the form of the agent. Which however is not true in the same way in all agents; for heaven acts upon these lower things although it does not agree with them in matter, and an intelligence moves a body with which it does not agree in matter. In agents therefore that act by univocal and corruptive action that proposition is simply true, and Aristotle spoke properly of them; for there he said that an agent that agrees with the patient in matter also suffers from it, but it is otherwise with a superior agent, which does not communicate in matter. In agents therefore acting by equivocal action only that agreement according to some common nature is required; for we speak of created agents, in which none can alter or generate another unless they agree in matter in some way, at least in common, because it is fitting that both be material. In local motion also this is found, that the mover and moved always agree in some way

in capacity for receiving motion proportioned to itself; for nothing created can move locally unless it itself is also mobile, as is established concerning bodies, and we shall also say concerning intelligences below. But this is somehow extrinsic to the nature of the agent; but intrinsic is that in the patient there is capacity for that form of which the active power is in the agent.

12. Third. Thirdly action will be impeded if that capacity is already reduced to act, because then also the power of the agent over the patient ceases, in that whatever could be done by it has already been done, which coincides with those things we have said up to now, namely that nothing can act upon what is similar to itself insofar as it is such, which is as true in univocal agents as in equivocal ones, speaking of proportionate similarity, which can be between them and their effects, as is established from the above. For proportional reason arises from this same root, namely, because the whole power of such a cause has already been expended in such a patient, and therefore nothing remains for it to act upon. You will say: even if the patient is in act through one form or quality, there can still remain in the agent power for introducing another similar one, otherwise this whole question would be reduced to that one, namely, whether two accidents differing only in number can be in the same subject. I respond that it cannot be, because after the capacity of the subject is completed by one act, it no longer remains in potency to another similar act, and in this respect it is true that this question is closely connected with that about several accidents differing only in number in the same subject. For if several substantial forms, differing either in species or number, could be in the same matter, a natural agent could induce another form in matter that had only one; therefore similarly, if a subject could have two accidents entirely similar, although it had one, it could receive another from a similar agent, or even from itself, and therefore we said above, disp. V, sect. 9, that accidents differing only in number and entirely similar cannot be simultaneously received in the same subject.

13. Fourth. Fourthly finally, supposing power on the part of the agent and capacity in the patient, with dissimilarity and privation, action can still be impeded on account of resistance of the patient. In which it should be observed that for action as such, resistance in the patient is not per se required, just as we also said that contrariety or positive opposition is not necessary; for privation as such does not resist, but rather prepares the way for action; therefore whatever resists is reduced to positive contrariety or repugnance, and therefore is not per se required for action, but rather from itself impedes or retards action. Whence, that action is successive, and not instantaneous, comes from resistance of the patient, unless local motion intervenes, to which such succession is intrinsic, as is established from philosophy, and we shall touch upon below, in the treatise on action and passion. Hence therefore it happens that, when beyond dissimilarity of the patient there also intervenes resistance, if it is so great that it either surpasses or equals the power of the agent, action is impeded; and therefore it is a common axiom of philosophers and quasi first principle, that for effecting there is necessary a proportion of greater inequality, that is, in which the power in the agent is greater than the resistance in the patient. Which is taken from Aristotle in the cited places, and is easily evident, because the agent as agent overcomes the patient, at least as to that which it acts upon; therefore it is necessary that according to that nature it surpass it in strength; otherwise how could it overcome? And this will be declared more fully in the solution of the fourth argument.

Solutions of Arguments

14. It remains therefore that we satisfy the arguments; and to the first indeed it was rightly responded there, and from all that we have said, the response has been declared, and can be declared more fully. For the same thing can simultaneously and according to the same part be in first act and in potency to second act, which others call

in virtual act and formal potency; and thus according to those two natures, whether they are distinguished in reality or only by reason and relation, it has a certain dissimilarity to itself, not proper and formal, but eminential and virtual, which suffices for action, as we have said.

On Antiperistasis

15. Opinion of some. In the second argument the common difficulty about antiperistasis is sought, which is purely physical, and in I On Generation, c. 7, is usually treated ex professo, and therefore I shall touch upon few things necessary for this place. Some therefore say to that argument that, although the same quality cannot intensify itself by direct action, it can however by reflected action, which they say intervenes in that case in this manner, that a hot thing, for example, besieged by its contrary, sends certain species into it, which are like instruments for acting upon it; but when the contrary itself resists those species, they are reflected back to their agent, and thus intensify it. Thus teach Marsilius, I On Generation, q. 17 and 18; Albert of Saxony, q. 15; the Venetian, in Summa On Generation, c. 23, and in Summa Meteorology, c. 3, and others. But this opinion says incredible things and does not solve the difficulty. For first it feigns intentional species without foundation. Then it makes them an instrument of material alteration, which is unheard of. Again it makes them going and returning, although they are accidents, unless perhaps he says they are some corpuscles, which is more incredible; or unless he says that return is metaphorical through reaction, which cannot be true will already be evident from proving the other member, namely, that the difficulty is not solved. Which is evident first because those species, whatever they are, are instruments of the agent from which they emanate; therefore they act in the power of it; therefore they cannot exceed in acting its power; how therefore can they intensify it, even if they return to it? Second, this action often occurs without any

diffusion or action through a medium, as when contrary agents are closely neighboring, and the power of one is strengthened in itself; for then there are no species that can return to it, because they are not received in the contrary, as is supposed; for on account of its resistance they are said to return to their principle; nor even in the medium, because there is none. Finally sometimes this action occurs concerning a subject to which such a quality is repugnant, as in well water; therefore it cannot be through reflected action of it.

16. Opinion of others. It is refuted. Others therefore say[25] that one contrary surrounded by a stronger one, from natural appetite of its conservation, collects and unites itself and converts its action into itself, so that it may protect itself. And Niphus adds, I On Generation, his text. 195, in recognit. dub. 2, that one contrary per se has power for acting through some sphere, and because it is impeded by the contrary obstructing it from diffusing that outside itself, it converts it into itself and thus intensifies itself. But this opinion also is both false and does not solve the difficulty. It is proved, because it already admits not only that similar acts upon similar, but also that the same acts upon itself according to the same formal quality. Nor does it matter if it is said that this happens on account of the surrounding contrary and as if from fear of it; for either there is in that quality itself intrinsic natural power for that action, or not; if there is, therefore from the beginning and always it will effect that action and intensification in itself without occasion of the contrary, because natural power naturally executes its whole force without other occasion, provided it is not impeded. If indeed there is not sufficient power in the thing for that action, it will not effect it, even if the contrary urges it. A similar argument will be made by inquiring whether that greater intensity is natural to such a thing and quality or not. For if it is natural, it will always have it emanating from intrinsic nature, nor will it await the necessity of protecting itself from the

[25] Vide. Tolet., 1 de Gener., q. 14.

contrary in order to make it. If indeed it is preternatural, it cannot come from the intrinsic from the quality itself.

17. And again I shall inquire whether that greater intensity acquired from the intrinsic on occasion of the pressing contrary, with the contrary removed before it diminishes,[26] perseveres in the thing, or not. For if it perseveres, it is a sign that it is natural, and from the beginning and per se was always going to be future without occasion of the contrary agent, if there had been no impediment. If indeed it does not persevere, therefore it could never be made from the intrinsic; for perfection that emanates from the intrinsic is not removed without an extrinsic agent. Finally it can scarcely be understood what those words mean, that the agent collects itself and unites more, or that it converts action to itself. For either they signify that it condenses itself and reduces all its parts to a smaller place, and this is easily disproved by the arguments made, applying them proportionally, because either that motion or condensation is natural, or not; if it is natural, it will always be present, speaking per se; if it is not natural, it will not be made from the intrinsic on account of the pressing contrary. Which experience also confirms, for we do not experience in all things that suffer from their contraries such motions; but it would be necessary to occur in all, if this came naturally from the force of appetite for protecting itself from the contrary. But what was added, namely that the agent converts action into itself, because it is impeded from diffusing it, has no verisimilitude, because, from the fact that the agent ceases from action upon another, it does not become capable of action upon itself, nor of greater intensity. Otherwise, a thing existing in a vacuum would intensify itself by this very fact that it cannot act upon another. Likewise, because that effecting of greater intensity exceeds proper power; therefore, although the agent is impeded from proceeding to action

[26] diminuat, 1960; dimanat, 1751 (ed. Balleoliana). "La sustitución… nos parece totalmente desacertada." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 274.

proportioned to itself, it cannot therefore effect in itself action that surpasses proper power.

18. Others therefore, not finding a way to declare this action, deny that there is such action in things, and to the experiences they respond that they are apparent, not true, and various causes of such appearances are devised which are feigned and repugnant to sense; although Galen, book III On the Powers of Simple Medicines, c. 3, is inclined to this opinion.

19. Double mode of declaring action through antiperistasis. Why baths and the stomach of an animal are warmer in winter. The same concerning well water. It must be said therefore that a quality is intensified on occasion of a surrounding contrary in only two ways, namely, either by an extrinsic agent, which on that occasion is included and detained there, or, conversely, because through that occasion an extrinsic corruptor recedes, and immediately the thing from the intrinsic reduces itself to its natural state, which demands that greater intensity; and thus it happens that a quality never intensifies itself. We touched on the prior mode in the preceding section, where from Aristotle we said that baths in winter are warmer because heat is included in them by the colder medium and impeded from bursting forth outside, which we declared concerning hot exhalations. Thus also the belly of an animal is warmer in winter, because animal spirits are retained within, in that the coldness of air constricts the skin and pores, as Galen noted, explaining the cited aphorism of Hippocrates, and Aristotle elegantly, sect. 2 Problems, q. 29, where he adduces other examples. And from the same cause (I think) it comes that in winter well water is warmer, because, namely, some hot exhalations generated in the caverns of earth are impeded from ascending with the medium existing denser and thicker on account of greater coldness.

20. In which experience however there are two difficult things. One, whence there are such exhalations there. Another, how they can, since they are most tenuous, act upon water, which is very

cold. To the first indeed it must be said that by virtue of the sun and other celestial influences such exhalations are generated from earth, which on account of its density and dryness, which, speaking per se, it has greater in lower parts, is apt matter so that from it such exhalations may be excited. And perhaps very many of these generated there in summer time, are afterwards detained there longer on account of the cause said above. But those, since they are more subtle than water, are easily mixed while they try to ascend, and thus they can easily temper its coldness, at least by continuously reacting upon it. Perhaps also air included in caverns or pores of earth, since it is warm by its nature, is warmer on account of the same cause and helps to that action. The other mode of this action is declared by other examples: the first is concerning well water, which in summer time is colder; for hot exhalations, by which it could be heated, do not remain there, but ascend more quickly, both because the medium, in that it is warmer and rarer, does not impede, and also because at that time those exhalations are more subtle on account of more vehement influence of the sun. And thus with the contrary agent removed, water becomes colder from the intrinsic, not than its nature demands, but than it was before while it suffered more from its contraries. In this way also it happens that cold water exposed somewhat to the sun in summer becomes colder; for external heat effects in the medium or in the external surface of water, or in the vessel that contains it, some rarity, and then if any hot vapor surrounded the water, or was mixed with it, it evaporates more easily, and thence it happens that water reduces itself more to its natural state; and perhaps it is also condensed more not only on account of the said cause, but also on occasion of avoiding vacuum; and from this principle also cold increases. Let Aristotle be read, sect. 24 Problems, q. 13, and I Meteorology, c. 12. By one or the other of these two modes therefore all similar experiences can be declared, so that it is never necessary to admit that the same intensifies itself according to the same quality; for when that intensity is from the intrinsic through natural emanation, it is attributed to the generator.

Whether a Multitude of Agents, or Density of Matter of One, Contributes to Intensity of Action

21. Opinion of some affirming. In the third argument two difficulties are sought: one is whether a quality existing in a denser subject can intensify in another rarer one similar to itself beyond its grade; or, which is the same, whether several partial agents or several parts of the same agent on account of greater application to the same patient similar to itself in quality and equal in grade, can intensify its quality. For many thus affirm, as Marsilius, I On Generation, q. 19; and Soto, II Physics, q. 2; and Niphus, I On Generation, his text. 195, dub. 2, q. 2. Their reason is that the power of an agent increases not only from intensity of form, but also from multitude, Aristotle saying, VIII Physics, text. 80, that in greater magnitude there exists greater power; therefore if that whole power is more applied to the same patient, as happens when the agent is denser, it will also make a greater effect. And it is confirmed by the common example posited above of glowing iron, and of two luminous things equal and equally applied to the same part of air. Likewise of equal acts multiplied, which intensify a habit, and of equal drops equally falling, which finally hollow out stone. And it is confirmed secondly, for air in winter freezes water, because, namely, it intensifies its coldness beyond that grade of coldness which it has in itself; for if it were so cold, it would also be condensed and become water.

22. Nor do these authors think their opinion is contrary to the doctrine handed down about dissimilarity required between efficient cause and patient, but they say that just as similar acts upon similar according to form, if it is dissimilar in grade, so also that which is similar in form and grade can act upon another similar, if it is dissimilar in power and potency; but this happens in the present case; for something hot as four very dense, although it does not exceed air in grade, nor a hand equally warm, exceeds in power and potency.

Because this is not measured by intensity alone, as has been said. And it is declared moreover, because that dense hot thing has power for producing in another the whole form that it has in itself; because therefore it cannot multiply it in a rarer patient on account of its incapacity, it augments it intensively.

23. The related opinion is rejected. Resolution of the question. I think this opinion is false and contrary to the principle posited, which is to be taken in this sense, namely, that no thing can act upon another similar to itself according to that form in which they are similar, nor can it add perfection or intensity to it, if they are supposed to be perfectly similar, that is, not only in species, but also in grade of intensity, which Aristotle in the cited place On Generation says, if they are entirely similar. Wherefore to the argument made it must be said that multitude of form with equal intensity, whether in one very dense agent, or in many however much applied, does not suffice to intensify in another similar form beyond that grade which such form has in the agent. This is the more common opinion, which Paul the Venetian holds, in Sum. On Generation, c. 23; Albert of Saxony, I On Generation, q. 15; and Astudillo, q. 21; and excellently Victoria, in relect. On the Increase of Charity.

24. The a priori reason has already been touched upon, because the agent by its action intends to assimilate the patient to itself, which end having been achieved, its action ceases; but if the patient has been made similar in form and grade, it is already perfectly similar; therefore action does not proceed further. Nor can it be said that perfect similarity has not yet been made, because the patient has not achieved as much multitude of form as there is in the agent: both because multitude or paucity of form does not pertain to the nature of the form or quality itself, but comes from the subject or quantity, and therefore that is not dissimilarity in form, but inequality in quantity; for one white thing will not be called dissimilar to two white things, because it is not plural like them, but it will be called unequal; but through action such equality is not intended, but similarity in form.

And also because such similarity or rather equality is impossible, supposing the capacity of a rare or dense subject, or, which is the same, supposing that the patient is one and the agents plural. Nor is it true that that inequality can be compensated by greater intensity, both because they are quantities or perfections of diverse natures, and also because rather through that greater intensity there would be made new dissimilarity in grade, with the same inequality in multitude of form remaining.

25. The second argument is that in a remiss form, however much it may be multiplied in many and different subjects, or in many parts of the same subject, there is not sufficient power to bring about greater intensity in a similar form; therefore [the conclusion follows]. The antecedent is evident, because first of all there is not formally such power there, since there is not formally such intensity in that form. For I suppose that intensity is not an aggregation of several similar grades in the same part of the subject, but the proper and per se increase of the same quality in the same part of the subject, which increase, for example, as eight would not exist, even if two heats as four were placed in the same part of the subject, concerning which I will speak below in its proper place; this perfection therefore can much less be formally in the multitude of remiss form existing in many subjects or parts of the subject. Nor is it there eminently, since that form according to species is of the same nature, but according to grade is of inferior nature in individual parts of the subject, and consequently also in all taken together simultaneously. For in many things of the same nature there is not more eminent power than in individuals, since eminence of power requires a form or nature of superior nature. Nor can it be said that that intensity exists virtually in that form on account of its multitude, because virtual containment, as it is distinguished from eminential, is attributed only to instrumental power; but that intensity cannot be attributed in this way to the multitude of form of inferior intensity and of the same nature, both because such form, while it acts upon something similar to itself, conducts itself not so much as an

instrument as a proper principle of acting, as was said above, and also because a principal agent cannot be designated in whose power it is said to bring about that effect; indeed that multitude of form is not per se instituted to be an instrument of some action, but is like a certain aggregation of instruments of the same nature.

26. Absurdities from the opposite opinion. Third, I argue from inconveniences, because from the opposite opinion it follows first that three hot things as four can make themselves mutually supremely hot, if two joined together intensify the heat of the third up to the fifth degree, and that one in turn renders the others similar to itself, and thus they proceed up to the maximum. Second, it similarly follows that water hot as four according to every part can render itself hotter in any degree; for two extreme parts, for example, will act upon the intermediate and intensify its heat, and that in turn will act upon the extreme parts, and thus the action will proceed up to the maximum. These things, however, and similar ones are plainly false and contrary to experience. Third, it follows that habit is intensified through remiss acts, so that it inclines to more intense act, which also is false, as I suppose.

27. To respond to the foundation of the contrary opinion, it must be noted first that it is one thing for the power of acting to grow from multitude of form, another thing to grow as regards the force of producing an effect more perfect intensively; for the former is more general, and from it the authors of that opinion do not correctly infer the latter. Therefore the power of acting is increased in that way not intensively, but extensively, and therefore it is not increased so that it can produce a more intense effect than the form itself which is the principle of acting, but so that it can bring about its adequate effect more easily, more quickly, more strongly, and at a greater distance, other things being equal. Whence it can be said to be increased as regards the manner of acting, not as regards the thing which it can make. And similarly, when density of parts of the subject is joined to multitude of form, it helps greatly toward this mode of action, because

that whole multitude of form is better applied to what suffers, and therefore it conduces to more prompt action; nevertheless it cannot by itself alone conduce to a better effect than is contained in the power of the form, because that application is only a condition which does not per se conduce to acting, except supposing the power.

28. Second, it must be observed that the discussion concerns multitude of form which is entirely equal in essence and degree to the form of what suffers; for if it happens that the quality of the agent is, as regards essence and species, of another nature from that which comes to be in what suffers, and eminently contains it, although in its own order it would be remiss, it can be a principle of bringing about the inferior quality intense in its degrees, as was touched upon above; for that superior quality in any grade by reason of its essence could eminently contain the whole latitude of the inferior quality. Nor would like then act upon like, even if a quality, for example, as one, would intensify a quality as one, because they would be of different natures, and that would rather be a certain proportion than proper similarity. Then it can also happen that multitude of form conduces to a more intense effect, when the effect does not equal the intensity of the form of the agent; as, for example, when one lamp illuminates air, it does not produce in it light as intense as it has in itself, and therefore it can rightly happen that two lamps taken together and of equal intensity between themselves produce more intense light in air than either could by itself; for then the reasons given cease, because what suffers is never made perfectly similar to the agent; since therefore in the agent there is not only greater multitude of form, but also more intense form, there can be in it power to intensify the effect. Whence in any of those agents there will be per se form productive of that whole intensity; but that one agent by itself alone would not produce all that could arise either from indisposition of what suffers, or from distance, or from another similar cause. And then multitude of intense form can most excellently contribute to producing a more intense effect, which nevertheless does not exceed the intensity of the cause.

29. Whether two similar or unequal agents mutually help each other in action. The greater difficulty is, if two unequally intense agents would concur simultaneously, whether they could help each other to produce a more intense effect, which although it does not exceed absolutely the whole more intense cause, nevertheless exceeds the intensity of the other partial agent having less intense form, so that although remiss quality, however great its multitude, cannot per se intensify a quality similar to itself in degree, nevertheless with the partnership of more intense quality it can help toward intensification and cooperate. For then the reasons given also seem to cease; for in such a total agent there is absolutely more intense form and power sufficient for that effect, and the inferior degrees of quality joined to the superior ones can concur toward any degrees of another similar quality; as, for example, when something hot as eight intensifies heat as four, it concurs not only toward the fifth degree, for example, through the fifth of its heat or through the superior ones, but through its whole heat; just as on the contrary, when it makes the first degree it does not bring this about through the first, but through its whole heat. A sign of this is that for bringing about the first or fifth degree, something hot as eight has greater force than something hot as five or as one, other things being equal, for it will overcome greater resistance and will act more quickly; therefore it is a sign that it does not act only through the similar degree and the others conduct themselves concomitantly and as if by accident to that action, but truly concur toward it. And the reason is that, for all to help and concur, it suffices that in all and individual there be the essence of heat, although there may not be in individual degrees that peculiar similarity which exists between degrees of entirely the same nature; for it suffices that that similarity be in the whole form, which is the principle of acting. Thus therefore also several remiss forms, joined to a more intense one, will be able to concur with it toward producing a more intense effect. This therefore is probable, nor do the reasons given so militate against it, as is easily evident from what has been said, and it can contribute to

preserving certain experiences, as was touched upon above and we will also see immediately.

30. Nevertheless it is not without every difficulty; for if remiss form, joined to more intense, acts toward intensification of something similar to itself, why does it not rather act toward intensification of itself? Also, because otherwise something hot as eight, equally near to two hot things as four, would act with one and through it toward the intensification of the other, and conversely. Nevertheless it could be responded that from the peculiar disposition of what suffers or of the partial agent it comes about that one partial remiss agent cooperates more with the intense agent toward intensifying similar form in another subject than in itself, or than another similar one, as will be established more easily from what is to be said. This therefore is probable, concerning which more below.

31. How glowing iron generates fire. From these things therefore the foundation of the contrary opinion is sufficiently resolved. To the first experience brought forward by us concerning glowing iron, the common consensus and response of all philosophers is that there is some fire enclosed in the pores in it, although it escapes us; from which fire enclosed in the pores of the glowing iron comes that greater intensity which we easily experience with the senses, although the vehemence and speed of action comes from the partnership of iron and its density. A sign, moreover, that there is some fire enclosed and contained there (as we just said) in the pores of iron, can be taken from the brightness which always comes from fire, as Plato said in the Timaeus. Also this very thing can be shown by a reason by no means to be despised, because iron is not without pores, in which air is usually present; therefore when vehement heating has intervened, it is turned into fire by the force and efficacy of heating so intense and vehement. And finally, such vehement heating never occurs in any matter or subject capable of such heating without some exhalations being separated from it and inflamed or turned into fire. Others respond in a far different way, namely that there is in iron the

highest heat which can exist, and this without the form of fire on account of other dispositions repugnant to fire and preserving the form of iron there. But it is difficult to believe that those dispositions which exist connaturally in iron as in a subject proportioned and connatural to itself, do not also impede such great intensity of heat, since they also are repugnant by nature of the thing. I suggested another response above, that in dry and disposed matter fire can be generated without previous supreme heating, which can easily be defended, and with that posited it does not follow that there is supreme heat in iron. The first response, however, is sufficient.

32. Whether remiss acts increase habit. To the experience concerning remiss acts that was adduced, it is responded that it rather proves the opposite, because according to common opinion they do not intensify or increase habit; although this requires longer exposition, which we will deliver more professionally in its proper place. To the other concerning falling drops it is responded that individual drops do something, because gradually they dispose the subject, which they render somewhat softer otherwise if the subject remained equally indisposed, the second could do nothing more than the first, nor the hundredth than the third; nevertheless each acts upon something dissimilar; for of itself, for example, it was dry, and in the beginning it begins to be moistened according to the proportion and power of the falling drop; because, however, the later ones find what suffers more disposed, they act more, nevertheless none acts beyond its proper intensity and power. To the third concerning frost it should be noted first that air does not make water colder than it itself is cold, but at most it can completely prevent it from being heated by an external agent, and then the water itself reduces itself to the supreme coldness which its nature can have. But if that coldness suffices for freezing, it no longer comes from air; if however it does not suffice (as indeed it seems not to suffice, otherwise water existing in its natural state would always be frozen), even then another cause of that freezing must be sought besides air, because air was only said to make

cold. I think, however, that freezing comes from diminution of the humidity of water, and indeed from some celestial influence causing dryness; for that dryness so affected and tempered with such density and coldness of matter completes the freezing; therefore no quality intervenes there which is intensified by a more remiss quality of the same nature.

On Reflected Action

33. The other doubt taken from the same argument is concerning reflected action, in which some confess that remiss form can intensify itself, not merely something similar to itself. We reject this opinion taken so absolutely and universally above, and we will immediately add something again against it. Others say that by reflection solar rays are multiplied, for example, around the same part of the medium, for because of themselves they could (they say) pass through further, obtaining a greater sphere, therefore when they encounter a body which impedes their diffusion, they return to the same thing which suffers from which they are reverberated, and thus reflection occurs. But unless these things are said by metaphor, they are plainly false and openly contrary to reason; for rays are imagined to be certain corpuscles which arise from the sun, which concerning every agent was the opinion of Democritus, rejected by Aristotle and all philosophers, as St. Thomas noted generally, I, q. 115, a. 1, and specially concerning light, q. 67, a. 2.

34. The first mode of explaining the question is disproved. Therefore in two ways it can be understood that action into the medium is more intense on account of reflection. First, because while the principal agent operates in a smaller sphere, it acts more intensely in the parts of it than if its action were diffused to a greater sphere; which principle indeed appears probable per se, for finite power, applied to more things, is less in individuals; therefore conversely, collected to fewer things, it will act more strongly in individuals;

therefore it will also act more intensely, within the latitude however of its power and intensity. Thus therefore fire heating this hall, when it could heat a much greater sphere simultaneously, because nevertheless its action is detained within the barriers of the hall, makes more intense heat in this air than it would otherwise make, and the same proportionally is true of the sun illuminating. Although however it is then said that intensity is greater on account of reflection, nevertheless truly that reflection so explained, on the part of the body in which it occurs, is only an impediment lest the action proceed further. On the part however of the principal agent it is more efficacious action and greater application of its power.

35. But this mode of explaining reflection, and action through it, although it is probable in what it affirms, nevertheless does not alone suffice, as it seems, to preserve everything which experience shows in reflection of this kind. First indeed, because if the body in which reflection occurs only served as an impediment to diffusion, by reason of which the power of the first agent as if united to a smaller sphere acts more strongly upon it, any body placed in the same point and equally impeding the extension of the sphere would make equal reflection, for it would provide entirely equal occasion for the first agent to intensify its action more strongly and (so to speak) double its forces; but the consequent is openly contrary to experience; for a black thing, for example, other things being equal, does not make equal reflection of light as a white thing; nor does a white thing make equal reflection as a mirror. Second, because if reflection were made only in that way, it should occur in equal proportion through the whole sphere; for that stronger action or application of power occurs in equal proportion to that whole. But the consequent is against manifest experience, for stronger reflection occurs in parts nearer to the body from which reflection is made, as is sufficiently evident per se.

36. The body which reflects action truly acts upon that against which it reflects. Wherefore it seems necessarily to be said that

in this said reflection there intervenes proper efficiency of that body in which reflection occurs; for it receives from the first agent form or active quality, and being thus affected it again acts upon what suffers near to it, which is the medium itself through which the first action of the agent came to that body. And therefore that first action of the agent is called direct, the other however is called reflected. This mode however is proved in no other way than from sufficient enumeration, and because it is probable per se and involves no repugnance, because it often happens that one thing acts again through form received from outside, just as hot water through heat. Nevertheless it is not without its difficulties; for first it can be asked, since the medium receives the same quality from the first agent, why does it not rather act upon another, from which reflection is said to occur, than suffer from it. It is responded that this comes from the peculiar disposition or condition of such body and quality; for light, for example, does not seem per se active unless it is received in a dense and polished body; or at least it is not equally active, as experience teaches; therefore because the moon illuminated by the sun illuminates more than other parts of the sky, because it is so bright that it is also dense. Since therefore reflection of light always occurs in a dense body toward a rare medium, therefore that action is rather from such body than from another. Something similar is found in reflection of heat; for it commonly occurs from a denser body, which acts more strongly, as was said above, on account of multitude of matter.

37. The doubt is satisfied. But then a second difficulty arises, because from this it follows either that the first agent more intensely heats or illuminates a distant thing than a near one, on account of its disposition, or that that distant thing in which reflection occurs intensifies similar quality in the medium only on account of greater multitude of matter, although nevertheless in it there is either less intense or at most equally; but both repugn what was said above. This is the argument by which those are especially moved who say that in reflected action like is intensified in degree by like, or the same by

itself. But this has been partly refuted above, and moreover can easily be refuted, because reflected action is true action and cannot occur without sufficient power and has nothing special except denomination, because it is turned toward the agent, from which form is directly received, from which is the reflected action. And therefore someone could respond that this reflection never occurs except either through quality of different nature or with the help of some similar quality; as, for example, when a mirror heats by reflected action through light, then reflection is said to occur through quality of different nature, and the difficulty touched upon easily ceases, as was said above; because, although light is not more intense in the mirror than in air, it can heat more intensely, because it is quality of superior nature, and from elsewhere it is helped by density of subject and multitude of form more applied. But truly when reflection occurs between lights themselves, the said response has no place, and therefore then there will not be lacking someone who denies that there is in reality such reflected action by which light of the medium is made greater, but that it so appears, because that polished or white body moves sight more vehemently. But this does not appear believable, because we experience that the air itself shines more clearly when reflection occurs, and objects placed in it are seen better. It could also be said that light is not intensified in the medium, but a new one is made by the body through reflection; nor is it inconvenient that two lights be simultaneously in the same part of air. Just as when reflection occurs in a mirror, it is probable that a new visible species of the same object is caused in the medium through reflection. But this multiplication of lights, although it pleases students of optics, is not received by philosophers, nor is it consonant with what was said above concerning individuation of accidents. And therefore it can be said otherwise that light received in a dense body is of different nature from that which is received in air, which is difficult to believe. Or it could also be said that it is helped by some quality of the subject; but all these things and others which can easily be thought up would be

affirmed without foundation to flee the difficulty rather than to resolve it.

38. Wherefore it seems necessarily to be admitted that something from the said consequents [holds], provided it is not understood that remiss quality either by itself alone intensifies something similar to itself, but in the power and with the partnership of the principal agent; for this to be probable was declared above. If therefore we say that the sun, for example, on account of greater capacity of the subject, more intensely illuminates a distant mirror than the intermediate air, with the medium itself cooperating as instrument or partial agent, then it is easy to understand that the mirror thus illuminated again acts upon air near to it and intensifies the light; for it is not inconvenient that in the same quality certain degrees be made by one agent and others by another, when they act by different actions and not equally primarily, but with some order, as happens here. If however we say that in direct action the remote mirror is not illuminated more intensely than the intermediate air, thus it must be said, because the mirror is more apt for acting through received light than air, as soon as it is illuminated it is joined virtually to the first agent and helps it and is helped by it toward intensifying the light of air. And thus these two modes of speaking can probably be defended, although, everything being weighed, among these two modes the former seems easier and better to declare reflected action and avoid difficulties.

On Reaction

39. In the fourth argument difficulty is sought concerning reaction and how in it the greater proportion necessary for effective causality is preserved. But this difficulty is most broadly treated in Book I On Generation, and depends especially on understanding the difference which exists between the power of acting and of resisting, which we will deliver below treating of power. Now therefore it is

briefly said that to resist something formally is not to act upon it; for a thing can sometimes resist, even if it acts nothing upon another. From which it happens that for acting it is not necessary that the force of acting of one be greater than the force of acting of another, but per se it is only required that the action of one overcome the resistance of the other. Hence therefore it happens that what suffers reacts upon its agent, even if it suffers more vehemently from it, because, although it is overcome in activity, nevertheless it can by its activity somewhat overcome the resistance of the other, and thus it does not act upon it insofar as it is greater or equal to itself, but insofar as it is in some way inferior. But these things will be understood better, with the natures of active and resistive power explained, and their proportions, which we will accomplish below. The last argument was solved above.

SECTION X
WHETHER ACTION IS THE PROPER PRINCIPLE OF CAUSATION OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE, OR ITS CAUSALITY

1. We have explained the principles and necessary conditions of the efficient cause so that it may be proximately apt for causing; it remains for us to explain what that is by which it is formally constituted as actually causing. For we call this the proximate principle of causation, or the causality of each cause. And, as I have often said, there is no discussion here about the relation of the cause which is said to result from an effect already produced, because it is manifest that this is not causality, since it rather presupposes causality as the principle in which it is founded. Therefore, the discussion concerns causality insofar as, according to our mode of understanding, it denotes the proximate principle of founding the relation; for that principle is what constitutes and denominates the cause in act, insofar as it is said to be prior by nature to its effect.

Opinions of Some Authors

2. The difficulty is whether this causality is the very action by which the agent acts, or whether it is something else besides the action. For some Thomists deny that the causality of the agent is the action itself, such as Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 4, and Javellus, q. also 4, who cites Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1, and Quodl. IV, q. 8. The foundation can be that the causality of the agent ought to be different from the effect of the agent, for causality is not caused, but through it the effect is caused; but action is an effect of the agent; therefore it is not its causality. The minor is proved, both because action is nothing else in reality than the effect as it emanates from the agent, and also because the action itself, even taken formally, arises from the agent and from its power; therefore it also is an effect of the agent and needs causality by which it is caused. Second, because when the action is completed, the efficient cause still remains true; for the sun, after it has produced gold, is the efficient cause of it, and it is true to say that gold depends on the sun as on an efficient cause, and yet the action does not endure.

3. But if you ask these authors what is the principle of causation of this cause, they respond with nothing else except that the causality of the efficient is to give being to the effect. But since these words are also common to other causes, especially to form, they add an explanation, namely, that it is to give by effecting, or that it is to effect or to produce. In this they seem to fail in two ways: first, because they define the same by the same; second, because unwillingly they fall back into the opinion which they reject. For what is to effect except to act? And from what is a thing denominated as acting except from action? Therefore it is the same to say that the causality of the efficient cause consists in the very acting as to consist in action, except that by these latter words it is declared more formally, not only through the concrete itself or through the denomination of the agent,

which is the same as the denomination of the efficient cause in act, but through the abstract and through the form that denominates.

4. Second Opinion. Others therefore, so that they might entirely depart from the aforesaid opinion, say that the causality of the agent cannot be something outside the agent, but ought to be an intrinsic mode of the agent itself. For in other causes, the causality of each is an intrinsic mode efficaciously making that cause intrinsic; therefore the same will be in the efficient cause. But action properly so called, as such, is not a mode of the agent, but something outside the agent itself. And it is confirmed, for such action, which is in the effect, does not intervene in every effective causality, as is evident in creation, and yet there is true efficient cause there; therefore the causality of the efficient as such does not consist in action, but in something intrinsic to the agent itself, whatever that may be. It is confirmed secondly, because one efficient cause with respect to one adequate effect has one causality, and yet often it does not have one, but several actions, as fire with one causality generates fire similar to itself, and yet there intervenes the action by which it transmutes matter, and another by which it makes the form, and another by which it unites that form, and another by which it produces the whole composite; for all these actions can be distinguished in the generation of man, and the same reasoning seems to apply to the rest; for the very distinction of relations and relationships indicates the distinction of actions.

Resolution of the Question

5. The causality of the efficient is the action itself. Nevertheless, it must be said that the causality of the efficient cause can consist in nothing other than action. This opinion is taught in these times by the most learned modern writers, and is signified by St. Thomas, V Metaph., c. 2, in those words: "The efficient is the cause of the end as to being, because by moving it leads to this, that the end might be"; and below: "The efficient is a cause insofar as it acts." Albert

holds the same opinion, II Phys., tract. 2, c. 6. And it is proved, for that is the causality of the agent cause which constitutes it or rather denominates it as actually acting; but this is action, and nothing else can be; therefore. The major is established from the very exposition of the question given above and from the terms themselves, because a cause is constituted in the nature of cause by causality; but it is the same to be an efficient cause in act as to be an agent. The minor also seems clear from the terms, because the cause is constituted as actually acting by that which is understood to be added immediately beyond the power of acting; for while a cause is understood to have only the power of acting, it is not understood as actually acting; therefore there must be something beyond this power that is necessarily required within the scope of this cause; but this is nothing other than the action itself, which being removed, the power cannot be understood as actually acting, and with that being posited, it is necessarily actually acting; on account of which Aristotle said that the relation of the agent is proximately founded in action, V Metaph., c. 14; therefore that is the proper causality of the agent.

6. Second, because the causality of each cause is that by which it proximately, per se, and intrinsically attains the effect and by which, conversely, the effect depends on such a cause; for causality is like a way or tendency toward the effect. Hence it is situated between cause and effect as between two terms, because through causality the cause flows into the effect and the effect proceeds from the cause. But action is that by which the efficient cause actually attains its effect and by which the effect depends on its cause; for it is the very dependence of the effect made upon the cause making, as we shall immediately signify and treat more broadly below when disputing about action; therefore.

7. Third, from sufficient enumeration, because action is necessary for this causality, and besides that nothing else is necessary, indeed nothing else can even probably be conceived; therefore. I suppose the major as certain, especially in the present matter, where

we are dealing with created causes; for doubt could only arise about creation, but we are not now dealing with that, although even in that it is true, as we shall show below. The minor will be clearly established from the solutions of the arguments of the opposite opinion; now it is briefly declared in this way, because if something else mediates between the power of acting and the action which is the causality of the agent, either that is previous to the action and in some way the root of it, or subsequent to the action and resulting from it, or something having itself concomitantly; none of these can probably be said. The first member is proved; for whatever is previous to action does not pertain to the actual causality of the efficient, but either to the principle of causation by way of principle quo or quod, or to a condition required for acting; the sign of which is that if one stops at that whole previous thing and action does not follow upon it, the cause is not yet understood to actually cause, whether this happens through precision of the intellect, or because action is suspended in reality with all other prerequisites being posited, whether this happens supernaturally, or from the freedom of the cause; but immediately as action is understood to be posited in reality, it is impossible that the cause should not actually cause. The second member is easily persuaded in the contrary way; for whatever follows upon action is either its term or something posterior to the term; therefore it can much less pertain to the causality of the first cause than the action itself; for that is properly the effect, either primary or secondary, of such a cause. The third member is also easily proved, because if it only has itself concomitantly, therefore it is per accidens to action; therefore with that being excluded, action can remain; therefore with that also being excluded, the causality of the agent will remain; therefore this causality cannot consist in that. Especially since there cannot be understood or declared what that is which is distinct from action and from its principles, and from all conditions previous to it, which is nevertheless necessary for it. Nor can any probable reason for

this necessity be given. It remains therefore that action alone can be the causality of the agent.

Solutions to Objections Raised to the Contrary

8. Whether action may be called an effect of the agent. Action is not made by another action. The agent is constituted in act through action in act. To the foundation of the prior opinion therefore it is responded that action is not properly and formally the very effect produced by the agent, but is a mode of such an effect distinct from it by the nature of the thing; a sufficient argument for which is that the effect can remain without such a mode or with varied dependence, which is the same thing. For that mode is the emanation or dependence of the effect from the agent cause; but the effect can now depend on this cause and later on another, and thus dependence can be varied in it concerning the same effect, and then nothing else is varied than the causality of the agent. Concerning this distinction of action from the term we have touched on some things in what preceded, and we shall say more in what follows, partly when treating of creation, partly below when treating of action and passion. But if by the name of effect we comprehend not only the thing produced, but whatever emanates from the power of the agent, thus we concede that action is in some way an effect of the agent, since it is dependent or rather the very dependence upon it. But to be an effect in this broad way does not conflict with causality; rather, in all the causes which we have treated thus far, causality is an effect of the cause; for union is an effect of form and also of matter in its genus, and is the causality of each according to diverse relations. And the general reason is that causality always comes from the cause; and therefore, although it is not caused for its own sake, it is nevertheless co-caused, and therefore speaking broadly it is comprehended under effect. Nor indeed is it therefore necessary that causality be caused by another causality, or

that action be made by another action, because it is of the nature of causality that it have an immediate relation to the cause and be like a medium or bond between cause and effect. And thus action is compared to its term and to the principle or efficient cause from which it emanates; but the action itself does not emanate by means of another action, otherwise one would proceed to infinity, but action is the very emanation; just as the term of motion is made through motion, but the motion itself is not made through another motion, because it is the very way to the term. From which it happens (so that we may respond to the second argument) that it is impossible for the cause to endure in act when action ceases or is completed; the thing which was a cause in act can indeed endure, but it will not endure in the nature of actually causing, since it does not actually flow into the effect; hence neither can such an effect be truly said to now actually depend on such a cause, but to have depended at some time in its becoming, which dependence it did not have except by reason of action, which also then existed when it emanated from its cause.

9. The causality of the agent is not an intrinsic mode of the agent. To the arguments posited in the latter place, we deny that the causality of the agent ought to or can be an intrinsic mode of the agent itself, distinct from the action which emanates from the agent and is in the term itself or in the patient. This seems manifest in natural agents which act by transient action alone, because they are not changed nor do they acquire anything from the fact that they act. Nor is there any necessity of feigning such a mode, since action is sufficient for the effect to emanate from its agent. But in those things which act by immanent action, if they do nothing else than the very immanent act itself, it is also manifest that in the acting faculty there is not another intrinsic mode distinct from the very act or immanent action which is the causality of such an act; for the very immanent action immediately emanates from its principle, and whatever else is added as a medium between the power sufficiently constituted in first act and the action, will be gratuitously fabricated and without necessity, and beyond all

common doctrine, which in these powers recognizes nothing except either the acts themselves or actions and their principles, which are either species or habits. And in the will there is nothing actual in which the freedom of the will is first exercised except the action elicited by the will itself; therefore that is the effective causality of such a power. But because the thing which is made through such action remains in the power itself, therefore such action is a mode affecting the agent cause, not because this belongs to the nature of causality of the agent as such. Finally, in those things which through an immanent act do something outside themselves, it can seem that the causality by which such a cause acts outside itself is the act or motion remaining in it; nevertheless it really is not, because that act which remains in such a cause is not the formal causality which constitutes the thing as actually causing outside itself, but is either the proximate principle of acting, or the application of the proximate principle, from which causality arises. This can be seen in God himself, who most of all acts ad extra through an act remaining in himself; for since this act in God is eternal and immutable, nevertheless his actual causality is posited in time, because God does not actually cause until the effect is made, and therefore such causality cannot be something in God himself, who cannot be changed, but in the creature, which is made or changed. Therefore the causality of the agent is never a mode intrinsically affecting the agent as such.

10. Nor is it truly necessary that in this there be complete similarity among all causes, because the nature of all is not the same; for material and formal causes are intrinsic; but the efficient cause by its genus is extrinsic. And comparing matter and form among themselves, the latter is in a certain way more intrinsic, insofar as it is more proper and determining, affecting matter. And therefore among the causalities of these causes there is a certain proportional dissimilarity. For the causality of form is an intrinsic mode and in reality the same as the form; but the causality of matter can be called intrinsic insofar as it is intimately in the matter itself, but it is not a

mode so identified as that of form; but the causality of the agent is per se extrinsic and as distinct from the agent as the effect itself; but if sometimes it remains in the agent or is distinguished from it not really but only modally, this is accidental to the nature of the agent as such and comes either from the fact that the agent is simultaneously a patient, or from the fact that the thing which is made is not entirely distinct from the agent, but is its mode.

11. To the first confirmation the assumption is denied; for even in creation causality consists in action, as the argument made a little before shows, for since that causality is temporal, it cannot consist in an intrinsic mode of the agent; therefore it must consist in extrinsic action; but what kind of action that is and in what subject, we shall say later.

12. To the second confirmation it is responded that that argument can be turned to the contrary; for wherever there is one cause formally, that is, one causation, there is one action, and conversely, where actions are multiplied, causalities are also multiplied; therefore it is a sign that this causality consists in action. Wherefore, if the generation of fire is taken as including the preceding alteration and substantial generation, we indeed confess that those are two actions; nevertheless in the same way they are two causalities; but if there is discussion about the causality of substance alone, we deny that there are several actions there, but there is one and the same by which both the whole composite is made and the form is educed from the potency of matter and is united to it; for in all these things only several relations are denoted which the same action has to its subject or to the formal or total term; but in the generation of man the productive action of the form is distinguished by special reason from the unitive action (whatever some may say), because that form does not depend on matter as on the proper cause of its production, but it does depend in union; but the action by which the form is united and

the composite is made is not distinct, because the composite cannot be made otherwise than by uniting the form to matter[27].

SECTION XI
WHETHER THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CORRUPTS OR DESTROYS SOMETHING BY EFFECTING, AND HOW

1. If the very name of efficient cause is attentively considered, it does not seem to signify a cause which takes away being, but which gives being, and therefore in all the things which we have said about this cause thus far, we have only explained the causality of this cause insofar as it gives or flows being. But since philosophers so commonly speak of the efficient cause that they consider it to effect not only the generations of things, but also corruptions, which is not to give being, but rather to take it away, therefore for the completion of this disputation it is necessary that we also say a few things about this matter and explain whether this also is true efficiency, and by what causality and power it is done.

2. Various modes of destroying things. It must be noted therefore that something can be corrupted or cease to be in two ways: first, because the non-being of one thing follows from the being of another. Second, because a thing is absolutely deprived of its being as if immediately and without consequence from another being. In the prior way wood is corrupted when fire is generated from it, because the being of wood cannot simultaneously be in the same thing with the being of fire. But in the latter way light is corrupted in air through the absence of the sun; for no being is introduced into air that conflicts with the being of the luminous, but that form simply perishes when

[27] Lege Scotum, VII Metaph., q. 10; et Ant. Andr., q. 4; et Soncin., q. 23; et Zimar. Theorem 100; et Duramd, In II, dist. 1, q. ult. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 299.

the conserving cause recedes. Although even the very being of the sun in another hemisphere can be said to be naturally incompossible with the being of light in the air of this hemisphere; but that is very remotely, extrinsically and per accidens, on account of the defect of a condition necessary for acting and not on account of a repugnance which is intrinsically and per se between light and place.

Resolution of the Question

3. Nothing is ever directly destroyed by positive action. This being supposed, two principles seem certain: the first is that corruption and cessation of a thing is never done through positive and proper efficiency, except insofar as the lack of some being follows upon the effection or position of another being. It is proved, because positive efficiency is only done through positive action; but positive action does not immediately and per se tend toward non-being; therefore corruption or destruction of some thing cannot be positively effected through it, except insofar as through it there comes to be the being of some thing, with which the non-being of another is necessarily conjoined. The major has been proved in the preceding section, and the same is established from the terms themselves; for efficiency and action are the same, just as efficient and agent. The minor is proved, both because real or positive action (for they are the same) necessarily tends toward a real term, as will be shown below in its place, and in transient actions this is denied by no one; but a real term receives some real being through action; therefore it is the term of it. Hence even those who deny a real term in immanent actions cannot deny that the very action, insofar as it is positively made, receives some real being from its efficient cause. But if through that action something is immediately corrupted (that is, without the production of another term or thing), it is only insomuch as the being of that action, whatever it may be, is incompossible with another being which is destroyed. Therefore it is universally true that through

positive efficiency nothing is immediately destroyed, but only consequently upon another being which comes to be through action; which consequence is always founded in some repugnance of such things. And it is confirmed from that common axiom, that no agent, intending toward evil, operates; but non-being as such has the nature of evil; therefore positive efficiency never per se tends toward non-being, but toward some being from which another non-being follows.

4. An objection is dissolved. You will say, although this is true in natural agents, nevertheless not in voluntary ones; for God can will something not to be, not so that another thing might be, but only so that it might not be, and one man often in this way intends the death of another, whence in artificial things action often tends per se primarily toward destruction. It is responded, although a voluntary agent can per se intend the destruction of a thing, nevertheless it cannot pursue and effect it through action which of itself primarily tends toward non-being, on account of the reason touched upon above. Hence even God himself, while he wills to destroy some thing, will either obtain this through the sole suspension of influence without positive action, or if he wishes to use positive action, he will necessarily make something from which such corruption follows. But man, who cannot destroy a thing through the sole suspension of influence, since things do not depend upon him in their being, always uses actions which commonly are nothing but local changes of bodies, which tend directly and per se to their proper terms, and thence per accidens follows corruption or destruction, which although it is per se intended as to the extrinsic intention of the agent, nevertheless happens per accidens or consequently through such action.

5. Destruction of a thing, directly intended, happens through lack of efficiency. The Aristotelian axiom is explained. The second principle is: when the cessation of some thing does not follow upon the positive effection of another, but happens per se alone, it does not happen through proper efficiency, but through lack of efficiency. This principle follows from the preceding, because positive action is only

toward some positive being; therefore, while no being is communicated, positive action cannot intervene; but in this genus of cessation and corruption no being is communicated, but only taken away; therefore it cannot happen through true action; therefore it must necessarily happen through lack of action, because no other mode of causality which pertains to the efficient cause can intervene. You will say this genus of cause seems only to be per accidens, such as that which removes the cause per se; but truly such a cause of corruption is not only per accidens, but per se; therefore it is not only by absence of cause, but by proper efficiency. The minor is evident, both from Aristotle saying that, just as the presence of the sailor is the cause of conservation of the ship, so absence is the cause of its submersion; and also because that effect cannot be reduced to a more proper and per se cause. And on this seems to be founded that common axiom: If affirmation is the cause of affirmation, negation will be the cause of negation, which is most known in proper per se and adequate causes. It is responded that from this very axiom is gathered that the per se cause of corruption (if indeed it can have any) is not to be sought as positively acting, but rather as not acting, since the cause ought to be proportioned to the effect. Hence in that example of Aristotle also, the absence of the sailor is not an acting cause, but rather a non-acting one. Wherefore, if it is compared to the submersion of the ship insofar as it is a certain positive effect, it is only a per accidens cause of it, truly and physically considering the matter, although morally and imputatively it is considered per se, if he was bound to be present; but if it is compared only to the lack of aid or defense of the ship, another negation can be called the per se cause of this negation; for they have proportion among themselves and intrinsic and immediate consequence. Therefore, in this way, if a cause per se was influencing being and takes away the influence, it will be called the per se cause of cessation of such being, not because it effects cessation by positive action, but because in a proportioned way it is the proper principle and origin of such cessation. Hence, just as

privation is said to be not through positive being, but through lack of being, so it is said to become not through positive action, but through lack of action. And by the same proportion the efficient cause per se of it is not called such because it positively effects it, but because it takes away the influence by which it per se caused that being which is destroyed through such corruption. Rather, every cause which by positively effecting destroys another as such or insofar as it is efficient, is not a per se cause, but a per accidens cause, of the destruction of the other.

Corollaries of the Above Doctrine

6. In any destruction of a thing change is found, not in any action. From these principles we can infer some things worthy of note concerning the changes or corruptions of things. For first, it follows that in every corruption or loss of some real being some change intervenes, but not always does some action necessarily intervene. This is evident from the second principle posited, with the definition of change added. For, as Aristotle testifies, a thing is changed when the thing has itself otherwise than before; therefore when air from illuminated becomes dark, it is changed; therefore some change is made in it; and yet that is not done through action, as is established from the second principle posited; therefore there is change there without action, and the same is true in all similar cases. But the reason is that that change is purely privative, not positive. Whence it happens that this only occurs in accidental changes, if we speak properly and according to the common course of nature about change, because the subject of an accident can sometimes lose it, even if it does not acquire another; but the subject of substantial form cannot be substantially changed by losing one form without acquiring another. And therefore I said properly and according to the common course of nature speaking about change. For God could suspend the influence of substantial form while conserving matter; or if the name of change is

extended to annihilation, he could entirely change a thing from being to non-being without any action. In which there is also to be noted the difference between free and natural causes, that free causes can suspend their influence from intrinsic dominion and power without any prior action or change in themselves or in another; and thus they can also cause this privative change, either in themselves, if they themselves are changeable, as created causes, or in others, as God; but naturally acting causes cannot suspend their influence unless something else is first changed which was necessary for acting; and therefore although they sometimes change some subject in the aforesaid way without action concerning it, nevertheless some other action always intervenes, either concerning the same subject or concerning another, as the sun does not destroy light in air through withdrawal of influence unless there precedes an action by which either the sun itself is moved, or a window is closed, etc.

7. Action secondarily tending toward destruction is always dependent on a subject. Annihilation cannot be from a subject. Second, it follows from what has been said that whenever corruption or cessation of a thing happens through positive action which of itself has the consequence of causing such corruption, it is necessary that such action be made from a presupposed subject. The reason is that corruption or cessation does not happen from the force of physical action (for thus we speak), except because that being which comes to be through such action has natural repugnance with the being which is destroyed: but this natural repugnance cannot be except in order to the same common subject, which remains under both terms, because among things subsisting per se and having no order to a subject there cannot be natural repugnance, on account of which they cannot simultaneously be in the nature of things; therefore it is necessary that such action be from something presupposed. And hence it is that proper annihilation cannot be done by God through positive action, because annihilation leaves nothing of the thing which can be the subject of action. Likewise, because either the action is made in the

subject, and thus does not destroy it, and consequently does not effect annihilation, or it is made without a subject, and thus nothing can be made through it which conflicts with the whole being of another thing; therefore nothing can be annihilated through such action. But if someone objects that the action by which the rational soul is made is not from a subject, and yet to it follows the corruption of another, namely of the embryo, it is responded by denying the minor, but properly that corruption follows either from the action by which matter is sufficiently disposed for the introduction of the rational soul, or from the action by which the soul itself is united to the body, or from both in their genus, as will be explained below; but both of these actions are from a presupposed subject; but creation is only presupposed by natural order to the unitive action, but consequent naturally to the dispositive action. Someone could more difficultly insist about that action by which bread is converted into the body of Christ, which is not an action from a presupposed subject, and yet from the force of it the substance of bread ceases to be. But this difficulty is higher than can be treated in this place, and therefore to exclude it I said that the discussion is about natural action and cessation; but that mystery is entirely supernatural. Nevertheless in it I believe it true, either that there the cessation of bread does not follow from the force of physical action alone[28] and natural connection of things; or if some such action intervenes there, that it deals in some way with a subject, and the quantity of bread, conserved without the substance, takes the place of such a subject, as I have disputed more broadly in the proper place.

8. Third inference. Third, I infer that whenever corruption or cessation happens through positive action, there intervenes one simple action, but two partial changes, one positive, the other privative. For something is changed in three ways, as Aristotle proposes in V Phys. First, from some form into lack of it; and then

[28] Castellote notes that the line "cae et naturalis connexionis, vel si" is incorrectly positioned in ed. BHF, t. III, p. 305.

change is made, but no action intervenes, properly speaking, as has been said, but lack of conservative action. Second, change is made from pure privation into form, as from dark to luminous; then just as one action intervenes, so also one simple positive change. Third, it happens that something is changed from one form into another, as when from hot becomes cold, and from wood fire. And then one simple action intervenes by which the form which is newly introduced into such a subject is educed or united; for no other action is necessary to expel the other, as we have said; but a double change is made; for that subject has itself otherwise in a double title, namely both by lacking the form which it had before, and by having that which it did not have before. Which two changes are so distinct that in reality they are sometimes separated, as has been declared in the first two members. Likewise one is generation, the other is substantial or accidental corruption, or sometimes one is intension and the other remission. Finally one is positive, the other privative. Hence, as much as the information of one form and the privation of another differ among themselves, so much do those changes differ among themselves. But those partial changes can be called such because they physically compose one integral transition from one positive term to another, which in philosophy is called the conversion of one thing into another. You will say: just as positive and privative change intervenes there, so intervenes positive action and lack of action by which the opposite form was conserved, either by natural causes or at least by God; for one of these is always necessary; therefore there is the same reason about action and change. It is responded that there is only the difference that the nature of change is preserved in the new privation insofar as it is in becoming; but the nature of action not at all, but requires positive influence; which is established from their definitions and essential natures.

9. Fourth, it is inferred that corruption which happens through some efficiency is made through the same principles, whether principal or instrumental, and with the same conditions by which the

generation or production is made to which such corruption follows. It is proved from what has been said, because there is no other efficiency nor other action for corruption than for production; therefore through the same principles by which one being is made, another is taken away. Nor can any principle positively concur to taking away being except insofar as it concurs to giving another being. From which in the preceding we said against some moderns that the form introduced into the patient by the agent does not concur effectively to expelling the opposite form, as heat to expelling coldness, and so concerning others, because the form introduced into the patient is not an efficient principle of its generation; therefore neither of the corruption of the opposite form. Likewise, because if that efficiency is positive, something positive is made through it; but the form introduced into the patient positively effects nothing by which it expels another form, but immediately follows the expulsion of the other form; therefore.

10. How one body displaces another from place. Hence it is not similar to what is usually adduced concerning one body expelling another from the same place, which seems to expel it effectively; although indeed Scotus, In IV, dist. 12, q. 3, seems also to deny this, yet in truth the case is not similar. For two bodies touch each other and one drives out the other; and what is expelled does not lose place through mere cessation, but through real change and tendency toward another place, to which it is effectively moved by the expelling body; and therefore not only does formal incompossibility of those bodies in the same space intervene there, but also special positive action by which the body, driven from one place, is transferred to another, which is distinct from that by which another body is introduced into the place of the other. But it is otherwise when a form introduced into one subject expels another, for that which is expelled is not changed positively, but merely privatively ceases to be; and therefore no special efficient causation can intervene there. There is therefore only formal expulsion there, and universally any cause in its own genus so concurs

in the non-being of one term as it concurs in the being of another; because therefore heat introduced into a subject does not heat it actively, but only formally, therefore it does not expel cold actively, but only formally. But it is otherwise concerning heat which is in the generator; for that is the efficient principle of another heat, and consequently expelling the opposite cold. And by the same proportion, heat produced in wood (and the same applies to every similar disposition), although it excludes the directly opposite accidental form only formally, yet corrupts the substance itself dispositively, because in this way it causes the introduction of the opposite form, and, as has been said, in that genus of cause one form concurs in the non-being of one term in which it concurs in the being of the opposite term. Hence, because an accident from its proper nature and power has the capacity to dispose toward the substantial form connatural to it and formally to expel the contrary disposition, therefore it can be said in this genus to corrupt the substance by its own power. But if those accidents and dispositions of the patient also concur effectively in the eduction of their form, by the same genus of efficient causation they concur in the corruption of another; or if they have no efficient causation for the former, neither do they for the latter. And thus universally it is true that only those are efficient principles of corruption which effect generation when corruption occurs through efficient causation; for when it happens through the sole lack of efficient causation, it does not require a proper principle of acting, but it is only necessary that that which was the principle of acting or conserving the thing cease from acting.

DISPUTATION XIX

ON CAUSES ACTING NECESSARILY AND FREELY OR CONTINGENTLY; WHERE ALSO CONCERNING FATE, FORTUNE, AND CHANCE

Beyond all that has been said about created efficient causes in the previous disputation, it remains to discuss the mode of acting of such causes; this we have reserved for this disputation because it has a particular difficulty, and because upon it depends that celebrated distinction concerning necessary and contingent effects, and the knowledge of many causes. We shall therefore speak first about causes acting necessarily, then about free causes, and finally about contingent ones; from these it will be established what fate, fortune, and chance are among natural causes.

SECTION I

WHETHER AMONG CREATED EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE ANY ACTING NECESSARILY, AND WHAT KIND OF NECESSITY THIS IS

Section I

1. Causes acting necessarily are given, if the requisites for acting are present. What these requisites are. This question is easy, and therefore it must be said briefly: first, that among created causes there are many which operate necessarily, if all things which they need for operating are applied. This is established by experience and easy induction; for the sun necessarily illuminates, fire heats, and so forth with others. The reason, moreover, must be taken from the intrinsic condition and determination of nature, as we shall declare in the following assertion. But that condition is added, "if all necessary things are present," because a sufficient cause must be presupposed that is proximately apt and possesses all conditions requisite for acting. For if any of these is lacking, action will not follow, not indeed from indifference or indetermination of the cause, but from a defect of some concurrent cause, or from a defect of power or condition necessary for operating. Among these things necessary for acting, however, the action itself must not be numbered, as is evident, because otherwise nothing special would be said about these agents, but that which is common to all, not only to agents but also to things, namely, that if they have the form by which they are constituted in such being or nature, it necessarily follows that they are such. For just as, if someone has whiteness, he is necessarily white, so if he exercises action, he necessarily effects; this is only necessity of consequence (as they say) or conditional necessity, not necessity of the consequent or absolute necessity; which is irrelevant to the proposition, because causes cannot be distinguished in it. Therefore, so that there may be discourse about true and proper necessity, the action itself must not be included when it is said that a cause acts necessarily, if all requisites are applied. From which it follows a fortiori that neither should those things be numbered among these which are posterior to action and consequent upon it, as is clear per se. Indeed, properly speaking, what is of this kind cannot be called necessary for action, but rather necessary from action.

2. The first and second requisite for acting. The third. The fourth. The fifth. Therefore, under that condition must be included all and only those things which are prior to action. These, moreover, are numbered as several by authors, as may be seen in Scotus, In IX Metaph., q. 14, ad 2; Antonius Andreas, q. 1, ad 2; Zimara, theorem. 112, who posit six conditions. The first is that the cause have complete and sufficient power of acting, which is evident per se, because action must presuppose sufficient potency; and, in order that it act necessarily, it must be presupposed as simply and absolutely powerful; but it is not absolutely powerful without sufficient potency. The second is that it have a patient capable and sufficiently approximated, because created agents can do nothing except from a presupposed subject; and because they are finite, they require it within a proportioned sphere, beyond which they have no power of acting. The third, which follows from this[29], is that the medium, if any is interposed between agent and patient, be unimpeded and capable of the agent's action; for we suppose that agents can effect nothing at a distance except through a medium. The fourth is that nothing impeding the action be present of equal power to resist; because nothing can overcome by acting unless it exceeds in active power, and therefore it was shown above that for action there is necessary a proportion of greater inequality. The fifth is that the patient not already be in the terminus or have the entire form which the agent can effect. For this reason alone gravity does not move earth existing in the center; and this condition is contained in the second, for the patient is required for action in that state in which it is capable of action; but after it is in the terminus, it is no longer capable of action. Finally, this condition coincides with that treated above, that agent and patient must in principle be dissimilar in some way.

3. The sixth. A sixth condition is applied, that if some action is naturally prerequisite, it be already presupposed; as the appetite of a

[29] In some editions, hinc is replaced by hanc, which introduces a slight variation of nuance, but not of the sense of the phrase. Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 315.

brute, although it operates naturally, does not always act, because it necessarily requires a condition which is not always present. And similarly sight does not act unless the action of the object upon it precedes. And this condition is virtually contained in the preceding ones, for when one action is prerequisite to another, this is either because through it the power of acting is completed, as in the example of sight, which must first be acted upon by the object, because without a species it does not have completed power of acting. And many think the same about knowledge of the object necessary for appetite, namely that it completes the power of acting of that appetite. More correctly, however, it is said that it applies the object in a sufficient and proportioned manner. For what we said in the second condition, that it is necessary for the patient to be sufficiently near, regarding immanent acts must be extended to the object which is related as the matter about which such acts are concerned. And universally, whenever any efficient cause needs other concurrent causes, even of different kinds, for effecting, it will not be able to begin action unless all necessary concurrent causes are so disposed that they can concur in their kind; for this reason the patient is necessary, because the action of a created agent cannot be made without a material cause. Thus therefore, because the known object or knowledge of the object is a necessary concurrent cause for vital appetition, whether it concurs by mode of efficient cause, or by mode of end, or by mode of extrinsic form, or by mode of matter about which (for concerning all these there can be opinions which refer nothing to the present matter), knowledge of the object is an action necessarily prior to the efficiency of appetite.

4. The seventh. The eighth. A seventh condition is added, that the cause not be free; but this condition is not necessary for us, because this is what we assert in the assertion, namely, that some causes are not free in operating, but given the requisites, act from necessity. An eighth condition can also be added, that the cause have the necessary concourse of the first cause. But concerning this

concourse we must treat expressly below. What pertains to the present matter, however, this condition is either not among the prerequisites, or is contained in the superior ones, as they have been explained by us. For if there is discourse about actual concourse, this is not distinguished from the action itself; and therefore, just as action is not comprehended in the conditions prerequisite to acting, so neither is actual concourse. If, however, there is discourse about aptitudinal concourse (so to speak), or about sufficient application and conjunction of the first cause for concurring, thus indeed that condition is necessary; it is contained, however, in what we said is necessary, namely the cause having complete power and every concurrent cause; for the power of a second cause without the power of the first is either not complete, or if it is said to be complete and total in its kind, it needs conjunction with every other necessary cause in whatever kind or nature of causing. Wherefore under that condition is comprehended every concourse of a superior cause to which the inferior is essentially subordinated, whether this subordination among efficient causes is only between created and uncreated causes, or also between created causes among themselves; which we shall see below.

5. Whether there are any natural agents indifferent to several effects. A ninth condition can be added, that a natural cause not be equally indifferent between several effects, for then, by this very fact that the cause is not free but natural, it will not necessarily make one, and consequently will make neither, because there is no greater reason for one than for another; and because it is not free, it cannot be determined to one more than to another, unless the indifference is removed from elsewhere. Many examples are customarily applied; we shall adduce, however, those which suffice to explain the root of this indifference. The first is concerning fire existing in the center of the earth in circular figure, which according to every part of itself is equally distant from the highest place; for it would not move toward one part rather than another, because there is no reason or determining cause. Nor would it move toward every part, because

otherwise it would be divided in every part of itself. The second is concerning glass perfectly plane superimposed on a stone perfectly plane, upon which another stone perfectly plane falls; for it will not break it, because either it will divide it in every part of itself, which is impossible; or there is no greater reason why it should divide some parts rather than others. The third common example is concerning a brute having simultaneously two equally lovable objects, which would move toward neither. The fourth concerns superior causes capable of effecting contraries, which from themselves cannot be determined to one, if they are applied to acting with that indifference. The fifth and more difficult is concerning every natural cause, which although it is defined for effecting a form in one species, is nevertheless indifferent to various individuals of that species.

6. Where would orbicular fire existing in the center of the earth tend? But nevertheless it seems this condition should be said to be reducible rather to some one of those posited above or to the defect of some one. For this condition of indifference, considered per se, is in some way repugnant to the proper determination of natural agents, for it is proper to them to be determined to one; how therefore can they have indifference from themselves? For it is not sufficient if it is said to be determined to one according to some common nature; for in this way even a free agent is determined to one, namely to good in common. If, however, it is said that a natural agent is determined to one in species, not however in individual, first from this it results that at most there is found in these agents the indifference indicated in the last example, not however that which is signified in the others. And still against that it can be objected, because this itself seems beyond the fitting institution of nature, namely, that these agents are created with some indifference and that they cannot determine themselves; for in this way they would be most inept for acting from themselves. Furthermore, in the first four examples, insofar as they contain some truth, the lack of action does not seem to arise from indifference, but from some impediment or defect of some necessary condition from

those posited above. For example, in the first example, it is very probable to me that fire in that case would not be moved from intrinsic principle. The reason, moreover, arises from equal activity and resistance of all parts; among the conditions, however, requisite for acting from necessity, one was that equal power not resist the action; but in that case all parts of fire equally incline to motion upward by straight line with respect to each one, and thus they have equal activity and resistance among themselves, and thence it happens that none is moved. Nor indeed are they altogether divided among themselves by those quasi contrary propensities. First indeed, because they are more inclined to their conservation than to their place. Second, because the division itself would have to be made by local motion; whence, by this very fact that they cannot be moved, neither can they be divided.

7. Glass perfectly plane striking a plane stone, why it should be broken. The second example first cannot naturally happen, because a perfectly plane object cannot naturally fall equally at first upon a plane, just as a plane cannot equally be separated from a plane, because either a vacuum would have to be granted or air would have to fill that entire place in an instant. For thus conversely it follows, if a plane falls equally upon a plane, either some part of air goes out simultaneously in an instant, so that it passes through distant space as quickly as near space, or it remains there penetratively, or certainly, if air remains in the middle, those two planes do not touch each other. It is necessary therefore that the falling plane first touch according to one part rather than according to another; although concerning this itself the same difficulty can arise, why, namely, it falls and touches first according to one part rather than according to another, if it is plane and of equal weight according to every part. On account of which either some extrinsic cause of this inequality must be sought, given such bodies and such motion, namely, that the medium is not equally divisible according to every part, or something of this kind. Or certainly if none of these intervenes, it must be said that that plane

which falls equally cannot exclude all intermediate air and on account of this cause does not touch the glass nor break it. The reason, moreover, is because even the smallest particle of air, while it cannot be penetrated nor simultaneously pass through some space, resists any heavy thing falling, lest it be expelled thither, just as conversely no force however great can simultaneously according to every part separate two planes, because air cannot simultaneously enter to fill the vacuum. And so in that case the effect does not follow, because a medium sufficient for impeding is granted.

8. But if, pressing the difficulty, we grant either that air goes out simultaneously or that that fall happens through a vacuum, two probable things can be said. The first is that the stone would naturally act as much as it could, and thus would not divide the glass, but would so compress it that it would corrupt it and change it into another nature, as we see happen in wheat ground by a mill; but that body which would arise thence could be continuous; for if it were divided into particles, as flour is, a natural reason could scarcely be given why some parts rather than others would be divided, unless reducing that variety or inequality in the effect to some inequality in contact and alteration arising thence because of the pores of those bodies or because of some other causes concurring there. Or certainly if that contact were not sufficient so that alteration sufficient for corrupting the glass would result thence, it is not inconvenient, but necessary to say that it would not be broken. The reason is because while one body falls upon another it does not break it except on account of some local motion unequally made in the parts of the broken body; for while one part of it is depressed before another, which neither can resist because of defect of power nor yield or bend because of hardness, breaking occurs; but in the said case the glass could not be moved locally, because it is equally touched and impelled according to every part, and it is also equally resisted according to every part by the body placed beneath. Whence if that were not equally plane or equally solid and according to some part would yield more easily, according to that

part the glass would be broken. And thus in that example action never ceases on account of indifference, but on account of impediment equally resisting.

9. To which of two equal objects equally proposed should a brute be moved? In the third example it can also easily be denied that that equality can naturally happen in all respects, because those objects cannot simultaneously be equally considered and presented; or even if we grant that they are simultaneously represented as equally lovable, we shall say that they are simultaneously also loved, but that it is moved toward one rather than toward another for attaining it first, because motion toward that part is apprehended as easier on account of some circumstance. Finally, if we admit equal apprehension in all circumstances, both with respect to appetition and execution, it seems that it must be conceded that there is not in the appetite of a brute the faculty that it determine itself to one rather than to another, on account of lack of freedom. Whence that indetermination does not come from indifference, but rather from natural necessity and determination in the mode of operating, and defect of condition necessary for so operating; which defect comes from causes equal in their kind and mutually resisting each other. For, as we said, sensitive appetite cannot operate except with sufficient proposition and motion of object; but this is lacking in that case, because neither of those objects is apprehended absolutely as to be loved and pursued, as is necessary so that the effect of appetite necessarily follow. The reason, moreover, why that apprehension or judgment is not had in that case is because those objects mutually impede each other while in their mode of causing they equally move and resist. And thus also in that case the conditions enumerated above are lacking.

10. An equivocal natural agent, why it effects this rather than that effect. In the fourth example we can deny first that there is any natural cause which per se is equally indifferent to effecting contrary effects; but rather Aristotle, as we shall see below, constitutes the difference between free and natural potencies in this, that the former

are potencies for opposites or contraries, but the latter not at all, but for one only of the opposites. Which must be understood per se, and with all other things remaining the same, for it happens per accidens that from the effect of the same natural agent contrary effects follow, as we declared above in antiperistasis. From diverse disposition of matter it also happens that the same sun renders wax softer and hardens mud; and from various concourse of causes it also happens that the sun concurs to various or repugnant effects; nevertheless it always acts with natural necessity and determination, supposing all causes concurring simultaneously. Indeed always, as much as is from itself, it begins action in the same way by illuminating and heating; and then according to the disposition of the patient or concourse of other causes, a proportioned effect follows with the same necessity. And in this sense Aristotle said, II de Gener., text. 18, that a natural agent, the same in the same way related (namely in itself and with respect to others), is naturally apt always to do the same thing. Therefore on account of power of acting contraries there is also no indifference in natural causes, because they can never per se alone effect contraries, but with others adjoined, which being posited they necessarily make one or another effect.

11. Whence any efficient cause effects this rather than that singular effect in the same species. In the fifth example there is somewhat greater ambiguity concerning the indifference or determination of any natural cause to individual or singular effects. In which there is a not improbable opinion, that, although the power of a natural cause, absolutely considered, is indifferent to many individuals by mode of superior and sufficient cause for all those, nevertheless in particular applied to this patient with these circumstances, it is naturally determined to effecting such a form in the individual; but when we say that a cause acts necessarily with all requisites applied, there is discourse about all in particular which are required for action. More probably, however, as I touched upon above, this determination to individual effect comes from the concourse and definition of the

first cause; which being posited, it must be said that this condition is also contained in the prerequisites for acting, according to those things which have been explained by us. For a second cause needs the concourse of the first determined to a particular effect, which concourse being exhibited in first act, and all other requisites being adjoined, such a cause is necessarily determined to such an effect in particular. And thus also in this way no indifference intervenes here which is repugnant to natural necessity of acting. Nor is this last indifference, as was objected, against the due institution of nature, that natural agents cannot determine themselves to individual effects unless determination begins from the first cause. But this is the natural imperfection and neediness of such agents and a certain subordination which they have to the first cause, on account of which they are considered as certain instruments of it; and therefore, just as they depend upon it in operating, so also in determination to operating this individual rather than another. Indeed, from this effect we correctly understand that the work of nature is the work of intelligence; and that the effect, however necessary with respect to a particular cause, is free with respect to the universal cause. It is established therefore from all these things that in natural causes there is no proper indifference which is repugnant to necessity of acting, so that such a cause, with all other concurrent causes and conditions requisite for operating being posited, operates from necessity without any indifference whatsoever.

Which Are the Causes Acting Necessarily

12. Second, it must be said that all causes which operate without use of reason, insofar as they are such, operate with the aforesaid necessity. This is taken from Aristotle, lib. IX Metaph., c. 2, where he constitutes this distinction between rational and irrational potencies, that irrational potencies are determined to one, but rational ones are indifferent to opposites. What, moreover, he understands by rational potencies, and whether that mode of operating belongs to all,

we shall see below; now we only assert that all faculties which entirely lack use of reason exercise their operations with natural necessity. Which can also be confirmed by induction; for thus it is established by experiment in all grades of things up to brute animals.

13. The sensitive appetite of man, does it act freely or necessarily? Only concerning the sensitive appetite of man could there be doubt, to which some attribute I know not what vestige of freedom. Indeed there are those who extend this to the appetite of brutes, as we shall touch upon again below. But in that matter, which is disputed more widely in theology, the truth is that if there is any participation of freedom in the sensitive appetite of man, it is insofar as there is participation of reason in the cogitative power of man. But if in this there is no true reasoning, as indeed there is not, neither in that taken per se is there true freedom which excludes necessity of operating, given all requisites. And thus by this example the induction made is rather confirmed and as it were consummated. The reason of this, moreover, is because the adequate root of freedom is use of reason, as we shall see below, and therefore lack of use of reason is also the adequate cause of lack of freedom, and consequently of necessity in operating. But if we inquire into the intrinsic and quasi positive root of such operating, there is no other than the very nature of such things or faculties, which from their nature have this determination in mode of operating, because they are not so perfect that they can participate in dominion over their operations. Also, because indifference in operating intrinsically and adequately arises from the amplitude of rational faculty, as we shall declare below; but just as affirmation is the cause of affirmation, so negation of negation.

14. From which finally it is permitted to infer that this kind of necessity is so great that it can be removed or impeded from coming into act not only by the intrinsic power of the faculty itself, but also by any other natural causes. Indeed natural causes can, as we said, impede each other by resistance or contrary action; and thus they can also remove all things requisite for operating; nevertheless, these being

posited, they cannot contain the action of a necessary agent, because they cannot change the natures of things, nor remove properties altogether intrinsic. God alone seems to have this power; for by it he brought it about that fire did not burn the three boys, and similar things; nevertheless, if the matter is carefully weighed, even God himself does not seem to be able to make that in the composite sense (as they call it), a cause which by its nature acts necessarily cease from acting when all requisites for action are posited; but he can only remove something from the requisites, and thus simply or in the divided sense he can make that such a cause not operate; as in the said example God impeded the action of fire by denying fire his concourse, that is, by not applying his power to operate with fire; but this is one of the prerequisites so that fire can act. Therefore God did not make fire not act with all requisites posited, but he removed something from them. For if God had decided to give concourse as much as is from himself and to leave other requisite conditions complete, he could not impede that action, because it implies removing that which is natural without any contrary efficiency, or at least without denial of aid or efficiency necessary on the part of God. For how can natural action be impeded with no impediment posited? Or what other impediment can be understood, if none of the aforesaid intervenes? And so with the said supposition made, as it has been declared, action arises with such necessity that it cannot be impeded except by removing something from the supposition. The difference, however, between God and other created agents in this is that, with all things which are required outside God for actions of natural agents being posited, he can by his will alone impede action, by denying that which is necessary on his part; but other created things cannot do this, but only through opposite action or resistance, or certainly because through some local motion they can place some impediment or remove matter or another necessary condition. And thus it is sufficiently established what kind and how great this necessity is.

SECTION II
WHETHER AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES THERE ARE SOME THAT OPERATE WITHOUT NECESSITY AND WITH FREEDOM

1. Arguments of the negative position. First. This question is most serious and extensive, and depends largely on theological difficulties that arise from the supernatural mysteries of grace and divine predestination; however, in this place it must be treated only insofar as it can be defined from natural principles. If therefore we consider natural reason, it seems to be proven by many arguments that there can be no efficient cause without an intrinsic necessity of acting. First indeed, because the first cause, from which all others flow, operates from the necessity of nature, nor can anything else be understood by natural reason; therefore much more so do all causes that operate under it. The antecedent is commonly supposed from the opinion of Aristotle and other philosophers; and it is evident by reason, because unless God operated from the necessity of nature, he would not be immutable, for he could now be otherwise than before. The first consequence is proven because a second cause does not act except when moved by the first; therefore if the first necessarily moves the second to operate, the second is necessarily moved; therefore it also operates necessarily, because neither can active motion stand without passive motion, nor actual motion toward operating without actual operation, both because there cannot be motion without its term, and also because divine motion cannot be frustrated.

2. Second. And from this comes the second argument, which proceeds even if we do not suppose that the first cause acts from necessity, but freely, because, although from this it correctly follows that effects are not necessary with respect to the first cause,

nevertheless the same efficacy seems to be inferred that under the first cause there is no other that does not operate from necessity, because there is none that operates without being moved by it; for every second cause needs to be moved by the first; but every moving cause that is moved operates from necessity, because that it be moved is not in its power, but in the power of the mover, whose motion it can neither produce nor impede; but that being moved it operates has a necessary consequence, as we argued before.

3. Third. Let the third argument be that in the superior section it was shown that every cause operating without reason acts from necessity; if therefore some cause effects something without necessity, it will be either man or created intelligence (since I now omit the first cause, because here the discussion is chiefly about created things); but this cannot be said of either of these causes, following natural reason. This is first proven concerning intelligences, because by natural reason they are only known as movers of celestial orbs; but in that action they cannot be considered as freely acting causes, otherwise the motions would not be necessary nor inevitable, and created intelligences could at their discretion invert the order of the universe. Hence for this reason the philosophers posited that secondary intelligences are equally immutable as the first; therefore since the same reasoning applies to this effect and to others, intelligences must be judged as causes necessarily acting in all things, insofar as they can be known by natural reason. And from this the other part concerning man is proven a fortiori; first indeed, because either acting without necessity pertains to perfection or to imperfection; if to perfection, since intelligences do not participate in it, how shall we attribute it to men? If to imperfection, why should we rather attribute it to men than to brutes? Second, because man is subject to celestial influences like other inferior things; but inferior causes have a certain necessity in their effects from celestial influence; therefore from the same source human actions and behaviors

participate in necessity; which experience itself and the predictions of astrologers seem sufficiently to persuade.

4. Fourth. Let the fourth argument be that if some cause operates without necessity, it is necessary that it have some faculty or power that has the force of containing its operation, even when all things required for acting are posited; but there is no such power in created things; therefore neither is there freedom or lack of necessity in acting. The major premise is established by the contrary from what was said in the preceding section; for a second cause operates nothing except through some faculty of its own; but that faculty is the principle of necessary operation which necessarily exercises it, all requisites being posited; therefore in order that some action not be necessary, it is fitting that some power have the opposite mode of operating. The minor premise is proven, for if there were such a power, it would be either intellect or will, for we have said that in all inferior things there is none such; but this cannot be attributed to the intellect, because it necessarily gives assent when truth is sufficiently known, as is known by experience; therefore the intellect is of itself a power determined to one thing. But if sometimes it is not sufficiently determined, this is only from insufficient application of the object or because of reasons proposed that fight among themselves and as it were resist each other; which is not sufficient for indifference in operating, as we declared above in inferior powers, proportion being maintained.

5. Nor does the will seem to have that mode of operating, for the intellect is a more perfect power than the will; therefore if that does not participate in this mode of operating, neither does the will. Next, because the will does not operate except when moved and determined efficaciously by the intellect; for the will is a blind power, which cannot go out into act unless it be led by the intellect, nor can it resist it, if it efficaciously moves and commands, otherwise there could be a defect in the will, even if the intellect does what it can to direct it, which moral philosophers do not admit.

6. And this argument is confirmed first, for the will (and the same is true of the intellect) operates from necessity in its most important acts, as in the love of good as such and in the intention of the ultimate end; therefore in all acts. The consequence is evident, both because there is one mode of operating for one faculty, and also because either operating from necessity is better than operating without it, or not. If it is better, therefore if the will attains that mode of operating in its most perfect acts, it will attain it in all. If it is not better, therefore for what reason the will does not have a more perfect mode of operating in all its acts, and especially those most proper to it, it will not have it in the rest.

7. It is confirmed second, because if the will is free in some operation of its own, it either has that freedom in the instant in which it operates or before it operates; not in the same instant, because then it already operates necessarily; because just as a thing when it is, necessarily is, so when it operates, it necessarily operates. Nor even before it operates, because then it exercises no non-necessary action. And besides, because even then it necessarily does not operate.

Notes by Which the Meaning of the Question is Explained

8. Free and necessary are taken in multiple ways. Although this question is general concerning all created causes, indeed it can even be extended to the uncreated, nevertheless we shall treat it especially concerning human actions, both because they are better known to us and they are more frequently disputed about, and also because concerning all inferior agents we suppose that there is no place in them for another mode of acting except from necessity, as was touched upon in the preceding section; concerning superior ones, however, we cannot philosophize except according to a certain proportion to our things, insofar as we agree with them in intellect and will. But so that there may be agreement about terms, it should be

noted that these words of necessity and freedom, and of free and necessary, can be taken in various ways. For properly and in the dialectical manner of speaking, necessary is opposed both to impossible and to possible not to be, in which way a necessary action is said to be one that cannot not be or be done, always understanding that hypothesis, namely, all things required for acting being posited, and concerning this necessity of action we spoke in the preceding section. But in another way necessary is usually taken as it is opposed to voluntary, in which way for an action to be called necessary it is not enough that it cannot not be exercised, but it is also fitting that it not be voluntary, which can happen in two ways, namely either negatively or contrarily: in the former way all actions of things lacking cognition are called necessary, even if they are most natural; for, although they can be called spontaneous metaphorically, insofar as they are conformable to natural and metaphorical appetite, nevertheless they are not properly voluntary, since they are not from cognition, without which voluntary cannot be, as is established from Ethics III, c. 1, and D. Thomas treats, I-II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2. In the latter way that is called necessary which is violent and coercive, because it is against proper elicited appetite, either perfect, as rational appetite is, or imperfect, as sensitive appetite is. And in this way the action of a brute, if it proceeds from mere appetite, although it is necessary in the first way, nevertheless not in these latter ways, because it is not violent nor merely natural, but spontaneous; but an action will be necessary in this way if a brute is forced to do something against its proper appetite, and in this respect the same is true of human action. In which way it is said in II Corinthians 9: "Not from sadness or from necessity," etc.; although human actions can also be called necessary in other ways, even if voluntary, indeed even if they are free, namely, because they are done from the necessity of precept, concerning which it is said in I Corinthians 7: "Not having necessity, but having power over his own will." Or because they are done from some servile subjection, in which

way the actions of a slave are called necessary, especially if he does them from fear.

9. But since free is necessarily opposed to necessary, it is said in almost as many ways as necessary itself. For if free is believed to be said from the verb "to free," so that a free action is called one that is free from all necessity, that action will be free in all ways which has none of the aforesaid necessities, which will scarcely be found except in divine action; although it is also found in some human actions in its own way, especially in those that are honest and are done only from counsel and appetite for rectitude and justice. And thus free is sometimes taken so as to exclude not only proper necessity, but also servitude, in which way, in Scripture[30] those sanctified by grace or glory are called peculiarly free, namely from the servitude of sin. Otherwise an action is called free which is not coercive, but voluntary; which freedom does not exclude the first necessity, which consists in determination to one thing with inability to suspend action, but excludes only violence and coercion; in which way it is most evident that there are non-necessary actions, not only in men, but also in brutes, although those actions are more perfect in men to the degree that the character of the voluntary is found more perfect in them. From which some, especially heretics, took occasion to say that human actions are not free for any other reason except because they are perfectly voluntary, so that free is said not from the verb "to free," but from the verb "it pleases." Finally, however, and in the most proper way, an action is called free which is truly free from that necessity which natural and irrational things have in acting, as was declared in the superior section. And concerning this freedom or non-necessity we properly dispute in the present question; and in this sense it was always disputed also by ancient philosophers; for no one ever doubted, or could doubt, whether men operate in many of their actions spontaneously and moving and applying themselves to work by their own will with prior cognition, but whether in this very

[30] Rom., 6 et 8., II Cor., 3.

voluntary act necessity and determination to one thing is mixed, this is what has been called into controversy.

The First Error Denying Freedom

10. In this matter, then, there was an ancient error of certain philosophers, who said that all effects and actions of the causes of the universe, even of human wills, proceed by a certain fatal necessity, arising from the connection of all causes and the influence of the heavens and stars. So Augustine reports, Confessions IV, c. 3, and City of God V, c. 1, where Luis Vives indicates Democritus, Empedocles and Heraclitus for this opinion, which is also commonly attributed to the Stoics, but undeservedly, as I shall say below. Many heretics later followed this error, such as Simon Magus, Bardesanes, Priscillian, Manichaeus and others, as is established from Augustine and other ancient writers[31]. And the same error was revived in these times by heretics, as modern Doctors report at length, who most wisely disputed against them. Nevertheless, they did not teach this error in the same way nor under the same principles, as I think, for some attributed this necessity to the influence of stars, others to divine concurrence or motion, or to the efficacy of divine will, or to grace. Again, some denied freedom altogether and in all acts, both internal and external, both good and bad, others however only in moral or honest actions, not however in civil or indifferent ones.

11. But scarcely any of the aforesaid philosophers or heretics declared sufficiently whether this necessity which they attribute to human actions arises from the intrinsic nature of man or only from the action of some extrinsic cause; for they declare this necessity only in the latter way. Nevertheless, if they spoke consistently, it is necessary that they felt this necessity to be founded also in the intrinsic nature of

[31] Aug., lib. de Haeres., c. 35, 46 et 70; Clemens, lib. III Recog.; Roffensis, a. 36; Richard., a. 7; Bellarm., late, lib. III de Grat. et lib. arbit., et sequenti.

man, because namely there is no faculty in him that is by its nature indifferent in its actions. Because if things are moved not violently, but according to what is due to their nature, so each thing is moved as it is by itself apt to be moved; since therefore the influence of the heavens and the concurrence of God is not violent, but natural, if from such causes man always operates necessarily, it is a sign that his nature demands this mode of operating. I omit the opinions of those who attributed this necessity either to divine grace or to original sin, which are not natural causes, but merely extrinsic and beyond or above nature; for the treatment and refutation of these errors does not pertain to the metaphysician, but to the theologian, since consideration of original sin and grace, and other similar causes, exceeds natural reason. Against these errors, therefore, two things must be shown by us. First, that there is in man some active faculty which from itself and from its intrinsic and particular nature is not determined to one thing only, but is indifferent from itself to operating this or that, and to operating and not operating, all things required for acting being posited. Then it must be shown that no extrinsic cause always impedes this mode of operating. For thus it will be shown that there are among created acting causes some that can operate not from necessity of nature, but from freedom, and often do in fact so operate.

It is Demonstrated that Man Often Operates Freely

12. I say therefore first, that it is evident by natural reason and by the very experience of things that man in many of his acts is not carried by necessity, but by his own will and freedom. This conclusion is proven first from the common consensus of philosophers. For thus Aristotle and the Peripatetics think about human freedom, as is established from Aristotle, Metaphysics IX, c. 1 and following, where he distinguishes rational powers from irrational ones, and grants to the former alone the intrinsic force of operating contraries through themselves, namely from internal freedom; and in Ethics III, from the

beginning, he establishes this freedom as the foundation of all moral doctrine. Plato recognized the same, as is established from the Gorgias and from the last book of the Republic; the Stoics also excepted human wills from the necessity of fate, which they asserted in other things, as Augustine testifies, City of God V, c. 10, where Vives reports from Plutarch, On Opinions I, that the Stoics thought the same as Plato about human freedom. Cicero also, in the book On Divination, and On the Nature of the Gods, in order to defend human freedom, denied divine foreknowledge, because he thought this conflicted with human freedom, which he believed to be evident from the very experience of things. And thus, as Augustine says above, in order to make men free, he made them sacrilegious. It is therefore a sign that this truth is sufficiently clear by natural light, since it has been received by common consensus from the wiser philosophers and their schools. The Fathers of the Church and all scholastics and Catholic philosophers also most constantly defend this truth, whom it is not now necessary to cite all, but only those who treated this truth from philosophers and principles of philosophy, such as Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel VI, throughout; Gregory of Nyssa, in the four last books On Philosophy, which are attributed to him, and are found in Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, where from c. 32 to 42 he disputes about this matter; and Damascene, On Faith II, c. 25; and Augustine, tome I, in three books On Free Choice; but in tome VII, disputing against Pelagius and defending free choice and reconciling it with grace, proceeding from theological principles, he supposes this natural truth as certain and shows that grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. And in almost the same way proceed Prosper, Anselm, Bernard and other Fathers who wrote about the harmony of free choice with grace and foreknowledge. Whence it is clear in passing that these and other ancient authors, when they defend free choice, do not deal with freedom as it is only opposed to coercion, but also as it excludes necessity in operating; otherwise they would not have labored in reconciling grace, providence or predestination with

freedom, since it is most evident that what we do by will, we do not by coercion, but spontaneously. But the difficulty could only be about indifference in operating; therefore they labor in defending this and in composing it with divine grace and motion.

13. The assertion is proven by experience. Second, we can argue from experience; for we evidently experience that it is placed in our power to do something or omit it, and for this we use reason and discourse and consultation so that we may be inclined to one part rather than to another; therefore choice is placed in our judgment; otherwise, as Damascene correctly said above, this power of deliberating and consulting would have been given to us superfluously. To this is added the usual mode of operating and governing human actions through counsels, through laws and precepts, through exhortations and reproofs, through promises of rewards and threats of punishments, all of which would be superfluous if man operated by necessity of nature and not by his own freedom.

14. Objection weakening the experience. Someone will say that by all these indications and experiences it is only evidently proven that man is led and moved by reason in his operations, not however that he exercises them freely. For all those things that are proposed in the argument, namely punishments and rewards, exhortations, consultations, etc., seem to contribute only to this, that the actions themselves or their objects are apprehended and judged as desirable or as to be fled, not however that they be freely chosen. Whence consequently he who has been obstinate in the contrary opinion will say that, given the apprehension that arises from all those causes and circumstances, man is necessarily determined to operate this or that; but the apprehension itself or judgment is necessary when such causes are applied; but the application of such causes is often from the outside, and then it also cannot be free, but necessary to man himself; sometimes however it is from one's own will, as when man voluntarily consults or inquires in order to choose; and then of that very will it will be said to arise necessarily from another apprehension or

judgment; and thus one must always stop at some first apprehension or judgment proceeding from eternal causes. And this evasion can be confirmed, for we also experience in some brutes that they are restrained by inflicted punishments so that they do not do something, so much so that the memory of previous punishment often suffices for this. And similarly they are induced by benefits and by certain signs or words by way of exhortation or excitation, all of which and similar things are not done around brutes because it is in their power to act or not act, but because according to diverse apprehensions they are moved in diverse ways, spontaneously indeed, yet from necessity, according to the requirement of apprehension; therefore in this way someone can contend that man is moved to operate through exhortations, counsels, etc., with greater perfection indeed as to the discourse of mind and perception of all reasons that can determine appetite or will, not however as to indifference or lack of necessity. It can be confirmed second, for, if we suppose that God sometimes necessitates the will of man using reason (for we suppose that God can do this), in that case it would seem to man that he operates by his own judgment and will just as he now operates, because he would experience himself to be moved by his reason and will and would have no principle for knowing the necessity imposed from outside by God; therefore it cannot be sufficiently gathered from experience alone that there are free operations in men.

15. The objection is dissolved. It is answered that these arguments conclude that this experience is not so clear and self-evident that no place for evasion is left to a perverse man; otherwise there could not have been any diversity of opinions or errors about this matter among men themselves. Nevertheless, if we wish to consider our mode of operating fully, we shall easily meet the aforesaid objections. Therefore we experience not only with changed cognition or apprehension of the object, but also with the same standing, that it is placed in our will to sit or stand, to proceed by this or that way, and similar things. It is therefore a sign that this various

mode of operating does not consist formally or proximately in discourse and apprehension of reason, but in freedom or indifference. Moreover, we also experience that after knowing the threat of punishment or promise of reward, it is placed in our power to be moved or not moved by that reason; and the same is true of prayers, exhortations and similar excitations. Finally, after consultation about means we often choose one before another, only because we will it. And thus it is also established that what was brought forward about brutes is not similar. To the confirmation indeed about divine power of imposing necessity, we say first that this natural evidence excludes miracles or extraordinary actions of God. Whence it is enough if from effects we show that this mode of operating is in our intrinsic faculty, and consequently that it is not connatural, or consonant with the natures of things, that it be moved otherwise from outside by God; nor can this be affirmed of any work of ours, much less of all, unless it is established from revelation.

16. Then we can add the experience taken from human actions that are morally depraved, which cannot be attributed to divine motion imposing necessity without manifest impiety contrary to the very light of nature; therefore evil actions proceed from our free determination. Especially because God not only prohibits, but also most severely punishes these actions; but this would be most unjust if he imposed necessity for the same. Whence it is also established that punishment and reward are not conferred on man only for subsequent actions, namely so that he may be either allured to them or withdrawn from them, but also precisely and per se for the good or evil that he has wrought in them. And for the same reason man is judged worthy of praise and honor for his actions, all of which cannot be understood without freedom. And from this it is also confirmed that this is the common way of thinking of all men about human actions. For all judge that those who operate badly are worthy of punishment, because so to operate is placed in their will and power, and therefore they bear injury badly when it is inflicted by a man using reason, not

however when inflicted by one who is insane or not paying attention, indeed they do not reckon damage inflicted by these among injuries. Whence, as Eusebius correctly noted above, even those who deny free choice, while they bear gravely injuries inflicted on them by other men and try to avenge them, whether they will or not, confess that they were freely inflicted; because if it had not been in the power of others not to inflict such harms, there would be no reason there for injury or just anger or revenge. And from this Damascene also says, On Faith II, c. 7, that neither virtue nor vice is in what happens from necessity; which Dionysius also gravely taught, On Divine Names c. 4; and Augustine, On True Religion, c. 13 and 14, and epistle XLVI, saying that free choice being removed, judgment and just punishment, or even reproach, are removed; and Chrysostom, homily LX on Matthew, and in the orations on providence; and Clement of Alexandria, Stromata I, and very many others.

17. Finally we can argue by a priori reasoning, which must be taken from the mode and perfection of knowing proper to the nature of intellect; because freedom is born from intelligence, for vital appetite follows cognition, and therefore more perfect cognition is accompanied by more perfect appetite; therefore universal cognition and in its own way indifferent is also followed by universal and indifferent appetite; but intellectual cognition is so universal and perfect that it perceives the proper nature of end and means, and in each one can weigh what it has of goodness or malice, utility or disadvantage; likewise that a means is necessary for an end, but another is indifferent, because others can be applied; therefore the appetite that follows this cognition has this indifference or perfect power in appetition, so that it does not necessarily seek every good or every means, but each one according to the nature of good judged in it; therefore that good which is not judged necessary, but indifferent, is not loved necessarily, but freely; and by this reasoning, as I was saying above, free choice follows rational consultation. And it is confirmed, for God is a free agent because he freely wills goods not necessary to

him; therefore also creatures that participate in intellectual degree and in this agree with God in some way, also participate in the free mode of operating. The antecedent will be proven below when disputing about the perfections of God. The consequence however is proven, both because most perfect freedom follows most perfect intellectuality according to our mode of understanding; therefore according to participation in intellectuality there will also be participation in freedom; and also because the same proportional reasoning intervenes, namely, that an intellectual creature can perceive some good as necessary or as indifferent, or as good simply or only secundum quid or having something of evil, disadvantage or difficulty joined to it; therefore a creature that participates in intellectual degree also participates in freedom.

It is Demonstrated that There is Some Free Faculty in Man

18. From this first conclusion follows the second, which is no less evident, namely, that there is in man some active power that from its force and intrinsic nature is free, that is, having such dominion over its action that it is in its power to exercise it and not exercise it, and consequently to elicit one or another or opposite action. All parts of this assertion are so connected that one follows from another. Therefore in the preceding assertion we proved the use of freedom that we experience in ourselves; but from this use some free faculty is evidently gathered, just as potency is inferred from act. But we add that this faculty, insofar as it is free, cannot be except active, or conversely a faculty cannot be free unless it is active and insofar as it is active. This part is very notable for correctly explaining and defending the freedom of choice. It is proven thus, for passion as passion cannot be free to the patient as such, but only insofar as the action from which such passion proceeds is free; therefore freedom formally and precisely is not in a patient power as such, but in an agent power. The

consequence is manifest, because to a passive power as such only passion corresponds, just as action corresponds to an active power; therefore, if passion is not free except by denomination from free action, the faculty or dominion of freedom cannot be in a passive power as such, but in an active one. But the antecedent is proven, because action, if it be from the subject, as we now speak of it, necessarily brings about passion, and conversely passion neither can be except insofar as it is brought about through action, nor can it not be, if the action remains from the agent; therefore all freedom and indifference is about action as action is, not however about passion except insofar as it is inferred from action; therefore the free power must be an active power as active, and not as passive.

19. Passive power as such is not free. You will say: passive power as passive can be from itself indifferent to various acts or contrary modes, as is evident in prime matter and in a surface from itself indifferent to whiteness and blackness; therefore by the same reasoning passive power as such can be a free faculty. It is answered by denying the consequence, for indifference to various acts and their lack is not sufficient for freedom, but internal force is necessary by which such a faculty can determine that indifference to either part; but this force cannot be in a passive faculty as such, but in an active one. The reason is, because if a faculty is indifferent without internal force of determining itself, as much as is from itself it will always and necessarily remain in the same disposition and indifference or lack of every act, until it is determined by another. Which indeed can be free to another efficient cause making the determination, not however to the one receiving. As if we suppose heaven to be merely passively indifferent to motion and rest, it cannot be understood that motion or rest are free to heaven itself, because it does not have the force of defining either of these, but with respect to another agent that motion can be denominated free, if it proceeds from a free will. And the same is true universally of every passive power insofar as it is passive; because passive power as such cannot change its natural disposition;

for this reason indeed beyond the material cause an efficient one is required, because the patient as such cannot transmute itself; therefore neither can passive power, insofar as it is passive, have the force of beginning its determination, because determination is not made without some change, and consequently neither without some effecting.

20. The objection is dissolved. You will say: passive power as such can resist action or not resist; therefore by this reasoning freedom can be understood in passive power as such, namely if we imagine that it is placed in its power to resist the agent or not resist. As those who say that love is not elicited by the will, but impressed by the known object or by cognition itself, will nevertheless say that, although the object or cognition as much as is from itself necessarily effects, nonetheless love is free to the will, because it is in its power to resist or not resist such effecting or impression of love. It is answered first, since the will taken nakedly is from itself indifferent to receiving or not receiving love, it cannot be understood that through itself and its pure entity and passive power it resists the impression of love; for resistance formally can only be from something contrary or repugnant, not from the very subject as capable. Next, from this it happens that such resistance cannot be indifferent and free, because it only arises from formal repugnance or opposition of entities; and therefore, if the will, for example, through its very entity formally resists sometimes the impression of love, it will always and necessarily resist, because it will always have the same formal repugnance; but if it does not have this, it will never resist, unless something else is added by which it repugns and resists, and then in effecting this or not effecting it freedom can be discerned. As in the example posited, if we admit that there is active force of love in the object or cognition, the will can only resist the activity in either of two ways, namely, either by removing the object or consideration of it, which it cannot provide unless by doing or willing something, or by not cooperating with the object itself or cognition, which supposes that the will itself is at least a

partial efficient cause of that love, and thus indifference of freedom is always reduced to the faculty of doing something, insofar as it is such.

21. What divine freedom is like. In what created freedom is situated. You will say finally that there is most perfect freedom in God, though that formally does not consist in the faculty of acting. This is proven, both because the faculty of acting in God is only with respect to actions ad extra; but freedom formally and per se primarily is in the very act of love, which is immanent in God, to speak in our manner; and also because, as we shall say below, active power in God is rationally distinct from will; but will alone is the formally free power, as we shall say a little later. It is answered that we speak of created freedom, which proximately and primarily is exercised concerning the acts of the free faculty itself. For as Scotus correctly noted, In I, dist. 39, § Quantum ad primum dico quod voluntas, freedom can be understood either in order to diverse acts immanent in the power itself, or in order to diverse objects, or in order to diverse extrinsic effects. This last relation or indifference is posterior and as it were consequent to freedom, insofar as the power freely willing is also efficacious of those things which it wills, or can apply the power that effects them. But the second respect is formally required and per se sufficient for freedom, if there is indifference in it; nevertheless to have this indifference in the very act immediately with respect to objects without any addition or change, is proper to God alone, as we shall show below when disputing about him, and therefore the freedom of divine will is not formally in the faculty of acting, nor is it in the faculty of receiving, but in a certain eminence alone of that most pure act. But truly the freedom of a creature cannot be determined to objects except with intervening certain second acts which are added to the free faculty itself, with respect to which it is indifferent by way of first act. And with respect to the same we say that freedom inheres in such a faculty insofar as it is active of such acts, and not formally insofar as it is receptive either of the acts themselves or of another thing that is ordered to them.

22. According to the opinion of the philosophers. And thus all philosophers, especially Aristotle, declare our freedom through the power of acting and not acting, or of acting in an opposite manner, as in book I of the Magna Moralia, chapter 9, he says that it is in our power to do good and evil things, which he extensively pursues in book III of the Ethics, especially chapter 5; but moral goods and evils, concerning which the discussion there takes place, formally and properly consist in the acts of the will itself. Whence also similar expressions of Scripture harmonize with this truth: "He who could transgress and did not transgress, could do evil and did not do it" (Ecclesiasticus 31); and that passage: "Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad" (Matthew 12). Augustine, treating these words in his book Against Adimantus the Manichean, chapter 26, says: "It is placed in the power of the will to be so changed that it can work good." And Methodius, in his book On Free Will, declares freedom through this, that the power of doing what he wishes has been given to man; and similar things are read in Basil, homily "That God is not the author of evils"; Nazianzus, oration 1, and others to be cited below. And finally the Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 4, and canons 4 and 5, in order to defend the freedom of our will, teaches that it does not conduct itself merely passively in its acts, but actively works them, intimating that the use of freedom consists in action, but the faculty of freedom consists in some power insofar as it is active. And thus it is simultaneously left proven that among created efficient causes some are freely acting agents, which we principally intend in the present disputation.

23. Now indeed it remained to be declared what this faculty that is thus free in acting might be. Likewise, what kind of indifference it has, and in what it is placed. But these matters will be treated among the arguments to be resolved; for each of the proposed arguments demands serious difficulties.

SECTION III.
WHETHER THERE CAN BE ANY FREELY ACTING AGENT AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES IF THE FIRST CAUSE OPERATES BY NECESSITY; AND IN GENERAL WHETHER FREEDOM OF ACTION REQUIRES FREEDOM IN ALL CAUSES INFLUENCING IT, OR WHETHER ONE IS SUFFICIENT

1. The first argument therefore asks primarily whether the first cause operates freely or by necessity of nature; but this must be treated below in its proper disputation concerning divine perfections. Here we assume that God effects not necessarily, but freely, whatever He properly effects outside Himself. This is not only certain by faith, but we also believe it can be sufficiently proven by natural reason, as we shall show in the aforementioned place. And thus that first argument remains solved by denying the antecedent.

2. The opinion of Scotus and its foundation. Nevertheless, there still remains concerning this same argument a hypothetical question: whether, even if God were to act by necessity of nature, a created cause acting freely could still be understood. For this question is controversial between Scotus and the principal followers of St. Thomas. Scotus absolutely denies that it is possible for a second cause to act freely if the first acts by necessity of nature, and thinks that Aristotle, or any other philosopher who taught both things simultaneously (namely, that God operates necessarily and man freely), taught contradictory doctrines. The foundation of Scotus is touched upon above in the first argument, namely, because a second cause does not act except when moved by the first; whence if the first acts and moves necessarily, the second must be moved and act with

the same necessity. Thus holds Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. Y; dist. 4, q. 4; dist. 38, ad 1; dist. 39, § Quantum ad primum; and In II, dist. 1, q. 3; and the same is held by followers of Scotus, as may be seen in Córdoba, in I lib., q. 55, dubio 4; and certain modern commentators of St. Thomas follow the same opinion, I, q. 19, a. 8.

3. But others among the ancients think that from that hypothesis that God operates by necessity of nature, it does not follow that every second cause operates by necessity, but that there can be a contingent effect by reason of the proximate cause, although the first cause influences by natural necessity. The foundation is that when an effect depends on several causes, it can have a particular condition or defect by reason of one cause and not by reason of another. For thus from two assents to premises, one certain and the other uncertain, an uncertain assent to the conclusion is produced; and from a first cause that is perfect and a second that is defective, an imperfect effect follows, because, as is said, good comes from an integral cause and evil from any defect. Thus therefore, for an effect to be free or contingent, the freedom of the second cause can suffice, although the first cause operates necessarily. For since the effect depends on both causes, the influence of both is required for the effect to follow; but for it not to follow, it suffices that one cause be absent. And by equal reasoning, for an effect to follow necessarily, it is necessary that both causes influence by necessity; but for it to be free or contingent, it suffices that one be able not to influence. Thus approximately Cajetan, I, q. 14, a. 13, circa ad 1, and q. 19, a. 8; and Ferrariensis, II cont. Gent., c. 67, circa rationem 5; and Capreolus, In I, dist. 38; who attribute this opinion to St. Thomas, because in the aforesaid places he says that although God's knowledge is a necessary cause, contingent effects proceed from it, because its influence is modified in the second cause; and St. Thomas has similar things in q. 2 de Veritate, a. 14, ad 5, and q. 5, a. 9, ad 10. Gabriel holds the same opinion, In I, dist. 38, q. unica, a. 1, part. 2 illius; and Palacios, disp. 2.

4. Each of these opinions contains something true, yet neither has exactly declared or confirmed the matter; for that conditional or hypothetical question can have several senses, which must be distinguished; for according to those different senses the question must be defined in different ways.

First Sense of the Question & Its Resolution

5. The first sense therefore is: if there were no freedom in acting in the first cause, could there be any in some second cause? And in this sense it must be absolutely denied that any second cause could be free if the first is not. In this sense it is true what Scotus says, that the philosophers were deluded who said that God acts by necessity of nature, but men freely; although neither does Scotus intend this sense nor does his reasoning prove it, as we shall see. The first reason therefore is that if God does not have freedom, there is no source from which a creature might participate in it. You will say: in the same way someone could argue that because God does not have sensation, there is no source from which a creature might participate in it. I respond that it is not similar, because freedom as such pertains to perfection simply speaking, which if it is not formally in God, neither can it be in a creature. Whence a more similar argument is that if there were no knowledge in God, neither could there be any in a creature, and consequently neither intellect nor sensation. The second reason is that if any second cause is capable of freedom, it is especially an intellectual creature; but if there is no freedom in acting in God, neither can there be any in an intellectual creature; therefore. The minor is proven, for God is intellectual by essence, a creature by participation; therefore whatever perfection in the intellectual order can be conceived, from which freedom might arise, is in God in a more excellent way. As, for example, the perfection of understanding, universal knowledge of all goods, immateriality of powers, non-necessary connection with extrinsic goods or independence from external things, or if there is

anything else of this kind which either on the part of the object or on the part of the subject or its proper nature can be a reason for freedom, whatever (I say) is of this kind is found in God in a more excellent way. If therefore all these things in God cannot be sufficient for Him to be free in acting, neither will they be sufficient in a creature.

6. Freedom is a perfection of what kind. You will object: freedom requires a perfection mixed with some imperfection, namely potentiality or mutability, and from this consideration that consequence may not be evident. Whence we also confess that in a creature there is freedom with indifference toward various acts, but not so in God. It is answered by denying the assumption; for freedom taken precisely and absolutely includes no imperfection, because it can be preserved with indifference toward objects or effects without any composition or potentiality with respect to diverse acts, and only expresses a certain dominion and independence with respect to such things or objects. And in this way there is freedom in God, because He is freedom by essence; in a creature, however, it exists only by participation, and therefore has that adjoined imperfection which indifference toward diverse acts includes, in which whatever there is of potentiality and composition is imperfection. But supposing this imperfection, the very indifference and dominion over one's own act is perfection, which perfection could not be participated by a creature unless there were in God that pure perfection of freedom without imperfections. Neither does the reasoning of the second opinion proceed against this sense; for that supposes indeed, granted the necessity of God in acting, that there are free second causes, the opposite of which we have shown follows from the aforesaid hypothesis.

Second Sense of the Question & Its Resolution

7. The second sense of the question is: if per impossibile it should happen that God acts by necessity of nature, but a creature has

a faculty of acting that is free by its nature, would God, on account of His natural mode of acting, impede the use of freedom in the creature, so that de facto it would not have free action, even if it had free power? And indeed the negative part seems to follow manifestly from the opinion of certain Thomists, who think that for the free action of a creature it suffices that it operate through a faculty that is free of itself and that it not be necessarily drawn by an object, or determined to one thing. But these two things God would not take away, even if He were to act with all His power in and with the created will by necessity of nature; therefore, notwithstanding that mode of God's acting, the creature would still act freely.

8. But this foundation is false and provides great occasion for error in this matter. For first, it does not sufficiently distinguish between these two things, namely, having a free faculty and having the free use of such a faculty unimpeded, although they are very distinct; for the former pertains only to power or first act, but the latter to second act. For although a free act cannot exist without a free faculty, because second and vital act essentially presupposes the first, yet a free faculty can exist without the use of freedom, not only when it does not operate, but even when operating it is impeded from having that dominion over its act which it could have by its nature. For this dominion consists in the power of not doing what one does, or of doing something else. But it can happen that an agent otherwise indifferent of itself is so carried or determined to act by another superior agent that with respect to such action or mode of acting it does not have the power of not acting, and thus retaining its innate free faculty it can be deprived of the use of freedom. This is confirmed, for all theologians teach that God can impose necessity on our will; but then He would not take away the free faculty, because this is not distinguished from the will itself, but would impede its free use and change it into necessary. Therefore those two things are to be distinguished; and God can bring it about that a faculty, free of itself and remaining free in first act concerning some object, does not freely

tend toward it, but from some necessary motion which impedes the use of freedom. In this theologians seem to agree, In II, dist. 15, and St. Thomas supposes this, I-II, q. 6, a. 4; and Scotus holds it, In IV, dist. 49, q. 6, § Duo ergo.

9. From which it further follows that what that opinion supposes is false: that for the use and free act it suffices to have a faculty free of itself and an object indifferent of itself or which of itself does not suffice to impose necessity on the faculty. For this opinion supposes that no other cause can impose necessity on the will except an object or by means of an object, which is false; for God too can impose necessity on the will, not as an object, but as an agent of infinite power. Indeed, if the will could suffer necessity only from an object, it could never be drawn from its connatural mode of operating, or be necessarily moved, except when it is necessarily carried by its own nature and intrinsic impulse. For an object, as object, does not move the will in a preternatural way, but in a most connatural and intrinsic way, and therefore an object in its kind does not necessarily move a power that is otherwise free, except when it is not free with respect to such an object. Therefore if the will can only be necessitated by means of an object, it is not really necessitated concerning that toward which it was free of itself, as in heaven the will is necessitated by God as an object clearly seen, because it is not free of itself with respect to such an act.

10. And thus it happens that according to that opinion God can never necessitate the will to an act toward which it is free of itself; for either God proposes an object sufficient of itself to move the will necessarily, and then the will is not really free of itself toward such an act, and thus suffers no extrinsic necessity; or He proposes an object which in its kind is not able to move the will necessarily, and from the force of such an object the will will never be moved necessarily unless God imposes necessity from elsewhere. You will say: an object can be proposed that is of itself insufficient to move necessarily, yet in such a way or under such a judgment that it imposes necessity on the will. I

respond, first, that this cannot be done without a false judgment, namely, judging to be the highest good or a necessary good what is not such, which judgment God cannot send. Then, even granting this, the will would not now be moved as a power free of itself, but as a power determined to one thing, because just as by its nature it tends not only toward true good but also toward apparent good, so by its nature it is born to be necessarily carried toward apparent necessary good. And thus it is never preserved that the will can be necessitated by God to an act which it would elicit freely of itself. This is surely false and against common opinion, and derogates from God's omnipotence. For since He is the author and lord of the will, He can move and impel it as He wishes so that it acts necessarily, or impede it so that it does not act at all. And this is confirmed, for the power which the created will has for willing or not willing is not of infinite efficacy, since it is commensurate with the finite virtue of such a power; therefore in both directions it can be conquered and overcome by an extrinsic agent of infinite virtue, such as God is. Therefore the created will can be so moved by God toward willing an object otherwise indifferent of itself, that the will thus moved is entirely impotent to resist or use the power it has for not willing such an object. Indeed Augustine sometimes seems to teach that this pertains to divine omnipotence, and not without merit, since in that effect or motion no contradiction is involved. Then therefore, although the will is free of itself and is not moved by an object by necessity, nevertheless the very use and act is not free to the will itself, because it is not permitted by the superior agent to use its free faculty; nor does it have power with respect to the superior agent to resist it using its absolute power.

11. Therefore for a free act or use of the will it is not enough to have a faculty free of itself with indifference of object or judgment, unless also the superior cause imposes no force or preternatural efficacy, but allows the will itself to operate in its connatural way, as the Fathers of the Church also speak, whom I shall presently indicate. Therefore the foundation of that opinion is not solid. Wherefore it

now remains to be seen whether, given that hypothesis that God would act by necessity of nature, and that there would be in man a faculty free of itself, it nevertheless correctly follows that there would then be no use or free act in the created will.

12. If God were to act by necessity of nature, there would be no exercise of freedom in causes. And in this sense it seems that should be said, given that hypothesis, no use of freedom is left in a created agent. And in this sense also it is truly said by Scotus that the philosophers erred who posited that God acts by necessity of nature and admitted free and contingent effects from second causes. But Scotus's reasoning neither proceeds in this sense nor is it approved by me, as I shall say below. Therefore the proper reasoning must be taken from what was said a little before, because God can through His infinite power so move the will that He imposes necessity, as has been proven, and He could do the same even if He were to act by necessity of nature, because then He is not posited to be of lesser power, but only of lesser indifference or freedom. But if God were to act by necessity of nature, while acting upon the created will, He would act with as much efficacy as He could; therefore He would always act by imposing necessity, and thus there would never be use of freedom in a created agent. The minor is evident, because this is the condition of a natural agent that it acts as much as it can, because it does not have the faculty of tempering its action, or applying it more or less, because this is not done except through free power.

13. An objection is satisfied. But perhaps the philosophers would say that God, acting by necessity of nature, does not always act as much as He absolutely could, but as much as the nature of second causes requires, by which He is determined to act more or less and in this or that way. But first, we speak only from the hypothesis that divine power has absolute necessity in acting. Then we add that in whatever way God is said to act by necessity of nature and not from freedom, the determination of His action cannot come from the natural capacity of a second cause; for God's power does not

adequately regard that capacity, but a greater one; therefore it cannot be determined by it. For why would He be so limited by it that He could never act more, when He has greater power? I confess indeed that from that hypothesis, and from the infinity of God's power, many impossible things follow; nevertheless, that being posited, by extrinsic reasoning[32] it follows that God through His power always so moves the created will that He imposes necessity on it. And therefore the Holy Fathers attribute to divine wisdom and free providence that in acting and moving the created will He so accommodates Himself that He does not impose force on it, but allows it to move itself in its own way. As may be seen in Augustine, de Praedestinatione et gratia, c. 15; Prosper, ad Obiect. Gallor., c. 1 and 11; Cyril, lib. IV in Ioann., c. 7; Damascene, lib. II de Fide, c. 30.

14. Neither does the foundation of the second opinion proceed against this decision of the question in this sense; because for the freedom of an act or contingency of an effect it is not enough that the second cause be free or contingent according to itself, but it is necessary that insofar as it is such it be allowed to exercise its action, because otherwise it is only materially (so to speak) free, but does not act as free. But an act does not take its nature and denomination from a cause materially taken, but as actually influencing. But that reasoning does not prove that God's necessity in acting does not impede the free use of created faculty. Neither does St. Thomas, cited there, contradict in this or the prior sense, because he does not treat of God's absolute necessity in acting, but of the necessity of immutability, which does not exclude absolute freedom, as we shall declare below in the disputation concerning God.

Third Sense of the Question & Its Resolution

[32] extrinsecum, 1960; alit. intrinsecum. "No es preciso advertir la profunda modificación que semejante cambio introduce en el sentido de la frase." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 352.

15. If God were to give by necessity the very concurrence He now gives to free causes, those causes would remain free. The third sense of the question is this: if God acts by necessity of nature and gives to the created free will neither more nor any other concurrence or motion than He now gives, does He thereby remove the contingency of its action and impede the exercise of freedom? This sense differs greatly from the preceding ones and presupposes several things, as is evident. In the preceding assertion we said that if God's action were necessary, the exercise of freedom would be impeded, because God's motion would be greater than it is now when God concurs freely. We now ask, by contrast, whether—if we suppose the motion to be no greater nor different in magnitude but only different in the mode of bestowal (namely, that the same motion which is now given freely would then be given by necessity of nature)—it follows for that reason alone that the exercise of freedom is impeded and the contingency of things removed. In this sense Scotus's opinion and line of reasoning seems to proceed.

16. I hold that even if the first cause acted by necessity of nature in that way, it would not impede the exercise of freedom nor remove all contingency from the effects of secondary causes. In this respect I approve the second opinion proposed above: when several causes concur to one act, it is sufficient for that act to be free that the proximate cause be free and that, through the cooperation of another cause, it not be drawn away from its connatural mode of operation. That is what would occur in the present hypothesis. Therefore. The major (principle) is sufficiently proved by the foundation of the second opinion: even if many causes concur and all except one act necessarily, so far as each is concerned, if one cause alone—by its freedom—can refrain from eliciting the act, that suffices for the effect to be free or contingent, since it can simply fail to occur; nor does the necessary mode of acting of the other causes impede the use of this power in the other cause, as the hypothesis supposes. The minor (application) is easily shown: in that case God would not move the

created will more strongly or vehemently than He now moves it; but God's present motion does not draw the will away from its connatural mode of operation; therefore neither would it then alter it. For whether that motion or concurrence is, on God's part, given freely or necessarily makes no difference to the ad extra effect it produces, provided the concurrence or motion itself is not greater in itself.

17. A second argument. Otherwise it would follow that an act of our will is now free[33] only because God freely concurs with it. The consequence is false: first, because I do not have formal and immediate dominion over my act on account of God's freedom, but on account of my own; and second, because on that view even the appetite of a horse or a lion would be free, since God freely concurs with it. Therefore an act is free with respect to some cause when it proceeds from that cause in such a way that there remains in it the power and capacity not to produce the act, notwithstanding other causes concurring to the same act, whether those other causes concur by nature or freely, so far as each is concerned. In the case posited, the created will would conduct itself in precisely this way, as has been shown. Therefore.

18. A third argument shows the same, not only by satisfying the foundation of Scotus's view but by turning it back upon him. If that foundation had any force, it would prove that even now the contingency of effects and the exercise of freedom are removed from every act of a secondary cause, so far as it is from that cause, and that nothing is free except in relation to the freedom of the first cause. But that consequence is contrary not only to natural reason but also to faith, for otherwise free acts could not be imputed to us. The inference is established thus: even now a secondary cause does not act unless moved by the first cause or with the first cause concurring; and even

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[33] actum… liberum (1960); "actum voluntatis nostrae nunc esse nobis liberum, quia Deus ad illum libere concurrit…" in 1605 (ed. B. Colosino); "Actum voluntatis nostrae nunc non esse liberum, quia Deus ad illum libere concurrit" in 1751 (Balleoniana ed.). (BHF, vol. III, p. 354.)

now the first cause influences or moves with priority of nature—the same priority with which it would move if it acted by necessity of nature. God's motion is now equally efficacious, as is supposed; indeed this can also be proved by Scotus's own argument: it does not stand that God moves and the creature is not moved; therefore, once God's motion is posited, the created will is necessarily moved. Consequently, if such motion, when given by God by necessity of nature, would remove freedom in the act of the human will, it removes it now as well, since it is equally prior. Or, if it does not remove it now —because, although it is in some way prior, it is nevertheless given in absolute dependence upon the created will itself, as we shall soon explain—then for the same reason it would not remove it in the proposed case; for although on God's part it would be given necessarily, it would still be given dependently upon the created free will.

19. Nor is Scotus's reply satisfactory: namely, that if God acted by necessity of nature, His motion would be simply necessary and would thus remove all contingency of the effect, whereas now it is free and therefore does not remove it. This does not suffice. At most it preserves the contingency or freedom of the effect with respect to the divine will, not with respect to secondary causes. Moreover, if under that hypothesis he understands God's motion to be absolutely necessary—that is, necessarily to be posited in reality—he assumes something false. It would be necessary only on God's side; nevertheless, it would at the same time depend upon the created will and could not be posited in reality without it; therefore it would not be absolutely necessary. Thus one could then say that God acts by necessity of nature, because by His intrinsic nature He is of Himself determined to concur with the will; yet since that concurrence is not posited in reality except with the will simultaneously cooperating, it would not be posited with absolute necessity, but according to the exigency of the cooperation of the free will.

20. From this there follows a general rule confirming the proposed opinion: the fact that some cause concurs by natural necessity to an act or effect does not obstruct that act's freedom or contingency, provided that some cause brings it about with indifference, in virtue of which the effect is denominated free. The rationale for this has already been explained in setting out the foundation of the second opinion, but it can be further illustrated by several examples. First, according to a probable opinion, knowledge—or the known object—concurs effectively in an act of will: that concurrence, insofar as it is from knowledge, is natural and without freedom, and yet the act is simply free on account of the will's indifference. Hence, although knowledge, as far as it is concerned, influences by necessity of nature, its actual influence is not posited in reality without the will's actual influence; therefore it is not absolutely necessary. Something similar can be said of the influence of a habit concurring with a free power: a habit as such has neither indifference nor proper freedom, but operates by necessity of nature when its power operates. Another example concerns the effects of natural agents, as they proceed both from themselves and from God: that action, although from the proximate agent it is by necessity of nature, is free with respect to the first cause, because according to true doctrine God freely provides His concurrence. Hence from God's power that action can absolutely be or not be, even though this power is not in the proximate agent. In fact, however, the action is called simply natural, both because, just as it receives its determination and specification from the proximate agent, so also it receives these denominations; and also because, by a certain general law and definite will, God now concurs in these actions according to the exigency of nature, that is, of the secondary cause. In this sense one should take the common saying that the influence of the first cause is modified in the second or by the second. Thus, on the hypothesis under discussion, the action would be free in its relation to the secondary

cause, even though the first cause provided its concurrence by necessity of nature.

21. Whether one and the same action can be free for one agent but necessary for another. Therefore what Scotus assumes above —that the same action cannot be necessary with respect to one cause and free with respect to another, because "necessary" and "contingent" are contradictories—is either not true, or, if true in some sense, is beside the point. That two causes can influence the same act, one freely and the other by the natural impulse of nature, has been demonstrated; in this sense, then, it is not repugnant that the same effect be contingent and necessary with respect to different things, for there is no contradiction with respect to the same cause, since contradictories must be taken relative to the same subject. If, however, "necessary" is taken not merely relatively but absolutely, for what simply cannot not be, then it is true that it is repugnant for an effect to be necessary and also to have contingency from some cause. Yet in this sense it is not true that an effect is necessary merely because some cause concurs to it by acting necessarily; it suffices that it be necessary relatively and by force of that cause, which is consistent with its having contingency or freedom from another standpoint or with respect to another cause.

SECTION IV

HOW FREEDOM OR CONTINGENCY STANDS IN THE ACTION OF A SECONDARY CAUSE, NOTWITHSTANDING THE CONCURRENCE OF THE PRIMARY CAUSE, AND CONSEQUENTLY IN WHAT SENSE IT IS TRUE THAT A FREE CAUSE IS ONE WHICH, WHEN ALL THINGS REQUIRED FOR ACTING ARE POSITED, CAN ACT AND NOT ACT.

1. This difficulty is sought in the second argument posited at the beginning of the second section, and Scotus also touches upon it with that argument that a secondary cause or created will cannot do anything unless moved by the primary cause; but when it is moved by God, it necessarily moves itself; therefore its motion with respect to the same is never free and contingent. The major premise is explicitly stated by St. Thomas, I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 3, and a. 4 and 5, and will be proven below when we treat of the dependence of secondary causes upon the primary cause. The minor premise is from the same St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3, where he says: "It is impossible for God to move the will and for the will not to be moved." And this can easily be persuaded, both from the efficacy and perfection of divine motion, and from the mutual relation between moving and being moved. The same difficulty is proposed in another way; for a free cause is one which, when all things required for acting are posited, can act and not act; but one of the requirements for a secondary cause to act is the motion of God, which being posited, it cannot act and not act, but necessarily acts, just as when that motion is not posited, it necessarily does not act; therefore that definition is repugnant to every secondary cause, and thus with respect to it there is no contingency or freedom, but only with respect to the primary cause.

The Prior Mode of Speaking is Proposed

2. This difficulty is one of the principal ones of this matter, and provides occasion for declaring more fully what a free cause is, or what conditions it requires, where simultaneously the common and received definition of a free cause will be expounded. Therefore the authors whom I mentioned above, placing the entire nature of freedom in objective indifference (so to speak), will easily expedite the present difficulty by saying that a free power is that which, when all things required on its own part are posited, still remains indifferent or

not determined to one thing by virtue of the object, and therefore nothing prevents the use of freedom from the fact that, when the motion of the primary cause is posited, the will already remains determined to one thing, so that it cannot not exercise the act toward which it is moved. And in this sense, to solve the prior difficulty, that common distinction about necessity in the composite sense and in the divided sense is applied; for that the will moved by God operates necessarily is only necessity in the composite sense, and therefore does not conflict with the freedom of an act thus necessitated. To the latter difficulty, however, they will respond by limiting the major and common definition of free faculty, namely, that it is that which can act and not act when all things required are posited, specifically on the part of the intellect and of the will itself, but not on the part of God. This modification had been indicated before these modern authors by Almain in his Morals, which he nevertheless does not approve, although he does not sufficiently attack it.

3. Hence the aforesaid new theologians have devised another definition of a free act, namely, that it is a motion of the will made from such a judgment of reason which by itself, or through the object which it proposes, is not sufficient to determine the will to one thing. They confirm this first because all freedom of the will arises from the judgment of reason; therefore a free act is optimally and sufficiently defined through its relation to such a judgment or, what is the same thing, through its relation to all things required on the part of the intellect and will. Second, because for freedom the indifference of the object suffices and the indifference of the power is not required, as is evident in the divine will, which of itself is always determined to one thing; nevertheless, because created objects are indifferent, that is sufficient for it to will them freely; therefore the same will be sufficient for a free act of the will.

The Aforesaid Opinion is Refuted

4. This entire doctrine proceeds from a false foundation, as I proved in the immediately preceding section; and the occasion of error seems to have been that there is not sufficient distinction between the root of freedom and the formal freedom of power and act. For the indifference of judgment is the root of freedom, as was touched upon above and is the common opinion of theologians; it is not, however, formal freedom itself, because the judgment itself is not free in itself nor is it proximately from a formally free power, as I will say below, but it is said to be indifferent objectively or on the part of the object, because it proposes an object so indifferent that it does not draw the will from necessity. And hence it happens that an indifferent judgment sufficiently indicates in such a nature which can so judge some faculty formally free, and consequently also a use or free act, if such a faculty is allowed to operate in its proper mode and suffers no external force by which it is compelled, or, speaking more properly, necessitated so that it tends toward an object otherwise indifferent of itself. For that this is possible was proven above, from which we rightly inferred that absolutely and without the aforesaid limitation, an indifferent judgment and a faculty free of itself are not sufficient for free use.

5. First inference: From this we further gather that the received description of free faculty is not rightly limited, namely: "That which, when all things required for acting are posited, can act and not act," not rightly (I say) limited to requirements on the part of judgment and of the will itself, because, when all requirements on the part of judgment concur, and the faculty itself exists as free of itself, it can in its very use not be free, or, what is the same thing, the act can not be free; therefore, so that that definition may comprehend not only the faculty free in itself (so to speak) or in first act, but also the use or free act, those requirements do not suffice. Hence the heretics of this time, when they see us operating from judgment and advertence of reason, and not being carried or determined from necessity by the objects themselves, nevertheless say that we do not

operate freely, because we suffer necessity from God himself. In this they indeed err, asserting that God operates in us always in such a way, which is repugnant to faith and divine Scriptures and right reason; they do not err, however, in the inference, namely, that if God imposes external necessity upon an act, it is not in fact free; nor would they err if they only said either that this mode of God's operating is possible or, that being posited, the indifference of judgment does not suffice for free use.

6. Second inference: Or it is further inferred that the difficulties posited are not satisfied by the responses of that opinion. For that distinction of composite and divided sense, by which the prior difficulty is expedited, although rightly explained it satisfies, as we will see below, nevertheless taken so generally it cannot be sufficient; for we will show that some necessity, even in the composite sense, is repugnant to the use of freedom and destroys it. And this is easily evident from what has been said; for God by some motion and activity of his can impose necessity upon the will, and then the act would not be necessary in the divided sense, because the will, of itself and setting aside that motion, could not exercise that act; but it would be necessary in the composite sense, because, that motion being posited, it cannot not be exercised; and yet that necessity in the composite sense would remove free use, because we suppose that God then necessitates the will as much as he can; therefore something must be added so that that distinction satisfies. Again, that limitation of the common definition of freedom, by which the latter difficulty is solved, has already been disproved, besides the fact that it is arbitrary and provides occasion for introducing any similar limitation at will in this matter. For by equal reasoning someone could say that, a certain influence of heaven being posited or a special motion of a demon being applied, our will could not not operate following that, and nevertheless would then operate freely, because, all things required on the part of judgment and intrinsic faculty being posited, that operation

does not necessarily follow, even if from another supposition it necessarily follows.

7. Third inference: Finally, it is established from what has been said that that new definition of free act has been falsely devised, namely, that it is that which is made by the will from a judgment of reason that does not necessitate, because an act can from elsewhere be necessary with a necessity impeding free use, as has been declared; therefore that definition can agree with some act that is absolutely necessary. The first reason on which that definition is founded only proves that indifferent judgment is the root of freedom; nevertheless it does not follow from this that the definition of free act is completed from the fact that it proceeds from such a judgment, but it must be added that it proceeds from a faculty consonant with judgment that is not impeded nor suffering external necessity, which the common definition explained in those words, that when all things required are posited, it can act and not act. In the second proof, however, something false is assumed when it is said that for a free act the indifference of the object so suffices that the indifference of the power is not necessary; for how will an act be free if the power is not indifferent to exercising it? Or why is an object said to be indifferent in the nature of an object, unless because it does not impose necessity upon the power, but leaves it indifferent? The example of the divine will either assumes something false or is not to the point, because it is adduced in that which is not similar. For the divine will, although in a higher and more perfect mode, is nevertheless truly indifferent of itself to willing created objects; for it is not naturally determined to this, otherwise how would it be free? And although from eternity it has determined itself and necessarily always perseveres in that determination, nevertheless that very determination (whatever it may be) is from freedom; and its necessity is not of nature, but of immutability, which does not remove the proper indifference which a free thing has from itself. Nevertheless, because in the will of God there is no efficiency of its own act nor composition from potency and

act, therefore that indifference is not in potency with respect to act, but in pure act with respect to objects, and therefore in this the indifference of created freedom is not to be compared with the divine.

The Definition of Freedom is Explained

8. Therefore, so that we may satisfy the difficulties proposed, that description of free faculty must first be retained and explained, in which two things are postulated. One is that it be an active power, having from itself and from its internal faculty the force for exercising and suspending its action. The other is that that faculty, while it exercises an act, be so disposed and proximately (so to speak) prepared for work that, when all things required for acting are posited, it can act and not act. In the first part of this opinion there is no difficulty, nor is a new explanation scarcely necessary, supposing what was said in section II, where we showed that freedom consists in active faculty as such; for from this it manifestly follows that freedom requires an active faculty indifferent to acting and not acting. Hence, for the sake of clarity, we can prescind two powers in a free power, or as it were two parts of one power. One is for willing or exercising an act; the other for not willing or suspending action. For this latter part of this power, although it be in itself some positive perfection, nevertheless in use it can be exercised through mere negation or lack of act of such a faculty, if we speak of its absolute power, as is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 6, a. 3, and other theologians there, because not willing, as such, can be free, but not willing taken precisely does not include an act, but lack of act, which if it be with perfect advertence of reason and full power of willing, will be free. I say, however, if we speak of absolute power, because morally or ordinarily this kind of lack of appetition is not exercised without a positive act which is either nolition by which the proposed object is rejected or another act concerning it, for example, love or intention of it, or is conversion to another repugnant or diverse object, as experience

sufficiently establishes; because it would be very difficult, perfect and practical advertence of reason existing, to suspend every act of will.

9. From this it is incidentally understood that this indifference of free faculty is first and precisely sufficiently saved through the relation to act or lack of act, which is customarily called freedom as to exercise, because through it the very exercise of act is indifferent. Since, however, this free faculty is vital and so perfect and spiritual that it can reflect upon itself and upon its own motions, whenever it can not freely exercise some act, it can also through another positive act will that lack or not will to exercise such an act. And in this way there is never freedom as to exercise without some freedom as to specification, for whenever the will can freely not love, it can also elicit some act, according to its nature and species repugnant to love, and thus there is there some indifference as to the specification of act. Besides which there can be another intervening in relation to contrary acts with respect to the same object, insofar as it can either be freely loved or also held in hatred. This twofold power is also included by free faculty, according to itself and taken absolutely, although it is not necessary that it have it concerning all and singular objects, because it is not necessary that it be equally free concerning all of them, as we will touch upon below. And these things concerning the prior part of this opinion.

10. In the second part of the proposed opinion is declared not only the nature of free faculty, but also that which is necessary for the use of freedom or free act; for the aforesaid definition of freedom comprehends all of this, and rightly, because the entire difficulty of freedom and its utility is placed in the very use and exercise of freedom. It must be considered, however, that something can be said to be required for an act in two ways: in one way, as a prerequisite for action; in another way, as intrinsically or essentially included in the action itself. The former is customarily called a prerequisite antecedently or on the part of first act, whether that be the proper principle of action or a condition prerequisite for it in any way or in

any genus of cause. This latter can be called a requirement concomitantly or in second act itself, because it is not distinguished from the free action itself, which is the second act of free faculty. When therefore it is said that that is free which, when all things required for acting are posited, can act and not act, it must be understood of prerequisites antecedently and in first act, not of others. And this very thing is insinuated in the aforesaid opinion when it is said that the free faculty ought to be so disposed and proximately prepared for work that with that disposition it can act and not act; for in that preparation are included all those prerequisites in first act for operating.

11. And indeed that for free use it is necessary that with all those things the said indifference and quasi twofold power remain intact, can easily be shown. First, because otherwise cessation, for example, from work would not be from intrinsic force and faculty, but from defect of some required condition; but this contributes nothing to freedom, for there is no natural power so necessarily acting that it cannot sometimes not act from defect of a required condition, such as approximation of the patient or another similar thing. Indeed, if one rightly considers, that is not being able not to act, but is rather impotence of acting or not being able to act with such a defect; but the indifference of freedom is not founded in impotence of acting, but in power of not acting. Hence, when the will itself lacks some act on account of natural inadvertence of reason, that lack of act is not from power of not acting, but from impotence of so operating or willing, and therefore such lack cannot be free. Therefore, so that faculty may have free use, it is necessary that, when all conditions prerequisite antecedently or in first act are posited, from its internal force and faculty it can act and not act. When, however, we say from internal force and faculty (to meet objections), we do not exclude divine concurrence, or greater aid necessary for the quality of acts, but we leave this to theologians.

12. That the said definition is not to be understood of requirements concomitantly is proven, because these, as we said, are included in the action itself; for just as action is required for acting, so whatever is included in action can be said to be required. Action is required as that by which the power is formally determined and constituted actually acting, and therefore it cannot be included among those conditions with which the power ought to be indifferent to acting and not acting, because manifest repugnance is involved; therefore neither ought all that which is of the intrinsic nature of action or is essentially included in it be included among those requirements; for the same reasoning applies to all of those as to the action itself. And this interpretation of that definition is gathered from the common opinion of theologians, In I, dist. 38 and 39, and In II, dist. 24, and from the doctrine of Anselm, which we will immediately explain.

The Prior Difficulty is Expedited

13. Twofold motion of our will by the divine: And from this interpretation the two difficulties touched upon at the beginning are easily expedited. For to the first it is responded that a twofold motion of God with respect to our will can be understood. One is antecedent to actual concurrence to the act of will; the other consisting in actual concurrence itself. The prior is little known in metaphysics or from the principles of nature alone; nevertheless in theology it is certain, and whatever it may be, it is contained under the conditions required for an act antecedently or by way of principle or first act. For although this motion is made through a vital act, which is second act with respect to the power in which it inheres, nevertheless with respect to another act for which that motion is given, it is compared by way of principle, and for that reason it is said to be by way of first act; just as judgment about good to be done is the principle of the act of will by which such good is loved; hence, although in the intellect it is second act, nevertheless

with respect to the will it is compared as first; and the same is true of other similar things. The latter motion is more known by natural light, because physically it is more intrinsically necessary for the action of a creature, but that motion is counted among requirements for an act concomitantly, because the concurrence of God is essentially included in the action of a creature.

14. Concerning the prior motion, therefore, it must be said that, when it is posited, the will can still not operate that act for which such motion is given, because since that motion is from the conditions prerequisite for a free act, unless it left that power unimpeded, it would remove free use, for it would determine the power to one thing. But what would be freedom or choice where only one part had been granted? as Evodius rightly said to Constantius, in Turrianus, lib. IV pro Epistolis Pontific., c. 2. And therefore the Council of Trent, sess. VI, c. 4, concerning such previous motion even in works of grace defines that, when it is posited, it is still in the power of the will not to consent. Nor is this against the efficacy of divine motion, both because this does not come from impotence, but from wisdom, providence and will of the first mover himself, and also because, when he wills, he also efficaciously brings it about that the will infallibly consents, although it could not consent. But truly by itself and absolutely it is not repugnant that, this motion standing, the will not be moved by that act or free motion for which such motion is given, nor as to this are moving and being moved correlative, when one motion is compared to another act as its principle and not only as a way to the term. How otherwise did Augustine say that he who is so moved cannot not feel the motion, but can not consent; but this matter has in theology a grave and lengthy disputation, from which we deliberately abstain, and abstracting from all opinions we are content with that response which all embrace under the aforesaid words, although there is dissension in their sense, concerning which we now pass no judgment.

15. Concerning the other motion, however, the difficulty which we treat properly proceeds; for that is the one by which the action of a secondary cause depends by itself and essentially upon the primary cause; and, as I said, it is nothing other than the very concurrence of God, concerning which why it is called motion, we will say below and in treating of the dependence of secondary cause upon the primary in operating. Concerning this motion, therefore, it is true that, when it is posited, the will cannot not be moved; we deny, however, that this is repugnant to the use of freedom, because that motion is not from the conditions prerequisite for an act, but is essentially included in the very action of the will. What kind of concurrence or motion of God this is, and how it is simultaneous with the influx of the created will itself, and whether it can be said to be in some way prior without injury to freedom, and finally how it is in the power of man to have or not have this motion of God (for this also is true and necessary for freedom), we will say in the place cited a little before.

Response to the Latter Difficulty

16. Finally, the second difficulty has already been expedited from what has been said; for omitting the prior motion, which neither pertains to us nor is there speech about it in the argument, concerning the latter or concurrence of God it is denied that it is from the prerequisites antecedently, of which the definition of freedom speaks, as we explained, and therefore we confess that, when it is posited, the will cannot not be moved, because it is already supposed to be constituted under its action, not however without its free determination. And in this sense the response is also optimally made through that distinction about composite and divided sense; for when this motion is posited in the composite sense, the will cannot not operate, because it is already supposed to be operating; hence this does not conflict with freedom, because in that very supposition the

use of freedom is included and already supposed, concerning which, just as concerning any other thing, it is truly said that when it is, it necessarily is, although simply and absolutely (which is said in the divided sense) it could not be. And this very thing is what Anselm said, lib. de Concordia praesc., at the beginning, and lib. II Cur Deus homo, c. 17 and 18, that necessity from antecedent supposition removes freedom, but not from consequent supposition. For he calls antecedent supposition all that which we have said to be prerequisite antecedently or on the part of first act for a free act; hence he himself calls this antecedent supposition the cause of the thing, and therefore, if from such supposition an act necessarily follows, freedom is removed, of whose nature it is that with all those prerequisites the power remains intact for acting and not acting, even in the composite sense with respect to such antecedent conditions, as has been declared. But he calls consequent supposition all that which includes the very action of the creature, because that already supposes free use, as has been declared. Hence necessity from that cannot take away the free use itself, because it is not necessity of the thing, but of inference only, as St. Thomas said, q. 24 de Verit., a. 1, ad 13, who confirms this doctrine lib. II Phys., lect. 15, at the beginning; St. Augustine also favors this, V de Civit., c. 10.

SECTION V

WHAT IS THE FACULTY IN WHICH THE FREEDOM OF CREATED CAUSES FORMALLY RESIDES

1. Every rational agent, and only rational agents, are capable of freedom. In the third and fourth reasons for doubt proposed in section 2, it is asked that we declare more distinctly what are those created causes that in their action are not subject to necessity, and through what faculty they have this dominion. And indeed,

concerning principal causes or those operating as "that which," the resolution is easy from what has been said; for we have shown that all things lacking reason also lack freedom on account of their imperfection. Whence it follows that, on the contrary, all rational or intellectual agents are also free agents; for that negation of the use of reason is a sufficient and adequate reason for the lack of freedom; therefore the opposite affirmation is also an adequate reason for the opposite affirmation. And this is confirmed; for it has been shown in particular that man is a free agent, although he is the lowest of all in the intellectual grade; therefore a fortiori it must be said that all created agents that have intellect also have freedom. This we shall say again concerning created intelligences in particular when we dispute about them below. Nor does the argument taken from the motions or influences of the heavens stand against this. For as regards the moving intelligences of the heavens, although they are free in other things, they can be led by some necessity in moving the heavens, either from the motion and command of a superior agent or from a preconceived end, which they love and intend immutably. But as regards the influence of the heavens, it must be said that this does not extend directly and per se to spiritual and immaterial things, both because they influence only through physical motion, of which spiritual reality is incapable, and also because spiritual reality is of a superior order, and therefore a material thing cannot act directly upon it. But the souls of men are immaterial in themselves and have freedom insofar as they are immaterial and operate through an immaterial power, and therefore the influence of the heavens cannot impede the use of freedom in men, even though indirectly through the medium of the body and its affections it can incline them more or less toward one part or another, which inclination man can overcome by his freedom and dominate the stars.

2. Spiritual substance is the radical principle of free action. From this it is further established that the principal principle by which free action always exists is some substance or substantial spiritual

form. This is proven because such a principle is either a rational soul or some superior substance; but the rational soul is immaterial, and much more so is every superior substance; therefore. And this is confirmed, for every material form, insofar as it is such, operates without intelligence and reason, and therefore operates in a merely natural way; therefore the form that is the principle of free action must be spiritual.

3. The proximate principle of free action is always a spiritual power. Free act, either elicited or commanded. Third, from this it is also established that the proximate principle of free action is some power of spiritual substance insofar as it is spiritual or intellectual. I add this on account of the human soul, which, although it has many faculties, many of them are nevertheless material, because they do not belong to it insofar as it is intellectual, and therefore they are not the proximate principle of free action. The reason for this assertion is that the proximate principle must be accommodated to the principal. Likewise, because a thing does not have dominion over its act except insofar as it is intellectual; therefore it does not have this dominion except through a faculty pertaining to the intellectual grade; but this grade is immaterial according to itself and according to all powers proximate to it; therefore. It must only be noted that an action is denominated free in two ways, namely, as an elicited act or proximately in order to the power effecting the action, in which way willing itself is free, or as a commanded act or remotely in order to the power moving or applying an inferior faculty to action, in which way walking is free. When therefore we treat of the proximate principle of free action, it must be understood of action properly free in order to its immediate principle, and in this way we say that the proximate principle of free action is a spiritual faculty; for the proximate principle of action that is only imperatively free can sometimes be a material faculty as is the motive power according to place residing in the members of the body, because that can be subordinated to a superior spiritual substance, in which is the proper dominative force

over its act, and through that over the inferior power and its action. Whence it can also be said that, although imperatively free action, physically and according to its entity, is proximately made by another power, nevertheless it has the denomination of freedom only from a superior power through the medium of its act; therefore that power which is the proximate principle of an act per se and immediately free must be spiritual and per se pertaining to the intellectual grade, insofar as it is such.

Free Will Consists Not in Act or Habit, But in Some Power

4. And from this, fourth, we conclude that created free will directly and formally consists in such a power that has the aforesaid force and dominion over its proper act. Nor is it necessary to linger in refuting the opinions of those who said that free will consists in some act, or in a habit, or in a power as affected by some habit. Of these opinions, the first was held by Hervaeus, Quodl. I, q. I; the second by Bonav., In II, dist. 25, a. 1, q. 4; the third by Albertus, In II, dist. 24, a. 5. But these opinions are either not probable or they use words differently. For man has free will even when he would operate nothing; otherwise he would lose free will by the mere cessation from act, which is absurd; therefore free will cannot consist in act. Likewise man is of free will because he can operate and not operate, all things required for acting being posited; but he is proximately able to operate through some power; therefore he has freedom proximately through some power of the soul; such a power therefore will be free will. Then, if the freedom of will consists in some act, I ask whether that act is elicited by a free power or not. If the first is said, already freedom precedes that act; it is therefore in the power itself before the act. But if the second is said, that act is necessary; how therefore can the freedom of will consist in it?

5. A response to an objection. Perhaps it will be said that act, even if it is necessary, can be the principle of free election or deliberation; for thus Hervaeus seems to have philosophized. For he thinks that a power is not apt for eliciting a free act unless a necessary act precedes which is its principle; for (he says) deliberation precedes a free act, and the will to deliberate precedes deliberation. But this can be understood of an act of intellect or of an act of will. It is true therefore that before the first act freely elicited, an act of intellect must necessarily precede, not free nor properly voluntary, but natural; because since nothing can be willed unless it is preknown, before every volition some judgment must precede; therefore that judgment which precedes the first volition cannot proceed from the will, and consequently is neither free. But it would be most improperly and falsely said that judgment is free will itself because in its genus it can be the foundation and origin of free use, since it is only a required condition and application of the object so that the free power can use its faculty. And although we should grant that judgment concurs actively to the act freely elicited by the will, nevertheless freedom would not consist in it; for rather it influences naturally of itself, yet it awaits (so to speak) the consent or influx of the will, in whose power it is to grant or suspend that; therefore freedom is not rightly attributed to judgment or to an act of intellect as the principle in which it proximately resides.

6. But if this is understood of an act of will, it is not universally true that before every free act of the will some natural act precedes that is the principle of the free act; for what is such an act, or what necessity that it should precede? It will be answered that it is the will to deliberate. But on the contrary; for first, in God there is perfect freedom without such a will, there pre-existing in the intellect (according to our mode of understanding) perfect knowledge of things that is merely natural and necessary. An angel also in the first instant had a free act of will without a previous will to deliberate through the intellect, but only with some actual cognition of intellect

supposed, which he had concreated and received rather than acquired by his proper will. And similarly man, if he has in his intellect sufficient proposition and consideration of an object, even if he does not have this from the application of will, but from the excitation of an offered object or from the speech or infusion of another, can immediately freely will or not will such an object. And then, although in man that will to deliberate or to inquire something more or to consider about such an object often precedes, even that will to deliberate is not natural, but free, because there is nothing that necessitates to having it; therefore neither does that will to deliberate always precede another free act concerning every object, nor, when it precedes, is it always natural and necessary. And the reason is that, in order for the will to will an object, it is not necessary that it first willed the consideration of the object, but it suffices that it have such consideration, whether it has that consideration from nature, or from will, or from elsewhere. For concerning the necessity of willing an object, it is only required that it be preknown; but that this cognition comes from this source or that is accidental. And by the same reason, even if it often happens that consultation and inquiry of intellect is directly voluntary, it is not necessary that it be from some natural or necessary volition, but it can be from free volition, indeed morally it happens thus, and therefore often inconsideration is blameworthy, because consideration could be had through free will. From this head therefore it is not necessary that some natural act of will precede the free.

7. Whether every intention of end is necessary. It can be objected otherwise, because intention of end always precedes election of means; but intention of end is necessary; for freedom, as Aristot. and St. Thomas hold, is only in the election of means; therefore from this head before a free act there always precedes some necessary act, which is the proximate principle and reason of free election; therefore freedom of will is to be placed first in it. I respond that both what is assumed is false and what is concluded is badly inferred. For not every

intention of end is necessary; for there are many particular ends that we will freely not only as to exercise, but also as to specification, and we necessarily love only the ultimate or highest end, and that only as to specification, not as to exercise, at least for the state of this life, as we shall touch upon a little below, and there we shall declare how freedom is said to be concerned with election. Then also, when intention of end precedes, the freedom that is in election of means is not to be attributed to it as to its proper principle, but to the faculty from which is both the intention and the election, both because it is still uncertain whether intention is the proper and per se principle of effecting election, or only a previous disposition or necessary condition to it, and especially because, even if intention concurs actively with the power to election, nevertheless the determination to elect this means before others is not from intention, but from the virtue of the will itself, from whose influx the election itself is intrinsically voluntary, and consequently determined to this means rather than to another. Therefore by no reason can it be understood that the faculty of freedom properly resides in some act, but in the power from which the free act proximately is.

8. And by similar arguments it can easily be shown that free will is not some habit. First indeed, because either such a habit would be natural and congenite with the power, or acquired through acts (I omit infused habits, because now we speak of natural freedom and of acts of the natural order); the first cannot be said, because, according to true doctrine, there is no natural habit naturally placed in the will, if we speak properly of habit as it is a quality distinct from power, adding facility or inclination; for nature does not give this, but use does. Nor does experience or reason teach otherwise; for the inclination or virtue that nature has placed in a power is nothing other than the power itself. Whence if perhaps St. Bonaventure or Albert by the name of habit understand the hability or connatural force of such a power, they differ from us only in name. The second also cannot be said, because habits of free faculty are acquired through free acts;

therefore the use of free will precedes such habit; therefore free will itself cannot consist in such habit. Moreover there is a general reason, because a habit can be the principle of a free act insofar as we can use it when we will; therefore the habit itself does not give freedom, but rather (so to speak) receives it from the power in which it resides, insofar as it is the power that uses the habit, and it is placed in its faculty to use it or not use it. The third reason is that habit does not give the ability to operate, but gives facility in operating; whence the will affected by habit can effect no act of natural order that it cannot absolutely effect without habit; but free will does not necessarily require this facility in operating, but absolute power of acting and not acting, all requisites being posited; whence man using reason is free from the beginning before he acquires that facility; therefore freedom does not consist in some habit nor in power together with habit, since it per se has absolute power. Only in habits per se infused can this seem probable, insofar as these habits give not only facility, but also the very ability. Whence it can be conceded that these habits complete intrinsic freedom from this part with respect to supernatural acts. Although even without them the power, if it otherwise has proportioned aid, can be called simply free to such acts, because it suffices per se for not eliciting them; but for eliciting them, it can be completed not only through habits, but also through aids. Nor does difficulty occur in this doctrine, nor do St. Bonaventure or Albert object any argument that needs our response.

Free Will is Not a Power Distinct from Intellect & Will

9. The opinion of Alensis is disproved. Therefore, supposing that the free faculty is proximately placed in some power of soul or intellectual substance, it remains to be inquired what power that is. And first, there were not lacking those who said it is a power distinct from intellect and will. Thus holds Alex. Alens., II p., q. 72, memb. 2, a.

1, § 3, where he says that free will, properly and specially taken, is a certain motive power distinct from intellect and will. Nevertheless this opinion can neither be proved nor understood. For the speech is either of motive power according to place or of motive power of other powers to their acts. Concerning the former, it is probable that there is in the soul, or even in intelligences, one distinct from intellect and will, whether for moving itself or for moving other things, as was touched upon above, and will also be said below when treating of created intelligences. Nevertheless freedom cannot be formally constituted in this power. First, because that power properly does not elicit an immanent act, but a transient action; and therefore it is more imperfect than is necessary for it to be capable of formal freedom. Second, because that power does not go out into act unless applied by will; for an angel or man moves himself or others when he wills; indeed, universally, the principle of motion in more perfect living beings is appetite; therefore that power is not actively free (so to speak) or elicitively, but passively or imperatively; it is therefore not in itself a free power, but is subject to a free power. Whence its act is only voluntary by denomination from the act of another power, not intrinsically through itself, which is necessary for a formally free power, as I shall explain a little below. But if the speech is of motive power of other powers, such power in an intellectual creature is not other than will and intellect; for speaking of objective motion, thus intellect moves will; but if of effective or applicative motion to work, thus will is what moves both itself and other powers; for we are not applied to operating freely except because we will; therefore to feign another power is both superfluous and unintelligible, because we are inclined and applied to operating only by appetizing and willing.

10. But if perhaps Alensis distinguishes this motive power of powers from will not really but rationally, and in this sense calls free will a power distinct from will, first he will differ from us only in words. Then he does not sufficiently declare the office of free will; for it does not adequately consist in motion of other powers, but also in

willing any object, with the power of not willing it. Let it therefore be constant and certain that this faculty in which formal freedom proximately is, is not other than intellect and will. But which of these powers it is, remains to be explained.

Formal Freedom is Not in Intellect, But in Will Alone

11. Freedom does not formally coalesce from reason and will. In this matter there can be three modes of speaking. The first is that intellect and will together and formally complete the freedom of will, so that both of these powers are formally free in their acts and from the freedom of both consists the perfect freedom of man with his human acts. This was held by Durand., In II, dist. 24, q. 3, where first he says that intellect together with will is a formally free power; and he thinks it is the opinion of Aristot., IX Metaph., c. 3, where he indistinctly says that rational powers are free. Then Durandus adds that intellect is primarily and more perfectly free, because, since it is proper to a rational power to be free, whichever is more perfectly rational will be more perfectly free; but intellect is the more perfect rational power; indeed that alone is properly and quasi-essentially rational; but will only by participation or some subordination, insofar as it is apt to be directed by reason; therefore intellect is also primarily free. And this is confirmed, for intellect is not only free, but is also the root of freedom of will; for from indifference of judgment, which pertains to intellect, arises indifference of election, which pertains to will; therefore freedom is prior and more perfect in intellect, for on account of which each thing is such, that also is more so. Finally from this Durandus seems tacitly to conclude that free will formally quasi-coalesces from intellect and will. Whence also by the Master there, and by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 1, free will is defined as a faculty of will and reason; for that particle "and" is to be taken not copulatively, but

collectively. Whence the office of free will consists not in judgment alone or election alone, but in both together.

12. Freedom is not formally in intellect alone. The second mode of speaking can be that freedom is formally in intellect alone, and not in will. I do not find this among any author; but it seems it can be founded rather probably in a certain opinion received by many, namely, that will is entirely determined to election by the judgment of intellect, so that neither can it be determined to elect something without that, nor with that posited can it discrepant from that or not conform to it. For from this principle it openly follows, first, that the power of will is not formally free. First, because it is never in its power to act and not act, all things required being posited antecedently, as was declared above. For one of these requisites is the judgment of reason, which being posited it is not in the power of will either not to act, if it is judged that action should be taken, or to act, if it is judged that action should not be taken. Second, because will in its determination conducts itself more passively than actively, since with a certain necessity it follows the motion of another faculty; but formal freedom cannot be in power as moved, but as moving itself, as has been shown. Third, it is declared by the example of executive or motive power according to place; for that can both move and cease from motion, and effect this motion or the contrary, and yet it is not formally free, because it cannot do this as moving itself or determining, but as moved and necessarily following the motion of will; therefore the same must be said of will, since with equal necessity it obeys the judgment of intellect. But from this part thus proved, the other is necessarily concluded, namely that freedom is formally in intellect as to the power of bearing judgment and not bearing judgment, because otherwise formal freedom will be left nowhere. And this part can also be confirmed by the arguments of Durand.

13. Freedom formally resides in will alone. The third mode of speaking is that freedom is formally in will and not in intellect. This is of St. Thomas, I, q. 83, a. 3, and I-II, q. 13, a. 1, ad 6, and In II, dist. 24,

q. 1, in which places the same is held by Cajetan, Capreolus, Conrad, and other Thomists; Richard also consents, dicta dist. 24; and Scotus, dist. 25; from Henry, Quodl. I, q. 16. And I judge this opinion to be most true, which will be sufficiently proved against the preceding if we show that formal freedom is not in intellect, because no power besides will is left in which it can be. But this can be demonstrated in this way, that intellect according to itself is neither free as to the specification of its act nor as to exercise; therefore it is in no way free; nor indeed can another mode of freedom be thought out.

14. The prior part is proved, because intellect from its nature is determined to assent to the true and dissent from the false; but if neither of these reasons is in the object, or it does not perceive it, it can elicit neither act, because it cannot operate without an object. You will say that between these members a medium can be given, namely, that in the object intellect does not clearly see truth or falsity, but it appears in some way by probable reasons or the testimony of someone. Then therefore intellect will be able to be free as to the specification of act. It is responded, first, that intellect cannot determine itself from itself to the species of act unless it can also determine itself to exercise, because power does not determine itself to such an act unless by exercising it, and because, as we said above, freedom is primarily and per se discerned in the exercise of act; if therefore we show that intellect is not free from itself as to the exercise of act, it will also be established that concerning such objects it does not have formal freedom as to specification.

15. Moreover, it can be declared and proved a priori, because intellect concerning such objects, thus proposed, does not therefore remain from itself quasi-suspended and indeterminate because it has intrinsic force and dominion over its act, but only because the object is not sufficiently applied so that by the natural impetus by which it is inclined to the true, it is necessarily carried into it. In which is discerned a great difference between will and intellect, for intellect cannot be in any way indeterminate concerning its act except on

account of imperfect proposition of object. But truly will even concerning an object exactly proposed can be indifferent according to the capacity of the object. And for this reason in the divine intellect there is properly no indifference as to judgment, because there is always an evident act of knowledge and with perfect manifestation of object; but in will there is indifference with respect to objects, even if they are most perfectly proposed.

16. And the reason can be taken more a priori from the diversity of objects of intellect and will; for the formal object of intellect is truth; but in the same object there cannot be truth and falsity, because truth consists in the indivisible, as was treated above, and therefore per se, and as much as is from the merits of the object, intellect is always determined to one as to the species of act; whence, if sometimes it is not sufficiently determined, it is only because the object is not sufficiently proposed or appears, not truly from internal force and dominion of intellect itself over its act. But the object of will is good; but the same object can be simultaneously good and evil, or convenient or inconvenient in order to diverse things or under diverse aspects, and therefore, the perfect proposition or cognition of object standing, the appetitive power can be indifferent as to specification to pursuing or rejecting such an object; therefore indifference as to specification is not found per se and formally in intellect, but in will.

17. The other part concerning necessity as to exercise is proved because no power whose act is not intrinsically voluntary can be formally free as to exercise; but the act of intellect is not intrinsically voluntary; therefore intellect is not a formally free power. That the antecedent may be understood, I suppose that an act can be voluntary in two modes: first extrinsically, by denomination from the act of another power moving or applying another power to work, in which way walking is voluntary when someone moves himself spontaneously. In the second mode, some act is voluntary intrinsically and through itself, as an act of love is voluntary; for what is more spontaneous than to love? And yet, speaking per se, it is not voluntary

by denomination from another act, but through itself. For it is not necessary that he who loves by a prior and distinct act wills to love; and although sometimes someone can do this for his freedom, nevertheless it is accidental to voluntary love; for immediately and without a prior act someone can elicit love, and loving itself is intrinsically willing love. But there is a difference, that in the prior mode of voluntary, the act that is denominated voluntary by another is the object and effect of it; object indeed, because the prior act tends into it; but effect, because such an act is not only willed as object, but also caused, at least mediately, insofar as from the force of the act of will or appetite the inferior power is applied to operating. But truly the act that through itself is intrinsically voluntary is not compared as proper object or effect to that act by which it is voluntary, because it is voluntary by itself, and is not properly the object or effect of itself; it therefore has another object into which it directly tends, and is the effect of the power from which it is elicited, and only through a certain virtual reflection, which it includes in itself, is it voluntary; whence it is usually said to be willed through the mode of act, not through the mode of object.

18. An act voluntary in itself is always elicited by appetite. From which it is understood that no act can be intrinsically and through itself voluntary, except that which is elicited by an appetitive power. It is proved, because proper voluntary, as it is distinguished from connatural, formally proceeds from some act elicited by vital appetite, and thus in the prior mode of voluntary that act which is extrinsically called voluntary receives that denomination from some act elicited by some vital appetite, by which it is commanded; therefore the act that through itself is voluntary, since it does not receive this denomination from another act elicited by appetite, must necessarily be elicited by vital appetite. And from the very reason and mode of such act the reason can also be given; for the act elicited by will is through the mode of intrinsic and spontaneous tendency and inclination into object, and therefore such tendency is also

spontaneous through itself; but this mode of tendency is proper to appetitive power; therefore it is also proper to it that its act is through itself intrinsically voluntary; since therefore intellect is not an appetizing power, it is established that its act is not through itself intrinsically voluntary, which was the posterior part of the antecedent assumed.

19. But the prior part, namely that only that power can be free as to exercise whose act is intrinsically voluntary, is declared in this way, because the exercise of act, or (which is the same) the determination of power to operating, must be either natural from the sole impetus of nature or voluntary from the elicited inclination of the operator. Nor indeed can another reason be understood on account of which some cause goes out into some work, unless either because it is of such a nature determined from itself to that work or because it wills and appetizes such operation. But a power free as to exercise is not determined to work from the sole impetus of nature; therefore it must be determined voluntarily; therefore either extrinsically through voluntary elicited by another power, and thus it will not be a formally free power, but imperative, because it does not move itself as to exercise, but is moved and determined by another. Or through intrinsic voluntary, and thus it is necessary that such power be appetitive; therefore, that some power be formally free as to exercise, that is, able to determine itself to exercising a free act, it is necessary that it be a power operating intrinsically voluntarily through its act; since therefore intellect is not such a power, as is evident per se, it is rightly concluded that it is not a formally free power in the exercise of its act.

20. This indeed can be confirmed first from the common mode of feeling and speaking of all men; for when man can consider about this thing or that, if someone is asked why he occupies himself in consideration of this thing rather than another, he will respond that he does it because he wills; indeed also he who believes those things that he does not manifestly see, believes because he wills with will

regulated by reason, if he believes prudently; and therefore theologians say that believing is meritorious and depends on pious affection of will; therefore it is a sign that intellect is never freely determined to either part except through will; therefore it is not in itself formally free. And it is finally confirmed, for when the act or exercise of act of intellect is not had from necessity of nature, it cannot be assumed or preferred by man to the lack of such act or exercise except through a certain election by which this is preferred to another; but election is an act of will; therefore the determination of power to exercise of act is always through command or motion of will electing, and thus all freedom of such act is formally from will and not from intellect. And the same is concluded with greater reason when election is not only of exercise of act of intellect, but also of its species, as when someone elects to believe firmly rather than disbelieve or doubt; for that must necessarily be done through will determining intellect, as St. Thomas rightly said, II-II, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3.

21. The use of reason is the root of freedom. From the proof therefore of this part there remains first sufficiently disproved the opinion of Durand; for if intellect is not formally free, free will cannot formally consist in the collection or aggregate of both powers, intellect and will. But I say formally, for radically intellect or reason pertains to free will. In which sense it was said that free will is a faculty of will and reason. For it is of will formally, but of reason presuppositively or radically. Nor is it necessary to dispute with Scotus, Henry, and others, who deny that reason should be called the root of freedom, but only a necessary condition to freedom; for these authors seem to contend more about the mode of speaking than about the thing. For because cognition is only a necessary condition, previous to volition, therefore they want to call the mode of cognition only a necessary condition to the mode of volition, which consists in freedom. Nevertheless it can very well be said that the root of freedom is the use of reason or intelligence; for if we speak of the powers themselves, appetitive powers follow cognitive ones, so that, although their root is the soul,

immediately nevertheless it is the root of cognitive power, and through that of appetitive; and thus more perfect appetite is rooted proximately in more perfect cognizing power; therefore also this formal perfection of freedom arises from the perfection of understanding or reasoning. Just as therefore one passion is the root of another, so freedom of will will be said to be rooted in intelligence of reason. And the same is the proportion between acts, because, just as there is order per se between powers, so between their acts; and because morally that is per se causality, but the foundation of all moral being is freedom, therefore also indifference in acts of will proceeds from judgment of reason, as St. Thomas rightly teaches, I, q. 83, a. 1, and other places cited above, whom the Thomists follow in the same places; and Sonc., Iavell., and others, IX Metaph.

22. It must only be observed that the said authors often say that indifference of act of will arises from indifference of judgment of reason, in which locution the equivocation of the word indifference must be avoided; for attributed to will, in the power itself it signifies formal freedom or power to either alternative; but in its act it signifies immediate relation to the power eliciting the act, with proximate power to the opposite. Whence, if in the same sense it is said that indifference of act of will arises from indifference of judgment, it is not a true opinion, because in judgment, as it precedes will, there cannot be this formal indifference, as has been demonstrated. Otherwise therefore indifference attributed to judgment as root of freedom must be taken, and it can be called indifference not formal but objective; for because judgment of reason on account of its perfection and amplitude proposes in the object various reasons of convenience or inconvenience, and similarly proposes a means not always as necessary, but as indifferent, because it both discerns the grade of utility and difficulty of it, and simultaneously finds or proposes other means, therefore it is the foundation of free election of will. But that in judgment there is no other indifference or freedom necessary, is sufficiently established from what was said above against the opinion

of Hervaeus. And it is easily apparent in divine freedom; for, natural knowledge of all possible objects being presupposed alone, the divine will freely wills this or that outside itself, on account of the sole indifference or non-necessity of objects, which through natural knowledge it understands most clearly and necessarily.

23. And thus satisfaction has been given to all the foundations of Durand; for to be a formally free power is not the same as to be a rational power, nor does it necessarily accompany that, but only accompanies a rational appetitive power; but to a rational power as such there only follows that it be free formally or radically. And in this way Aristotle must be understood, IX Metaph., where he speaks indistinctly of rational powers through the mode of one, and only intends to teach that in the rational part which we call mind there is indifference in operating; but how individual powers of that superior part concur to this indifference he does not treat, but it has been declared by us.

24. Secondly, from the disproof of the same part, the second opinion is left disproven, which denied formal freedom in the will; for if formal freedom is not in the intellect, as has been shown, it is necessary that it be in the will, otherwise it would be nowhere. Furthermore, that opinion is in itself highly improbable and alien to all human understanding; for everyone judges that man is free because if he wills, he acts, and if he wills, he ceases. Hence also Sacred Scripture especially attributes this indifferent power to the will, in 1 Corinthians 7: "Having no necessity, but having power over his own will," and therefore also all goodness and malice, and every reason for reward or punishment is considered to be in the will, as theologians teach more extensively. And explicitly the Council of Trent, session VI, chapter 5, when it had taught that it is in man's power to cooperate freely or to resist grace, expressly declares that man does this by his free will, either alone, if he resists, or aided by God's grace, if he cooperates. And finally the ancient Fathers for this reason often call free will itself "free will" (libera voluntas), as can be seen in Augustine, book III On

Free Will, chapter 1 and following; and in Damascus, book II On Faith, chapter 25; sometimes, however, they call it "the free judgment of the will" (liberum voluntatis arbitrium), as is evident in Augustine, book V On the City of God, chapter 9; and Ambrose, book II On Faith, chapter 3.

25. And from this part, that the will is formally free, the other part can be confirmed, namely, that the intellect is not formally free, because there should not be posited in man acts elicited by two powers that are free per se from their relations alone to their powers, otherwise there would be a double moral disorder in such acts of intellect and will. Therefore, as soon as the intellect should judge this object to be a wicked thing eligible for choice, in this act precisely taken and before any other consent of the will there would be malice, because it is of itself dissonant with reason, and otherwise it is formally free. Again, in the election of such an object there would be new malice, because that is a new free act which man could avoid, and concerning an object contrary to reason. But if, with that judgment standing, the will should still not consent, nevertheless man would be worthy of reproach by reason of such judgment, not by reason of any prior will, formal or virtual, but precisely on account of the freedom of the intellect. And by the same reasoning, inconsideration or error could be culpable by reason of the intellect alone without intervention of the will, all of which things are absurd, since nothing is more repugnant than that there be sin without the voluntary. Just as therefore there is no other formal goodness or moral malice in man except that which proceeds from the will, so neither is there any other power formally free besides the will. Nor is this contrary to the perfection of the intellect, because it is simply a greater perfection to be the rule of the will, to which perfection formal freedom in the same power is repugnant, both because a rule ought to be certain and of itself immutable, and also because that operation which is a rule is not through inclination and tendency toward the thing ruled, but through a certain commensuration to it, which commensuration is not

indifferent, but certain and determined; but the will, because it is as if blind, needs the rule or direction of the intellect; but because it tends toward its object through perfect voluntary inclination, it is capable of freedom; and in this it can in a qualified sense exceed the intellect, although it is simply inferior in perfection.

SECTION VI

HOW THE FREE CAUSE IS DETERMINED BY THE JUDGMENT OF REASON

1. First opinion. Nevertheless, it remains for us to respond to the difficulty proposed in favor of the second opinion, which requires another question, namely, how the will, while it wills freely, is determined by reason. In this matter, the disciples of St. Thomas cited above, and other more recent authors, contend entirely that the will cannot be determined to a free act unless there precedes in the intellect a definite practical judgment or, as others speak, a command by which here and now, having weighed all things, it pronounces a definite sentence that this is to be chosen by man, or an impulse which is explained by this word, "do this," it effects. The reason may be that the will cannot be carried except toward a known object and one proposed by reason, since it is rational appetite, Ethics III, c. 2; therefore, until reason determinately judges what is to be chosen, the will cannot choose; otherwise it would tend toward an unknown object, because true cognition does not exist without judgment; for by pure apprehension it is not yet known whether a thing is such or is not such; therefore conversely, that definite judgment standing: "this is to be chosen," the will cannot not choose, because otherwise even then it would be led without reason, and formally, or at least virtually, would be carried toward the unknown, because by not choosing, either by formal or virtual act it refutes that object, or wills not to embrace such a means without any reason or judgment; therefore it is repugnant for

the will to operate thus. For this reason perhaps Bernard said, in his book On Grace and Free Will, that the will always has cognate reason, because, although not always from reason, it is never moved without reason.

2. Second opinion. But this opinion does not please Henry, nor also Scotus and his disciples, as is evident from the places cited and from Antonio And., IX Metaph., q. 2. And surely the reason suggested in the previous section, in relating the second opinion, is irrefutable in my judgment; for if that judgment of reason is so prerequisite to operating that in its genus it is a necessary cause for the free act of the will, and with that judgment posited the will cannot not consent to it, therefore the will is not such a power which, with all things absolutely prerequisite to operating being posited, can will and not will; therefore it is not a free power. The whole inference seems evident according to the principles demonstrated above. And it is declared further; for with the judgment posited, the will wills from necessity in the composite sense (as they say); which the authors of that opinion will easily concede, so much so that Medina, I-II, q. 9, a. 1, dub. 2, after the second conclusion, says that, with an efficacious command standing on the part of the intellect, no freedom remains in the will to contradict. And he adds that the command does not have this efficacy from that will, speaking per se, because, since there is no going to infinity, one must necessarily come to one command of the intellect preceding every action of the will, which efficaciously carries the will along with itself. And Bellarmine, who holds that opinion, lib. II On Grace and Free Will, c. 8, says that, just as the will of the blessed is determined to loving God with the vision of God posited, so in any particular thing to be chosen the will is determined to one thing as to specification and as to exercise, and in reality will necessarily choose when there will be present a particular practical judgment dictating here and now absolutely, with all things considered, that this is to be chosen.

3. But then I ask again whether that judgment is absolutely and simply necessary, so that it is carried by the intellect from the force of the object alone and of evident means, or of another cause necessitating the intellect to such a judgment, or whether it is a simply free act. If the first is said, the use of freedom is evidently destroyed, because such use is neither discerned in making that very judgment nor in the act of will which necessarily follows upon it. Nor does the composite sense help anything here, because that supposition with which the act is necessarily composed is in itself simply necessary and not free and is antecedent as a necessitating cause to the subsequent act, which mode of composition is found in beatific love, nor can an act of will be necessary in any other way. If, however, it is said that that judgment is free (as Javellus finally concedes after useless and obscure distinctions, IX Metaph., q. 4), I ask again whether that judgment is free elicitively from the force of the intellect or imperatively from the will. The first cannot be said in the opinion with which we agree who dispute about this point, that the intellect is not a formally free power. If, however, the second is said, either one proceeds to infinity or that opinion is entirely destroyed, for concerning that act of will which determines the intellect to such a judgment I inquire whether it is determined by another judgment of the intellect, and concerning that the same argument will return, and thus one will proceed to infinity. If, however, that free act of will is not from the determination of a similar prior judgment, two things contrary to the opinion are inferred. The first is that the will is not determined in all its free acts by a judgment of the intellect; the second is that it is never so determined unless in virtue of some prior free volition, in the force of which the rest follow and from it participate in freedom.

4. Someone will perhaps say that, with that judgment standing, it is impossible for the will not to consent, yet the will can remove that judgment, and therefore its act is free and not necessary; but this response does not satisfy the proposed argument, but tacitly and implicitly admits that that judgment is free; otherwise the will

could not take it away; but it does not declare by what will it is free from the beginning. For it is not sufficient if it is said to be free indirectly because the will did not impede it, both because at least the will could have a free volition by which it would impede that judgment, concerning which the same argument returns, and also because, although for the negation of an act perhaps indirect voluntariness might suffice, nevertheless for the positive exercise of a free and commanded act it does not suffice, but a formally free act, commanding and determining the power, is necessary. Another evasion besides, which can be taken from Javellus above, does not weaken the force of the argument; for he says that that judgment is free radically, which it has from the intellect and not from the will; but this is not to respond to the dilemma made, but to elude it, because to be free radically is nothing other than to be the root of freedom, which is in the will, concerning which there is no inquiry, but concerning formal freedom; for that very act of the intellect which is the root of the act of will is truly and formally elicited by its power, and concerning it there is inquiry whether it is elicited from necessity or with indifference by the power. Others respond by distinguishing concerning speculative or practical judgment, because not the speculative, but the practical determines the will. And they say this is free, even if it happens that the speculative is natural. But this does not weaken the proposed difficulty; for if, with the whole speculative judgment about the object's convenience, utility, honesty or turpitude, and other reasons or circumstances being posited, the practical judgment concerning such a thing to be loved or chosen is free, concerning it the whole argument made returns, by what, namely, the intellect is determined to such a judgment. If by the intellect, therefore the intellect is free; if by the will, what determines that? And thus it is concluded that the first free determination of the will occurs without such a judgment, and that there is no judgment entirely determining the will to any act, unless in virtue of a prior free volition.

5. Third opinion. Finally, some say that that practical judgment is free from the force of the will loving that object, and that the will itself loves that object from the force of such a judgment, and that those two acts are mutually causes to each other in diverse genera of causes, because both the will determines the intellect to judge thus practically, and the intellect determines the will to will such a thing. Nor is it repugnant (they say) for those two things mutually to precede and follow each other, because this happens in diverse genera of causes. For the will determines the intellect efficiently, but the intellect determines the will finally. But this doctrine is not approved by me; for first it is founded on no reason, nor is it necessary for anything; and from elsewhere that mutual priority and motion between those two acts can scarcely be conceived by the mind. And moreover I show it to be impossible, for in every vital act the sufficient application of the object necessary to the act, simply and in every genus of cause, precedes such an act nor can it happen that the very application of the object effectively proceeds from the act to which it is ordered; but the judgment of reason is required for the act of will as applying the object; therefore it is impossible that the judgment of reason necessary for the act of will should effectively proceed from the same act. The major can be shown by induction in all other vital acts outside that one concerning which we are treating. And a proportional argument can be taken from natural things, because it is impossible that an agent which needs a patient in order to act should not suppose absolutely and in every genus of cause the application of the patient to such action, or that through the very action it should apply the patient to itself. And the reason can be given, because the agent is powerless to act except concerning applied matter; therefore it is impossible that through that action it should effect the very application, but it must entirely suppose it. Likewise, because otherwise such action, as applicative of the patient, would not be concerned with it as applied, but as distant, which will immediately be declared more in the matter concerning which we are treating.

6. But the minor of the first syllogism is certain from that principle that nothing is willed unless previously known. But if anyone contends that the judgment of reason is not only the condition and application of the object, but also an efficient principle with the will of its act, he does not weaken, but increases the force of the argument; for from this it will be more repugnant that that judgment should be effectively from the motion of the act of will, which very judgment is said to be the efficient principle of such an act of will. And it is confirmed moreover, first, because the will does not apply any power to its act unless by willing that act; therefore, if the will directly applies the intellect to that judgment, it will do this through the act by which it wills that the intellect judge it; what therefore moves the will to will this? Whether another prior judgment, or that very one which is to be willed? If another, therefore the will is not determined to that act by the judgment which it wills, but by that which precedes. If that same one, therefore that judgment by way of object moves the will before it is judged by any mode concerning it. And it is confirmed secondly, for otherwise the first act of the intellect could be from the will itself, which is against the opinion of all, founded on that principle: Nothing is willed unless previously known. And the consequence is proved, because even concerning the first act of the intellect it could be said to be free and voluntary from the motion of the will, and nonetheless in its genus to be the cause of the same act of will by which it itself is voluntary. But if in the first act this is impossible, as it really is, it is not because it is simply first, but because it is in such a way the cause of the act of will that it is presupposed to it simply and in every genus of cause; but this reason proceeds in every other act; therefore it can never happen that a judgment of the intellect should be free through an act of will subsequent to it. Or otherwise it cannot happen that the will should be determined to a free act through a judgment which is born from the same free act. And thus it happens that either it is determined through an entirely necessary judgment, which is

repugnant to freedom, or that free determination does not arise from such a judgment, which is what is intended.

Resolution of the Question

7. Therefore, on account of these difficulties, I think that for the free determination of the will such a practical judgment entirely determining it is not necessary. Which besides the discourse made (which seems to be a posteriori and from inconvenience) can be declared a priori and from the thing itself, because the judgment of the intellect does not move the will except by means of the object which it proposes; but the proposed object does not always impose necessity on the will or determine it to one thing, nor is this necessary so that the will can tend toward the object; therefore neither is such determination necessary on the part of the judgment, indeed nor is it possible. The major is proved, because either the judgment moves only by reason of the object or it itself by reason of itself has peculiar efficacy for determining the will. This latter cannot be said, both because such efficacy would be repugnant to the freedom of the will, as has been said, and also because such a mode of moving is alien to the office of the intellect, which is to illuminate and direct and regulate the operations of the will, and finally because that mode of moving is proper to the will, which has been given peculiarly for this end, that it might efficiently move other powers as to exercise; therefore it cannot happen that the intellect, which is efficiently moved by the will, should in turn move it in the same way. And St. Thomas teaches this expressly, I-II, q. 9, a. 1 and 3.

8. But some object because the intellect through practical command efficiently moves the will to work. It is responded that the practical command of the intellect, by which someone is understood to command himself or his own will, is nothing other than a perfectly practical and entirely definite judgment with all circumstances. Nor can an impulsive act of the will be understood in the intellect except

by way of judgment; just as with respect to others no command is understood except by way of speech intimating what is to be done; and whatever else is feigned in the intellect, both is asserted gratuitously and cannot be explained what it is, and is outside the nature of the intellect, which essentially and adequately is a cognitive and judicative power; and therefore it cannot have an act except by way of apprehension or judgment. Since therefore this command concerning which we are treating is not mere apprehension, as is evident per se, it cannot be except practical judgment. Nor do Aristotle or St. Thomas ever declare command rationally except by way of entirely practical judgment, as is treated more broadly in I-II, q. 17. This judgment therefore moves from itself alone on the part of the object, as has been declared. But if sometimes it seems to impel efficaciously, it is only in virtue of some efficacious act of the same will, which preceded; for if the will efficaciously proposed or intends to attain this end, or chose to employ such a means, the intellect, having obtained the occasion, here and now judges that this is entirely to be done, supposing the prior will. And then the will is entirely determined, not so much by the judgment as by itself. A sign of which is that it is determined not absolutely, but as it were conditionally, namely, if it wills to persist in the intention or choice made. Whence if it wills to retreat from the prior will, it can, and impede such a command. But when such efficacious will does not precede, it is impossible that the command of the intellect should have that efficacious impulsive force, otherwise it would destroy the freedom of the will, and praise or blame would not be attributed to the will, but to the intellect. And Medina finally admits this, on account of the authority of St. Thomas, I-II, q. 17, a. 5.

9. It remains to prove the other part, namely, that the will is not always determined to one thing by the proposed object, which is certain and received by all, and which St. Thomas proves ex professo, I-II, q. 10, a. 2. For it is the same to say that the will is not necessitated by another as not to be determined to one thing by it, as the

arguments made above prove; but it is certain that it is not necessitated by all objects; therefore neither is it determined to one thing; therefore as to exercise it is determined to one thing only in the fatherland by the infinite goodness of God clearly seen, according to received doctrine; as to specification, however, by good in common or other similar objects, as we shall touch below; but not by all, because in all there does not appear any necessary reason of good, or there does not appear such goodness which does not have admixed either malice or some inconvenience or defect. Although, however, the object does not so determine the will, it can be so sufficient for exciting and alluring it that it by its own freedom is determined or carried toward it, because if in the object some reason of good is represented, that is of itself sufficient for moving the will; therefore that necessary determination is not so that the will is moved.

Response to Contrary Foundations

10. From which not only is our opinion proved, but also response is made to the foundation of the opposite opinion. For from the fact that the will cannot be carried toward the unknown, it is only had that a judgment of the intellect is necessary so that the will can choose, but it does not follow that it is fitting that that judgment determine the will to one thing. Which Bernard said elegantly, in his book On Grace and Free Will, in these words: "Reason is given to the will that it might instruct it, not that it might destroy it; but it would destroy if it imposed any necessity, so that it would not turn itself according to its own choice." Whence, when in the argument it is assumed that it is necessary that the intellect first judge what is to be chosen, the proposition can be ambiguous; for if the sense is to judge first what goodness, utility or convenience the means to be chosen and the choice itself has, the proposition is true; if however the sense is that it is to be judged first absolutely and entirely that this is to be chosen, the proposition is false. For it renders this sense, that, having

weighed and considered all things, now here and now it is under some aspect necessary to choose this, and therefore it is entirely to be chosen; but there is no reason why such a judgment should be necessary before every choice; indeed this is repugnant to the freedom of choice, as has been shown. Therefore that judgment suffices by which this means is judged useful and, having weighed all things, apt so that it can be chosen; and the same is true concerning any good object, that, namely, it is judged sufficiently good so that it can be loved. For just as, so that sight can be carried toward an object, it is not necessary that it be applied as seen or as to be seen, but as visible, so, so that the will is moved by an object, it suffices that it be proposed as lovable, although it is not judged entirely to be chosen.

11. Which is declared first in the divine will and intellect; for so that God in his eternity might will something outside himself determinately and freely, it is not fitting that before every free determination there should precede in our way of understanding in the divine intellect this judgment: "This is entirely to be loved or chosen by me"; for such a judgment would be rash and without foundation and strictly false; for it would include that such an object outside God is necessary to him in some way; therefore only that judgment precedes that such an object is convenient or eligible; therefore the same is to be understood in created will. Secondly it is confirmed and declared; for, so that the will chooses one means, it is not necessary that the intellect so judges concerning it that it has no judgment concerning any other, because the will only needs cognition of that object toward which it is carried; but ignorance or inconsideration of another object is impertinent to it, speaking per se; therefore, if the intellect judges this means to be useful or eligible, even if at the same time it judges another to be useful, the will can choose one, nor is it necessary that the intellect first determinately judge concerning the other that it is to be chosen, indeed nor that it is more eligible than the other.

12. Response to the objection. You will say: if the judgment of the intellect is indeterminate, how can the choice of the will be determinate? It is responded that the judgment cannot be called indeterminate when through it it is judged what sort the object is, and what convenience or lovableness it has; but it can be called either multiple judgment, when concerning several objects it is judged what sort they are, or it can be called determinate judgment concerning an indifferent object, that is, one not having necessary conjunction with the will, although it has some goodness or convenience, and such determinate judgment, although it does not suffice to impose necessity on the will, nevertheless suffices so that it by its own freedom can determine itself and follow that judgment.

13. But you will press: for if only one judgment is at hand, the will will entirely follow it, because it does not have another to which it turns. If however several are at hand, it will necessarily follow that which is concerning the more useful means or better object, and thus it will always be determined by judgment. It is responded, first, that there can be judgments concerning equal means, and then the will neither will be able to be determined by judgment nor will it necessarily be suspended, but this is its freedom that it can choose one and omit the other. But if it cannot do this, I do not see how it can be called free; but in reality it can do this, because it is free to this end that it can will what is good and not will what is not necessary. And there is an illustrious example of this freedom in the divine will, which between this matter and another entirely equal and similar, and between these heavens and others entirely equal (and so concerning other things), chose to create these rather than others, which cannot be referred to an unequal judgment, because neither on the part of those things themselves nor on the part of God is there any reason by which such a judgment which would be true could be founded; therefore that pre-election is only from the free determination of the divine will. Again also when objects or means are judged unequal, I think it more probable (although less certain) that the will is not

necessarily determined to that which is better from the force of judgment. It is proved, because, by this very fact that neither is proposed as necessary, the will can love neither; therefore it can also indifferently love either of them, with the other being passed over. And in the divine will this seems necessary to many, because he could have made better things than he made, and yet he did not will to. Whence all theologians teach that the Incarnation of God was the best means for redeeming men, and that God necessarily judged this first by reason than he would will it, and nonetheless, with that judgment standing, God could have not willed it, but something else. Therefore the judgment concerning the better or more useful means does not determine the will to willing it. But I said from the force of judgment because from the force of a prior act or intention of the will it can happen that it is entirely determined to choosing the more useful means, if that greater utility is necessary for attaining the end as it had been intended; for then it is not only more useful, but necessary for fulfilling such an intention. But if that greater utility is not necessary for the intention of the end, the judgment concerning it will not determine the will to will such a means entirely.

14. From which finally it is established what is to be said when only one judgment is at hand; for, even if the intellect thinks concerning only one object, and judges that it is convenient and worthy to be sought, and as much as it can practically invites the will to seek it, still the will by its own freedom can not love it, because for not exercising an act precisely it does not need another judgment, but it suffices that through that which man now has he does not judge this good here and now to be necessarily to be loved by him. Whence the will can then either suspend the act or divert the intellect lest it think concerning that object, or apply it so that concerning such an object it might inquire more diligently how great its goodness is, and whether it has joined to it some malice or inconveniece, on account of which it can not only not love it, but even hate it. Therefore judgment as such never entirely determines the will unless otherwise the object on

account of excellence of goodness has that force, which we shall touch below. In this way therefore the whole proposed difficulty is best solved and our freedom is excellently defended; and it is clearly understood how it is formally in the will, and how the intellect operates toward it and toward its use.

SECTION VII

WHAT IS THE ROOT AND ORIGIN OF DEFECT IN THE FREE CAUSE

1. But there still remain to be solved three difficulties touched upon in the fourth argument proposed in the second section, and its confirmations. The first is: if the will can will something against the judgment of reason at its pleasure, how can that dogma of many philosophers and theologians be true, namely, that there cannot be a defect in the will unless there precedes a defect in judgment, such that it is either erroneous, or at least imprudent and inconsiderate. This principle was handed down by Aristotle in Ethics III, chapters 1, 3, and 5, and book VI, chapters 12 and 13, and book VII, chapter 3, and On the Soul III, text 58, from which places that axiom was taken: "Everyone who sins is ignorant." The Wise Man also seems to have taught this in Proverbs 14, saying: "They err who work evil." And this can be confirmed, for otherwise it could happen that a man might always judge prudently through the intellect, and yet be vicious in his will, which is contrary to all moral philosophy and experience.

2. First opinion. In this difficulty, Bl. Scotus and other authors do not consider it problematic to concede that there can be a moral defect in the will without any preexisting defect in the intellect, because for failing morally, the freedom of the created will is sufficient, whatever the intellect may operate, as is evident from Scotus in the places cited above, with whom Gabriel and the nominalists commonly

agree, In III, dist. 36; and Almain, treatise III of Morals, chapter on Prudence.

3. And Adrian follows almost this same opinion in Quodlibet IV; but he limits or explains it by saying that he who acts badly always has a practical judgment by which he judges absolutely, in accordance with his affection, that this must be done by him or that this ought to be done by him, given such an affection, although otherwise he neither is ignorant of nor errs concerning the judgment about all honesty and malice of the object or work.

4. Nevertheless, this limitation seems neither consequentially added nor fully satisfying, because it is not necessary that every depraved affection of the will proceeds from that practical judgment by which something is judged absolutely to be done consequentially to a prior affection. For either that affection or appetite which precedes such a practical judgment is elicited by the will, or it signifies only a natural or even habitual propensity of the will. But in neither way is it necessary that such an affection or conforming practical judgment precede. For I take the first depraved will, which is in a man or angel previously well affected and disposed even in natural or habitual inclination: in him there does not precede a practical judgment from some prior affection either evil or inclining to evil.

5. It can be replied that even then there precedes some natural or elicited inclination, which although it is not evil in itself, nevertheless, because man allows himself to be so led by it that he judges not prudently but inconsiderately that something must be done or loved by him, it can be an occasion of sinning. As, for example, in the example which Adrian uses, if someone has an affection for freeing a man from death, and then understands that he cannot free him except by lying, even if that prior actual and elicited affection is not evil, a man can judge absolutely, in accordance with that affection, that he must lie. Similarly, from natural love of self that is not evil, or even not elicited, someone judges that this delectable good must be pursued by him. And in this way before every morally evil act and

before the first depraved affection there always precedes that practical judgment by which some lesser good object is proposed absolutely as to be loved, chosen, or preferred even to another greater good, which judgment is called practically false because it is not in conformity with right appetite.

6. But the difficulty still remains, because it is never sufficiently proven that this judgment is so absolute as necessary for the will to be moved, which I was saying above is not necessary—a judgment about an object to be loved, but about the lovable; not about what is to be chosen, but about the choosable; nor is a comparative judgment (so to speak) always necessary, namely, that this is choosable before others, but an absolute one suffices, namely, that this is choosable or useful. Or if it is comparative, it can be with equality, or with excess not absolutely, but in such a nature of good, for instance delectable, etc.; for example, if someone consults about two means from the intention of obtaining health, and judges both to be apt and useful, but this one to be more honest, that one however more delectable, and at the same time actually judges according to reason or the law of virtue that the former should be preferred, but according to the inclination of the body or sense that the latter should be put first, no other practical judgment seems required for the will to choose one of them at its own discretion; for no necessity of another judgment can be explained; for through those things we have said the object is already sufficiently proposed, and judgment is only required to propose the object, as was said above from the opinion of St. Thomas, which he also has in I-II, q. 82, a. 4, and excellently in q. 22 On Truth, a. 11, ad 5, and a. 12.

7. And this can be further clarified; for this absolute judgment "This is to be done" (as Adrian notes above, and it is very noteworthy for understanding all that we have said), can have three senses. The first is that it only speaks of the future existence of the act, as when we say Peter is to be chosen for the episcopate; and this sense is irrelevant to moral actions, as is evident per se. The second is that it

signifies the obligation of law and honesty. And this sense also is irrelevant in the present case, because it is clear that it is not necessary that everyone who operates freely so judges, otherwise it would be necessary to have a heretical judgment for operating evil, such as would be judging that such an act is to be done in that sense. The third is that it signifies the necessary consequence of one from another or the necessary connection of the subsequent work with a prior purpose or intention. In which way, he who has decided to take revenge on an enemy, when the occasion is offered immediately judges that he must kill. And this sense looks more to the matter; nevertheless it also seems evident that such a judgment is not always necessary for operating either good or evil, because that necessary connection does not always intervene between the work which is judged to be done and some antecedent affection, as the arguments made sufficiently prove.

8. We can add further a fourth sense, namely, that it signifies the absolute (so to speak) resolution of man about executing such a work or willing such an object. And this act, if the matter is considered attentively, cannot precede the free decree of the will, but follow it, both because that judgment in that sense cannot be inferred by force of consultation from any premises, which only show goodness or utility on the part of the object, not the resolution of man. And also because that resolution is free, and in reality is nothing other than free choice or free execution; for no other object of that judgment in that sense can be understood; but man could not truly judge about such free resolution unless he already had it. And finally because, since that judgment is absolutely free, it is necessary that it arise from some free will; but there is no other free will from which it could arise, except that by which man decides to do that which he so judges must be done by him; therefore in no sense is it true that that practically false judgment necessarily precedes any depraved deliberation of the will.

Resolution of the Question

9. Therefore in the proposed difficulty I think we should say that we can speak of the judgment, disposition, or defect of the intellect which precedes the free deliberation of the will, or which follows at least in the order of nature. Likewise, the discourse can be either about physical and absolute necessity so that the will can operate, or about moral necessity according to those things which, morally speaking, always happen.

10. First therefore I do not think it absolutely necessary, for operating evil through the will, that there precede a defect of error in the judgment of the intellect, whether speculative or practical. The arguments made sufficiently prove this to me; and I confess this follows from that principle, that no judgment of the intellect is per se sufficient for determining the will. Nor can the opposite be founded on the words of Aristotle, since he speaks not of error, but of ignorance. Nor on the words of the Wise Man, both because he does not speak of error antecedent to the will, but can be understood of consequent error, as I shall now say; and also because Adrian expounds those words, and not badly, about error of morals, not of intelligence, just as he is said to err who departs from the right way, even if he does not have a false judgment in his intellect.

11. Some defect of intellect morally precedes defect of will. Second, I assert that, morally speaking, the will never falls without some defect preceding in the intellect, at least some inconsideration of several reasons or motives which can restrain the will from that affection in which it sins. Experience sufficiently proves this, and the Philosopher can be understood about this inconsideration; for this inconsideration is called a certain practical ignorance. Indeed, St. Thomas interprets the words of the Wise Man about this in I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1; because a judgment about things to be done or desired, pronounced absolutely with such inconsideration, is a certain practical error, for it is an imprudent act and per se unconformed to right appetite. But I do not understand it to be necessary even morally and

according to what regularly happens that this judgment be either formally comparative, namely, this is to be chosen before another, or that it formally be about the object as to be entirely loved or done in some sense from those placed above; for the arguments made above proceed sufficiently against this; but I understand that morally and regularly there intervenes a judgment by which it is judged absolutely that this object or this work here and now is suitable on account of pleasure or honor, or another similar reason, and worthy or sufficient to be desired here and now. For this judgment suffices so that the will can be moved, as has been proven at length and I shall say below in the disputation on the final cause. But frequently such a judgment is had in that absolute and simple way; for regularly several judgments are not had simultaneously, nor are various objects compared among themselves nor several reasons of good and evil of the same object; indeed, although this comparison sometimes precedes, in that moment in which man freely wills a depraved object, he regularly turns away the eyes of his mind from other reasons, and attends to that one which moves the will to such an act, and thus he conceives the aforesaid judgment. And this is sufficient for it to be considered practically erroneous; for it virtually includes comparison and preference of that object to others, and consequently includes deformity to right appetite.

12. Practical judgment follows the free act of will. But I add third that it is probable that, from the free consent of the will concerning things to be done, there follows by necessity in the intellect that practical judgment about the same things by which it is judged absolutely that this is to be done, in the third and fourth sense declared above. And if this is true, by reason of such judgment those who operate evil can rightly be said always to err, even according to intellect, not by speculative error, but practical, nor by error which precedes free consent, but which follows from it. You will say: if such a judgment in no way precedes free consent, therefore it is not posited to represent the object to the will, nor to induce it to consent; for what

purpose then is such an act necessary? It is answered that it seems necessary first from the natural sympathy and agreement of these powers, which was necessary so that man might be able better to execute what he decides must be done. Then, because prior in time or nature before man consents, he does not know that he will consent; and therefore it is necessary that, as soon as he consents, he should know and (so to speak) notify himself or promulgate his own consent; but this is done through that judgment.

13. And hence it happens further that if that free consent is about some matter to be done, and therefore is to be mandated to execution through some action, immediately the intellect judges entirely practically that it is to be done; and this is the command which St. Thomas places in the intellect after the efficacious election of the will. But if the consent of the will is through simple love or delight without order to another action to be executed, then in the intellect there does not follow a judgment about some matter to be done which would be quasi impulsive to work, but there nevertheless follows a judgment about such consent as already exhibited, and it can be called a certain knowledge of approbation by which man, by force of depraved free consent, as if approving that consent, practically judges that it should be loved by him. That nevertheless cannot be called command with respect to such consent of the will because command, as such, regards a subsequent act; for what is already done is not commanded, but what is to be done, as St. Thomas rightly notes in I-II, q. 17, a. 3. And these things seem sufficient concerning that first difficulty for the opportunity of this place.

SECTION VIII
TO WHICH ACTS DOES INDIFFERENCE BELONG IN THE FREE CAUSE

1. The second difficulty touched upon above was how the will is said to be a formally free power when in its principal acts it is found to be not free. In this difficulty two questions are suggested. One is whether the will can elicit some acts freely and others by necessity. The other is, if it can do both, which acts does it exercise freely and which necessarily.

The First Point: Concerning the Twofold Mode of Operating of the Will

2. Concerning the first part, the opinion of Scotus can be referred to here, In I, dist. 2, q. 7, and dist. 10, q. 1, and in Quodl., q. 16, in which places he asserts that one power can have only one mode of operating; and therefore, since the will is by its nature free in operating, it cannot have another mode of operating in its acts; and thus he concludes that the will freely exercises all its acts, to such an extent that he asserts that God also freely loves himself, and the Father and Son (by the same reasoning) freely produce the Holy Spirit. But in this there cannot be controversy among Catholics, if there is no equivocation in the word freedom. Therefore Scotus in the cited place does not take "free" as it is opposed to "necessary," but as it is opposed to "coerced" or "involuntary." For he expressly admits there (nor could he have denied this without heresy) that the procession of the Holy Spirit is entirely necessary, so that it implies a contradiction that it should not be, or that God should not love himself; nevertheless he contends that necessity does not conflict with freedom, but rather confirms and perfects it; and conversely, that the mode of operating naturally conflicts with the will, because free and natural are modes of operating not only diverse, but also opposed.

3. Nevertheless, the entire discourse of Scotus is founded on an equivocation of names; for he clearly takes "free" to mean perfect voluntary action, which follows upon intellectual cognition, and without controversy sometimes admits necessity; and we freely

concede to Scotus that this acceptation of the word "free" is not entirely unusual; for St. Thomas also sometimes uses it thus, as is evident from question 10 of De Potentia, article 2, ad 5, when he says that God freely loves himself. We, however, as we noted in section II, do not take "free" in this way, but as something that adds something beyond the voluntary; for it is distinguished from that by the Philosopher, Ethics III, chapters 4 and 5; but it is not distinguished with respect to the human will unless freedom excludes necessity in operating, as other theologians have taught, In II, dist. 24 and 25; and Alensis, II, q. 72, membr. 3, a. 5; and St. Thomas, q. 6 de Malo; and this is sufficiently established from those things by which we have proved that we are free from the necessity of acting.

4. The same will can love some things freely, others necessarily. Therefore, with this true sense presupposed, it must be said in the present matter that it does not conflict for the same will to love some things freely and others not freely, but necessarily. This is evident by induction, because the divine will necessarily loves God himself, but other things not necessarily, but freely; and the same is found, proportion being maintained, in the created will. The reason a priori is the same that dissolves the foundation of Scotus, if it is applied against this, for those two things do not include opposition, because they are not with respect to the same thing. For that the same act should simultaneously and in the same respect be both free and necessary plainly involves a contradiction; nevertheless, that diverse acts, and concerning diverse objects, or through diverse means, one should proceed freely and another necessarily from the same power, there is no repugnance. Nor is it necessary that one mode of operating should be adequate to such a power, for it can be a superior and more universal power; likewise it can have a twofold power concerning one act, namely of acting and not acting, but concerning another only one power, namely of acting. Finally, this difference can be founded in the objects themselves, and from this is taken the a priori reason, as will immediately be declared in the other part proposed in this section.

5. From these things it is understood what must be said about this same matter under those terms "freely" and "naturally"; for there is also equivocation in this latter word in Scotus above. For sometimes that is said to operate naturally which operates not only from the impulse of nature, but also without previous cognition, and consequently without elicited appetite; and this natural excludes not only the free, but also the voluntary, in the way we say that earth naturally moves, fire heats, etc.; and in this sense it is true what Scotus says, that the will cannot operate freely and naturally, even in diverse acts, because it is necessary that it operate with previous cognition and voluntarily. In another way, however, no less commonly used, that operation is called natural which is from the inclination of nature as entirely determined to one thing, even if it is simultaneously from previous cognition and from vital appetite, and finally voluntary, in which way brute animals are said to move themselves naturally or to desire something; and in this way St. Thomas excellently says, I, q. 41, a. 2, and q. 8, a. 1 and 2, that it does not conflict for the same power of the will which exercises several acts freely to elicit some naturally, because the will itself has its own proper nature, by which it can be determined to some act, although it is not determined to all on account of the difference of objects, as we shall soon see.

6. Why the will can be moved only voluntarily. But someone will ask, since the will operates both voluntarily and freely, why does it conflict with it to have another mode of operating than the voluntary, but it does not conflict to have another mode of operating than the free? It is answered that this happens because the former mode is adequate to the will, but not the latter; for the will is adequately will, but it is not adequately free choice; for this is as if something inferior or more limited; for free choice necessarily includes the will or the principle of voluntary act, as has been declared above, and adds freedom, that is, indifference or the power of not operating. Then from objects this reason can be more explained; for the adequate object of the will is the good, which must necessarily be presupposed as known,

because the will is essentially an elicitive appetite; and therefore it necessarily operates with previous cognition and by way of appetition; and this is to operate voluntarily. Under this adequate object, however, there can be various objects differing much in goodness, and therefore also diversely lovable as regards freedom or necessity. Finally, that an act elicited by appetite be voluntary consists in the positive mode of such an act, so intrinsic that it is not distinguished from the act, and therefore is inseparable from it; but freedom in an act only superadds a denomination from the power, insofar as it is capable of not eliciting or suspending that act, which denomination may not belong to the act, if the will does not have such power over the act.

The Second Point: To Which Objects the Will Is Necessitated

7. Concerning the second part, various questions could be treated about the necessary acts of the will, either in the present life or also in the future. But those questions have their proper places, either in the science of the soul or in theology; here, however, they are only touched upon insofar as they are necessary for explaining in general the various modes of efficient causes and the necessity or contingency of the effects of the universe, and for solving difficulties occurring about this, for this entire disputation tends toward this end. But principally a certain opinion of many must be treated, saying that the will is only free in the choice of means, but not in the love or intention of the end. This opinion can have its foundation in Aristotle, Ethics III, chapters 2 and 3, where he says that deliberation is not about the end, but only about means. From this an argument can be constructed; for everything free can fall under deliberation; but only choice can fall under deliberation; therefore only choice is free. The major premise is evident, for in everything free there is some indifference and reason for tending or not tending; therefore it can fall under deliberation whether such an object or such an act is expedient or not. And it is

confirmed first, for thus the will is related to free choice as the intellect is to reason; but the intellect, as it is reason, does not deal with principles, but with those things which it collects from principles; therefore the will, as free choice, does not deal with the end, but with those things which it chooses on account of the end; for, as Aristotle said, Ethics VI, chapter 2, as principles are related to speculable things, so ends are to operable things. It is confirmed second, because it is necessary that everything variable and mobile be founded in something invariable and immobile; but free choice is of itself variable; therefore it ought to be founded in something invariable; but it is founded in the intention of the end; therefore this ought to be invariable and not free.

8. How the intention of the end is necessary. But this opinion needs moderation and declaration. Let us suppose therefore first the common distinction of twofold necessity and freedom, namely, as regards the exercise of the act or as regards specification, whose exposition of terms is sufficiently established from the above. Again, let the distinction of twofold end be supposed, namely, proximate or particular and ultimate or universal; about which partition we must speak ex professo below in the disputation on final cause; now briefly, a particular end is called any private good which is loved for its own sake, such as health or knowledge. But ultimate is called the very happiness of man, whether this is constituted in some determinate thing or is taken in common, either under the formal notion of beatitude absolutely or under the more universal notion of good in general. Moreover, let us now omit the state of future life and especially of supernatural happiness already obtained, about which it does not pertain to the metaphysician to consider. But theologians dispute extensively whether in that state the will is determined by necessity even as regards exercise to the love of God; for Scotus, In I, dist. 1, q. 4, even in that state denies that this necessity has place in any act of the will; but the contrary opinion is taught by St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2; Capreolus, In I, dist. 1, q. 3; Cajetan, dist. a. 2; Ferrariensis, III

cont. Gent., c. 62, and others commonly, which opinion we suppose as more true; here however we treat only of the will operating according to its nature, and especially for the state of this life.

9. And in this sense we say, first, that the will has no act simply necessary as regards exercise, whether concerning the end or concerning means. Thus St. Thomas, in the cited place, I, and I-II, q. 10, a. 2, and the Thomists commonly. But it is proved by St. Thomas because the will in this life can always turn away the thought of any good proposed to it. This reason does not seem universal or true in the universe, and thus neither sufficiently proves the assertion; for the first thought of man is merely natural, which man cannot turn away; therefore it is not always in the power of man's will to turn away thought. Cajetan touched on this difficulty in that article, and concedes that the first thought is not in the power of the will; and similarly he concedes that the first love or first act of the will is necessary as regards exercise, as he taught I-II, q. 9, a. 4. Nor does he think this is against St. Thomas in the former place, because St. Thomas (he says) does not simply deny that the will has some act necessary as regards exercise, but denies that the will suffers that necessity from the object, which is true because it comes only from the natural condition and propensity of the will itself. And similarly he says that the will, as far as it is from the force of the object, can turn away every thought, and St. Thomas asserts only this, to which it is not repugnant that sometimes from such a disposition or other cause it cannot turn away such thought.

10. But I think first that that interpretation is contrary to St. Thomas and to truth. The first is evident, for St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2, absolutely denies necessity as regards exercise in our will outside the beatific vision, and does not speak only from the part of the object, but absolutely about the will itself. The second is evident, because, just as the will has no act except with the concurrence of the object in its genus, so it suffers no necessity in its act (I speak of intrinsic and connatural necessity) which is not caused by the object in its genus,

namely, in the notion of final cause alluring and moving metaphorically. Hence also in the state of beatitude God clearly seen so moves the will that in the notion of object and ultimate end he determines it by necessity to one thing; for that necessity too is intrinsic and connatural to the will as informed by charity. This does not conflict with St. Thomas in another place, I-II, q. 10, a. 2, because there he speaks of the will of the wayfarer tending toward beatitude; rather this doctrine is taken from the same St. Thomas, I, q. 82, a. 2, argument 2, with the solution; for the argument was that the object is related to the will as mover to mobile; but motion necessarily follows in the mobile from the mover. But he responds that the mover then necessarily causes motion in the mobile, when the power of the mover exceeds the mobile, so that its whole possibility is subjected to the mover; but since the possibility of the will is with respect to universal and perfect good, its possibility is not entirely subjected to any particular good; and therefore it is not moved by necessity by that. Therefore St. Thomas clearly feels that the whole possibility of the will is subjected to universal and perfect good; and therefore is moved by necessity by it. Hence whenever St. Thomas gives the reason for some act of the will being necessitated from within, he always assigns it from the part of the object, as can be seen in the cited places.

11. The first act of the will in one using reason is not necessary as regards exercise. And hence I further think that what Cajetan says is false, namely that the first act of the will in man already using reason is necessary as regards exercise; although other Thomists feel the same about this, such as Ferrariensis, book I cont. Gent., chapter 23, and more clearly book III, chapter 89; and Capreolus, In II, dist. 24, q. 1, ad 7, who also adds that that act is not actively from the will, but only passively, which is improbable, as we touched upon above in disputing about efficient cause. And similarly it is false that it is simply necessary, as Scotus correctly taught, in Quodl., q. 21, and Henry, Quodl. XII, q. 26; and Conrad feels the same, I-II, q. 9, a. 4, and other expositors there. And it is proved, because the will is never

moved necessarily as regards exercise unless the object itself in its genus sufficiently concurs to that necessity and entirely subjects the will to itself; but the object which is proposed through the first thought is not of this kind, because it is often some particular and deficient good; therefore. Likewise otherwise the first volition of an angel would have been necessary as regards exercise, and consequently there would have been no merit in it, which is foreign to the common doctrine of theologians, especially the school of St. Thomas. Likewise, if the foundation of Cajetan or Ferrariensis were solid, not only would the first act of the will of the whole life be necessary as regards exercise, but also the first in individual days, or whenever man begins to attend through the intellect and consent through the will. But the consequent is plainly false and against experience. But the sequence is evident, because the first thought too in individual days is natural, and the first act of the will is from that alone, its efficacy tending toward the object. But neither reason is of any moment, because although the thought is natural, it can apply an object that does not necessitate; and although the will alone effects that act, it can effect it freely, because through its very entity it has a certain eminent power for making that act and natural inclination toward it, and simultaneously also has the power by which it can restrain and suspend it.

12. The first act of the will of man first using reason is not necessary as regards specification. From which I further add that that first act is not only not necessary as regards exercise, but also not as regards specification. It is proved by proportional reasoning, because it can happen that the object applied through the first thought is not sufficient for inferring necessity, even as regards specification; for it can happen that it is not beatitude nor good in general, but some particular good closer to the senses, such as health or some pleasure. Hence below, in treating of final cause, we shall show that it is not necessary that the first act of the human will be about the ultimate end simply. And it is confirmed, for this first act in the human will can be both good and bad morally; for the first object proposed can be

depraved, which the will can either reject or embrace, and thus operate well or badly. But whether the same is true as regards this in the angelic will is another consideration.

13. To the objection therefore made against the reason of St. Thomas it is answered that, although the first thought of man is natural, and therefore it is not in the power of man not to have it for that instant in which he naturally receives it; nevertheless it is in his power, as soon as he sufficiently attends, to remove it; and this is sufficient so that the will is not necessitated as regards exercise, since it is free either to consent or not to consent, but to divert the thought. Then, even if the first thought is natural, nevertheless the judgment about the object to be loved or not loved can be not entirely natural, because, that natural thought remaining, the will can apply the intellect, so that for making a judgment it may consider and inquire into the matter more. But if the intellect does not yet so sufficiently attend that this is in the power of the will, there is not yet sufficient actual use of reason; and therefore there is also not full freedom; and hence follow those motions which theologians call indeliberate.

14. Finally I add that, although a full and perfect thought were entirely natural, if it did not propose the object as entirely necessary good, indeed not only the object, but the act itself, the will would not therefore be moved by necessity. And I think this is the a priori reason for the conclusion posited. For when the will is carried toward an object, it not only wills the object, but also virtually wills the exercise of its act, because it is intrinsically voluntary, as has been declared above; and therefore, so that the will may be necessitated as regards exercise, it is necessary that man apprehend and judge such exercise here and now as simply necessary good, so that the lack of such an act can be apprehended under no notion of good; but this never happens in this life concerning any act of the will, as is known by experience, and because there is no reason or occasion for such necessity. But if someone should feign that someone from error has here and now such a judgment about some object, and the exercise of

an act concerning it, I would readily concede from the hypothesis that such a man would operate necessarily; I say nevertheless that the supposition is impossible in a human way in a man not stupid, or who does not sufficiently lack the use of reason.

15. Second assertion. Second, it must be said that, although concerning an end proposed under the notion of universal good the will is carried necessarily as regards specification, nevertheless, while it loves or intends other particular ends, this happens freely even as regards specification. I think this assertion is consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas in the cited places, and as regards the first part it is declared and proved first, for when good in general is proposed, although the will is not forced to love it actually, nevertheless it cannot hate it, because it finds no reason of evil in it; and therefore if it wants to exercise an act, it is necessary that it be of love, and not of hatred. And this is necessity as regards specification. The same is true of happiness in general, for, as Augustine often says[34], if a man is asked whether he wants to be happy, there is no one who responds or can respond that he does not want this, but either he will be silent, or he will respond that he wants this most; but this is necessity as regards specification. But the reason is, because in these and similar objects no reason of evil appears; but we suppose that nothing can be held in hatred except under the notion of evil, just as nothing can be loved except under the notion of good.

16. As regards the other part the conclusion is also easily established by induction and reason; for he who intends to attain knowledge, health, or similar goods, does not so love them that he cannot also hold them in hatred or reject them; for in these particular goods sometimes some defect or some inconvenience or difficulty is found, by reason of which they can displease the will. Rather under this notion even the love of God himself is free, not only as regards exercise, but also as regards specification, because, although God according to himself is universal good, he can nevertheless be

[34] Aug., III de Trin., c. 4, et in lib. de Lib. arb., saepe.

apprehended by the mode of some particular good, and in him can be apprehended some notion of evil or inconvenience, at least in order to his effects; and much more can this inconvenience or difficulty be found in the intention or love of God himself, and therefore it can easily be rejected by the will, and sometimes even God himself can be held in hatred.

17. Objection taken from St. Thomas. But someone will object from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 10, a. 1, saying that man naturally through the will desires certain particular goods, such as knowledge of truth, being, and living, and similar things; but natural appetition includes necessity at least as regards specification. Hence there, ad 1, he declares that in such appetition the will operates by way of nature; but when the will operates as nature it tends with some determination to one thing, for this is the mode of operating of nature.

18. Solution and explanation of St. Thomas. It is answered first that St. Thomas there does not speak of any necessity even as regards specification, but of the mode of operating naturally, as is established from the title of the article; but that word "naturally" does not signify there the same as "necessarily"; for St. Thomas openly distinguishes these two words in that article, and in the second. Therefore "to be moved naturally" signifies there the same as "to be moved from the propensity of nature"; for St. Thomas there intends to teach that the will has natural propensity not only toward private advantages, but also toward the proper goods of other powers or parts of the whole man. And in this way he says that it naturally desires knowledge, life, etc. With this natural propensity, however, stands freedom as regards specification in the elicited appetite for these goods; because, as I was saying above, the will has the power either of suspending the act toward which it is inclined or also of eliciting the contrary, when in the object there can be some other reason in which such an act can be founded. And that this is the mind of St. Thomas is established from the solution ad 3, where, notwithstanding that natural motion or propensity, he adds that the will is determined to no

particular good, but only to good in general. Where he speaks of determination as regards specification; for, as he immediately declares, article 3, even to good in general the will is not determined as regards exercise, but only as regards specification. But it can be further added that with respect to these goods some necessity as regards specification can be admitted, namely, either speaking per se and excluding extrinsic reasons; for there are certain of these goods so consonant with nature that they can scarcely or in no way be held in hatred, unless very accidentally and for very extrinsic reasons. Indeed even on account of these, these goods are very rarely held in hatred in themselves, but their investigation and procurement displeases on account of its difficulty, or because it impedes other sensible advantages. Or also these can be loved necessarily if they are apprehended as simply necessary for happiness; although then they are loved not so much as ends but as means or parts of the necessary and universal end.

19. Third, it must be said that the freedom of the will is exercised more evidently and perfectly in the choice of means, to such an extent that every free act, insofar as it is such, participates in some way in the nature of choice, and under that notion can fall under deliberation. The reasons made at the beginning of this doubt persuade this conclusion. And it is declared briefly, because toward the intention of the end the will is carried from some natural inclination alone, although it is carried freely; but toward the choice of means it is carried from the force of the appetition of the end, which the will itself added to itself beyond natural inclination; and therefore in a more special way and more from its own resources the will is said to move itself in the choice of means than in the intention of the end; but then it operates more perfectly freely when it more perfectly moves itself; therefore. Moreover the other part is declared, because the freedom of any act comes from various reasons which are in the object or in the act itself, and from a formal or at least virtual collation of them. For if there is freedom as regards specification, it is necessary that in the

object there be some reason of good on account of which it can be loved, and some defect or some reason of evil, on account of which it can be held in hatred; but if there is freedom only as regards exercise, it is necessary that either in the object or at least in the act itself there be some defect or lack of goodness, on account of which it can be apprehended as here and now inconvenient or at least not necessary; and thus, whenever an act and its omission is free, some collation is made between these reasons explicitly or implicitly, and thus also some choice is made of one act before another or of one act before its omission, or conversely.

20. But in this choice of one before another, it is necessary that comparison be made in order to some third thing or to some common reason, to which the will is somehow affected formally or virtually, so that it may have some principle or foundation for making the choice, as was proposed in the arguments at the beginning and is declared from the thing itself. For he who chooses between the honest good and the delectable, certainly is supposed to be affected toward good as such, otherwise he would not immediately choose among special goods, but first would determine with himself whether good was to be pursued by him; and the same is true in all similar cases. Thus therefore, although the tendency toward a particular end, insofar as it is motion toward some object on account of its goodness and toward others on account of it, is love or intention of the end, nevertheless, insofar as it is a free act by which this good is preferred to others, it is virtual choice of this good as a means, or certainly a part of the happiness which the will intends in its acts. And the very act of intention or love even of ultimate happiness, insofar as it is exercised here and now freely and is preferred to its lack or leisure, is virtual choice by which such an act is chosen here and now as a means for beginning or obtaining happiness. And for this reason it is customary to say that every intention of a particular end is virtual choice of happiness, for which it is not always necessary that elicited intention of happiness itself precede, but natural and necessary propensity

suffices. Thus therefore every deliberation deals proportionally with choice, and every free action participates in some nature of choice; and therefore formal and thus proper choice itself, which proceeds from proper and elicited intention of the end, is considered the most free action; and for this reason free choice is said as if by antonomasia to deal with choice, although it has several other free acts, as has been declared.

21. Whether to operate freely or necessarily is more perfect. And through these things sufficient response has been made to the reasons posited at the beginning of this doubt. But to the difficulty from the second section remitted here, on whose occasion we made this section, it has now been declared how the same will is capable of both modes of operating, freely and necessarily. But when it is asked whether the mode of operating freely is more perfect than the mode of operating necessarily, why the will attains it in some acts and not in all, and in less perfect ones and not in more perfect ones, it must be said that to operate freely is not always and in all things better than to operate necessarily; but the rule of perfection is that the object be loved according to its dignity and capacity, so that if the object is the highest good and most necessary, it be loved with all necessity; but if it is a lesser good, or not necessary, the act also concerning it should be under the dominion of the one loving. And for this reason God loves himself necessarily and other things freely, although his act is most perfect under every aspect; the same therefore must be said, proportion being maintained, in the created will.

SECTION IX

WHETHER A CAUSE HAS FREEDOM WHILE ACTUALLY OPERATING

1. The final difficulty arising from the second section is whether a free cause has actual freedom while it is operating, or only

before it operates. For if it is already operating, it operates of necessity, such that it is then impossible not to operate; and the same argument can be made regarding the absence of an operation. But if freedom always regards the future, then no act existing in reality will be free, because a future act, as such, does not exist; thus in fact there will be no free effect at all. Besides, it is repugnant that what is future, precisely as future, be free and yet later, when it is present, not be exercised freely, since the only reason something is future is that at some time it will be present.

2. In this difficulty Ockham, Gabriel, and other Nominalists, in I, dist. 38 teach that the will is not free with respect to the act it is already performing, in that very instant in which it performs it, except either insofar as it proceeds from the indifference and freedom that the will had immediately before that instant, or insofar as in that instant the will has the power, in the immediately following time, to omit the act—even if all other conditions or causes concurring to it are present. In this, they say, a free cause differs from a natural one. The Master seems to embrace this opinion, in II, dist. 25, c. 2, where he says that free choice is referred not to the present or the past but to the future. Its foundation is what was touched upon above: in the present the will is already determined to one; and "what is, when it is, must be," as the Philosopher says (De Interpretatione I, last chapter). Hence Boethius (Consolation of Philosophy I, last prose) says that the rising of the sun and a man's step agree in this, that while they are occurring they cannot fail to occur; they differ, however, because the sunrise, even before it happens, was necessarily going to occur, whereas a man's step was not so.

The Will Most Properly Exercises Freedom in the Very Instant in Which it Operates.

3. The will most properly exercises freedom in the instant in which it operates. But this opinion is false, and to me plainly

improbable. Therefore it must be said that the freedom of the will is properly exercised in that very instant, and concerning that same act which it presently elicits or exercises. So taught Scotus, In I, dist. 39; and Hervaeus, Quodl. I, q. 1, dubio 6; Capreolus, In II, dist. 25; Gregory, In I, dist. 39, who nevertheless added something false, as I will immediately show. This opinion is proved first by the reason suggested, which for me is a demonstration, for if the will in the instant in which it elicits an act does not proceed freely into the act, it was never before free in relation to that act, because it was only free in respect to that instant in which it was going to effect such an act freely. Likewise, because if in that instant it has the act not freely, but necessarily, therefore for the same reason during the whole preceding time, in which it lacked the act, it lacked it not freely, but necessarily; and the same reason will apply to future time; therefore in reality it never makes use of freedom.

4. Secondly it is explained a priori, because the authors of the former opinion err in this, that they do not distinguish priority of time and of nature, and the true composite sense from the divided sense; therefore the will in the same instant in which it elicits a free act, prior by nature to eliciting it, is understood to have the power to elicit it and then from that power is understood to elicit it; therefore in that same prior by nature it must be understood as having the power to elicit and not to elicit such an act; otherwise it is not really understood to be free to elicit that act. And this is confirmed and explained, for in the time immediately before that instant the will is supposed to have that power to elicit and not to elicit the act. And in that instant, prior by nature to that power determining itself to the act, there is nothing that has taken away from it the power to elicit it; therefore the will retains both powers in that instant, and from that power elicits or does not elicit the act for that very instant. Wherefore, if the will is taken simply and absolutely in that instant with all prerequisites for acting, it really can in that instant not elicit such an act, which is power in the divided sense, or in priority of nature, which is necessary and most sufficient

for freedom. But if it is considered already in that posterior by nature in which it has already elicited the act, it can no longer go back for that same instant; but this is only the necessity of composition from a supposition consequent upon the determination or action of the will itself.

5. And this is confirmed, for God from eternity freely loved creatures, and yet for no instant or real duration did he lack that free determination, which is related to the divine will just as a free act is to ours; therefore the freedom of the will is not only with respect to an act posterior in real duration, but also with respect to an act existing in the same instant, posterior indeed by nature, if such an act is truly elicited and caused by the power, or only according to reason or intellect, if it is only a free determination of the same act. Otherwise free love could not be understood in God, because neither did he love freely from eternity, since he always loved perpetually, nor after the instant of eternity, because much less can he either begin to love what he never loved, or cease from what he loved and as he loved from eternity. The same argument can be taken from the free action of angels, which they had in the first instant of their creation, since in that instant they had merit according to the more true opinion. Nor is it of any importance what Ockham signifies, that that act was meritorious because it was in the power of the angel to continue or not continue in it in the immediately following time; for this power could confer that the continuation of that act would be meritorious and the cessation would be the absence of such merit[35]; nevertheless it contributed nothing to merit in the first instant, both because that power was not exercised in the first instant, but we do not merit formally through free power, but through its use; and also because cessation from that act cannot contribute to merit, and yet the evil angels, who immediately after the first instant ceased from that act, nevertheless merited in the first instant; therefore for that instant that act was free, at least as to its

[35] meriti, 1960; alit. medii. "La palabra medii de otras ediciones creemos que carece de sentido." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 422.

exercise. And the same argument can be made about the merit of Christ, about which it is more certain that it began from the first instant of his conception.

6. Finally, proportional arguments can be made in human beings, for, as I was saying above, a human being can in the first instant of the use of reason have a free act, both good and also evil. Likewise, whenever a human being sins, he does not demerit or lose grace in the time immediately before the instant in which he exercises the sinful act, as is evident per se; for no one sins or demerits in what he is going to do, but in what he does, as Augustine extensively shows, epist. 107. Therefore it is necessary that in the same instant in which the act of sin is exercised, it be free; because no one truly sins except when he can avoid what he does or do what he omits. Likewise, there is a similar argument when a sinner is contrite; for he does not obtain grace before nor after the instant of contrition, but in that very moment in which he elicits contrition, and in the same moment only he disposes himself sufficiently, although the disposition ought to be free, and in the same moment he merits glory; therefore in the same moment and for the same moment he exercises a free act.

The Argument for the Contrary View is Refuted

7. The foundation of the former opinion has already been resolved. For Aristotle clearly speaks of conditional necessity and ex hypothesi consequent, and Boethius must be understood in the same way; for what he says about the rising of the sun having been necessary beforehand, must be understood not only of priority of time, but also of priority of nature or cause. Indeed, therefore in prior time it was true to say that that effect was going to be future from necessity, because it has necessity in its cause. But what they say, that the same power cannot simultaneously effect and not effect, is a sophism consisting in equivocation of words; for both powers are simultaneously in the same instant, not however for exercising both

acts together, but separately, that is, either one or the other according to its choice. Hence, although it exercises one part of the power, for example, by eliciting an act, it nevertheless retains the power for the opposite, which it could exercise in the same instant, not indeed simultaneously with the other act nor making a composition with it, but absolutely.

8. An act of the will does not necessarily endure through some time. However, Gregory adds above that, the supposition being made that the will has elicited an act, it not only cannot abandon it for the same instant, but also not even in the immediately following time, because he thinks it contradictory for an act to cease in the same instant in which it begins to be. But neither in theology nor in philosophy does this opinion have foundation. For it is not contradictory for a thing which comes to be to endure for only a single instant; for the same instant can be the first and last of the being of a thing; for what contradiction is there in this? He responds that it is contradictory for a thing to begin and cease simultaneously. But if inception occurs through an instant intrinsic to it, but cessation through an instant extrinsic to the cessation itself or intrinsic to the existence itself, there is no contradiction, because it does not follow that the thing is simultaneously and is not, but only follows that it is so, that neither was it immediately before, nor will it be immediately after; just as the instant itself has being, and in it God could create an angel and not preserve it further; therefore from this part there is no necessity of continuing a free act. Nor indeed from another part, for the evil angels, as is probable, endured in good acts for only one instant; and he who sins is compelled by no necessity to persevere in sinning, otherwise a human being could in this life for some time sin from necessity and not desist from sinning, which is most absurd. And conversely he who has begun to merit, freely perseveres in merit; otherwise he would merit nothing in that perseverance of good work; but this matter is disputed more extensively by theologians.

SECTION X
WHETHER CONTINGENCY IN THE EFFECTS OF THE UNIVERSE ARISES FROM THE FREEDOM OF EFFICIENT CAUSES, OR CAN EXIST WITHOUT IT

1. An act is called contingent in two ways. In order that there be no ambiguity in the term contingency, it is necessary to observe that an effect can be called contingent in two ways: in one way, because it happens by chance and beyond the intention of the agent; in which sense the term contingency is taken very strictly and rigorously; but we do not speak thus now, for we shall discuss casual effects in the final section of this disputation. Therefore, in another way contingent is taken as signifying a certain middle ground between necessary and impossible, in the way that logicians say contingent encompasses being both possible to be and possible not to be; and it is taken in this signification in the present discussion, and thus taken it also appears to be understood by Aristotle in On Interpretation I, final chapter, where he disputes about future contingents.

2. Second, it must be observed that some effect can be compared either to its proximate cause alone according to its intrinsic power, or to the same cause as conjoined with the concurrence or opposition of other causes, which in the whole order of the universe can encounter it or concur with it; among which we can either include the first cause, or only the series and order of secondary causes. And we now speak in this latter way; for we suppose that in relation to the first cause no effect of the universe happens from absolute necessity, because all depend upon its concurrence, which it can refuse according to its freedom; and therefore in relation to it there is nothing so necessary nor any effect having a cause acting so necessarily, that it could not be and not be, and in this sense be

contingent. Now however, even though God acts freely, we suppose him to be prepared to concur with secondary causes, and to provide his concurrence according to a definite law; and therefore we consider the contingency or necessity of natural effects in relation to secondary causes as if they did not depend upon the first or as if the first could not refuse its concurrence or impede or change the actions of these causes. For the miracles which God can perform in this regard, philosophy does not consider, nor does it deny them if they are true, but it says they are exceptions from the general rule, which do not pertain to it.

Resolution of the Question

3. With these points established, the resolution of the present question is very easy; and therefore it must be said first that in relation to a proximate cause operating from the necessity of nature, there is no contingent effect through the intrinsic power of such a cause; however, it can be contingent from the imperfection or defect of such a cause, which can be impeded by the concurrence or opposition of another cause. The first part of this assertion is clear, for if a cause is by its nature determined to one thing, therefore it is so powerful in acting that from its intrinsic power it cannot not act; therefore the effect from this aspect does not have contingency, but necessity. Whence if anyone regards only the intrinsic power of the cause and its natural mode of acting, he will not be able to conclude from this either that the effect will not be future, or that it can not be, but rather that it has the necessity of being, insofar as it concerns that aspect; therefore the effect cannot have contingency from this relation to such a cause. Nevertheless the other part of the conclusion is equally true and easy; for although the proximate cause acts necessarily, it is powerless to resist every contrary cause that encounters it, or to conquer and overcome every resistance that can be made by another cause; therefore from this aspect it can happen that an effect does not occur

which would otherwise necessarily occur insofar as it concerns the power and mode of acting of the proximate cause; therefore such an effect is contingent, not from the power, but rather from the defect of power of its cause, joined with the possible concurrence or opposition of other causes; under which we include not only efficient causes, but also material ones and those resisting or impeding natural action in any way. And in this way philosophers correctly admit contingency in the effects of natural causes, because a contingent effect is one which can be made and not be made by its cause; but this effect absolutely can be made and not be made by its cause, whether this comes from power or from defect of power, from possible impediments; therefore.

4. A contingent effect both intrinsically and extrinsically. Hence however, for the sake of greater clarity, a twofold contingent effect is correctly distinguished, namely either intrinsically or only extrinsically. In the former way an effect is called intrinsically contingent because it flows from a cause which from its intrinsic force and power can give contingency to the effect. Not that this contingency is sometimes an intrinsic mode inhering in the effect itself; for it is nothing other than a denomination taken from the power and mode of acting of its cause; but that such denomination comes from the intrinsic power and perfection of its proper cause alone. And this contingency exists only in relation to a free cause. In the latter way, however, or extrinsically, an effect is called contingent when the lack of necessity which is in it comes only from extrinsic impediments. From which it is also understood that contingency of this kind does not depend upon the freedom of any cause, even the first, because it consists only in a relation to the proximate cause, which can be impeded; which relation is the same, whether free causes intervene or not, indeed even if God were to act from the necessity of nature, provided that he had produced the same natural causes which now exist.

5. With free causes excluded, in the whole series and collection of others there is no contingent effect. I say second: an

effect which is contingent with respect to a proximate cause operating naturally, if it is compared to the whole order and series of causes of the universe, and among these causes none intervenes acting freely, at least as applying other causes or removing impediments, does not have contingency, but necessity. This is taken from St. Thomas, Summa contra Gentiles I, chapter 67, reason 3, where he says: "Just as from a necessary cause an effect follows with certainty, so from a complete contingent cause, if it is not impeded." Where Ferrara correctly observes that this must be understood concerning the effects of natural causes. It is also taken from Durandus, In I, distinction 38, question 3; and Scotus, In I, distinction 1, question 1; distinction 8, question 2, and distinction 39; but Gabriel proposed it more clearly, In I, distinction 38, unique question, article 1. And it is proved, because if all causes which in every genus concur to an effect and can promote or impede its production act from necessity, therefore with the same necessity such an effect will follow as can follow from all those causes thus disposed and applied. And it is explained, for just as a natural proximate cause, not impeded and having matter suitably applied, necessarily produces a proportionate effect, so if the same cause is completely impeded, with the same necessity it will operate nothing, or if not completely, but partially impeded, with the same necessity it will make an imperfect or monstrous effect; therefore if all causes, both acting and impeding, so converge from natural and necessary course alone, and each also operates with necessity in its own way, that is, what impedes, necessarily impedes, and what applies matter, necessarily, and so concerning others; therefore such an effect considered in relation to the whole series and collection of such causes, does not have contingency, but necessity.

6. Nor do I find reason for doubt in this conclusion, for this whole necessity is understood as subordinated to the divine will, as we supposed at the beginning, and in respect to it each of these effects has contingency, that is, the possibility that it not occur; nevertheless divine freedom also intervenes in this very matter. And thus it is

simply and without doubt true that, with respect to the whole order or collection of acting causes, there can be no contingency in effects, unless in that collection of causes some free cause intervenes.

7. And from these two assertions it is incidentally understood how difficult it is to foreknow with certainty these future contingent effects, even merely natural ones, which have contingency with respect to one or another, or even several causes, and have infallibility and necessity only with respect to all simultaneously. For it is most difficult, at least for men (let us pass over angels), to know all such causes, both because some are very remote from the senses and very hidden, such as the stars or their powers; and also because they exist in great multitude, and their concurrences and oppositions are various and manifold; and finally because these causes do not act without matter, whose disposition is also various and often unknown; and therefore it is very laborious to compare and observe all these things among themselves so that from them something future in particular can be foreknown by sufficiently probable conjecture, much less by infallible certainty. Let Benedictus Pererius be read on this matter, book II In Genesis, chapters 2 and 3.

8. In whatever way a free cause intervenes in the series of natural causes, the effect can be contingent. I say third: if a free cause concurs to any effect, even of natural causes, whether as a cause per se or as a cause per accidens, applying the agent or matter, or removing what prohibits, this is sufficient for the effect to be simply contingent, even if it is compared to the whole collection and series of causes. This is proved, for a contingent effect is one which can be and not be from the power of its cause; but an effect of this kind, compared to the whole collection of its causes, can simply be and not be, either from this alone, that among those causes some free one intervenes, from whose judgment it can happen that either matter is not disposed for such an effect, or the proximate and per se cause is absent, or some similar impediment intervenes, which is sufficient for the effect not to follow. As if a farmer does not plow the earth, which is free, natural

fruit is impeded, even if there are suitable rains and all other causes concur; and the same reasoning applies to any other effect requiring some concurrence of a free cause without which it cannot exist.

9. The distinction between natural effects and contingent non-free ones. And from this it is permitted to gather the difference between these contingent effects, which we can call free in a certain broad way, and the former natural ones: that these are contingent only in a qualified sense with respect to one or several causes, but not with respect to all taken collectively; the former, namely the free ones, are simply contingent, whether they are compared to individual causes or to all their causes taken simultaneously. From which it also happens that these free effects can much less be foreknown in their causes than those. For a natural effect, although formally as contingent it cannot be known in its cause as certainly future, that is, in the proximate cause alone considered in itself, nevertheless it can be known in the collection and comparison of all causes, because then it is known not as contingent, but as necessary; but truly an effect that is simply contingent can be certainly foreknown as future neither in one nor in all causes simultaneously, because in both respects it is simply contingent, and therefore from the power of causes indeterminate and indifferent to being and not being; and therefore, unless the free determination of the cause sufficient to determine the effect is known from elsewhere, it can in no way be certainly foreknown from the power of causes.

10. Here indeed there immediately presented itself an occasion for disputing about the foreknowledge and prediction of these contingent effects insofar as they are future; for if before they happen they do not have in their causes determination to being or to not being, therefore there can be no determinate truth in propositions by which one of these futures is announced; which Aristotle plainly seems to have consequently conceded, indeed even proved ex professo in On Interpretation I, chapter 8. But from this it further follows that neither part, affirming or denying such an effect to be future, can be

foreknown as determinately true, even by God; for what is not true is not knowable; therefore what is not determinately true cannot even be known as determinately true. And thus Cicero conceded this, in the books On Fate and Divination, as Augustine reported, City of God V, chapter 9.

11. The determinate truth of future contingents. But this difficulty requires a deeper and more extensive disputation, concerning which theologians dispute, In I, distinction 38, and I, question 14, article 13. Now it is briefly responded that the determination of truth in a proposition about a future contingent is not to be taken from the fact that the cause from which such an effect will come is already determined to it in its power and faculty from that time or instant from which it is true to say that effect is future, but from this alone that at some time such a cause in its action is to be determined to a free effect, for this alone is enunciated by that proposition, and not that the cause, from itself and from its power, is already determined to such an effect. Therefore with the absolute contingency of these effects there can stand the determinate truth or falsity of those propositions in which they are announced to be future, because this determinate truth does not conflict with contingency any more than in a proposition about the present. Because although the effect can happen and not happen, from which it has that it is contingent, nevertheless in fact one thing will determinately happen, and from this it has that it is a future contingent determinately. And in this we think Aristotle was deceived and spoke against the principles of our faith, although Catholics are not lacking who attempt to interpret and defend him. From this, however, it further results that it is not entirely repugnant that these free effects, before they happen, can be certainly foreknown, at least by that knowledge which on account of its infinity comprehends and intuits every truth and every knowable object in the way that it exists; in which Cicero erred more shamefully by denying to God foreknowledge of all futures. For that knowledge does not destroy this contingency, both because it does

not change or alter (so to speak) its object, otherwise it would render itself false, if by knowing an effect to be contingent it made it necessary; and also because this knowledge of futures as such is not their cause, but pure intuition; but concerning these matters at another time.

12. Two other difficulties remained concerning the final conclusion. The first is whether the freedom of a secondary cause alone suffices for the said contingency, even if per impossibile there were no freedom in the first cause, and this has been treated above; for it is the same to ask whether with that hypothesis contingency simply can arise in natural effects and to ask whether with it there can be freedom and use of freedom in a creature. For if there is use of freedom, there will also be contingency simply; but without it there will not be; and therefore the response given above must be applied here. The other difficulty is whether conversely the freedom of the first cause alone suffices for the contingency of an effect, even if no secondary cause were free; but this has an easy response from what has been said, for in the way that effect is free, it can be called contingent, as we now speak. But whether it should be spoken of so simply that effects, insofar as they happen freely with respect to God, can be called contingent, we shall touch upon below in disputing about God and his free will.

13. In what free agent is the root of freedom. And from this there also remains resolved another difficulty which is usually treated here, namely in what cause the root of contingency is placed, whether in the freedom of the first cause, or in the freedom of the second, or of both simultaneously; for it must be said that, if there is discussion about contingency that is only extrinsic and in a qualified sense, its root is not placed in any freedom, neither of the secondary nor of the first cause, but proximately in such a nature and condition of the secondary cause, which can be impeded, joined with such an order and series of other things and natural causes from which such impediment is wont to occur. But the first cause, or God, can only be

called the first root of this contingency, just as he is the first cause of all effects of the universe; because namely such secondary causes were both created by him and so disposed and ordered that from them contingent effects of this kind would come. To this however, formally speaking, it makes no difference that the first cause produced all these things freely; for the same contingency would follow even if he had created all these things from necessity, provided that he had ordered them in the same way and afterwards concurred with them. But truly speaking about contingency simply, its immediate reason is placed in the freedom of the proximate cause and some use of it, as has been declared; but its primordial root is the freedom of the first cause, in the way that was declared above, section 5.

SECTION XI

WHETHER FATE CAN BY ANY TRUE REASONING BE NUMBERED AMONG THE EFFICIENT CAUSES OF THE UNIVERSE

On Various Errors

1. There was an ancient opinion of certain philosophers who attributed all effects of the universe to fate. They established fate in a certain connection and order of causes of the universe, from which they said all things proceed by necessity, as Cicero reports concerning the Stoics in book I of De Divinatione, near the end, and Diogenes Laertius in book VII in the life of Zeno. They attributed this power especially to the stars and their positions and dispositions, joined with the motions of the heavens; for from these there arise by inevitable necessity various aspects and concourses of causes of the universe, from which they said all effects in this lower world occur by the same necessity. Hence they defined fate as the binding together of causes,

drawing efficacy from the motions and power of the stars, as Albert reports in book II of Physics, treatise II, chapter 19, from Apuleius and others. Many of them asserted this not only concerning natural effects, but also concerning human actions, both virtuous and depraved. For they thought that celestial bodies influence human wills by the same power and direct action as other things, as Augustine reports in book IV of Confessions, chapter 3, and book V of City of God, chapter 1. Where he also notes (which Plotinus also reports in Ennead III), that some of these were so foolish as to deny that this disposition of causes of the universe, to which they ascribed fatal necessity, proceeded from divine wisdom or will, but that it possessed from itself an intrinsic necessity that was absolutely inevitable.

2. Others, though they did not deny that this order of secondary causes proceeded from the divine will, nevertheless attributed to it a necessity that was completely inevitable, even with respect to God, because perhaps they believed that God acts from necessity of nature. Peter Abelard is reported by Castro to have held this opinion among the heretics, in Contra Haereses, under the word "Liberty" and the word "Contingent Future"; and he reports the same of Wycliffe, who said that all things happen by such inevitable necessity that not even God himself could have created things otherwise than he created them, nor govern otherwise than he governs; and from things thus created and governed, no other actions can proceed than those which do proceed. Many other heretics have also followed this opinion concerning fate, as it was asserted by the aforementioned philosophers.

3. Others placed the necessity of fate not in the stars but in the divine will; thus Seneca in book II of Natural Questions, chapter 35: "Just as (he says) the water of rushing torrents does not flow back upon itself, nor does it delay, because the following water precipitates the preceding, so the eternal series governs the order of fate, whose first law is to stand by its decree." And immediately in chapter 36, defining fate, he says it is the necessity of all things and actions, which

no force can break. The same excellently in book IV of De Beneficiis, chapter 7. Plato seems to have been of the same opinion in the last dialogue of the Republic. Certain modern heretics also (which we can attribute to Calvin and his followers) have introduced this kind of fate, though perhaps not under that name; for they teach that all things occur by necessity, not from the influence of the heavens alone, but from the superior influence of God so moving and applying all secondary causes to action that they necessarily act toward that to which they are impelled, and nothing else. They subject this necessity to the divine will, and with respect to it they say it is simply variable; although, given the eternal disposition of God, now immutable, by which he determined to create, govern, and impel all things universally so that all things occur by necessity, this is necessity simply speaking with respect to creatures, but with respect to God it is the necessity of immutability.

The Resolution

4. In this doctrine of fate thus explained, many errors are contained not only against the Catholic faith, but also against natural reason, as can easily be established from what has been treated thus far. For this reason, the matter itself has been condemned by the Church in several councils, and has been most diligently opposed by the holy Fathers, and the very name of fate is odious to all Catholics, although some, with a sound interpretation added, do not think it should be entirely rejected.

The Aforementioned Errors Are Noted & Refuted

5. First Error. First, therefore, to attribute to secondary causes a fatal necessity independent of God is plainly foolish and against natural reason. This need not be proven otherwise than by

demonstrating that all things depend on God in their becoming, being, and operating; which we will accomplish in the three following disputations.

6. Second Error. Second, to establish the necessity of fate under God's causality and influence, yet inevitable even to God himself, is contrary to natural reason. This is proven because that opinion includes either two errors or only one of them, namely, either that God is not omnipotent, or at least that he does not operate freely in whatever he operates outside himself; for if God has these two perfections, what disposition, influence, or necessity of secondary causes could there be which he could not change or impede by his omnipotent and free will? That there are omnipotence and free will in God we will demonstrate below, when disputing about God and his attributes. The conclusion should be understood concerning inevitable necessity simply speaking; for if the discussion is about inevitability only in a qualified sense, arising namely from the immutability of God, from this aspect there will be no error, if it is not mixed with something else from another source, as we will say.

7. Third Error. Third, to establish such a necessity of fate which flows from the influence of stars and other natural causes to all lower causes, comprehending human wills also under them, is an error also repugnant to natural reason. This conclusion is understood even if this necessity is posited as depending on the divine will and changeable through it. This is proven because such fatal necessity destroys the freedom of the will. Under this title that opinion was condemned in the first Council of Braga, chapter 9, and by Leo I, epistle 91, chapters 11 and 13, and against it Eusebius gathers many things in book VI of Preparation for the Gospel, chapters 5 and following, and Chrysostom also writes extensively in his orations on Providence, and Augustine in the aforementioned book V of City of God, almost throughout; and Gregory of Nyssa or Nemesius in book VI of his Philosophy; Boethius in book VI of Consolation, and others frequently. Indeed, even philosophers have opposed this kind of fate,

as is gathered from Aristotle in book I of Ethics, chapter 1, and book I of De Interpretatione, the last chapter, and Ammonius and other interpreters there, and book II of Physics, chapter 6, where Simplicius, Themistius and others; and Alexander of Aphrodisias in his book On Fate; Plutarch in his book On Fortune; see others in Julius Sirenus, book On Fate. The foundation of that opinion also includes another error, namely, that the influence of the heavens falls directly and per se upon human souls and wills; which is against the immateriality of the soul, and consequently against its immortality.

8. Fourth Error. Fourth, to establish that fate by attributing to the efficiency and influence of the first cause necessitating all secondary causes, even rational wills, to individual effects, is an error both against faith and against natural reason. This is proven from what has been said, because in this way too free will is destroyed. Hence in this sense also this fatal necessity has been condemned, although not under the name of fate, in the Council of Trent, session VI. And it is declared by philosophical reasoning, for either among secondary causes there are some which by their nature do not require for acting that necessitating motion of God, or there are none of this kind; if the second is said, then none is a cause free and indifferent from itself. If the first is said, then either the first cause always draws the secondary from its natural mode of operating, which is alien to all right reason, because the first cause according to the ordinary mode of providence only cooperates with the secondary insofar as it needs, as we will say below; or certainly the secondary cause is not always necessitated to act by the first in that way, which is what we intend; therefore it follows that the position of fate in the aforesaid sense is entirely false.

In What Sense Fate Might be Admitted as to the Thing Itself

9. Fifth, to establish fate in that sense so that it extends only to the effects of natural causes to which neither angelic nor human

creature concurs in any way by its freedom, and in those effects to posit fatal necessity, arising from the series and order of causes of the universe, inevitable through secondary causes, and through the first according to ordinary power and according to the mode of operating and concurring naturally due to such causes, or also from the immutability of some decree or predefinition of God himself, but not from his absolute power and will, this (I say) mode of establishing fate contains no error, but true doctrine, although moderation should be maintained in the use of words, as we will say below. This entire assertion is established from what was said in the preceding section, nor is it necessary to add any other proof or declaration. In this sense Ludovicus Vives reports from Plutarch and others that the Stoics and Plato posited fate, in book V of City of God, chapters 1 and 10, for they excepted human wills and free actions from the necessity of fate. Hence also Damascene in book II of On Faith, chapter 25, reports without naming them that philosophers did not posit fate concerning human actions which are contingent, but concerning necessary ones. And similarly Tertullian in book On the Soul, chapter 20, says that even philosophers distinguished fate and freedom of the will; and he adds from his own opinion: "And we according to faith already know how to differentiate them under their proper title."

10. But you will ask whether fate with respect to such effects is an efficient cause, or what it is; for some judge that fate formally signifies a certain relation, because Boethius in De Consolatione, prose 4, defines fate as the order of secondary causes executing divine providence; but order implies relation. This is gathered from St. Thomas, I, q. 116, a. 2, ad 3. But it must be said that such fate is neither a relation alone; for this contributes nothing to effecting; nor is it some one efficient cause; for none by itself alone suffices to induce that necessity which fate indicates; but it is a collection of causes so disposed by divine providence as is necessary that such an effect should follow. This is established from the very explanation of fate which we have given and from the assertion posited. But that

disposition of causes, which others call order or series, is not a relation, but signifies in individual and in all causes an application accommodated so that such an effect can follow; which application indeed is not a relation, although perhaps it is the foundation of a relation or is declared by us by way of relation. And thus St. Thomas can be explained, above, concerning relation for foundation, from the same St. Thomas, opusculum On Fate, which is 28, chapter 5, where he holds that fate signifies the condition of a cause. And the same is meant by those who number fate among efficient causes. See Alexander, in the aforementioned opusculum On Fate, chapter 2. From what has been said, however, it is permitted to understand that under this collection of causes not only efficient causes are comprehended, but also material ones; for on these depends in great part the necessary consequence of such an effect; but fate is more reduced to efficient cause, because this is what per se induces the effect, given such matter and other conditions required for acting. Again, it is gathered from what has been said that fate, according to this interpretation, is not always a per se cause of all effects; for some effects are per accidens which are casual with respect to particular causes, as we will say below, which do not have a per se cause, as will be proven there. Hence with respect to the collection of all natural causes they necessarily occur, yet they cannot be attributed to any per se natural cause which might be called fate; thus therefore the stated conclusion is to be limited.

What Should Be Thought About the Name of Fate

11. Sixth, to establish fate in the disposition of natural causes, insofar as they are subject to divine providence and operate infallibly according to its preordination or permission and prescience, contains no error in the thing itself, but rather Catholic doctrine, also consonant with natural reason; but the mode of speaking needs to be corrected or sufficiently explained. This entire conclusion is taken

from St. Thomas, I, q. 116, a. 1, and from Augustine, whom he cites, V City of God, chapter 1, saying: "If anyone calls God's will or power by the name of fate, let him keep his opinion and correct his language." And the former part of this assertion is intended by Boethius in the place cited above, while he attempts to reduce the name of fate to a congruent and true signification. And many think that the opinion of Plato and Seneca, related above, can be reduced to the same; for they did not intend to deny the freedom of our will. Plutarch also seems to feel this in book I of Placita, chapter 27, and Aristotle in the book On the World to Alexander, near the end, where he speaks excellently about this matter. Indeed, Augustine teaches that the Stoics felt no differently about fate nor took away freedom of the will, V City of God, chapter 10, as was touched upon above. And finally it is declared, because through fate thus explained nothing else is signified than that secondary causes are subordinated to divine providence, insofar as all those causes are ordered by God to produce these effects, which is most certain. Then it is signified that those secondary causes operate nothing which is not from God and foreseen and preconceived or forespoken (for the name of fate is thought to be derived from speaking) and in some way also preordained or permitted, and speaking more generally, provided for; which is also most certain and consonant with natural reason, as we will show below when disputing about the attributes of God. And hence it happens that in order with respect to divine providence there is a certain infallibility or, as Boethius speaks, immobility in the effects of secondary causes; because they can never entirely escape the order of God's providence. And this immobility is declared by the name of fate. This does not exclude contingency nor the freedom of some causes, because it does not consist in absolute necessity, but in the infallibility of prescience and divine providence and its immutability, to which corresponds a similar necessity in the effects of secondary causes, which is called necessity from supposition or of consequence; because it cannot happen that they occur otherwise than they have been foreknown, as

St. Thomas explains above, article 3. It should be noted, however, that even with this signification admitted, it is not rightly attributed to God, as St. Thomas notes there from Boethius above. For fate is the disposition of causes as it is under God, but it is not properly God himself or the will of God except causally, as Augustine sometimes speaks, book V City of God, chapter 1, and Seneca, and Aristotle above. And the very name of fate agrees with this, which is derived from speaking, hence it signifies that which has been spoken, not he himself who has spoken. Add that fate is also not properly attributed in the stated signification to free acts of created will, because free will is subject to God immediately and not to other causes or their disposition except accidentally and remotely; and therefore either in no way, or only most improperly can the proper acts of free will be attributed to fate, by calling the very providence of God and its immediate influence fate.

12. And hence finally the last part of the assertion is established, which is only about the use of this word fate; St. Thomas says that the holy Fathers refused its use because of those who posited fate in the influence of stars. That this is true is established from those cited above, and from Augustine, book V City of God, chapter 9, and tract XXXVII on John, and Gregory, homily 10 on the Gospel, and Gregory of Nyssa, book VI of Philosophy, chapter 2, or otherwise Nemesius, book On the Soul and its Faculties, chapters 35 and 36. And the reason is that fate from its original imposition was instituted to signify the root of fatal necessity, which those who invented the name of fate felt to be absolute necessity; and therefore in its proper signification it cannot be attributed to all secondary causes, even as they are subject to divine providence. From which it also happens that neither should natural effects which occur in this lower world be said to occur by fate in that propriety, because regularly they never occur without the intervention of some free cause, either angelic or human; so that neither rains, winds, and similar effects, which seem most natural, should be said to proceed by fatal necessity; for with God

permitting or often ordering, they are impeded or excited through some action of good or evil spirits. For this reason therefore the name of fate is not to be used by us absolutely; if anyone wishes to use it by correcting its signification, there should be no contention with him; but the declaration or correction is that the name of fate should signify only the series of causes subject to divine providence, which imposes no necessity on them, but allows each to act in a mode proportioned to itself. Alexander of Aphrodisias adds in book On Fate, chapter 3, that fate sometimes signifies the nature of each thing, and that signification has foundation in Aristotle, book V of Physics, chapter 6, text 57, where they call natural generation or corruption fatal. According to which signification fate has neither greater necessity than nature nor greater universality. Hence just as not all things occur by natural order or necessity, but some freely, others by chance, so not all things are done by fate. Nevertheless, this signification of that word neither seems to be in common use nor to have foundation in the etymology of that word by which fate is derived from speaking, as we noted from Augustine; wherefore that fate might be something, divine prescience and providence is not to be excluded.

SECTION XII

WHETHER CHANCE AND FORTUNE OUGHT TO BE NUMBERED AMONG EFFICIENT CAUSES

1. The disputation concerning chance and fortune is connected with the disputation concerning fate, because once fatal necessity is removed, it seems to follow as a consequence that many effects happen by chance and fortuitously in the universe. And since nothing can happen that does not have an efficient cause, it also seems to follow that effects of this kind, whether casual or fortuitous, must have some efficient cause which is called chance or fortune. Therefore,

we inquire concerning this cause whether it exists and what kind it is. For it seems that there is no such cause among those that act necessarily or freely, and thus there can be none at all. The assumption is clear, because a cause operating necessarily either always or more frequently produces its effect; but casual effects are said to be among those that happen rarely; therefore they do not proceed from a cause operating necessarily. Again, a free cause always operates from purpose and from intention of an end; but chance is said to occur when something happens beyond intention; therefore chance is not a free cause; therefore chance cannot be any efficient cause.

Concerning Casual Effect

2. Although these names "chance" and "fortune" are often used for the same thing, nevertheless in strict usage they have different significations; and therefore we shall speak first about chance, then about fortune. The name "chance," therefore, properly signifies an effect rather than a cause, and it is said of any unexpected effect, which Boethius noted in Book I of the Consolation, prose 1, where he does not want chance to signify a cause, but an effect; nevertheless, usage has now obtained that it is also said of a cause; for that effect cannot lack some cause; and thus Aristotle treats of chance in Physics II, and with him the other philosophers; nevertheless, once the effect is explained, the cause will be better understood. Therefore, that effect is called casual which, accidentally and beyond opinion or intention, is joined to the effect per se of some cause, as when someone digging earth finds a treasure. This is established from the common signification of that word, for a casual effect is the same as one that is contingent, rare, and beyond intention. Two things, therefore, seem to belong to its nature. One is that it happens rarely, as Aristotle holds in Physics II, chapter 7, and there Averroes, Alexander, St. Thomas, Albertus, and others, although Avicenna wanted to limit this without cause, as I shall say immediately. However, when it is said that effect

happens rarely, it must be understood in a composite sense (so to speak), or with the supposition of such a cause made; for often an effect is rare because the cause is rarely posited, although once it is posited the effect always or regularly follows; and then it is not casual, but can be per se, unless the position also of such a cause or the concurrence of several causes is casual. In another way, therefore, an effect follows rarely even when the cause is posited; and in this way a casual effect is said to happen rarely. But since such an effect always proceeds from the concurrence of several causes, it is necessary that concurrence not have a certain and definite cause in the universe; from which it also happens that it occurs rarely, and therefore an eclipse is not a casual effect, nor is any other that is regularly joined with an effect per se.

3. Second, it belongs to the nature of such an effect that it happens beyond the intention of the acting cause; as when a stone falls while Peter is passing by, it is said to be a fortuitous chance, because it was beyond the intention both of the man passing and of the stone falling, or of that which generated it and moved it toward the center. But if that concurrence had been intended by someone, with respect to that person it would not be called a casual effect, but per se in its genus; therefore it belongs to the nature of chance that it be an effect beyond the intention of the agent, because it is an effect per accidens.

4. And from this explanation it is understood that there are no casual effects in the universe with respect to God, but only with respect to secondary or particular causes; and the reason is that nothing can happen beyond God's intention, because nothing can escape his foreknowledge. You might say: sometimes something happens in things beyond God's intention, as in human acts there are sins. And perhaps also in natural effects some can occur which, although they are foreseen by God, are nevertheless not intended. It is answered, first, that with respect to a cause operating through intellect and will, it is required not only that the effect be beyond the will in

order for it to be casual or fortuitous, but also that it be beyond the knowledge or opinion of the operator. For if something follows from my action which I foresaw would be future, it cannot be said to be casual or fortuitous for me, even if it might be either involuntary, but only permitted, or even in some way involuntary. Hence Aristotle says in Book II of the Magna Moralia, chapter 8, that there is less of fortune where there is more intellect. Therefore, in order that nothing happens to God by chance, it is sufficient that nothing occurs beyond his knowledge and foreknowledge. But we add furthermore that it is one thing to speak of an effect that is in sin, which is always some thing, and another to speak of a defect which is only a privation of due moral perfection; for speaking of the effect, it cannot be casual with respect to God, not only because it is foreseen, but also because it is caused by God himself not only accidentally but per se, and thus can be said to be intended in some way, at least as regards the will that God had of concurring to that effect, with the secondary cause also concurring. And for this reason no natural effect can be said to be casual with respect to God, not only on account of foreknowledge, but also on account of efficiency per se and some intention of such an effect that God had by the very fact that he willed to create such natural causes apt for such an effect and to concur with them. Hence some effects that are considered casual with respect to particular causes are not casual with respect to universal causes, such as the heavens (if they concur per se to such an effect), like monsters and certain other things that are said to be generated accidentally. But truly the defect that is joined to the effect in sin, in order not to be casual, need not be per se intended, because this is beyond its nature, since no one operates intending toward evil; therefore it is sufficient that it be foreseen and permitted; especially since it is always ordered by God toward punishment or to be an occasion of some greater good; ordered (I say) not by a preordination that according to reason precedes foreknowledge, but one that follows. And speaking simply, a casual or fortuitous effect can never be such with respect to God, as St. Thomas

correctly teaches in I, q. 103, a. 7, ad 2, and q. 116, a. 1, ad 2; and Augustine in Book 83 Questions, q. 24; Boethius in Book I of the Consolation, prose 1.

Concerning Chance, as it Signifies a Cause

5. Chance is a cause per accidens. From what we have said about casual effect, it is easy to declare what chance is, insofar as this word signifies the very cause of a casual effect. For it must be said that there is no peculiar cause per se instituted for such an effect, but any created efficient cause can be one, insofar as, accidentally and beyond intention, it is joined with the effect per se of that cause of another rare and entirely accidental effect. This is the opinion of Aristotle and other philosophers in the places cited; and St. Thomas declares it in I, q. 116, a. 1, because this effect contingent in the manner stated, as such, is not absolutely a being nor one, but in a qualified sense, namely one per accidens; therefore it is not necessary that it have a cause simply and per se, at least a natural one, but only per accidens; therefore chance is not a determinate cause per se, but only a cause per accidens. The antecedent is clear, for a contingent effect is, for example, that someone digging a grave finds a treasure; but this is not one thing; and therefore (says St. Thomas) there can be no cause in nature that per se inclines toward that effect, because a natural cause always tends toward something properly one. But we speak rightly of a natural cause, because an intellectual cause can per se intend, as one, that which is per accidens, like that concurrence of causes or effects, and therefore among intellectual causes there can be given a cause per se of this effect, just as we were saying about God a little before; but then with respect to that cause, the effect will not be contingent, because it will not be beyond its intention. Hence the argument can be concluded in this way, for if chance were a cause per se, it would be either intellectual or natural; not the first, because an intellectual cause is then per se when it operates from knowledge and intention; but a

casual effect is beyond intention; not also the second, because nature does not incline toward something one per accidens in that way; therefore chance is not a cause per se of any effect.

6. How God is the cause of a casual effect. You might say: therefore not even God is a cause per se of a casual effect, as such; the consequent is false, for being casual is something in the effect; but nothing is in an effect that is not per se from God. It is answered that being casual adds nothing real to the effect, but a denomination taken from conjunction or relation to such a cause, by means of its effect per se. Then it is said that God per se causes the contingency of effects, because he himself willed that such effects happen by chance, not however that they be constituted in the nature of casual effects through order to God, for this was repugnant, but through respect to a created cause; which respect God himself also causes, in the way that it can be or happen.

7. Again you might say: what effect is there that in events of this kind happens entirely per accidens and without a cause per se, since everything that is per accidens must be reduced to a cause per se? It is answered that it is not necessary that every effect, whatever kind it may be, have a cause per se, but it is sufficient that it be joined to the effect per se of some cause, and in this sense it must be understood when it is said to be reduced to a cause per se. And thus it happens in the present case; for example, in the example of finding treasure, that gold was generated there was per se from some cause; likewise the digging of earth happens per se and from intention by man. But truly that conjunction is so per accidens that it has no created cause per se, and therefore the finding of treasure, which proceeds from it, is called a fortuitous effect, whose cause per accidens is partly the man digging earth, partly he who placed the gold in that place; and the same is true in similar cases.

8. Furthermore, it must be noted that these effects per accidens and contingent happen not only from the concurrence of efficient causes, but also from the fortuitous concurrence of an

efficient cause with a material one; for thus monsters are generated, which happen rarely, on account of the disposition of matter; but then the effect is not casual with respect to the material cause, but with respect to some efficient cause. Avicenna did not sufficiently notice this in Book I of the Sufficient, chapter 13, and therefore he said that casual effects are not only those that happen rarely, but also those that happen indifferently, that is, which can equally happen and not happen to some subject, as with respect to a surface that it becomes white or black. But this is not correctly said, for chance does not signify a material cause, but an efficient one, with respect to which no effect is contingent indifferently except in free causes. For natural causes are determined to one thing; but in free causes such an effect is not casual from that consideration, but free; but it will be casual if it is beyond intention, which is not found properly except in those things that are rarely joined to effects per se intended. But the indifference of material potency is irrelevant for an effect to be called casual, both because the effect does not follow from the force of that, and also because on its part the effect is not per accidens or beyond intention; for this properly pertains to the efficient cause, as is evident per se.

9. What fortune is. Finally, from these things it is easily established what must be said about fortune, concerning which the pagans have told many fables, who, ignorant of the cause of many casual effects that happen to men, invented a certain goddess whom they called Fortune, who would be the cause of these effects. But this kind of fiction was attacked among others by St. Augustine in Book IV of the City of God, chapter 18, and Lactantius in Book III on True Wisdom, chapters 28 and 29, and Albert can be read in Physics II, tract III, chapter 10, and Scotus in Quodlibet, question 21. Therefore it must be said that a fortuitous effect is formally of the same nature as a casual one, and differs only because fortuitous is said especially in human affairs or with respect to an agent acting from purpose according to reason and proper and elicited intention. Hence fortune as a cause is also per accidens of the same nature as chance, and only

determinately specifies that it be a cause acting from purpose which is per accidens with respect to an effect that follows beyond intention. Hence it can happen that the same effect is fortuitous and casual, or from fortune and chance with respect to different things; as the finding of treasure is fortune with respect to the man digging earth, but chance with respect to the natural cause generating gold. But if it was not generated there, but deposited by another man, he too is a cause as fortune; nevertheless with respect to him it will be called bad fortune, with respect to the other good fortune; for these names do not signify diverse causes per se, or divine ones, but denominations taken from prosperous or adverse effects. And thus Aristotle explained the nature of fortune in Physics II, chapter 5, and in the book On Good Fortune.

10. The effects of fortune are subject to divine will. Only two things are to be noted. One is that fortune has been understood by some philosophers as if its effects were subject to no providence at all, and were not intended, foreseen, or ordered by any cause, even the supreme one. And for this reason St. Augustine sometimes reproached himself, as in Retractations I, chapter 1, for having used the name of fortune; but we subject all fortune to divine providence, because nothing happens to us by chance that is not either ordered or permitted by God, as was declared above, and was elegantly said by Augustine in Book III of the Trinity, chapter 4, in these words: "Nothing happens visibly and sensibly that is not either commanded or permitted from the interior invisible and intelligible court of the supreme Emperor, according to the ineffable justice of rewards and punishments, graces and retributions in this most ample and immense republic of all creation." And he touched on the same thing in Book 83 Questions, question 24. The other thing to be observed is that certain effects happen in us, which we think fortuitous because we are ignorant of their cause, when nevertheless they are not effects that happen to us per accidens, but happen per se in us from some superior cause; as when someone, intending or preconsidering nothing of the

kind, feels some good motion of soul in himself, or when someone about to proceed by this road is as it were seized by desire and will to proceed by another road, and thus escapes the ambushes of enemies, is called fortune by men; nevertheless that effect has a cause per se intending it, namely some angel or God himself. And therefore Augustine said in Retractations I, chapter 1, and Book I Against the Academics, that what is commonly called fortune is ruled by hidden order and has a secret reason and cause. Which the Philosopher also touched upon in the book On Good Fortune, chapter 2. And thus far concerning fortune and concerning created efficient causes.

DISPUTATION XX

ON THE FIRST EFFICIENT CAUSE AND ITS PRIMARY ACTION, WHICH IS CREATION

Concerning the glorious God, there is a twofold consideration in metaphysics, namely, insofar as He is the first cause and insofar as He is the first being; and although this latter notion is prior in itself, the former nevertheless comes to be considered first with respect to us and according to the order of doctrine which we pursue, both because we come to knowledge of God through effects, and also because the present disputation is necessary for the complete consideration of the causes of being as such. Therefore, we shall say nothing now about the first cause according to itself and according to those perfections which are inherent in it, nor indeed about its existence; but we now suppose that God exists, which we shall demonstrate below. We also suppose that He has no cause, because it is necessary to stop at some unmade being, since one cannot proceed to infinity. We shall therefore speak about the efficiency of this first being in relation to other things and about the dependence of other things upon it. This dependence can be threefold or can be considered in three ways, namely, in coming to be, in being conserved, and in operating; and we shall speak about these three matters in this and the two following disputations. The dependence in coming to be consists most especially in creation, both because this is the proper

dependence of being insofar as it is being which we here investigate, and also because the first coming to be (so to speak) of makeable beings consists in this action; and therefore we shall speak about this action in this disputation; for the other modes by which the first cause can produce things both present no difficulty and will be sufficiently touched upon in the following disputations.

SECTION I

WHETHER IT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON THAT THE CREATION OF SOME BEINGS IS POSSIBLE OR EVEN NECESSARY; OR WHAT IS THE SAME, WHETHER ONE BEING INSOFAR AS IT IS BEING CAN ESSENTIALLY DEPEND EFFICIENTLY UPON ANOTHER BEING

1. First, it must be supposed what the name "creation" signifies, for what the thing itself is will be declared afterwards. Creation therefore signifies the bringing about of some thing from nothing, as the theologians define it[36]. That particle "from nothing," in order to distinguish this action from others, excludes all concurrence of a material cause and dependence of the thing which is created upon any subject, as Anselm correctly explains in his Monologion, chapter 8, so that to say "from nothing" is the same as to say "from no subject"; and thus this action is distinguished from another action which occurs through eduction from the potency of a subject. For these two actions adequately divide all efficiency; and therefore, just as creation is sufficiently distinguished from eduction by that particle, so the nature of creation is also sufficiently explained by it. Whence the theologians

[36] St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 1.

infer[37] that whatever is created must be subsistent or must come to be in the manner of something subsistent, because it must come to be outside a subject or without dependence upon a subject. But what exists without dependence upon a subject subsists or has itself in the manner of something subsistent; which I say on account of an accident, if it were made by God separated from a subject, which would truly be created, because it would have a mode of being similar to subsistence. The rational soul, however, even if it comes to be in a body, nevertheless truly comes to be from nothing, because it does not come to be from the body itself; for it is neither educed from its potency nor does it depend upon it in its being; and therefore it also truly subsists while it comes to be in a body, as we shall say below when treating of subsistence.

Reasons for Doubt

2. First. Having thus explained the term "creation," it seems that creation cannot be known by natural reason to be possible; first, because what Aristotle, Plato, and other serious philosophers did not know, it is likely cannot be known by natural light; but those philosophers were so ignorant of creation that they held as a first principle and as something known per se that nothing comes from nothing, as is evident from Aristotle in Physics I; therefore.

3. Second. Secondly, it cannot be demonstrated of any being that it is created; therefore, neither can it be demonstrated that creation is possible. The antecedent is clear, because every being is either substance or accident; but an accident, if it is in a subject, is neither created nor can be created, even if it be most supernatural, as has been shown above; but that an accident exists and comes to be separated from a subject cannot be discovered by natural reason. Substance, furthermore, is either spiritual or material; the former can scarcely be investigated by natural reason whether it exists, much less

[37] Thomas, supra, a. 4.

can it be demonstrated what kind it is or whence it comes; therefore, it cannot be known evidently that there is some spiritual substance made by another; and consequently, neither will it be able to be demonstrated that creation is necessary or possible on account of these substances. But material substance always comes to be from matter; that matter itself is made, or needs the efficiency of another in order to be able to exist, cannot be demonstrated; whence Plato and many philosophers posited it as eternal and unproduced, nor does there appear any natural means by which the opposite could be demonstrated. For if there were such, it would be especially the imperfection and potentiality of matter. But why cannot it be said that matter has this its own entity from itself, however minimal and imperfect? For it is not per se evident that this imperfection of passive potentiality has a necessary connection with another imperfection of objective potentiality, which a thing needing production or creation includes.

4. Third, infinite power is required for creating; but it cannot be demonstrated that infinite active power is possible; therefore, neither that creation is possible. The major is declared a posteriori, because otherwise a creature could have the power of creating, because if it does not involve a contradiction on account of the infinity of power, there is no reason why it should involve a contradiction; but the consequent is sufficiently absurd per se. The minor is proved because there is no natural means of demonstrating infinite power in acting; for Aristotle, attempting to demonstrate this from motion, nevertheless did not achieve it, as I shall show below; and the same reasoning applies to any other natural argument. Whence many attempt to demonstrate from creation that there is some infinite power in acting; but this is a circle or begging the question in this matter which we are disputing.

5. Fourth, it is contradictory for being insofar as it is being to come to be; therefore, it is contradictory for something to be created; the consequence is evident from the definition of creation, because if

something comes to be from nothing, it comes to be per se primarily according to the entire nature of being; therefore, it comes to be per se primarily insofar as it is being. The antecedent is proved first, because if being insofar as it is being were makeable, every being would be makeable; because what belongs to some nature per se primarily and according to what it is, belongs to everything in which such a nature is found; but this is plainly false, because it is necessary that there be given some being which cannot come to be; otherwise, one would proceed to infinity in producers and products, which is impossible. The same antecedent is proved secondly, because being insofar as it is being abstracts from entity according to the being of existence and according to the being of essence; but it is impossible for some being to come to be according to this whole being; therefore, it is impossible for it to come to be insofar as it is being. Whence it also becomes impossible to come to be from nothing, because it is impossible to come to be according to the being of existence without being presupposed according to the being of essence; which being is not absolutely nothing, for through it true things are distinguished from fictitious and chimerical ones; therefore.

Various Opinions

6. In this matter, it was the opinion of many theologians that it cannot be demonstrated that some thing is made or can come to be through creation. So holds Gregory, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, toward the end, and Gabriel inclines toward this view there, q. 2, a. 2. Bassolis holds this, In I, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3. These authors a fortiori suppose that it cannot be demonstrated that every being distinct from God is made by Him, or that there cannot be several real unproduced beings. For although, with the creation of some beings admitted, it does not immediately follow evidently that it is impossible for there to be two uncreated natures, or that every being distinct from God is made by Him, but this requires its own demonstration, nevertheless, if creation

were not possible, it would be altogether impossible for all beings distinct from God to be made by Him, because it is evident that there are many beings which cannot come to be except through creation, if they are to come to be. Such as all spiritual things, which, since they do not have matter, cannot come to be from a presupposed subject; likewise the heavens, if we suppose that they cannot come to be through generation, as their nature, operation, motion, and whatever we experience about them seem sufficiently to show; likewise prime matter, which cannot come to be from prior matter.

7. The second opinion is that this truth can be demonstrated by natural reason. This is the more common opinion of theologians, which St. Thomas holds, In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 2, and which he also supposes In I, q. 44, a. 1, and q. 45, a. 2; Alexander of Hales also holds it, II p., q. 6, a. 6; Scotus, In I, dist. 8, q. 1; Argenteuil, In II, dist. 1, q. 1; Hervaeus, Quodl. II, q. 1; Henry, Quodl. VIII, q. 6. And this opinion is more conformable to the divine Scriptures; for they teach that from this visible world it can be shown that God exists, because the creatures themselves cry out that they have another author or maker; these passages we shall examine below, when we shall have demonstrated that God exists. The holy Fathers also speak in the same way, whom I shall cite below in the same place. And this is without doubt the true opinion, which cannot be better proved than by bringing forward the means by which this truth can be demonstrated.

Resolution of the Question

8. We can therefore prove two things: one is that creation is possible; the other is that creation actually exists or has been done or is exercised in the universe by some efficient cause. From these we shall elicit a third, namely, that there is given in the universe and there is necessary one first cause to which all other beings that have existence are reduced through creation as to the first origin of their being.

Section I

That Creation Is Possible Is Shown

9. First, therefore, we can prove a priori that creation is possible, if we suppose proven from elsewhere that God exists and is supremely perfect, as much as can exist or be understood in the breadth of being. For, as I shall say in the place cited below, although we cannot know God or His perfections absolutely a priori, nevertheless, with some principle or attribute demonstrated a posteriori being supposed, from that we can collect a priori another, such as immortality from immateriality. Thus, therefore, in the present case we suppose it demonstrated that there is given one supreme and most perfect being, indeed also most powerful; we shall prove this below, not from creation, lest we beg the question, but from other means. Now therefore I argue in this way, for production through creation is not so impossible that it involves in itself contradiction or repugnance; therefore, neither is the power to act in this way in itself impossible or involving repugnance or imperfection; therefore, such power is in fact in some being, at least in the first; therefore, by virtue of that, creation is possible. This last consequence is clear; but it is necessary to distinguish that term or denomination "possible"; for in one way it is taken negatively, insofar as it is the same as "not repugnant"; in another way positively for that which can be or come to be, in which sense it expresses a denomination from some power, either active or passive. In the antecedent, therefore, "possible" is taken in the prior way, but in the consequent in the latter way; for in order that creation be possible, two things are necessary and sufficient: one, that it does not involve contradiction in itself; the other, that it be possible through some power; and thus, with the antecedent supposed, the consequence is evident.

10. The first antecedent, however, is proved first, because no repugnance can be shown in the fact that something comes to be from nothing, in the true sense declared by us. For it is not to be imagined,

as some have thought, that nothing itself will be the matter from which such a being comes to be, which plainly involves a contradiction; for that particle "from" does not express there the relation of a material cause but of a terminus from which; thus there is no repugnance that what was nothing of itself should begin to be something through the production of another. But if we wish to interpret that particle "from" according to the relation of a material cause, it must be expounded not positively, but negatively, so that what is said to come to be from nothing is what does not come to be from any material cause; in which also no repugnance can be shown; for why, just as something comes to be in act which previously was possible through active and passive power together, could not also something come to be in act which is possible through the power of the agent alone, which is more eminent and more efficacious?

11. An Objection Is Satisfied. You will say: just as it is contradictory for something to come to be in act which previously was possible through passive power alone without active power, so conversely it is contradictory for something to come to be in act which is only possible through active power without passive power; for why cannot there be an effect from a power that suffers without an agent, if there can be one from an agent without a recipient? It is answered that the reason for the difference is sufficiently clear; for action, as action, expresses an essential order to an efficient cause, and therefore it implies a contradiction for there to be action without an agent; but action, as action, does not express an essential order to a patient nor to passion, speaking of action in its entire breadth, but it expresses a relation to the effect which comes to be through it and depends upon the agent cause. And similarly, passive power expresses an adequate relation to active power, because it cannot receive something unless it receives it from something; but active power does not express an adequate relation to passive power, as we shall say more broadly below in its proper place, because it is not of the nature of active power that it can act in something, but that it can act something, and therefore

something can be possible simply through active power alone, but not through passive power alone. Furthermore, passive power is imperfect, and alone is not simply powerful unto an effect unless it be perfected by active power; but active power is perfect from its own kind, and therefore from itself it involves no repugnance that some active power be so perfect in its order that it alone and without dependence upon passive power contains in its own strength both the effect and the action. And thus the first consequence is simultaneously proved, which is also most evident, with the antecedent supposed. For what greater repugnance can be conceived in such power than in the said mode of effecting? Or what imperfection, and not rather the greatest perfection?

12. And both can be confirmed, if by that "from nothing" we understand it to be signified that the whole thing which comes to be per se primarily as the adequate terminus of the action, which is called the "that which," comes to be entirely and according to its whole entity, with no part or thing of it presupposed; for all these senses are true and amount to the same thing. But in this also great perfection is indicated on the part of the active power, and there is no repugnance on the part of the effect or its production. For what contradiction is there in the fact that a whole thing, which did not exist, should receive existence according to its whole self? Certainly none appears greater from the terms than in the fact that a thing which was only begun according to one part is perfected through the addition of another part which previously did not exist, except that the latter requires greater force in acting. There is therefore no repugnance in such power or production, but only greater perfection. Only could someone hesitate what this action without a subject could be like, or how this does not involve a contradiction. But we shall explain this easily in what follows; for it is now sufficient that no repugnance is shown in it. Especially since some understand creation without transient action.

13. It remains to prove the second consequence, in which lies the force of that reasoning, namely, that this power must be posited in

the nature of things, at least in the first being, if it does not involve in itself repugnance or imperfection. This, however, can be proved first from that general principle that in the first being there is formally every perfection that is simply simple, which we shall demonstrate below when treating of the perfection of the first being. For such power from its proper objective concept expresses a perfection that is simply simple; for it expresses a perfection not repugnant in itself nor involving imperfection. From which it plainly follows that in the breadth of being it is better to have it than not to have it, in which consists the nature of perfection simply; therefore, such power must necessarily be attributed to the first being. Almost the same argument is that this power is necessarily included in omnipotence, because omnipotence extends to everything possible, that is, to everything not repugnant in itself; but it is of the nature of the first being to have omnipotence; therefore, also to have this power. The whole antecedent must be demonstrated below when treating of the attributes of the first being.

14. To these are added other reasons that are very probable per se, for this mode of acting without dependence upon another cause outside itself, whether efficient or material, is very consonant with the essential perfection of the first being. First indeed, because the mode of acting is proportioned to the mode of being; but the mode of being of the first being is with complete independence; therefore, the mode of acting proper to it will also be independent of every cause, even material. Second, because active power defined to acting in a subject and from a subject is very contracted and limited; therefore, it is not to be attributed to the first being, because there is no reason why it could have such limitation in it; for the power of acting is proportioned to the essence; just as therefore the essence of the first being, because it is pure act, has no reason to have limitation, so neither does its power. Third, because it is consonant with reason that in God there be power of a higher nature than in every other natural or created agent; but all others need a subject for acting;

therefore, divine power ought not to be so needy, but the more perfect it is, the more free it ought to be for acting, especially since that excess is in degree and in every possible perfection.

That Creation is Demonstrated as a Matter of Fact

15. The conclusion is proven in celestial bodies. Secondly, it must be added (whereby the preceding conclusion will be more evidently confirmed) that creation is necessary in the beings that now exist, such that without it they could not exist. This is proven first by induction, beginning with material things. And first I inquire concerning celestial bodies, whether they were made or unmade. The latter cannot be said, first because of the reason common to all finite things, concerning which we shall speak immediately; then, because things much nobler than the heavens are not without efficient causation, as is most evident in the case of man. Likewise, because the heavens are so imperfect that they require motion for the completion of their actions, and moreover an extrinsic mover who moves them, since they cannot have that motion from themselves; therefore it is much less probable that they have being from themselves. Likewise we see that the heavens are so constituted in all their powers, positions, aspects and motions, just as was expedient for the conservation of inferior things and their generations and corruptions; therefore it is an evident argument that they are not from themselves, but were established by the common author of all things. We shall pursue this reasoning more broadly below when demonstrating that God exists. But if the heavens were made, I ask again whether they consist of the matter of the elements, and therefore were made from that matter, and thus the same reasoning will apply to them as to generable things; or whether they consist of matter of a higher nature, or are simple entities, and thus it is concluded that they were made only through creation, because if they are simple, they could in no way be made

otherwise, as is manifest per se. If however they consist of superior matter, this is because they are ingenerable, and therefore they could be made only through creation alone. Add that the reasons by which we shall immediately prove that the matter of generable things cannot be unmade equally prove the same concerning the matter of celestial bodies.

16. The conclusion is proven in inferior bodies. I come therefore to the inferior world, insofar as it embraces elements and mixed bodies, and I ask whether this mass was made or not; it cannot be said to be unmade, because all species of things that are in it are made in their individuals; therefore in no species of those things can there be any individual that is unmade or has being from itself; for this would be a great and most essential difference between such an individual and others, and consequently they would not be of the same species. Whence, just as Aristotle often argues against Plato that there is no man separate from individuals, because that one would be incorruptible while these are corruptible, and thus they would not be of the same species, so we say that there is no singular man who has being from himself without the efficient causation of some cause, otherwise he would not be of the same species with other men; and the same argument applies to the remaining species, and therefore to this entire corporeal mass of elementary things. For although the elements are usually said by philosophers to be incorruptible according to themselves as wholes and corruptible according to parts, this is not to be understood concerning intrinsic incorruptibility through the constitution of nature, for in this way the nature of the whole and of the parts is the same, especially of homogeneous parts, but concerning incorruptibility from the power and mode of acting of natural causes, because thus the elements can never be corrupted according to themselves as wholes; absolutely however they are generable, and thus they could not have being from themselves without efficient causation; therefore this mass of bodies is not unmade.

17. Those who have asserted that matter is not made, but coeternal with God. Again therefore I ask whether it was made from nothing or from matter; if the first, we have our intent; if the second (which nearly all philosophers have thought), I ask again whether matter itself was made or not. And indeed nearly all philosophers have denied that matter was made, but have asserted that it is coeternal with God and has being from itself and altogether necessarily. Tertullian reports that the Stoics and Pythagoreans, and Plato himself, and Hermes Trismegistus were in this error, lib. cont. Hermogen., c. 1 et 8, et lib. cont. Valentin., c. 15 et 16, and Irenaeus indicates this, lib. II, c. 19; Epiphanius however, haeres. 7, also adds the Peripatetics; and Lactantius, lib. II de Origine erroris, says that both poets and philosophers thought the same, and specifically designates the Academics, and especially Cicero, lib. de Natura deorum. Many heretics have imitated these philosophers, such as Hermogenes, Manichaeus, and others, as is evident from Tertull. sup., et Augustino, lib. de Haeresib., in 46 et 59; et Gregor. Nyssen., lib. de Opificio hominis, c. 23, et Euseb., lib. VII de Praeparat. Evang., c. 8 et 9, where he also attributes this error to Sabellius.

18. The preceding assertion is refuted. Nevertheless, that this is alien to all natural reason, besides what was said in the prior assertion, and besides those things which are common to all created beings, can be shown first from the imperfection of prime matter; for since it is the lowest of all substances, even corruptible ones, it is incredible that it should have this supreme perfection, which is to have being from itself, of which perfection all other species of generable things and their forms are not capable. Whence a second reason can be taken; for if matter is coeternal with God and has being from itself, either as such it was lacking every substantial form or it had some from itself. The first cannot be said, because it is repugnant to the nature of matter; for although it does not imply contradiction, nevertheless it is alien to the natural order of things, and therefore it is not probable that matter has its entity from itself, and yet has it in a preternatural state

and as it were violent, which is the state of matter without any formal perfection, and consequently without use or utility. But if it had some form from itself, therefore it is not matter alone, but some integral substance that has being from itself. From which it further follows that that entire substance is simply necessary, and can no more not-be than prime matter itself, because what is independent from another in its being cannot lose that being. Whence it will also follow that that matter cannot serve for other generations, because it will always remain under that form.

19. Perhaps someone will say that matter has its perpetual entity from itself and also had a perpetual form, not however from itself but from God. But this also cannot be said, both because it involves a repugnance that it should have being from itself and not whatever is necessary for being, and also because otherwise that form would flow from God by necessity of nature; for if it were made freely, whence would it be established to be eternal? But it is against natural reason to say that God acts outside himself by necessity of nature. And furthermore it follows that by the same necessity by which God acts that form, he conserves it, and consequently matter is always necessarily under that form, and therefore can least of all serve for the generations or corruptions of things.

20. It remains therefore that matter, since it is not from itself, needed some efficient principle by which it was made; but it could not be made except through creation, because it could not be made from prior matter; therefore creation of some thing is altogether necessary so that these material things can exist. You will say: the making of matter could not be creation, because creation is of a subsisting thing, as we said, but matter is not a subsisting thing, because it is not that which is. Some respond that matter, although not properly created on account of the stated reason, is nevertheless created at least improperly or in a broad manner. But I say that matter can be understood to be made in two ways: first per se alone and separate from form, and then without doubt it would be most properly created, for it would both be

subsisting and would be made in the manner of a whole, although it is of itself a part; for the rational soul is also a part, and nevertheless is most properly created. Indeed, if quantity were made separate, it would be properly created according to everyone's opinion. In another way matter can be made (and thus we believe it was made) existing under some form; and then properly speaking the whole composite of matter and such form is said to be created, because that properly is; but being made is properly attributed to that to which being also belongs; then however matter is said to be concreated, which is sufficient for the demonstration we intend; for to an action, insofar as through it the whole is made and nothing is presupposed to it, belongs the nature of production from nothing. But if we wish to distinguish accurately that composite action into several partial ones of which it consists, we shall find that the entire nature of creation which is in it comes from that part which is the making of matter from nothing, as was touched upon above in explaining the eduction of form from the potency of matter. And thus the Fathers and Doctors of the Church absolutely and without any addition teach and demonstrate that matter was created by God, as can be seen in Tertullian., Irenaeo, Lactant., Euseb., Epiphan., Gregor. Nyss. et Aug., in the places cited a little before. Et Augus. etiam, lib. I Genes. ad litter., c. 14, et XII Confes., c. 4; et Ambros., lib. I Hexaem., c. 1; et Athanas., lib. de Incarn. Verb., in princip., et aliis passim.

21. It remained to speak, to complete this induction, concerning intelligences or immaterial things. Nevertheless, concerning them no special argument can be made, besides that universal one taken from this principle that it is repugnant to grant several unproduced beings and that an unproduced being or one that is from itself is infinitely perfect in the genus of being, because neither special reasons, nor differences, nor any proper effects of intelligences are known to us from which we might demonstrate that they have being from another and not from themselves. But I speak of demonstration simply, because some conjecture can be taken from the

motion of heaven, as I shall show below when demonstrating that God exists. Where also that principle must be demonstrated ex professo, but now let it be supposed. But from the fact that intelligences have an efficient cause, it is evidently inferred that creation is necessary for them to exist, because since they do not have a material cause, as was touched upon above, they cannot be made through another mode of production. This is excellently confirmed by the production of the rational soul, which cannot be except creation, because it is not eduction from the potency of matter, as was also proven above. This reason proves that creation is necessary for men to be generated, because it is always mixed in (so to speak) with their generation. Whence the use of creation is as frequent as human generation. Unless someone should be so foolish as to say that rational souls preexist before bodies, which would be an error not only in faith, but also against natural reason, as must be shown in its place, because for the present it does not matter, for even if souls existed before bodies, nevertheless they would not be from themselves and without an efficient cause, because, besides other reasons mentioned, since the soul is the natural form of the body, if it existed necessarily from itself, it would exist from eternity informing the body; for a thing which has being from itself cannot have it in a preternatural and as it were violent state, such as is the state of the soul outside the body. Therefore whether the soul begins with the body, or before it, it is necessary that it have an efficient cause, and consequently be made through creation.

The First Creating Cause is Demonstrated

22. Thirdly it must be said (and is gathered from what has been said) that in the universe one first efficient cause is necessary, which has brought about other things through creation. This is sufficiently evident from the discourse made in the preceding assertion. And the necessity of this first efficient cause with respect to all other beings must be demonstrated more broadly in the cited place.

But that, this necessity being supposed, that first cause could not give origin to other things without creation, is established from the definition of creation given above, because the first cause could not produce things from some matter, because not all produced things have matter, and in those which have it, that matter itself also had to be produced. It must only be noted that species of generable things could have been made in their first individuals from matter existing prior in time, and then they would not be made through creation in complete rigor; but inasmuch as they necessarily suppose the creation of matter, to that extent we say that creation is necessary for their production. And for this reason the name of creation, especially in the usage of the holy Fathers, is often extended to new production from preexisting created matter, as is evident from Aug., lib. I contra Advers. leg. et Proph., c. 24.

Arguments are Solved, and What Philosophers Have Thought Concerning Creation

23. To answer the arguments: in the first of them it is asked that we explain what philosophers have thought concerning this truth, and especially Aristotle. Concerning this matter Eugubinus has disputed much, lib. VII Peren. philos., c. 3 et sequent. But as far as other philosophers are concerned, they indeed often teach that this world was created by some first author; nevertheless if they are correctly examined, they do not attribute true creation, but formation from preexisting matter, which they also called chaos, as is established from those things which Tertullian and other authors cited above report[38], et Lactant., lib. VII, c. 3. And this indeed they explained concerning the making of this sensible world. But concerning the superior and intelligible world, that is, concerning angels, they spoke most obscurely; nor is it surprising, for since they could not form them from chaos, it does not appear how they could establish that

[38] Vid. Aug., lib. XI, de Civit., c. 4 et lib. XII, c. 17.

they were produced by God, unless perhaps they also made them material, although with more subtle bodies; for they held it as certain that God can produce nothing except as an artificer who works from preexisting matter. And Anaxagoras signified this, whom Aristot., I Metaph., c. 6, text. 18, praises, because he said that all things are mixed together except mind, and that mind alone is pure and free from all mixture. Whence also Galen., de Usu part., c. 10, reproaches Moses, because he said that God produced all things by his command.

24. What Aristotle thought. But leaving others aside, concerning Aristotle many think that he did not acknowledge creation, such as Gregor,, In II, dist. 1, q. 1; et Henric., Quodl. VIII, q. 9; et Iand., II Metaph., q. 5; Marsil., In II, q. 1, a. 2; et Bessar., lib. II cont. Calumniat. Platon., c. 6; and Comment., VIII Phys., comm. 4, et ibid. Simplic. seem to think the same. And this opinion has no small indications in the principles of Aristotle. First, because everywhere he admits and supposes that principle: From nothing, nothing is made. Second, because he defines all actions through order to passive potency, and thinks that every action has conjoined passion and motion or change, as is established from III Phys., from the beginning. But if it should be said that Aristotle in those places speaks only concerning the action and efficiency of natural causes, it still opposes, because never, even in the Metaphysics, does he extend his doctrine to another mode of action. Rather, V Metaph., c. 12, he defines active potency through order to passive, saying it is the potency of transmuting another insofar as it is another, and c. 2, in the same way he defines efficient cause through order to motion; therefore he did not acknowledge another mode of effecting. This is also confirmed because he posited incorruptible things as eternal, thinking them to be necessary per se, and therefore II Metaph., c. 1, he says in the plural that the principles of eternal things do not have causes; but by eternal things he seems to understand the motions of the heavens and the perpetual series of generations and corruptions, whose principles are the heavens and intelligences.

25. But others think that Aristotle knew creation and that God is the creator of all things. Thus thought Averroes, II Metaph., com. 4, et XII Metaph., com. 44, et lib. de Substant. orbis, c. 2; et Alex. Aphrodis., his locis, et D. Thom., ibid., et I, q. 44, et II cont. Gent., c. 15, et q. 3 de Potent., a. 6, et VIII Phys., lect. 2; Scot., in Quodl., q. 7, et In II, dist. 1, q. 3; Thom. de Argen., q. 4; Hervaeus, tract. de Aeternit. mundi, q. 4, et alii. And it is proven, for II Metaph., c. 1, he says that there is some being most true and most perfect of all, which is the cause of the others. And he speaks plainly of efficient cause, as Comment. also expounds there, saying that only the first being is being and true per se; but the others acquire being and truth from it. Whence by that plural "principles of eternal things" Aristotle seems to understand God alone, either because of his eminence or because of several reasons of causing. Moreover in I de Caelo, c. 9, text. 100, he posits a certain immortal and divine nature, whence to others, more exactly to some, more obscurely to others, being and living depends; and II de Gener., c. 10, text. 59, he says it does not befit all things to be always, since some things are far from that principle itself and therefore (he says) God, consulting the deficient mode, completed the universe, when he had instituted continuous generation; also in lib. VIII Phys., et XII Metaph., he concludes that there is one first being and prince of all; but he would not be prince unless he were the principle of all. Whence Arist., XII Metaph., text. 38, says that heaven and nature depend on God. Most clearly also he teaches in the same places that there is one end of all things; from which it plainly follows that there is also one efficient cause, because, as we shall teach below, there cannot be final causality without efficient causality; but there cannot be one efficient cause of all things unless creation intervenes, as was proven above. Moreover II Metaph., c. 2, he proves that principle by which we most come into knowledge of the first cause, namely, that there cannot be an infinite regress in efficient causes. Finally, in lib. de Mundo ad Alex., he seems to teach this most clearly: It would be as if a crime (he says) in the disputation of worldly things

to pass over that which is held as supreme in the world. And so there is an ancient fame, and indeed hereditary to all mortals, that all things are constituted for us by God and through God. Nor indeed does any nature suffice per se, deprived of the salvation which he brings.

26. Others use a distinction, saying that Aristotle did not know creation with newness of being, but knew creation through the mode of natural and eternal emanation from the first being, and in this way posited that incorruptible things flowed from God from eternity. But although this can be sustained concerning other things, nevertheless it cannot concerning the rational soul; for he himself, II de Gener. animal., c. 3, says that the rational soul comes from outside, that is, is not educed from the potency of matter, and consequently is made through creation. But a special reason can be given concerning it, because it is not made except when the creation of the body is offered, and on account of the composite. For it is not probable that Aristotle posited the soul as unmade, if he knew all other things besides God to be made. Nor can it be said that he thought all souls were eternal and afterwards in time united to bodies; for the same Arist., XII Metaph., c. 3, text. 16, generally says that form does not preexist before it is united to matter, and openly includes the rational soul; for he adds that in it there is something singular that remains afterwards, that is, after the composite is dissolved; but in beginning, because it begins simultaneously with the composite, he admits no exception. This part therefore is more probable, although it cannot be denied that Aristotle had slight knowledge concerning this matter, and therefore treated little concerning this efficiency, although, IX Metaph., c. 1, he sufficiently insinuated that he acknowledged an active potency which does not need motion or change for acting.

27. To the second argument it has been sufficiently proven by contrary induction how it is demonstrated that there are some beings which can be made only through creation, which is especially established for us concerning material things. But concerning immaterial things we prove only hypothetically, that if there are any

outside God, they can be made only through creation, nor can they even exist if they are not made. But whether it is proven by natural reason that there are substances of this kind besides God, we indeed suppose this concerning rational souls from the science concerning the soul, but concerning others we shall see below, for at present it does not matter.

28. To the third concerning the major proposition, namely, that infinite power is required for creating, we shall speak in the following section; now we only say that from other means it is sufficiently proven both that creation exists and that there is given in things a power which is a sufficient principle of it, whether that power ought to be infinite or a finite one suffices. Whence, if it is sufficiently proven from elsewhere that infinite power is required for creating, from the necessity of creation it will be sufficiently concluded that infinite power is given in things. Nor will it be begging the question or a vicious circle, because either we do not prove that creation is possible from the infinity of that power but because we gather from elsewhere the necessity of it and the non-repugnance, both of it, and also of the power which is the principle of it, abstracting from whether it is finite or infinite; or if we conclude from the infinity of power that creation is possible, we take that infinity of power itself as demonstrated from the infinity of the divine essence and perfection, which we gather from other principles, as we shall see below.

29. In what manner being qua being is made through creation. To the fourth I respond that that proposition "through creation being qua being is made"[39] can have multiple senses: one is, if that "qua" is taken reduplicatively and falls upon the most abstract and common nature of being common to God and creatures. And this sense is false, for it is signified through it that being by force of that precise nature is the term of creation, which is false. And the fourth argument supposes this sense, and sufficiently attacks it; nevertheless nothing opposes the truth of creation, because that proposition in that

[39] Vide Caiet., I, q. 44, a. 2.

sense does not follow from the definition of creation, as is evident. For if being is made reduplicating only the nature of finite or makeable being, that will be sufficient for the nature of creation, for it suffices that the thing be made entirely from nothing. And this can be another sense of that locution, which is true, and from it alone follows that every finite being is creatable; which is also true. But the ultimate and proper sense is that that "qua" be taken only specificatively. And in this way the proposition is most true, because through creation a thing is made per se primarily according to the total nature of being, because creation supposes no nature of being in it. For, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, that is said to be made per se primarily which is in no way supposed in the thing that is made; therefore for being qua being to be made is nothing other than that the very nature of being is made per se primarily in such an effect through such an action. But from this sense it does not follow that every being according to the nature of being which it has in itself can terminate creation, because, as is established from dialectic, the particle "qua," taken specificatively, does not infer a universal or distributive sense, because it does not denote the adequate nature or cause of the predicate, but only designates the part or nature according to which it befits. Nevertheless it is correctly inferred from that sense that the very nature of being as such is not found univocally in beings which can terminate creation and in uncreated being, as we shall say below when declaring this division.

30. To the ultimate proof, taken from the fact that the being of the essence of things is supposed to precede their creation, those who think that the being of essence according to itself is something eternal, would perhaps say that creation is from nothing of existence, but not of essence. But indeed Wyclif said that creation is not production from nothing simply, but from intelligible being to being outside God, as Waldensis reports, tom. I, c. 17. Scotus likewise, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, says that creation is production from nothing, that is, not from something according to the being of existence, nor according to

the being of essence, not however from nothing, that is, from no mode of being, neither simply, nor according to something; but he supposes that things have known being before they are made. But the truth is that the being of the essence of a creature, or known or intelligible being, before creatures are made, is nothing real outside God, as we shall say extensively below, in the disputation concerning the essence and existence of a creature. Wherefore that being does not prevent a creature from being made through creation from nothing and qua being.

SECTION II

WHETHER INFINITE POWER OF ACTING IS REQUIRED FOR CREATING, AND THEREFORE WHETHER IT IS SO PROPER TO GOD THAT IT CANNOT BE COMMUNICATED TO CREATURES

1. No creature has ever created anything. There have been philosophers who claimed not only about what is possible, but also as a matter of fact, that the power of creating has been communicated to creatures, and that a superior angel created an inferior one next to itself, and that the lowest created corporeal things. This was the opinion of Avicenna, whose opinion we touched upon above when treating the eduction of forms, and it will occur again below when treating the active virtue of created intelligences. However, the true and certain doctrine teaches that as a matter of fact no creature has created anything; for faith acknowledges only God as the creator of all things, and all the Saints teach this, especially D. August., XII de Civit., c. 24; Tertull., lib. de Praescript. haeretic.; Damascen., lib. II, c. 3, and Cyrill. Alex., lib. II cont. Iulian., sub finem. And finally it was defined in c. Firmiter, de Sum. Trinit. et fide Cathol.

2. From this certain principle, however, it is gathered with almost the same certainty that no creature has the power of creating as a matter of fact, because it is not likely that God gave such power to any creature and yet does not grant or permit its use; for it pertains to God's providence to allow creatures to perform their proper motions or actions, and because otherwise such power would be useless in the nature of things. Likewise, because what has never been done by any natural cause is rightly judged impossible through natural causes. And thus both the Fathers and all theologians deny in the same manner and with the same certainty that a creature has the natural power of creating, just as they deny that one creature has created another.

3. Although these things are certain to us from revelation, we inquire (which is proper to the present task) whether they can be persuaded and convinced by natural reason, which we judge depends entirely on the proposed question; for if we prove that the power of creating, on account of the infinite perfection it requires, is incommunicable to a creature, what faith teaches as a matter of fact will be left demonstrated; but if the power of creating does not essentially include that infinity, and therefore it is not repugnant for it to be communicated to a creature, it cannot be proven by reason that such power and its act have not been communicated as a matter of fact; for it will depend on God's free will, whose decree, if it is not manifested from effects, can be known to us only through revelation.

The Reason for Doubt is Proposed & the Sense of the Question is Opened

4. The reason for the difficulty in the present question is therefore that no sufficient reason has yet been found, much less a demonstration, which would persuade that absolutely infinite virtue is required for creating. I speak, however, of principal virtue which by its own power can produce an effect; for we do not wish to dispute professionally about instrumental virtue, because it is a purely

theological matter. But principal virtue of creating can be understood in various ways: first, as being in that order universal or adequate to the creatable object, and concerning this it is most evident that it cannot be communicated to a creature; nor has this been (as far as I know) called into doubt by any author. And the reason is clear, because such power has an object that is infinitely perfect syncategorematically; for in that breadth of object, none can be designated of such perfection that another of greater perfection cannot be created, and so on to infinity; therefore in the power which by its virtue contains that whole object, absolutely infinite virtue and perfection is required, because neither can actually finite power suffice, otherwise it could be equaled and surpassed by some part of its object, nor can that virtue be syncategorematically infinite, because it simultaneously and actually has existing its whole virtue and perfection. Nor will it be sufficient that it be infinite in a qualified sense or in some order of beings; for first, infinity of this kind is absolutely and actually finite, and moreover the breadth of the object is not enclosed under any genus or order of things, but absolutely embraces the whole breadth of creatable being; therefore the power which contains and surpasses all of that cannot be infinite only in a qualified sense, but absolutely and in the whole breadth of being.

5. A second reason can be applied, because it is impossible for any productive power to enclose itself under its adequate object, because it is impossible for something to be able to create itself; but every creature is contained under creatable being, as is self-evident; therefore it cannot have creatable being as such as the adequate object of its power, otherwise it would enclose itself under its object. And by this reasoning no generable thing can have such generative power which has generable being as its adequate object. Nor can any individual have power whose adequate object is the species itself. By these reasons, therefore, it is sufficiently demonstrated that the power of creating in this way is infinite and proper to God and incommunicable to creatures.

6. In another way the power of creating can also be understood, which has the force to produce something from nothing by itself alone and without dependence or concurrence of another. And in this way also I think it can be sufficiently proven that such power not only as it extends to everything creatable, but also as determined to creating any being whatsoever, is infinite and incommunicable to a creature, concerning which matter we will treat below, disp. XXII. For regarding this there is the same reason concerning the power of creating and concerning any created faculty for acting from a presupposed subject, because none can be independent in acting from the first cause, and such independence requires infinite perfection, as we will see there.

7. In a third way, therefore, the virtue of creating can be understood only by way of a proximate principal cause, dependent in acting on the first cause and limited to a certain order or species of things to be created, such as for creating bodies, or these species of angels, or something similar. And concerning this power no sufficient reason appears why it should require absolutely infinite perfection, or why it cannot be communicated to a creature, because neither from the side of the object does it have infinity, since it is posited as limited to an object of finite perfection, nor from the mode of acting, since it is posited as dependent on the concurrence of another.

8. Nor does what many say satisfy, that infinity is gathered from the mode of acting, not on account of the independence of action from a superior acting cause, but on account of the independence of action from a material cause; namely, because reducing something from potency to act requires some virtue, and the more that potency is distant from act, the greater virtue is required in the agent; therefore what is so distant from act that it is contained in no passive potency requires infinite potency in the agent so that it can come to be; this reason (I say) does not satisfy, first indeed, because the independence of action from a subject does not seem to be of such moment, nor to indicate such perfection, that it requires absolutely

infinite virtue in the agent; for why? For the concurrence of matter is something finite; why therefore cannot it be supplied by the virtue of an agent of superior order and perfection, even if it is not infinite? Next, because that gradation or proportional calculation is not formal, both because at most it infers a power of acting of superior order than any power defined for acting from passive potency, whether proximate or remote, or more or less distant from act; and also because that progression must be understood with respect to the same thing, and other things being equal; for it can happen that producing a more perfect form from proximate potency requires greater perfection than producing the lowest form from remote potency. Thus therefore for creating the lowest thing, for example, prime matter, finite power will be able to suffice, distinguished however in species from every generative power.

9. And the difficulty is increased, for principal virtue for acting can be attributed to a creature in two ways. First, as connatural and due, or flowing from the principles of nature, as heat is in fire, or as superadded or placed in nature, just as the light of glory is in the blessed. Although therefore we freely grant that connatural virtue in created agents cannot extend to creation, on account of the said disproportion, nevertheless concerning virtue superadded to nature that reasoning proves nothing, because that virtue can be supernatural, and thus of superior order, and therefore sufficient to overcome that disproportion. For thus theologians respond when a similar argument is made, namely, that for seeing an intelligible object mixed from act and potency, intellectual light of some perfection is required, and the more such object has of act and less of potency, the more perfect light is required for seeing it; therefore if the object is pure act having no potency, infinite light is required; theologians respond (I say) by denying the consequence and asserting that light of superior order is sufficient. Why therefore can we not respond in the same way concerning the power of creating?

10. For these and similar reasons, therefore, some theologians say that it is not shown by any sufficient reason that the power of creating is absolutely repugnant to a creature. Thus Gabriel plainly holds, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, a. 3. For although he teaches absolutely that a creature cannot create, nevertheless seeking a reason for this matter, he responds that no other reason can be given except that this is the condition of the creature, which it received from God, whose order it cannot transgress. But that creatures have received this condition of operating, he says is known only by experience. But first this experience is had at most in material agents and effects; how indeed did Gabriel experience that angels do nothing and have never done anything except from a patient? How likewise did he experience that one man, while generating another, does not attain by causing the soul itself? Next it seems to be founded only on the condition and order which the creature as a matter of fact received from God; either therefore he holds that God could have granted another condition or mode of acting to the creature, or he does not sufficiently respond to the question. Durand more clearly holds the same opinion, In II, dist. 1, q. 4, who denies that infinite virtue is required for creating, and consequently denies that it is repugnant for a creature to effect something without change from a subject, and he solves all the reasons which are usually brought forward to prove this.

11. Nevertheless the contrary opinion is common among scholastics. The Master holds it In IV, dist. 5, and D. Thom., I, q. 45, a. 5, and often elsewhere, and all his followers, and Scotus, whom his followers also follow, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1; Ocham In II, q. 7, although he holds it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated; Idem, Quodl. II, q. 9; Henric., Quodl. IV, q. 37; and Aegid., Quodl. V, q. 1.

Resolution of the Question

12. And indeed to me the latter opinion seems true and certain; nevertheless I judge it most difficult to bring forward a compelling demonstration to confirm it. A sign of this is that authors who agree in the conclusion disagree supremely in rendering the reason, and each attacks the reasons of others. Therefore with me that reason is most efficacious which is taken from the principle of faith, and therefore I rather said the assertion is certain to me than evident; for just as from the fact that no creature has ever created anything, we correctly reason that no creature made has the power of creating, so from the fact that no creature made has the power of creating, I correctly think it is gathered that no creature makeable is capable of this faculty. I prove this consequence first, because if such a creature were possible it would surely constitute another order and grade of creature besides those which now exist, because it would have a distinct and higher mode of operating; therefore it would have pertained to the perfection of the universe that such an order or grade of creatures be in it; therefore conversely, since God founded the universe without such a creature, it is a sign that it is not contained in the order of creatures nor is it possible, and therefore does not pertain to the completion of the universe. We will enrich this reasoning below, disp. XXXVIII, when with similar discourse we will show that there are created intelligences in the universe.

13. Second, the same reasoning is explained more fully, because among creatable substances there can be no higher grade than that of angels or intellectual things; among accidents indeed, if we speak as philosophers, none are better than those which are connatural to these supreme substances; if however we speak as theologians, none can be better than those which pertain to the order of grace and beatific vision; if therefore in these supreme orders of things the power of creating is not found, it is not possible in any creature. For that in the grade of angels others more perfect in species can be made than all those made is not sufficient for them to have a mode of operating of such diverse order and nature, and therefore

August., III de Trinit., c. 8, takes for granted that if angels both good and evil cannot create, no creature can.

The Reasoning of Scotus is Examined

14. Third, Scotus attempted to give some reason for this induction or experience which we suppose, and from it to gather the cause on account of which no makeable creature can be creative, whose discourse we can propose and amplify thus; for every creature is either material or spiritual; but neither of these can create; therefore none. The consequence is clear, because those two members, which include immediate and contradictory opposition, embrace all possible creatures. But the minor concerning the former part about material creatures is proven, because either a material substance would create through matter, or through form, or through accidents. Not through matter, because this is not active nor can it be; for it is intrinsically repugnant to its entity and imperfection, because it is essentially pure passive potency. Whence since this reasoning is common to all creatable matter, it cannot happen that prime matter be a principle of creating. And this indeed seems known through itself and from the terms; for such perfection as creation indicates is plainly repugnant with such imperfection as prime matter presents.

15. Nor can a material form (for we now treat of this) be a principle of creation. First indeed, because such is the mode of acting as is the mode of being; but this form has in its being connatural dependence on a subject; therefore also in every action of which it is the proper and connatural principle. Second, because such a form is not producible in a connatural way through proper creation, but either through eduction or through concreation with the whole composite; therefore neither can it be a principle of creating. The consequence is clear, because at most it can be a principle of producing a form similar to itself, and in a mode also proportionate and connatural to the form to be produced. Which I declare third thus, for such a form would

either be a principle of creating matter, or form, or a composite; not matter, because such a form is posterior to matter and by natural order supposes it so that it can exist, and therefore also supposes it so that it can act. Especially since a form so imperfect cannot contain matter eminently, and therefore cannot procreate a thing so dissimilar to itself. Nor can it create form, because it cannot produce spiritual form, since it cannot exceed its own order; nor can it produce material form, except in a mode connatural to the form to be produced; for it cannot change the order connatural to things themselves; but such a form, when it is not concreated to matter, is not makeable through creation, but through eduction alone, because it is not capable of proper being without dependence on matter.

16. Whence it also remains that such a form cannot be a principle of creating a whole material substance, because this cannot be created except by one who can create matter. But that it much less can create spiritual substance is supposed as evident, because it cannot transcend its order in acting. And by the same discourse it is easily concluded that a material substance cannot according to itself as a whole or per se primarily be a principle of creating, both because, as has been said, matter cannot be a principle of acting, much less of creating, and also because the whole composite cannot have power of acting except from those parts from which it essentially consists; if therefore neither in matter nor in form can there be that power of creating or proportion to such action, neither can it be in the whole composite.

17. It remained to speak of the accidents of this substance, which was the third member proposed in that former part; but concerning accidents generally we will immediately say more; now we take this member as sufficiently proven from what has been said about substantial form; for if this cannot be a principle of creating, on account of the natural dependence it has on matter, much less will a material accident be able to be, which is both more dependent and less perfect, especially since we now treat of the principal cause. And this

discourse about material things indeed seems efficacious to me and proceeds equally concerning substances made and possible; for it is founded on the proper nature and imperfection of material substance as such and on the connatural proportion between acting and being, which cannot be changed; for although God can act in a creature or through a creature other than what is connatural, nevertheless he cannot make that connatural to any creature which is disproportionate to its nature.

18. I come to the other part proposed in the principal argument concerning spiritual substance. Which Scotus proves in no other way except that a created spiritual substance can effect nothing except through a medium of accident; but through a medium of accident it can create nothing; therefore no angel can have the power of creating. He proves the major from the fact that an angel can effect nothing except through the mediation of acts of intellect and will; but these acts are accidents, nor can it happen that in an angel such acts are substance and not accident, as he proves at length there and we now admit, whatever may be of the efficacy of his reasons regarding this part, concerning which we will speak below when disputing about created intelligences. But the minor is proven by Scotus, because an accident could only be required for creating either as the action itself which is terminated to the thing created, and this cannot be said in the present case, because action of this kind is in the very term, as we will see below; whence such action cannot be intellection or volition of an angel; or an accident could be required as a principle of such action; but that this cannot be he proves only from the general principle that an accident cannot be a principle for producing substance. Which indeed concerning the principal principle all admit, and in this sense it seems sufficient to the present intention; for, as we said, we treat only of the principal principle.

19. Nevertheless Scotus himself extends that proposition also to an instrumental principle, in which sense it is not universally true, as we saw above; but whether it is true by a peculiar reason concerning

the instrument of creation, I will say below. But this discourse of Scotus supposes, regarding this last part, that if a creature could create, it ought to create substance; which he rightly supposes, because, as we said above, nothing can be created except either a subsisting thing or by way of subsisting; but a creature cannot create an accident by way of subsisting or separated from a subject, because such a mode of being cannot be connatural to an accident; but a creature cannot have power to produce a thing in a preternatural way or without other causes on which its nature necessarily depends. Add that an accident inhering in substance and by its nature powerless to exist otherwise cannot by its nature be a principle of creating an accident per se separated, because such a mode of acting surpasses the mode of being connatural to such an accident.

20. In what the discourse of Scotus is deficient. One thing only is that in which this discourse of Scotus seems diminished, namely that dilemma that an accident could only be required for creating either as action or as principle of action; for besides these there could be a third member, namely, that an accidental act be prerequired for applying or directing the proximate virtue of acting; for in this way intellection and volition are also required for works of art and for moving locally. Someone could therefore say that one angel can create another proximately and immediately through its substance as through a principle of acting; nevertheless, so that that principle may act in a free and intellectual way, an act of will is required as applying that principle or power executing to operating, and an act of intellect as directing, and in this way it is not inconvenient that an accidental act be required for the creation of substance. For thus in animals the power of generating is applied to operating through appetite, and in man through will; and intellect, although it is a more perfect power than will, is subordinated regarding exercise or application to act. Thus therefore the virtue of creating, even if it were substantial and more perfect, could be subordinated to will and applied to its action through its accidental act.

21. What should be added to the discourse of Scotus. For this reason therefore I do not judge this proof entirely efficacious regarding spiritual and intellectual creatures. Nevertheless conjectures can be applied here by which we will prove below that angels cannot at the nod of their will transmute matter to form; for if that is true, by much greater reason they will not be able to make something from nothing; concerning those reasons we will speak below. Moreover it is certain that no finite intelligence can create another more perfect than itself; for this is above the virtue of a principal cause. Nor is there reason why it can create material substances, because it does not contain them eminently, since it is limited to a definite species and since it has no proportion with corporeal things; but to other spiritual substances it is so compared that they are distinguished within the same grade as perfect species, just as species or genera of animal are distinguished. Whence, just as properly speaking one animal cannot generate another of diverse species, even less perfect, so neither could one angel create an inferior; therefore it only remains to be proven that it cannot create one similar to itself in species. A reason for this matter would easily be given, if it were true that intelligences cannot be multiplied numerically within the same species. But because that opinion is not true, therefore it can be said that at least the multiplication of individuals is not per se intended by nature, but only for conserving the species, and therefore it is not connatural to incorruptible individuals to have proper virtue for producing things similar to themselves in species. Finally, accommodating the discourse of Scotus, a conjecture can be added, because created intellectual substances, in operations most proper to themselves, such as those of intellect and will, can effect nothing except from a presupposed subject; therefore it is likely that they cannot have natural power for effecting an action entirely substantial and independent from a subject.

22. Ockham adduces another reason, in the said q., 7, namely, because every creature either acts naturally or freely; but in neither

way can it have the virtue of creating; therefore. The minor regarding the former part is proven, because such a cause acting naturally would simultaneously create whatever it could, because it would not depend on the disposition or capacity of a patient; it would therefore create infinite things, either in species or in individual, because no finite number can be designated which it could cause. The other part concerning a free cause is proven because, although it would not necessarily create all those things, nevertheless at least it could will, and consequently could create simultaneously all those things, which is inconvenient. But this reason is less efficacious than the preceding; for neither member is sufficiently attacked; for although such a cause would act naturally, nevertheless it would depend in acting on divine concurrence, and by the same could be determined to acting finite things, and these rather than those; just as now a natural agent applied to a patient is from itself indifferent to producing this or that individual form from infinite ones, but is determined through God's concurrence. But Ockham says it is inconvenient that such a creature be suspended from its action, if it can produce infinite things. But this same argument can be made thus concerning divine power; therefore that inconvenience is nothing, because infinite things are not all producible actually simultaneously. And by the same reason the proof of the other part is attacked, because it can be applied also to the divine will; therefore such a creature could not will to create simultaneously infinite things, because the object would be impossible, or if it willed that, it would will vainly and inefficaciously; therefore it could only create these or those from infinite things according to its judgment. Nevertheless the argument correctly concludes that such a creature could, within the same species or same genus, create syncategorematically infinite things, that is, not so many that it could not create more, at least successively, which Ockham also judges inconvenient, but there is none; for the sun also can thus generate more to infinity successively, although those which it can make or conserve simultaneously in any instant are not only finite, but

also in some determinate number and quantity, because finite virtue at least requires a terminus of this kind. Nevertheless this same thing could be said concerning the virtue of a creature for creating, if it were once posited.

The First Argument of St. Thomas is Examined: Why Infinite Power is Required for Creation

23. Setting aside therefore those arguments which either proceed in particular regarding this or that creature or through very extrinsic means, St. Thomas from the proper object and mode of creation has attempted to bring forth two general arguments on account of which universally all creation is repugnant to every possible creature. He has the first one in I, q. 45, a. 5, in the body of the article, which can be formulated thus: the effect or terminus of creation is proper to the most universal cause, so that it cannot belong to another; therefore both creation and the power of creating is so proper to the first cause that it cannot be communicated to another. The consequence is clear, because the action and power can belong only to that which can be the effect. The antecedent is proved because being as such is the proper effect of the most universal cause; but the proper terminus or effect of creation is also being itself as such; therefore the proper terminus of creation can be the effect of the first cause alone. The major premise is evident because more universal effects are to be referred back to more universal causes; therefore the most universal effect to the most universal cause; but being is the most universal effect; therefore. The minor premise is proved because through creation a being is produced insofar as it is a being; therefore through it being as such is communicated according to its absolute nature, according to which it is the most universal effect and proper to the first cause. Scotus attacks this argument in the cited place, and other Scotists, In II, dist. 1, and Cajetan, I, in the cited place, and Ferrariensis, II cont. Gent., c. 21, and Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 3,

defend it extensively. And indeed some of Scotus's objections have a true and easy solution.

24. How being is said to be God's proper effect. For he attacks first that proposition of St. Thomas, that being is God's proper effect, as if the meaning were that God alone effects being itself in any creature, and that secondary causes do not concur actively in effecting the being of existence. But this meaning is undoubtedly false, as I will show below when disputing about the existence of creatures, and it is not intended by St. Thomas, but he only calls being God's proper effect formally and per se primarily, either because God alone can make being from absolutely nothing or because he alone can make in any thing all those things which are required for its being. And these meanings are true, yet they do not serve the present matter, because the principle would be begged, since this very thing must be proven. Another meaning therefore will be that God alone regards factible being as if it were the adequate object of his power, and in this sense also the proposition is true, as is evident in itself and from what was said at the beginning of this section, and Scotus's arguments do not proceed against it. How moreover it serves the present argument will be clear from what is to be said.

25. A more universal effect is to be reduced to a more universal cause. From this it is also easily established what meaning the other proposition renders, that a more universal effect is reduced to a more universal cause, which Scotus also attacks, because either it is discourse about the universality of perfection, both of cause and effect, and thus, although the general proposition would be true, nevertheless it is false that being or existence is the most universal effect, because it is not the most perfect, but rather the most imperfect of all, since it is the most common; or it is discourse about the universality of predication, and thus neither would the proposition be to the point nor the subsumption true, because God is not in this way the most universal cause. But this has an easy response, because the discourse is about universality proportioned to effect and cause.

Hence on the part of the cause it is discourse about universality in causing; on the part of the effect however it is discourse about an effect universal in multitude, and consequently about an objective nature more universal in predication that is adequate. And in this way it is most true that a more universal or common effect, that is, the nature of being or of such a being, the more universal it is, the more it is regarded by a more universal cause as the objective nature per se primarily and adequate to its power. And the reason is clear, because, although a universal cause is simple in itself, nevertheless it is called universal through its order to the many things which it eminently contains and can effect; therefore the more universal it will be, the more it will contain and will be able to effect; therefore the more it will have an objective nature more universal in predication, that is, containing more things under itself; therefore also, conversely, the more universal an effect will be in this way, the more it is to be reduced to a more universal cause, if it is said to correspond adequately and per se primarily. Nor does it stand against this that natures more universal in predication are less perfect; for, although this is true considering those natures according to the mind's precision, nevertheless not as they include all lower things; but it is in this way that being and other similar natures are said to be adequate to some active power; for it does not attain that precise nature, but the whole that is contained under it; and in this way creatable being is said to be the adequate object of divine power, which things are sufficiently manifest. Others respond that being as such, even taken commonly for the being of existence, is the greatest perfection of all. But we will speak about the meaning of this expression below in the aforementioned disputation, for now it is not necessary.

26. In what the difficulty of St. Thomas's argument consists. The greater difficulty is surely in the application of these general principles to concluding the intended proposition, because from them at most seem to be able to be inferred the two things which we said above are certain. One is that a creature cannot create independently

of the first cause. But that it cannot do this with the concurrence of the first cause seems minimally to be inferred. For to give being is not proper to the first cause, except with the aforementioned independence. Hence in the book De Causis it is said (which St. Thomas also adduces): "A secondary cause does not give being except in virtue of the first and insofar as it participates in the operation of the first," which is true for no other reason than that a secondary cause can act only through power received from the first and dependent in its action on the actual operation of God; therefore in this way a creature can communicate being, even through creation, as far as it is from the force of those principles. Again from those principles it is optimally concluded that the power of creating which has as its adequate object creatable being or being itself as it includes the whole latitude of participable being is not communicable to a creature. From this however it cannot be concluded that every participation of that universal creative power, limited and determined to some genus or species, or certainly to some individuals of creatable things, is incommunicable to a creature; for such power thus determined does not involve repugnance in its very terms nor can it be shown impossible from those principles. The first is evident, because the creation of a lion, for example, is specifically distinct from the creation of a man; therefore from the terms it is not repugnant to give a created power commensurate to the creation of such a species and not to creation according to its whole latitude, just as is manifest in generative or eductive power from the potency of matter, which, as it extends to every possible generable thing, is proper to God alone, especially with independence; but limited to a certain species of generation, it can be communicated to a creature with dependence on the first cause. The second is evident because such created power, even if it is for creating, will not have as its object the most universal effect, but a determinate and particular one. Hence what St. Thomas subsumes, namely, that through creation being is produced absolutely, not insofar as it is this or such, is indeed true of creation in general, but

not of this creation in species; for through this there is truly produced being insofar as it is such, namely of a man or angel, and therefore it is not necessary that the power which does not regard creation as such adequately, but such creation, be the most universal power; therefore it is not necessary that it be proper to the first cause.

27. First resolution of the difficulty. To this difficulty it can first be responded by conceding that nothing more is proved by that discourse, and that this is not against the authority of St. Thomas, because he does not seem to have wanted to conclude more by such discourse. This is evident, for immediately after that argument he reports the opinion of those saying that a creature can create through power received from God, and although St. Thomas there calls this creating instrumentally, nevertheless he truly seems to take that "instrumentally" broadly, as secondary principal causes are also said to be instruments of the first cause. This can be proved, for in this way he immediately reports Avicenna's opinion saying that one intelligence created another; but Avicenna did not posit that an intelligence creates as an instrument taken in the strict sense, but as a secondary principal cause. In this response however two inconveniences are left behind; one, that the argument is not defended nor does the conclusion remain proved. The other, pertaining to the mind of St. Thomas, that the argument by which he immediately proves that a creature cannot be an instrument of creation would also proceed concerning a secondary principal cause, which however is difficult, as we will declare below when touching upon that argument.

28. Second response. Secondly therefore we can respond that the efficacy of that argument consists in this, that from the formal object and mode of creation it elicits that there cannot be given a power of creating which from itself does not regard as its adequate object being according to the whole latitude of participable being (for such being must be understood whenever in this matter being insofar as it is being is spoken of, unless that "insofar as" is taken specificatively, as I said). The force of that inference St. Thomas seems

to place in that proposition: "To produce being absolutely, not insofar as it is this or such, pertains to the nature of creation." And the deduction can be formed thus, for through every creation there comes to be per se primarily being, not only insofar as it is such being, but also insofar as it is being; therefore every power from which such action comes regards as its formal and adequate object being itself, not only insofar as it is such being, but absolutely insofar as it is being; therefore such power must necessarily be universal and embrace every participable being. The consequence is clear, because every power embraces all things which are comprehended under its adequate and formal object. The major premise also is established from the doctrine of the Philosopher, Physics I, touched upon above, which Cajetan also well explains, I, q. 44, a. 2. For an effect is said to come to be per se primarily according to that nature which did not precede on the part of the effect; for if it preceded, it will no longer be said to come to be per se, but per accidens; for when fire is generated from air, body does not come to be per se nor element, but fire comes to be per se. Thus therefore, in every creation there comes to be per se being or existence, not only as such, but simply as being, because no nature of being or existence is presupposed for creation, since it is from nothing.

29. The minor premise is proved because that nature according to which a power per se primarily attains its effect seems to be the formal objective nature under which such power attains the same effect. Hence it happens that in causing, the power is as universal and abstract as in its order is that formal objective nature which it per se primarily attains.

30. Another discourse of St. Thomas explaining the previous one is explained. We can add moreover to confirm the same deduction another discourse of the same St. Thomas in the same article, in the solution to objection 1. Because whatever creates something, creates being absolutely, and not only by applying being or the nature of being to this being; therefore as far as it is from itself, it can create any creatable being. The antecedent is explained, for it cannot happen that

one who participates in some nature produces it absolutely, but by applying it to something, as Peter cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, otherwise he could be the cause of himself. Hence he can only be the cause that human nature be in Paul or Francis. Just as this man participates in the nature of man, so any created being participates in the nature of being; therefore it cannot produce the nature of being absolutely, but by applying it to this being. Therefore just as man cannot through his action or production apply the nature of man to this except by presupposing something by which that determination of the common nature to this individual is made, so universally a being through participation cannot communicate the nature of being except by presupposing something by which the nature of being is determined to this, which is repugnant to creation. Therefore, conversely, every power which can produce being absolutely, presupposing nothing, produces the nature of being absolutely, and not only by applying it to this; therefore every power which can thus produce is a universal power; hence it cannot be a being by participation, but being through essence.

31. Some objections against both of St. Thomas's aforementioned discourses. But the mind still does not rest, but finds several difficulties in both discourses. For in the former, that subsumed proposition, in which is the whole force of the argument, namely, that every power per se attaining in some effect some nature of being is of itself universal to all things which are comprehended under such nature, does not seem universally true; for when wheat is generated, for example, not only is wheat generated per se, but also the living, because the nature of the living is not presupposed; for wheat or grass is generated from non-living earth, and yet, because it has the power to generate wheat, it does not therefore have the power to generate every living thing. The same is when a horse generates a horse, not only from a non-horse, but also from a non-animal, namely from seed; then indeed both horse and animal are generated per se, and yet that generative power does not regard the nature of animal as

adequate, nor can it effect the generations of all animals. Moreover, otherwise it also follows that God can create himself, because when some being is created, not only does the nature of creatable being come to be per se in it, but also the nature of being in the most abstract sense, because no nature of being is presupposed on the part of the effect; therefore if the said universal consequence holds, the adequate object of creative power will not only be creatable being, but absolutely and precisely being; therefore it will comprehend under itself absolutely every being, even God himself. Nor can it be said that being as such abstractly is not created per se, because the nature of being is presupposed at least in the creator; for this does not impede per se production, for fire generates fire per se, although the nature of fire is presupposed in the generator, and therefore I said above that the nature which comes to be per se ought not to be presupposed on the part of the effect, because on the part of the agent it does not obstruct.

32. But if it is responded that this does not follow, because the power of creating does not attain that most abstract nature of being, precisely as such taken as such[40], but insofar as it is included in the nature of creatable being, which above in dialectical terms we said does not attain it reduplicatively, but specificatively, it is indeed an optimal response, yet by the same the whole force of St. Thomas's argument and discourse is weakened. For in the same way it will be said that through the power of creating communicated to a creature there does not come to be per se the nature of creatable being as such, except insofar as it is included in the nature of such being, and thus also such power does not attain being insofar as it is being reduplicatively, but specificatively, and therefore it is not rightly concluded that such power ought to be most universal and comprehend every creatable being. Hence for the sake of clarity we can distinguish between coming to be per se and coming to be per se primarily, and assert that for the former it suffices that the thing,

[40] ratione, 1960; alit. rationem. "El acusativo 'rationem' sólo introduciría una ligera variación de matiz en la frase." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 494.

according to that nature by which it is said to come to be per se, is not presupposed on the part of the effect; but the latter adds that the thing comes to be according to such nature as the proper and quasi-formal terminus of the agent's power, and not only as included in the formal terminus. Through creation therefore there comes to be per se being insofar as it is creatable being, yet from the nature of creation it cannot be proved to be necessary that it come to be per se primarily according to that transcendental nature; for it can be created by some power per se primarily insofar as it is such being. Although however that proposition, which is the foundation of that discourse, is admitted concerning an effect per se primarily, nevertheless it cannot be admitted concerning every effect per se, as the arguments made conclude; it is therefore not sufficient for concluding what is intended.

33. Nor is the difficulty less, but perhaps greater in the latter discourse; for that proposition: "One who participates in some nature cannot produce it absolutely, but by applying it to something or to this," in this sense is true that he cannot produce it absolutely; that is, in all things in which it exists; namely, if that nature is specific, he cannot produce it in all individuals in which it is apt to exist; but if it is a generic nature or transcendental notion, he will not be able to produce it in all inferiors, proportion being preserved. And this sense that reason proves optimally, because otherwise such a thing could effect itself. According to this sense however, either it is not true or at least is assumed without proof that whatever creates creates being absolutely; for why will it not be able to create certain beings and not others, as we have argued thus far? But that proposition can render another sense, which seems more intended in that discourse, namely, that one who participates in some nature cannot produce that nature absolutely, that is, according to itself as a whole and according to every part of it, but only by presupposing some part of it and applying another to it, in which sense it is most truly said that whatever creates creates being absolutely; yet that proposition in that sense, whether it is true or false, is not proved in the aforementioned discourse; for

although someone might produce a nature similar to himself absolutely in the said sense, it does not follow that he could be the cause of himself; for he could produce such nature according to itself as a whole in one or another individual, yet not in all, or in one species (if the nature is generic) and not in all. And by equal reason he could create some being absolutely in the said sense, that is, according to its whole entity, yet not every being.

34. Hence further in a good sense it is true that one who participates in some nature does not make it exist absolutely, but is the cause that it be in this individual or in this being; yet it is not rightly inferred from this that there is presupposed for the action by which such individual or such being comes to be some individuating principle; for the whole thing with its whole individuating principle can come to be through that action. For when a specific nature is said to come to be in an individual or to be applied to an individual, it is not to be imagined that one thing, which comes to be, is applied to a preexisting thing, but it is only said to be applied because it comes to be in one individual and not in its abstraction. Hence also when God created Adam he did not create the whole human species absolutely, that is, abstractly, but he created it by applying it (according to that mode of speaking) to this individual, not indeed by presupposing in him on his part the principle of individuation, but by creating it simultaneously. Thus therefore, although one angel might create another similar to himself in nature, by applying his specific nature to such individual, it would not be necessary that for his action he presuppose some principle individuating the other angel, but that he produce it simultaneously; especially since this individuating principle in singular natures is nothing other than the very entity of the nature itself, if it is simple, or the principles by which it is intrinsically constituted, if it is composite. And it is confirmed, because otherwise by the same discourse it would be proved that, one angel being supposed, God cannot create another similar one, because either through that action he would create such specific nature absolutely,

and this not, because through that action he does not create the prior angel; or he produces by applying the specific nature to this individual, and thus it would be necessary that for such action an individuating principle be presupposed. But if it is then said, as truly must be said, that that nature is applied to this individual by producing absolutely its whole entity from nothing, the same would be said entirely, even if one angel created another similar to himself, whether in species or in genus; for that a similar nature is presupposed in the agent itself does not obstruct creation, as was already said above.

35. Judgment concerning the aforementioned objections. I confess that I do not know how to satisfy all these difficulties; for against the latter discourse they seem to me to conclude positively (so to speak) that that reasoning is not apt; against the former however they at least show that it does not convince, because not all the principles which are assumed in it are sufficiently proved, although it is not established that they are false. And all are reduced to this, that every power of creating necessarily ought to be such that it extends to everything creatable. This however does not seem to be sufficiently convinced from those things which we have said thus far and considering precisely the terminus to which creation tends. But it remains to be seen whether by joining the terminus from which, and the special relation of these termini, and the mode of acting proportioned to them, this can be more efficaciously inferred.

36. The final argument by which St. Thomas proves the assertion. There is therefore the final argument of the same St. Thomas, in the said article 5, ad 2, for the power of creating must necessarily be infinite; therefore it cannot be created; and in the same way it can be inferred that it necessarily extends to everything creatable; for a power simply infinite is also most universal, and its object must be infinite, as much as it can be in the nature of a factible object. The antecedent is proved by St. Thomas because the force of power is attended to not only from the thing made, but also from the mode; but the mode of producing from nothing indicates infinite

force in acting, for to produce something from remote potency requires great power, and from more remote, greater; therefore to produce from no potency or from nothing requires infinite power. Albertus has the same argument, In II, dist. 1, a. 7, and others.

37. Some base this argument on the fact that between being and nothing there is infinite distance[41]. But not rightly, as Scotus responds above, because no being is distant from nothing except according to those degrees of entity which it has in itself. Hence also St. Thomas, In IV, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5, says there is not infinite distance between being and non-being on the part of being itself unless when the being is infinite, because one opposite is as distant from another as it participates in the other. And therefore matter, because it is most imperfect, is said by Augustine to be near to nothing; but an angel is said to be near to God; and each being, the more perfect it is, the more it approaches God and the more it recedes from nothing. But nothing itself can in a certain way be said to be infinitely, or rather indefinitely or indeterminately distant from being, either because nothing can be more distant from being than nothing itself or because it does not have one determinate distance, but can have a greater and greater one, according to various degrees of being. But this does not matter for the present, because through creation there is not transcended (so to speak) this whole distance of nothing itself according to its whole latitude, but only according to those degrees of entity which the being that is created receives.

38. Others therefore commonly base that consequence on the maximum disproportion which exists between being and nothing. For to act from potency more removed from act requires greater power; therefore by what proportion an effect will come to be from more remote potency, by the same will greater power be required; therefore where the removal of act from potency is without any proportion, there greater power without any proportion will be required; but this is none other than infinite; for every finite power

[41] Henr., Quodl. IV, q. ult.; Rich, In II, d. 1, a. 4, q. 4.

preserves some proportion to another finite one. This mode of arguing is frequent in Aristotle, as is established from Physics IV and VIII. From this by similar proportion Cajetan argues, for if finite power sufficed to produce something from nothing, it would follow that equal power is required to produce something from some matter and from nothing; let the creative power be finite as four, but the power producing from remote matter be as two; therefore the power necessary to produce from matter twice as remote will be at least as three; therefore to produce from further matter also twice as remote will require power as four; therefore as much power is required to produce something from some matter as to create.

39. Objections against the aforementioned argument. Against this argument however Scotus and Durandus object many things above. But all tend to this, that they prove that between being and nothing either there is no distance or not an infinite one, which does not matter for the argument made; for we have already shown that it is not necessary to imagine that infinite distance as proper and positive, nor is the argument taken from there, but from the disproportion, which indicates such a mode of operating that requires supreme efficacy in the agent. Nevertheless that objection which we proposed above seems greatly to weaken this argument; for the argument optimally proves that creative power is from this consideration disproportionate to eductive power from the potency of matter; from this however it is not rightly inferred that it will be necessarily infinite simply, for it will suffice if it is of another order, which is also wont to be called infinite secundum quid, which to admit is no inconvenience. And this suffices so that that power does not preserve proportion with respect to any power which can only operate through the eduction of form from the potency of matter; because proportion is preserved only between those things which are of the same nature or quantity. And this is explained further from the very discourse; for when it is said that to produce something from more remote potency requires greater power, the discourse is about passive potency and about

greater or lesser removal from act from defect of dispositions or on account of repugnant dispositions, and consequently comparison is also made between active powers only through eduction from passive potency. But truly when it is inferred that to produce something from nothing requires greater power, that "from nothing" does not designate some passive potency most remote from act or very ill-disposed, but rather designates the absence of all passive potency; therefore it cannot be concluded that power productive from nothing is greater or infinite through augmentation (so to speak) of eductive power, but only that power thus active, namely from nothing, is of another and superior order from every power only eductive, even if it might be able to educe form from any real potency which is most remote. And thus that inconvenience does not follow that creative and eductive power are equal, because they are disproportionate. Add that, if other things were not equal, but they were compared to diverse effects unequally perfect, it would not be that great inconvenience, as we also proposed above in arguing at the beginning.

40. Summary and proof of all that has been said. The conclusion is strengthened by the authority of the saints. Therefore, on account of these difficulties, I said above that this truth becomes more certain to us from the things that have been done than from reason which effectively demonstrates and convinces that nothing else can be done. And in the same way I judge that from things that have been done it is most probably shown that for the creation of anything whatsoever there is required a power that is simply infinite; for since several substances so perfect have been made by God, none of them has received the power to create even the smallest thing which is close to nothing; therefore it is a sign that this comes only from the limitation of all these creatures, however perfect they may be; otherwise no reason could be given why the greatest perfection which is found in angels or Seraphim would not suffice for this. And from this point a further conjecture is made that that superior order, whose power must necessarily be creative, is none other than being itself

through essence; for among participated beings no new order or new grade can be found beyond those which have been made; since therefore by calculation it is concluded that creative power ought to be of another order, it is concluded to be infinite; for that order is none other than that in which there is being itself through essence. And Athanasius signified this in his third sermon against the Arians when he said: "To administer creatures and servants is one thing, but to establish and create is proper to God alone and to His Word and wisdom." Furthermore, this can be declared more fully; for the very mode of efficiency through creation indicates a certain supreme efficacy and independence in the creator, because since it presupposes no real power outside itself for acting, it requires only objective or possible power[42] through non-repugnance; but this indicates supreme force in active power, and therefore perhaps Cyril said in book II against Julian that to be able to work effectively as creator and to produce things which at some time were not is one of those things which are proper to the sole and supreme substance of all.

41. Next, creation is the first of all actions through which participated being can be communicated, and in this sense it tends per se primarily toward producing the whole being insofar as it is being; hence it becomes sufficiently probable that this action is such that by its nature it essentially demands to flow from being itself through essence, and therefore there cannot be given any participated entity which has the power for such an action.

42. And from the same principle it is quite probably understood that that gradation made above, that for producing from greater power greater perfection is required, should be understood not only within some genus of being, but absolutely in the breadth of being; and therefore for creating there is required a power not of any superior order whatsoever, but of the supreme order, which can be

[42] possibilem, 1960; alit. possibile. "En otras ediciones, se lee possibile, que no modifica sustancialmente el sentido del texto." Cf. BHF, t. III, p. 501.

understood in the whole breadth of being or of active power. And from this point it becomes very probable that principle, that creative power necessarily extends itself to everything creatable, because it does not expect (so to speak) from the part of the object except non-repugnance so that the effect may be or may be made, and because the principle of the first emanation and participation is from being itself through essence, and therefore such power can be nothing except a power which is being itself through essence, which is a most universal power and of itself powerful over all participated being. And perhaps for this reason Augustine said in book IX of Genesis according to the letter, chapter 15, that an angel can no more create any thing whatsoever than it can create itself.

43. Therefore in these ways we understand that, although the above reasons are not altogether compelling demonstrations, nevertheless they contribute very much to indicating the height of creative power and the reason on account of which it is repugnant for it to be created.

44. Finally, another conjecture of Giles[43] does not entirely displease me (although Scotus despises it), namely, that since every creature is changeable and in some way consists of act and potency, it is probable that it is not capable by its nature of the power of acting except through motion or change and by inducing act into potency. The consequence is clear from that principle that the mode of acting imitates the mode of being. From which it happens, on the contrary, that it befits God to be able to create insofar as He is pure act and being itself through essence, and finally insofar as He has infinite power.

The Reason Posited in the Beginning is Satisfied

45. First response. From these things sufficient response has been given to the principal reason for doubting posited in the

[43] Aegid., Quodl. I, q. 1; et Quodl. V, q. 1.

beginning. But what was added to increase the difficulty concerning principal power not innate but superadded can also be easily resolved in two ways from what has been said. The first is taken from what we believe as a matter of fact, because as a matter of fact no such principal power for creating has been communicated to created substances, and yet powers and qualities of the most perfect order have been added to them; therefore it is a sign that no power can be superadded to the natures of things which would be the principal power of creating. Whence, in my judgment, those who say that all supernatural qualities which are infused into us are created do not speak correctly or sufficiently consistently; otherwise supernatural acts also, such as the beatific vision, would be created, for they are true qualities and as supernatural as the habits themselves. From which it would follow that the light of glory, for example, which is the principal principle for making vision, would also be the principal power for creating; which is absurd.

46. Second response. The later response is that the reasons made previously prove not only concerning connatural power, but simply concerning created power; for they tend to show that no power of creating can be created or limited, which proceeds equally concerning power endowed to nature from outside and concerning that which is born from within; for power which is added from outside must be created. Whence there also arises another reason, because power added above the nature of a thing must necessarily be accidental, for a substance cannot be added to itself or be supernatural to itself; and therefore superadded power is necessarily accidental; but accidental power cannot be the principal power of creating. This can be sufficiently gathered from its mode of being, according to those things which we said above explaining Scotus's first discourse; for since every accident is by its nature dependent in being upon the subject, it cannot happen that it has a connatural mode of acting outside the subject or independent from the subject, such as is the mode of creation; therefore it cannot be the principal power of

creating. For it must be attentively considered that, although some form, which is the principal power for some act, may be supernatural to the subject, and therefore that mode of acting is also supernatural to such a subject, nevertheless that form has its own proper essence and nature connatural to itself; and therefore that mode of acting is connatural to the form itself. Since therefore a mode of acting without a subject cannot be connatural to an accident, neither can the power of creating be connatural either to the subject or to the accidental form itself; and therefore such a form cannot be the principal power.

SECTION III

WHETHER AN INSTRUMENT OF CREATION CAN BE GIVEN

1. No natural instrument of creation exists. It is not my intention to treat this matter professionally and theologically, but only to touch upon it briefly, insofar as can be concluded from the arguments that have been made. From what has been said, it seems to be efficaciously concluded that a creature cannot be an instrumental principle of creating, that is, such an instrument which by its nature is instituted and ordered toward such an action, and which has a natural instrumental power for it. For it is established, from what has been said above concerning created acting causes, that among the active powers connatural to created agents there are some that are instrumental and not principal, such as the power of seed. In this sense, therefore, we correctly say that it is proven from what has been said that there cannot be given a created power which of itself and by its nature is an instrumental power of creating. This is proven because the instrumental power of a creature for physical and real actions is always accidental; but to an accidental power there cannot be connatural a mode of acting through creation, even instrumentally. The major premise is established by induction in all proper

instruments, which are called instruments not only on account of their relation or denomination to some prior agent, but properly on account of their intrinsic mode of acting and the insufficiency of their power for the effect. And moreover it is specially proven in the present case, because if such an instrument were not an accident, it would be some substance. Of what, therefore, would it be an instrument in creation? Not of itself, as is evident; nor of another created substance, because there is none which is a principal agent for creating, and an instrument is spoken of in relation to a principal agent; nor finally of God, because on God's part no instrument is necessary for any creation, as is evident in itself; nor truly can any substance be conceived on the part of the substance itself which by its nature demands to be instituted for this end, that it be an instrument of creation, since that end is very extrinsic and very accidental to the creations of things. Indeed, since substance is being per se, never is the end of any substance connatural to it that it be an instrument for some action, unless such a substance is in some way partial and is compared to that of which it is an instrument as part to whole, and then also it behaves rather as carrying instrumental power than as an instrument through its proper substance.

2. That an accidental power cannot be a natural instrument of creation can be proven by nearly the same reasoning that was made concerning principal power. For the connatural mode of acting ought to be proportioned to the mode of being of the form, whether it acts as principal power or as instrumental, because in both ways action follows upon the natural being itself of the form; but the mode of being with independence from a subject cannot be connatural to an accident; therefore neither can the mode of acting from no subject be connatural; therefore an accident cannot be a power instituted by nature to operate thus even in the manner of an instrument. And this well confirms the reasoning by which St. Thomas, in I, q. 45, a. 5, proves that a creature cannot be an instrument of creation, namely, because a creature cannot be an instrument unless through something

proper to itself it operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent.

3. Therefore, if St. Thomas in that article were speaking only in this sense, namely, concerning an instrument instituted by nature for this action and having connatural instrumental power for creating, there would be no difficulty either in his conclusion or in his reasoning. For what can be objected against that reasoning, that often the action of the instrument is not different from the action of the principal agent, and then the instrument does not operate dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent, but immediately brings it about, as many think concerning the phantasm with respect to the intelligible species, this objection has a fitting solution and interpretation of that principle. For a natural instrument always operates according to something proper to itself, which corresponds proportionally to it in the effect, toward the effect of the principal agent; but it is said to operate dispositively not always with complete rigor and propriety, that is, by inducing a previous disposition really distinct from the effect of the principal agent, but either in this way or because the instrument, according to what is proper to itself, determines the action of the principal agent, which determination can be reduced to the genus of material or dispositive cause, in the way that the phantasm determines the action of the agent intellect to produce such a species. But in neither of these ways can a creature concur toward creation as an instrument by natural power. Not indeed by introducing a previous disposition, because such an action always presupposes a subject which is to be disposed, which is repugnant to creation. Nor by determining through something proper to itself the action of the principal agent, because every created form, according to its proper and connatural mode of acting, has no proportion with action from nothing, and therefore cannot according to something proper to itself determine such an action by concurring to it.

4. This reasoning thus explained can be accommodated also to principal secondary causes, which in that sense can be said to

operate dispositively toward the effects of the first cause, insofar as through their proper powers they determine its action. Nevertheless, in them this reasoning by itself alone will not suffice unless it is supposed to be proven from elsewhere that the powers of secondary causes cannot be by their nature sufficient or proportioned in their genus to produce an effect from nothing, because from this alone can it be proven that they cannot determine the concurrence of the first cause to such an action. Rather, that reasoning, applied to proper instruments and understood in the stated way, supposes it proven that created power cannot be a principal principle of creating. For it is founded maximally on this, that an instrument, as to what it operates dispositively or (so to speak) determinatively through what is proper to itself, so conducts itself as if it were a principal power as to this, which is to operate according to a mode connatural and proportioned to such a nature.

5. Add moreover, if we look only at the discourse of St. Thomas in that article, it does not seem to be able to proceed in another sense, except concerning a connatural instrument. For that principle "an instrument operates dispositively toward the effect of the principal agent through something proper to itself" is not necessary or true in another sense, given the more common doctrine concerning divine instruments supernaturally elevated to works of justification, transubstantiation and the like; for those instruments operate nothing through their proper power toward the effect of the principal agent, as has been treated at length in the first and third volumes of the third part. And this sense is sufficiently confirmed by the proof of that principle, which St. Thomas immediately adds, saying: "If therefore nothing would act there (supply: the instrument) according to what is proper to itself, it would be employed in vain for acting. Nor would it be necessary that there be determinate instruments for determinate actions." For this reasoning is excellent concerning instruments of nature, which are per se ordered, determinate and necessary for their effects. But in divine instruments that proof has no force, because it is

most true that divine instruments are not determinate, but indifferent and as it were universal through obediential power; but they are determined to determinate actions through divine will and elevation or most special concurrence. Therefore such instruments are indeed not necessary; for without them God can equally make the same effects; nevertheless they will not therefore be said to be in vain, because both when they are elevated and assumed, they truly act, and they are not elevated to act without end and reasonable cause.

6. The Master of the Sentences did not assert a natural instrument of creation. But although the reasoning and discourse does not seem to conclude further, nevertheless all disciples and interpreters of St. Thomas understand his opinion more generally, namely that a creature, even as an instrument elevated by divine power, cannot concur to creation. And certainly St. Thomas, when he there attacks the opinion of the Master, signifies this sufficiently. For the Master had not said that a creature could be a natural instrument of creation, but through divine ministry; for he was treating of sacraments insofar as they are divine instruments, as is evident in IV, dist. 5. Hence the same St. Thomas, in III, q. 13, a. 2, expressly distinguishing between the power of nature and the instrument of grace, denies that a creature can be an instrument of creation or annihilation; the same in II cont. Gent., c. 21, and in the same opinion are all theologians who attack the opinion of the Master, such as Albert., Scot., Henric. and Aegid., loc. cit. sect. praecedenti. Nevertheless this controversy, insofar as it pertains to supernatural instrument, must be examined in theology; for I think it cannot be defined from the proper principles of creation.

7. For if it were true that a creature either can in no way be elevated by divine power to do something by true physical action that exceeds its natural power and strength, or only through some power received in itself which has connatural force for such an effect, which many theologians think, and not improbably, if this is true, it is said quite consistently and excellently that a creature cannot be elevated to

be an instrument of creation; but if God can elevate a creature so that through its very entity without anything else superadded it may bring about an effect exceeding its natural power, which I judge far more probable (for thus I think he elevates water to produce grace, and fire to torment spirits, and words to transubstantiate), if this is true, I do not see by what reasoning the consequence can be denied, that God can use one creature as an instrument for creating another. Because neither is a sufficient reason for the difference assigned nor is any special reasoning brought forward by which this is proven impossible.

8. The first part is evident, for the only difference seems to be that creation is not an action from a subject, as other actions are. But this difference is first of all not universal; for transubstantiation also is not an action from a subject[44] as St. Thomas teaches, III, n. 75, a. 8. But that in transubstantiation something is presupposed as remote matter and as terminus from which, or under another similar relation, certainly does not matter so that a created instrument would less repugnantly concur to that action than to creation. Then from that difference is not proven, but is assumed what ought to be proven. For from the fact that creation is action without a subject it is excellently inferred that it cannot be connatural to a creature either as to a principal power or as to an instrument; nevertheless, this notwithstanding, from proportional reasoning to other divine instruments, we contend that this action can be communicated to a created instrument through elevation. For also the action converting the whole substance into the whole substance cannot be connatural to a creature either as to a principal cause or as to an instrument; an action similarly into a spirit, especially because in that there occurs a supernatural quality, cannot be connatural to a body; and yet both are communicated by divine power through elevation; therefore the same is true of the other action.

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[44] Haec est sententia Magistri in IV, q. 5, quam secutus est D. Thomas, ibi, q. 1, a. 3, quaestiunc. 3, ad 4, et eamdem defendit In II, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3; Gabr, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, a. 3, dub. 3.

9. Inconveniences brought by some against the instrument of creation are refuted. But the second part will be established easily by applying the reasonings made concerning principal power and concerning connatural instrument, and by considering that they do not proceed concerning an instrument through elevation. For what some say follows, namely that such an instrument would have infinite power and perfection, does not follow at all; for the action of this instrument is not attended to from its perfection, but from the perfection of the first agent and the obediential power of the instrument. Hence in this order of instruments a more perfect thing is not necessary for a more perfect effect or action. Nor can that gradation be made here that for producing a thing of greater power, a greater power is required; for with the same instrument God can educe a form from a subject however resistant. Finally, the same reasoning could be made concerning the instrument of transubstantiation; for also for transubstantiating by proper or connatural power, infinite perfection is required.

10. Again, what others say follows does not press, that something could be assumed as an instrument for creating itself. For first we deny that this follows in rigor and propriety; for in order that something be a physical instrument, it must necessarily be supposed as existing, and therefore its creation is presupposed, for which it could not have been an instrument. But that reasoning would have some force against those who say that a non-existing thing can be a physical instrument; but we consider that opinion improbable. Therefore, although from the force of creation it does not repugn that any creature whatsoever be made through a created instrument, nevertheless, from the condition presupposed and prerequisite for acting, it repugns that the same thing be an instrument of its first creation. This is evident by arguing in similar form concerning the instrument of generation or eduction; for no one will deny that God can use grace existing in Peter to produce grace in Paul; but he will deny that he can use it to produce itself, not on account of the

repugnance of such instrumental action taken per se, but on account of the aforesaid presupposition of existence for acting. Therefore, if it is true that the same thing can be produced twice or by two total actions truly and properly terminated to its being, there is no inconvenience in conceding that the same thing already created can concur effectively to its recreation, just as the humanity of Christ concurs effectively to the transubstantiation of bread into itself; concerning which elsewhere. Finally, proceeding in the same way through the reasonings made above, it will easily be established that the objections do not have place in this kind of concurrence or effecting through obediential power.

11. Whether there is some action proper to God, such that it cannot be communicated to any creature. But some consider it a great inconvenience that there be no action ad extra which God cannot communicate to creatures, for if there were any, it would be maximally creation. But I neither consider the consequence necessary, nor the consequent rightly understood to be an inconvenience. For someone could say that the action by which hypostatic union is made is loftier and more incommunicable to a creature; likewise that in the treasures of divine power there are other modes of actions which by other titles surpass creation; for although creation is first of all and as it were the foundation of others, it is nevertheless not the greatest of all. Again, it is one thing to speak of actions, another of things which are made through actions; speaking therefore of things made, there is no inconvenience that God can act through a creature, as through an instrument, whatever he can do by his power alone; rather this pertains to the efficacy of divine power, just as on the contrary it also pertains to the same efficacy that God cannot make any thing through a creature which he cannot make by himself alone. But speaking of actions, many are so proper to God that they cannot be from a creature, just as is the very action of creating by principal power alone. But this is not proper to God; for also the action of a creature, as such, cannot be done without it nor through another creature. The reason

for this matter we will explain in the following section, where we will also touch upon another reason on account of which others say that an instrument of creation is impossible, and we will show it to be ineffective.

SECTION IV

WHETHER CREATION IS SOMETHING IN THE CREATURE DISTINCT BY THE NATURE OF THE THING FROM THE CREATURE ITSELF

1. Thus far we have spoken almost exclusively about the power of creating, and at the same time we have explained its effect, insofar as it is the object or terminus toward which that power has a relation, at least according to our mode of conceiving; it remains for us to speak about the action itself or creation, what it is.

Various Opinions

2. First Opinion. In this matter I find there can be three ways of speaking. The first is that creation in the nature of action is not something in the creature, but exists in the creator himself as the very act of the divine will or divine command by which he produces things externally. I say in the nature of action, for in the nature of relation, which presupposes action already terminated and results from its terminus, creation is said to be something in the creature, namely, a certain real relation to the creator. This is considered to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 3, whom Cajetan and other Thomists thus interpret. St. Thomas's reasoning is that creation is not change; therefore nothing can exist in the creature except relation. The antecedent is evident, because change is about some subject, as is clear from the definition of motion; but creation is not about a subject, as is also clear from its definition touched upon above. St. Thomas proves

the first consequence, I, q. 45, a. 2, because action and passion agree in the substance of motion and differ according to diverse relations to the agent or patient, from III Physics, text 20. Therefore, with motion removed from creation, nothing can remain except relation, either of the creature to the creator or of the creator to the creature.

3. Second, because creation cannot be formally transient action; therefore it is formally immanent in the creator and can be called virtually or eminently transient, because it has the power of placing an effect externally, which fits excellently with an act of the divine will or command. The consequence is clear, because between those two members there is no middle term. The antecedent is proved, because transient action is an accident, and consequently necessarily requires a subject; but creation does not require a subject; therefore it cannot be an accident; therefore it cannot be transient action.

4. Whence I argue third, for every action is by nature prior to its terminus; therefore creation is also by nature prior to the created thing; therefore it cannot be in the created thing, but in the creator. This last consequence is evident, because it is impossible to understand creation as action outside God and prior to the created thing, because in that prior state it is not understood in what or how it exists, and action cannot be conceived, as action, in itself alone and as if subsisting through itself.

5. Fourth, the Thomists argue because not only creation, but no action of the divine power with respect to that [effect] can be transient, nor can there ever be given an action mediating between God's power and its effect, which is distinct from God's power; therefore much less can this be given in creation. The antecedent is proved first, because the divine power is intimately present in every one of its effects; therefore it immediately and through itself produces every one of its effects, and not through some mediating action. Second, because otherwise God's power would be not only the principle of its effect, but also of its action, which nevertheless St. Thomas denies, I, q. 25, a. 1, ad 3. Third, because transient action is the

complement of active power; but God cannot have complement of his power in a creature, otherwise he would depend on it; therefore [the conclusion follows].

6. Second Opinion. The second opinion is that creation is something outside God, yet in reality is not something distinct from the creature which is created, and thus is not properly in it except according to reason, but really and essentially is the very creature itself, namely that the creation of man is the very essence of man, and the creation of an angel the essence of an angel, and so of others. This opinion, in order to place creation in the created thing, is founded on this: that action, as action, must necessarily be in its terminus, either through identity or in some other way, because action is nothing but the dependence and emanation of the effect from the cause; but dependence must necessarily be in the thing which depends. This principle we shall prove extensively below, for it is most true. But in order to affirm that this opinion holds that creation is distinguished in no way except according to reason from the created thing, it can first be founded on the general proposition that no action is distinguished in reality from its terminus, but only by reason. And in this way this opinion can be attributed to the nominalists, who do not posit an action mediating according to reality between effect and cause, as can be seen in Ockham, In II, q. 9, and Gregory, In II, dist. 1, q. 4 and 5, who in q. 6 adds that creation is in the creature, or rather is the creature itself.

7. Second, this opinion can be founded on the special nature of creation, namely, that it is action from nothing, and therefore cannot be an accident, but substance or in the manner of substance, if perhaps a separated accident is created[45]. And to confirm this, this opinion can be aided by the arguments of the prior opinion, especially the third. And it can be confirmed, because if creation were something in the creature distinct from it and as if mediating between it and God, whatever that thing might be, it would be something created and

[45] Guliel. de Rubion, In II, dist. 1, q. 1.

made; for it would be distinct from God and flowing from him; therefore it would be necessary to distinguish its creation from it, and thus one would proceed to infinity, or if one must stop somewhere, let it stop at the first creature. And to confirm this, the arguments can be valuable by which Scotus, In II, dist. 1, q. 5, attempts to prove that passive creation (he speaks of relation) is not a thing distinct from the creature, which Capreolus there reports and resolves, q. 2.

8. Third, this opinion can be founded on the essential nature of creature as such; for it is of the essence of a creature that it depend on the first being; therefore the dependence by which it depends both is in the creature itself and is not other than its essence. But this first and essential dependence of participated being on being through essence is creation; therefore creation both is in the creature itself and is not other than its essence, whence it can no more be distinguished from it than the essence of any thing from itself. The first antecedent is evident, because just as it is of the essence of the first being to be through essence, and consequently to be from itself and not from another, so it is of the essence of every other being to be being through participation, and consequently to be dependent on another. The first consequence is proved, because to depend is something intrinsic to the creature; therefore it belongs through something intrinsic; but it belongs through dependence. Again, if the formal effect is essential, so also is the form; but to depend is as it were the formal effect of dependence; therefore if the creature is essentially dependent, dependence itself is of its essence. Therefore this is maximally true of the first and most immutable dependence; but such is creation, because, as we were saying above, this is the first emanation of participable being from being through essence, and through this any creature can exist from God alone.

9. From this foundation, however, it is inferred (speaking consequently according to this opinion) that in every created thing there is included some dependence on God, altogether immutable and inseparable from the created thing itself, both because what is

essential is immutable, and also because what is not distinct in a thing is not separable while that thing remains (for thus we speak). Whence it follows, second, that this dependence is from God alone; for every dependence of one creature on another is separable from the creature, especially speaking of created things, not of modes of things; for in this way it is true that God can do by himself alone whatever he does through a creature, or with it, or in it, or from it. And thus every dependence on a creature in any genus of cause is accidental and mutable, but dependence on God alone is essential and immutable. Third, it is inferred that this dependence on God alone is most properly creation, since it includes no order to material cause. Fourth, from this there seems to be given the best reason why a creature cannot concur in creation, even in the manner of an instrument, because by the very fact that it would depend on another creature it would not be essential to the other creature, and thus it would no longer be creation.

10. Third Opinion. The third opinion is that creation is something in the created thing, not indeed really distinct from it as having its own entity, but distinct by the nature of the thing as its mode. This opinion, as to that part concerning the existence of creation in the creature, is quite common. Gabriel holds it, in the cited location; Aureolus, cited by Capreolus, In II, dist. 1, q. 2, in the argument against the first conclusion; Ockham, In I, dist. 43, q. 1; Thomas of Strasbourg, In II, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1; Giles, In II, dist. 1, p. I, q. 3, a. 2, and in De Esse et essentia, q. 7; all of which authors also sufficiently explain and declare that creation is not a thing altogether distinct from the created thing; sometimes they also call it passive creation and the dependence of the creature on God; they also call it active creation or transient action. But they do not sufficiently explain the modal distinction; indeed Giles and some others seem to deny it. In favor of this opinion could be cited St. Thomas, In I, dist. 40, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, where he calls creation transient action and equates it with heating; nevertheless St. Thomas there speaks very ambiguously; for

in every transient action he seems to place the action formally in the agent, but in the patient only effectively or in the manner of passion, and thus Deza interprets him, In I, dist. 27, q. 1, notab. 1. Whence also Cajetan, I, q. 25, a. 1, says that if in God the executive power is rationally distinct from intellect and will, it cannot be denied that creation is transient action, and nevertheless he says that action is not something distinct from the essence of God, because he universally holds that transient action is formally in the agent. Therefore this ambiguity of expressions must be avoided.

Resolution of the Question

11. Among these opinions, this last one, as it has been proposed, seems true to me; but in order that we may clarify the matter, and begin from those things which seem more certain, it must be said first that the dependence of a creature on God is something really and intrinsically existing in the creature. This assertion seems sufficiently proven in the third opinion, and I have read no one who denies it under these terms, and all concede it in equivalent expressions. For all confess that passive creation is in the creature, not only insofar as it signifies a resulting relation (for that indeed is nothing), but insofar as it expresses passive emanation or the becoming of the creature from God, whether these are distinguished in reality or by reason, for we are not now dealing with this; but dependence is nothing other than passive emanation or creation, speaking of the first dependence on God alone, with which we are now dealing. The reason is that for a creature to depend is not an extrinsic denomination in the creature, but rather in God it is an extrinsic denomination that the creature depends on him; but the creature is called dependent from dependence; therefore dependence is something in the creature itself, and not only in God. Also because the dependence which light has from the sun is something in the light itself, and the same is true in any effect with respect to a created cause,

according to the mode of dependence which it has from that cause, whether only in being made or also in being conserved. And by the same reason, if God alone were to illuminate the air, the dependence of that light on God would be something in the light itself; for there is the same reason as concerning dependence on the sun, or perhaps greater; therefore also that dependence by which a creature according to its whole self depends on God is something in the creature itself. The consequence is clear, because if in other effects dependence is something in them, this is because dependence expresses a mode or condition of the effect, not of the cause; but this reason proceeds equally or more in total dependence.

12. The dependence of a creature on God is distinct in reality from the creature itself. I say secondly: this dependence of the creature on the creator is not entirely the same as the creature which is the term of that dependence or creation, but is something in the creature, distinguished from it in reality. This is proven first by parity of reasoning, by an induction made in all other dependencies of effects on their efficient causes; for in all of them action, and consequently also dependence, is distinguished by the nature of the thing from its term, as was touched upon above and will be treated ex professo below in its proper category; therefore also the dependence of creation will be distinguished in reality from its term; for it differs from others only because it is dependence on an efficient cause without the concurrence of matter or subject; but this difference is irrelevant to removing the distinction, as will be evident from what is to be said and will become clearer from the solutions to the arguments. Secondly it is proven, because this dependence is changeable and variable in the creature, while the same thing that is made remains; therefore they are distinguished in reality. The consequence is founded on the principle treated above, disp. VII, sect. 2, where we showed this to be a certain sign of distinction, either real or at least modal, if from two real extremes one can be in reality without the other. And this is the principal indication by which in other actions we prove that action is

distinguished in reality from its term. But the antecedent is proven, because that dependence by which God now conserves quantity without a subject in the Sacrament is distinct from that by which he conserved the same quantity in the substance of bread; for the former depended on matter, but the latter not at all, but is by the mode of creation; therefore if God were to create quantity outside a subject from the beginning, and afterwards unite it to a subject and conserve it dependently on that subject, the same quantity would remain without the prior dependence of creation; for that two total dependencies should remain there simultaneously is improbable, as I shall show below; therefore the dependence of creation is separable from the created term. What therefore appears in this example must be understood in every creation, both because the reason is the same, and also because if there seems to be any difficulty in this, it intervenes in every creation; and if it ceases in any thing, it also ceases in all.

13. The conclusion is proven by examples. We cannot, however, adduce examples in the ordinary mode of creation of substances, because such creation is done by God alone always and by the nature of the thing, and whatever is properly created by God from nothing is perpetually conserved by the same action, as will be said below, because the nature of the thing demands this. Nevertheless, from this no argument of complete identity and inseparability can be taken; for it suffices that, with a miracle or supernatural work intervening, the dependence can be varied concerning the same creature, because this very thing could not happen without some distinction in reality. But that this can happen through miracle can be declared (besides the argument made), according to the probable opinion that a creature can be an instrument of creation; for then God can create the same thing, either by himself alone or through an instrument, and then the dependencies are diverse concerning the same thing; for when he creates through an instrument, the dependence is far different than if it were from God alone; for through that dependence the effect depends simultaneously on God and on

the created instrument, which cannot be understood without a new and distinct dependence. For when an effect is made by God through a secondary cause, whether principal or instrumental, there are not two dependencies there, one from God alone, which always remains, another from the creature, which is changed, as we shall show in the course of this section and repeat often in the two following disputations; therefore it is necessary that the whole dependence be varied concerning the same thing. Wherefore, since it is probable that when worms are generated, or flesh from consecrated species, the same individual prime matter which was previously in the bread is again created under those forms, and it is also probable that it is created through Christ's humanity as an instrument, then, although the prime matter which is created is the same as it was before, nevertheless its dependence is different for the stated reason. And finally, if God were to annihilate one angel and afterwards create it again, the dependence would not need to be numerically the same as it was before, for although God can do this, there is no reason why we should say it is necessary; for if the same light successively depends on different agents through different dependencies, why cannot God make the same angel successively depend on him through different dependencies? All these things therefore sufficiently show that there is some distinction in reality between the dependence of a creature and its term.

14. The a priori reason for the conclusion. Third, there is an a priori reason, because this dependence is not of the essence of the depending substance, quality, or quantity, but is a certain way to it. This is clear from the very nature of substance, and the same is true of others; for substance, although it is created, in its essence is something absolute and only essentially includes being per se, and in the species of substance the essential nature is understood to be completed through similar absolute differences, without that transcendental relation which actual dependence essentially includes. And this could be confirmed, because it is not of the essence of a creature to actually

exist; therefore neither to actually depend; this inference has force according to the opinion which distinguishes existence from essence as actually created; according to our opinion, however, it has less efficacy. But that this actual dependence is not essential will be proven more widely and efficaciously below against the second opinion, from the inconveniences which follow from it, in that it does not correctly declare the essential dependence which a creature has on its creator.

15. The dependence of a creature on God is a mode distinguished by nature from the creature itself. I say third: this dependence which is in the creature is not a thing entirely really distinct from the term of creation, nor is it only a relation resulting from the term of creation, but is a certain mode distinguished by nature from the term itself. In all these things we compare creation to all other dependencies, in which all those things are almost certain, and from them a sufficiently efficacious argument is taken by induction and similarity, because the difference that action is from a subject or not from a subject is irrelevant to all these things, as is easily clear from what has been said and will become more evident from the solutions to the arguments. And besides I prove each point briefly. And in the first part indeed there is no controversy, both because it is superfluous to imagine that entity, since a distinct mode suffices for all the things we have said, and also because the second foundation of the second opinion proceeds efficaciously against such an entity, and finally because that entity cannot be a substance distinct per se; for who would understand or imagine it? or who would say that God cannot create one substance alone? and similar inconveniences can easily be inferred from that position. Nor is it a proper entity which would be an accidental form, since it is neither in a subject nor can an accident be intrinsically terminated to give substantial being; it remains therefore that it is a mode, which is what we intend.

16. The second part concerning the resulting relation, whether it is a thing, or a mode distinguished by nature from the creature, or not, in the way it is said to be resulting, cannot be the

dependence of which we are now speaking, because it is founded on the dependence itself; for it can have no other foundation or reason for founding, from those things which Aristotle enumerated, V Metaph., c. 15, text. 20. And it is clear, because therefore the creature is referred to God, because it depends on him. Also, because relation is by nature posterior to the created thing and is subjected in it as in its proper subject; but dependence is by order of nature prior not only to the relation, but also to the created thing, at least under some aspect, namely, because the way is prior to the term and becoming to having been made. Third finally, because this relation is said to result when the foundation and term are posited; but dependence does not result from the term, but rather is the way to it or its emanation from God. It remains therefore that it is only a certain mode modally distinguished from the creature which depends. Which finally that sign of distinction by nature which we adduced above confirms very well. For, although a creature and its dependence are so compared that this same creature can remain with the dependence or creation varied, nevertheless conversely this creation or dependence cannot remain without carrying its intrinsic term with itself, because it is essentially the becoming or being conserved of such a term; therefore it is a sign that only modal distinction intervenes between them.

17. I say fourth: this dependence does not have the true nature of change; it has however the true nature of a way or becoming of the creature, and thus is called passive creation; it also has the true nature of emanation from God and, insofar as it is from him, can truly and properly be called the action of God himself, formally transient, by which he produces the creature. In order that the whole conclusion may be understood, I suppose that in action which is made from a subject these three things are joined, which are distinguished by us in relation and denomination, not however in reality, even by modal distinction, namely, the becoming of the term, the action of the agent, and the passion or change of the subject; for the same mode of dependence, with respect to the form which it induces, is called

becoming or the way to it, with respect to the agent it is called its action, and with respect to what suffers it is called change or passion. Of these three therefore this last has no place in creation. And this is the first part of the assertion, which St. Thomas correctly taught by denying that creation is change, and the same is proven at length by Gregory sup., concl. 2, in which for this reason he rightly says that although every passion is action or has action conjoined, nevertheless conversely not every action brings passion, because action does not always concern a subject or something that suffers; but passion cannot be understood without something suffering, nor change without something changeable. Since therefore the dependence of creation does not presuppose any subject from which it is made, it cannot have the true nature of passion or change.

18. You will say: the creature itself is changed when it is created, for it is otherwise than before; whence it is referred to God by a new relation, not indeed through a change of God, but of the creature itself, according to the doctrine of Augustine, V de Trinit., c. ult. It is easily answered that change is sometimes said properly, and thus is said only of a subject which preexists in duration (or, according to some, in order of nature) and through action is otherwise than it was before. And in this sense we deny that creation is change, and it would be said more clearly that it is not passion. Sometimes however change is said more broadly of every action or effection which posits some novelty in the effect, and thus it will be said that through generation not only matter is changed, but the generated thing; and in this sense creation can be called change, though less properly, because the thing which is created is not said properly to be otherwise than before, because before it was nothing, but should be said to have being simply which it did not have before.

19. From this reason and response however it is understood that there is place in creation for that relation of way to term which is usually called passive becoming. For first such a way or becoming from its formal nature does not express a relation to a subject, but only to a

term; therefore from its precise nature it does not conflict with creation. Then such becoming in other effections is nothing other than the dependence of the effect on the cause, insofar as it is a certain tendency toward the effect. But all this is found in this dependence of creation. Moreover, because in everything that has been changed, there intervenes changing; therefore in everything that has been made, there intervenes becoming. Especially because this very thing, namely to have been newly made, is in some way to have been changed, at least speaking broadly, as we said.

20. To the dependence of a creature on God the nature of active creation truly belongs. Finally from this the last part of the assertion is easily shown, namely that to this dependence of the creature, insofar as it expresses a relation to the divine power from which it flows, belongs the proper nature of action or active creation. In which part the dissension among authors concerning the present question seems principally placed. It must be taken care however that we do not contend only about the name. For this question depends on that philosophical one, whether transient action is formally in the agent or in what suffers, which we shall treat below in its proper category. Now I only advise that among those who place transient action in the agent, some place it as a certain absolute mode including a transcendental respect coming newly to the active power when it acts and actuating it. And those who think thus about transient action speak consistently enough in denying such action in God; for it would be a great imperfection in him. Nevertheless that mode of explaining transient action is not only against Aristotle and the more serious philosophers, but also plainly improbable, as being contrived without foundation or reason, since it can scarcely be understood. Others therefore who place transient action in the agent say nothing is in it except a real relation resulting in it from the production of the effect. And these also consistently deny transient action to God, because real relations do not result in God from his effects. These however would perhaps say consistently that action in God is a relation of reason,

which how improbable it is in itself is sufficiently evident. And similarly that opinion rests on a foundation of little probability; for that relation, if it results in the created agent, presupposes the effect already produced; how therefore will it be action? But if it does not result, but is said to be made as it were per se and primarily by the acting power itself, as some Scotists imagine, it is a mere fiction and without foundation. Finally others, also placing transient action in the agent, say it is not something new absolute or respective in reality distinct from the power and added to it, but is the power itself as conjoined in act to its effect, or connoting that the effect actually depends on it. And these will not be burdened to concede transient action also in God himself, indeed they will speak consistently. But these place transient action in the agent in name only, and therefore we do not now dispute with them.

21. An objection is satisfied. We suppose therefore with Arist., IX Metaph., text. 16, that actions which have a term made outside the agent cause are in the very thing that suffers or the term, and not in the agent. And according to this opinion we say that the dependence of the creature, as it is a certain flow from God, has the true nature of transient action. And it is proven first, because in the heating by fire and all similar things, the dependence by which heat is made in what suffers is action of the heat existing in the fire for no other reason than because it is a certain flow of heat emanating from it; but the dependence by which a creature is made by God is a certain flow emanating from God himself; therefore it has the true nature of action. Some say it does not suffice for the nature of action that it be a flow from active power, but it is required that it be the actuality and complement of it. But this response seems to consist only in words, because no active power as such receives complement or actuality from action, but only exercises its actuality; but this exercising is not to actuate itself, but to reduce another to act, which also belongs to God. For in any merely active power there is only extrinsic denomination; for active powers actuate themselves by immanent

action, not however insofar as they are only active, but insofar as they are also passive.

22. Whence I argue secondly: for what prevents this flow of creation, as from God, from having the true nature of action? For either the lack of a subject prevents it, because action ought by order of nature to precede the thing made; and this does not, because as to this there is the same reason concerning that dependence as it is passive becoming; whence, just as according to the relation of dependence or way it can precede in its genus, even if it does not inhere in a subject, it will also be able to in the nature of action; and both will become clearer from the solutions to the arguments; or the perfection of the divine power prevents it; and this does not, because transient action does not perfect the power from which it flows, but rather whatever perfections it has, it receives from the power; therefore it no more derogates from the more perfect divine power that transient action flows from it than that the effects themselves flow from it. But that action mediates between effect and power no more derogates from the perfection of God's power than that dependence mediates, and both comes from the limitation and potentiality of the effects themselves. Finally, even if we freely grant that, with respect to some created power, transient action can be called an extrinsic complement or perfection of it, because such power is by its nature ordered and instituted for such action, nevertheless it is not necessary to attribute this to action emanating from God's power, because this power is such that it is not from itself ordered to action, but only from the fullness of its perfection can have it. Which by a certain participation also belongs to some principles of acting in created things, as was touched upon above and will be said more widely below when disputing about powers. It is not therefore of the nature of transient action as such that it be a perfection of active power, even in that extrinsic and improper way.

23. Third I argue because God's active power ad extra, speaking formally, is neither intellect nor will, but executive power

distinct in nature from them, as we shall show below when disputing about God's attributes; therefore the action of such power cannot be formally immanent, because only intellect and will act immanently in an immaterial thing; but executive power is immediately active ad extra. Therefore the act of God's will is not the very action by which he acts ad extra, since it is only the application of executive power to acting. Rather, even if someone holds that God's will is the proximate power of acting ad extra, he will not correctly say that God's volition, according to what it really is in itself, is the action by which it produces ad extra; for rather it is the very principle of acting ad extra, because it is the very formal perfection of God's will, which in him is rather by way of act than by way of power receptive of its act; but the principle of acting ad extra never enters (so to speak) the action itself, since such action flows from such a principle. But the relation of reason which is understood to be added to the free act of God's will as willing the thing which he produces ad extra cannot have the nature of real action, since that is nothing, but this is true and real production or making, from which God is denominated maker of heaven and earth. And the same reason can be applied to the intellect, even if executive power is placed in it. Whence Scotus correctly, In IV, dist. 1, q. 1, § Ista ergo, generally proves that an act of intellect or will cannot be productive of a term as action, but only as principle, because productive action and what is produced are in the same. In which he openly favors this opinion, although In II, dist. 1, q. 5, and in other places, he seems to think otherwise.

The Foundations of Other Opinions Are Solved

24. Whether action includes motion and relation. To the first reason of the first opinion it is responded by conceding the antecedent, namely that creation is not change, but denying the consequence, namely that it is not action; for it is negative from inferior to superior; for action extends more widely than change. But

when it is said that action includes the substance of motion and relation, if this is understood of the precise nature of action (as the argument seems to require) the assumption is false; for it only includes the substance of flow or dependence with transcendental relation to the principle from which it flows. But if that proposition is understood of action with motion, or presupposing a subject, thus as to both parts it can be well or badly understood; for if we speak really or identically, it is true that such action is the very substance of motion; nevertheless it does not have this from the fact that it is action, but from the fact that it is such action, namely, because it is from a subject; according to precision however and formal concepts it is not true, because motion as such expresses the act of something movable, which action as action does not express, and therefore although the nature of motion or change is removed, there can remain the substance of flow or dependence, which suffices for the nature of action. Similarly, when it is said that relation conjoined to the substance of motion is of the nature of action, this can be understood either of categorical relation resulting, either in the acting cause or in the made effect, and thus the proposition is false, because action is not an aggregate from categorical relation and from motion; also, because action is prior as the reason of founding such relation. Or it can be understood of the transcendental relation of the very emanation or dependence to its principle, and thus the assumed proposition is true, but nevertheless it is not correctly inferred from this that, with change removed, there remains only categorical relation, either of effect to cause, or of cause to effect; for there can still remain the transcendental relation of the very dependence from its principle, although it be dependence without subject and without proper change. All of which seem so clear per se that it is scarcely believable that St. Thomas used that reason to conclude that creation is only a categorical relation resulting in the made creature. And therefore some try to explain it of transcendental relation, so that by it he understood that dependence which we said is in the creature from the creator. For

this manner of speaking is not unusual with St. Thomas; for III, q. 2, he often calls union a relation, and never distinguishes between categorical relation and the mode of union, although nevertheless it cannot be denied that there is given that mode including transcendental relation to the things to be united. This exposition is therefore probable, but nevertheless it cannot be accommodated to all the expressions of St. Thomas, as is clear from the solutions to the arguments, a. 3, q. 44, I.

25. Creation is formally transient action. To the second the antecedent is denied; for creation is formally transient action, not that it passes from one subject into another, as Deza seems to attack above, but that it effectively exits from the agent and is in the term, and therefore is said to pass to it. But it is asked in that argument whether this creative action is an accident. In which Aegidius and others affirm; for it is univocally action, and consequently is of the category of action, which is one of the categories of accidents. Nor does it conflict that an accident be the way to substance, because substantial generation also has this; and by this very fact that it is called a way, something imperfect and being of being is said. But when the subject of this accident is asked, they respond that it is the very term; for although in one genus, namely of term, it is posterior, nevertheless in the genus of subjective cause it can be prior by nature. But this last is difficult for me to believe; first, because I do not think creation has a material cause; therefore neither can it have a subjective cause, for they are the same. The antecedent is clear, because this is the most powerful difference of creative action from all others, that it is made from the force of the agent alone without the concurrence of matter or subject. Second, because I do not understand that the term of a way can be prior to the way itself under some aspect including real existence. Which I add because of the reason of end, under which the term is prior by nature, because the final cause as such does not prerequire real existence; but the subjective cause intrinsically prerequires real existence; therefore the term cannot be

preunderstood by order of nature of its way under that aspect, because it has no real being which has not arrived at it through that way.

26. Whether creation is an accident, and of what subject. Wherefore it seems it can be responded more easily that action as action does not require a subject of inherence, but a principle from which it flows, because action as action does not express a relation to that in which, but to that from which; for thence it comes that action as action confers no formal denomination to what suffers, but only to the agent. Nevertheless this response, although it may be able to satisfy concerning action as action, nevertheless concerning passive creation or dependence as such there still remains a difficulty, because becoming as such does not express a relation to the principle, but to the thing which depends or becomes, and therefore concerning it as such it is necessary to explain in what subject it is. Whence the difficulty about action can again be urged; for although action as action does not regard a subject of inherence, nevertheless in the thing itself it must always have some subject of inherence.

27. In what category creation is placed. Many therefore deny that this dependence which is creation is an accident, asserting that it is a substantial mode of the thing which is created, which reductively pertains to the category of substance, because it is nothing other than the very substance according as it is in becoming and as it were in an imperfect state. And this can be confirmed, for motion for this reason is not placed by Aristotle in any category, but is reduced to the category of its term, which must be understood of motion precisely as it is the way to the term, because, as it is action or passion, it is placed in its categories, because as such it is compared by way of form to the agent or sufferer; nevertheless, as way it is not properly compared to the term as form, but only as imperfect to perfect. Thus therefore passive creation insofar as it is the way to a substantial term is reduced to the category of substance; but it does not have the nature of passion, because it is not in a subject. Whence insofar as that becoming is conceived as prior by nature to its term, it must be

conceded that it is not in a subject, but is conceived as it were in itself, which is not inconvenient, but rather this is the singular excellence and mode of dependence of the creature. But in the same instant of time in which it is made it is through intimate conjunction and a certain identity in the very term not as in a subject, but according to a special and proper relation by which the way regards the term; in which priority of nature on the part of the term is not required, because it does not require true causality, but mere termination. Just as heating both is in the thing which is heated and in the heat which is made, in the former as in a subject of inherence, which it presupposes, in the latter however as in a formal term, to which it tends, and therefore does not presuppose it, but brings it with itself and is identified with it. Thus therefore in the dependence of the creature, with the order to a subject removed, which it does not have, there remains the relation to the term, in which it is not as in a subject, but by another special and proper nature, as a certain mode of it. For this is common to many other modes, that they have their proper nature of affecting, as is evident concerning the mode of union and the mode of subsistence, as we shall see below.

28. Whence it can consequently be said that that creative dependence, as it has the nature of action, is not accidental action, of which kind is that which needs a subject, but is substantial action, and therefore is not placed in the category of action, but is reduced to the category of substance. Or it can also be added that in the categories of accidents are placed not only those things which are true and proper accidents, having true inherence in a subject, but also many things which imitate the mode of accidents in denomination and as it were extrinsic or intrinsic information, like habits, containing place, and similar things, and perhaps action as action universally is so related; thus therefore in the present case it can be said that, although the dependence of creation in itself is a certain substantial mode, nevertheless through respect to the agent it takes on the mode of accident, and this is sufficient for it to be placed in the category of

action. This response is probable, but the former seems truer, as I said in the III tome of the III part, disp. L, sect. 5. From which things there is also a response to the third argument of the same first opinion.

29. Every transient action is of God. To the fourth it is responded that the antecedent is false, namely, that there is no transient action with respect to God; rather every transient action is action of God himself; for if it is from a creature, it is from God through general concurrence, so that one indivisible action is the same of the creature and of God. Whence it happens that not only every transient action of a created agent is also transient with respect to the uncreated, because it flows outside both, but also every immanent action of a created agent is transient with respect to God, because, as it is from God, it flows outside him. Nor can it be said that these actions are not compared to God as actions, but as effects, both because this is said gratuitously, since the relation to both agents is of the same kind, and also because that action tends to a further term, whence from both agents it is as a certain flow to the term, and this is to be action. Finally because there is no action to action. And by the same reasons a fortiori it is concluded that when God acts by himself alone from a presupposed subject, there intervenes transient action of God; for who would believe that heating or illumination made by fire or sun is action, but not that made by God alone? or that this has something less in reality than that? or if it has nothing less in reality, that it is not equally true action?

30. God when he acts, always acts through mediate action. To the first proof therefore of that antecedent it is responded that from the intimate presence of God it is only concluded that God acts in all things by immediacy of power and supposit, not however without mediate action; for this does not intervene because of distance of the agent, but because it is his formal causality, which must always be in the effect. To the second it is responded by conceding the consequence; for God's executive power truly is the principle of its effect and its action; for it is of the nature of transient action that it

really flow from its power; but St. Thomas, in the cited place, either speaks according to the first opinion, or speaks of God's power with respect to immanent act, which also is the cause of effects ad extra. To the third it has already been said how action as such is not the true complement of active power, or if this is attributed to some in a broad way, nevertheless it is not of the nature of action as such.

31. To the foundations of the second opinion, insofar as they persuade that dependence is not distinguished by nature from the term, it must be said first that this taken universally of every action and its term is false, as was touched upon above in explaining the causality of efficient cause, and will also be said below in treating of the category of action. Then it is denied that there is a special reason in this regarding creation, and that dependence is less distinguished from the term in it than in other actions, as has been sufficiently proven in the above, and it has been declared how this distinction is not prevented by the fact that creation is production from nothing. Nor does a process to infinity follow, for the same could be inferred in any action; for any action in its way is an effect of the agent from which it flows, nevertheless it is not made or flows through another action, because it does not flow as effect, but as flow and dependence itself. Thus therefore creation in a broad way can be called creature, insofar as it also is made from nothing by God; nevertheless it is not creature simply, as a made thing and term of God's effection, but as the very dependence and effection, and therefore another creation is not necessary for it, because its essential nature is that it be dependence, and therefore another dependence is not necessary for it. This response is also taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 2. And hence it is that, although a creature can change dependence on this or that agent, nevertheless in the dependence itself the relation to this or that agent cannot change unless the dependence is changed, because through itself and not through another dependence it expresses intrinsic relation to such an agent.

32. To the third part of those arguments, it is responded that a creature can be understood to be a being essentially dependent on God in two ways. In one way, that the actual dependence itself is of the essence of the creature, and thus this is not true except of the actual dependence alone, which is established to be its own modal essence. But this is not of the essence of that creature of which it is a mode and dependence, since it has been shown to be something separable from it; and in this sense the entire argument proceeds, which therefore concludes nothing. In another way, therefore, it must be understood that a creature is a being essentially dependent on God, because it is indeed a being of such nature and essence that it cannot exist without some dependence on God. And this sense is most true, and is proven excellently from the nature of participated being. From this, however, it does not follow that the actual dependence itself is of the essence, but only that condition or imperfection on account of which such a nature requires dependence to be essential. This is evident because, although it is of the essence of a creature that it depends on God, it is not however that it depends on God alone, or (which is the same thing) that it depends through a dependence expressing a relation to God alone, although it can also depend sufficiently through such a dependence; therefore it does not determine for itself essentially a certain dependence, but only a condition or need of dependence.

33. Certain conclusions of the second opinion are refuted. And from this it is established, first, that the first conclusion of that opinion is false, for a thing which is properly created does not determine for itself some determinate dependence that is entirely immutable and inseparable, as we have proven. Second, it is established that the second and third conclusions of that opinion are also false, because even dependence on God alone is not essential or entirely immutable in every created thing. Otherwise all things, both forms and accidents, would depend on God now and always through some essential and immutable dependence regarding God alone, because they are by themselves apt to depend in this way, and this

could be sufficient for their existence, and finally because they are true creatures producible from nothing. From which it further follows, first, that in every production of forms true creation is mixed in, contrary to those things which have been proven above, and which St. Thomas teaches in I, q. 45, a. 8. It follows, second, that created agents either do nothing or act accidentally, or at least do not attain by efficient causation the forms themselves, whether substantial or accidental, but at most their modes or unions, and that God alone creates all forms. Whence it further follows, third, that there is no natural reason why some forms should rather cease to be through separation from a subject than the rational soul; all of which are contrary to true philosophy and sound doctrine, as I have treated more extensively in the third tome of the third part, disputation IX, section 1, toward the end.

34. And from what has been said here and there, it is sufficiently established that the fourth conclusion of that opinion is also false; for that reasoning which infers from essential and immutable dependence that no instrument of creation can be given rests on a false foundation; indeed it openly begs the question, for it supposes that it is of the nature of creation to be dependence on God alone, which was what needed to be proven. Add that the authors of that opinion are compelled to posit in generable things simultaneously two dependencies, one essential from God alone and another quasi-accidental (yet connatural) from created causes; therefore, although ingenerable things have essential dependence on God and do not have connatural dependence on a created agent, nevertheless God could supernaturally cause them to come about from a created agent through a quasi-accidental and preternatural dependence. For thus grace, although it has the said essential dependence, according to that opinion, and does not have another connatural dependence, nevertheless comes about supernaturally through the sacraments; therefore the same could be said of an angel, insofar as it follows from the force of that reasoning; but that second dependence would be true

creation, because it would be an action, unless it is said that such an angel comes about from itself, which is improbable; therefore that reasoning is ineffective in many ways and has a false foundation.

SECTION V
WHETHER NOVELTY OF BEING BELONGS TO THE NOTION OF CREATION

1. Concerning the eternity of the world there are two distinct considerations: one with respect to its substance, the other with respect to motion. The latter is properly a matter for physics and therefore is to be passed over in this science—although we cannot avoid touching on it below when we demonstrate that God exists and that there cannot be an infinite regress in efficient causes, whether per se or subordinated per accidens. The former consideration is properly metaphysical, for it pertains to the causality of beings as beings and is necessary for clarifying the notion of creation; hence it most fittingly belongs in this place.

Arguments for the Affirmative Side of the Question

2. We have said that creation is production from nothing (ex nihilo). Therefore, it is necessary that the thing created was previously nothing; therefore, it belongs to the notion of creation that before it there should precede the sheer and absolute non-being of the thing that is created; therefore, novelty of being (novitas essendi) belongs to the notion of creation. The last consequence is evident, because whatever has being after non-being at some time had a beginning of being, and that is to have a novelty of being. Second, it belongs to the notion of creation that it be distinguished from conservation, at least by reason and denomination, according to what will be discussed in the following disputation. But creation is distinguished in nothing else

except that creation asserts a novelty of being which conservation does not assert. For that reason the angel, who is now conserved by God by the very action by which he was created, is not now being created, because in the present now he does not have a novelty of being. The major is clear, because if in some effect creation were not distinguished from conservation, that effect would never be created, but always conserved—which plainly seems to involve a contradiction. For how will that be conserved which was not made or created? Third, it belongs to the notion of a creature that it is not eternal; therefore, it belongs to the notion of creation that it is not eternal; therefore, novelty of being belongs to the notion of creation. The consequences are clear. The antecedent can first be proved theologically: the holy Fathers infer that the Word is true God because He is produced from eternity. From this they judge it sufficiently proved that that production is not creation, because it is eternal; therefore they presuppose that eternity is repugnant to creation. The consequence is clear; and the antecedent is proved from St. Athanasius (Oration II against the Arians), St. Gregory Nazianzen (Oration 32, with the scholion of Nicetas, n. 58), St. Basil (Against Eunomius IV, "That the Son is not a creature"), St. Cyril of Alexandria (Dialogue IV On the Trinity), St. John Damascene (De fide orthodoxa I, chs. 8–9), St. Ambrose (Hexaemeron I, ch. 3), and others whom we shall cite below. Second, the same antecedent is proved by a philosophical reason: what is eternal is immutable; but immutability is repugnant to a creature. The antecedent is clear, because what is eternal must persist with infinite duration just as from eternity it was; otherwise there would be something eternal that persists only for a finite duration—a manifest contradiction. But what necessarily persists in the same way and disposition for an infinite duration is immutable. Whence it is confirmed: if a creature were eternal, God would be compelled to conserve it for an infinite time or duration; and by the same reason and necessity He would always conserve it

perpetually, since there is no greater reason for one duration than for another.

Opposing Opinions are Reported

3. Because of these and similar arguments, some theologians have asserted that it belongs to the notion of creation that by it being is communicated after non-being, such that by a real succession or duration being follows upon non-being. Thus teaches Albert the Great (In II Sent., dist. 1, arts. 6 and 10; Physics VIII, ch.), St. Bonaventure (In II Sent., dist. 1, a. 1, q. 1), Richard of St. Victor (ibid., a. 3, q. 4), Marsilius (ibid., q. 1, a. 2), Henry of Ghent (Quodl. I, q. 7; Quodl. IX, q. 17). All of these from this foundation teach that it was impossible for things—even substantial and incorruptible ones—to be created from eternity. Certain philosophers embraced the same view, such as Philoponus in his book replying to Proclus's arguments for the eternity of the world (ch. 3). In favor of this view Toledo in Physics VIII, ch. 2, q. 2, gathers many arguments and also embraces it.

4. The contrary opinion is presupposed by Aristotle in Physics VIII (if indeed he knew of creation). It is especially defended by St. Thomas (ST I, q. 46, a. 2), whom his disciples follow: Cajetan there; Ferrara (Physics VIII, q. 3); Hervaeus (Treatise on the Eternity of the World, q. 2; In II Sent., dist. 1), where also Capreolus and Deza, and likewise Giles, Ockham, Gabriel, the Argentine, and most notably Gregory of Rimini (q. 3), and Durandus (q. 2), who limits this to the creation of incorruptible things. Scotus, however (q. 3), considers it a problem.

Resolution of the Question

5. In my judgment the opinion of St. Thomas is true as regards this part of the question. To explain and confirm the matter, I note that a thing—or a production—can be eternal in two ways: first,

from its own intrinsic necessity, as the eternal generation of the divine Word is; second, without absolute necessity, from the freedom of a cause that wills to effect it from eternity.

6. Creation is not necessarily eternal. I therefore say first: it is repugnant to creation that it be eternal from its intrinsic nature. Hence one can say that novelty of being belongs to the notion of creation, either actually or at least in aptitude. This assertion follows first from faith: it is of faith that no creation has in fact been eternal—therefore, a fortiori none is eternal by necessity; and it is likewise of faith that God does nothing outside Himself by necessity of nature. The reason is concluded thus: every creature (under which creation itself is also included, as we have seen above) does not have being from itself and consequently has no necessity of being; therefore creation itself cannot of itself have such necessity; nor does it have it from an extrinsic cause; therefore it cannot be eternal in the sense described. And from this follows the latter part of the conclusion, namely, that novelty of being belongs to the notion of creation at least in aptitude. For by its very nature this novelty is not repugnant; nor is it repugnant on God's part, because, as we shall show below, God does nothing outside Himself by necessity of nature.

7. No natural reason proves the world to be from eternity. And from this conclusion it follows incidentally that it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason that the world is from eternity. I presuppose that by natural reason it is established that the world has being through creation, as has been proved above. The argument then runs thus: demonstration concerns only what is necessary; but that the creation of the world always exists is not necessary, neither from creation's intrinsic necessity nor from the extrinsic necessity of the agent; therefore it is not demonstrable. I will not linger over answering Aristotle's reasons, upon which other writers have worked learnedly—both for this very reason and also because the philosophical arguments are either of no moment, or they tend chiefly to prove that the world did not begin by natural generation, which is quite true

whatever we think of the strength of the arguments. The metaphysical or theological reason that may have some difficulty or weight will be touched upon immediately.

8. A doubt is resolved. Someone may doubt concerning the proof of this assertion, for we seem to ground something certain on an uncertain and debatable principle—namely, that creation is something created and outside God, which is uncertain, as is clear from the preceding section. The reply is that for the argument made it is enough that passive creation, or the coming-to-be of the creature (whether it is really distinct from the creature or only by a distinction of reason), is outside God and consequently outside any necessity of being. You will say: therefore, if we suppose that active creation is in God and not in the creature, it will have necessity of being and will be eternal from its intrinsic nature; therefore it will of necessity entail an eternal passive creation. The common answer distinguishes the antecedent: the action will be eternal as regards that reality which it posits in God, but not as regards the notional relation which it connotes to the creature; for this is not understood to exist until the creature exists. If you insist that the action is not action according to what the notional relation adds (for that is nothing), but according to what in it is entity and reality, the reply is that two things can be considered in that action: one is its being; the other is its actual efficacy, that is, that it actually induce a passion. With respect to the first, it is eternal; with respect to the second, it is not, because that action is of such nobility and perfection that it does not induce or posit its term except when the agent wills to operate. And because "action," as action, not only signifies the entity of the action in itself but also connotes the actual conjunction or passive emanation of the term, therefore simply speaking that action is not eternal by necessity, but can be temporal.

9. This doctrine is true; yet whoever considers it attentively will understand that whatever there is by way of an act that is understood to be eternal in God is not a true "action," insofar as

"action" signifies an actual way and flow proceeding from the agent and tending to a term; for such an action is not really separable from its term, since it consists in the term's actual efflux. Therefore whatever is understood to be eternal in God exists as an act that is a principle of acting—either as the very potency or form from which the action flows in time, or as an immanent act applying the executive potency so that at such and such a time it may induce the action; in this way there is in God from eternity the act of will by which He wills to create—not, however, for the very eternity, but for the time or instant He willed to determine.

10. From this one easily solves the argument that could most move philosophers: if creation is in time, God would have to change, at least with respect to the will to create; for if He creates in time, He wills to create in time—therefore He changes. We must distinguish the consequent "He wills in time," whether on the part of the act or on the part of the object. The first is false, the second true; that is, if the sense is "He begins in time to have the act by which He wills to create," or the free determination thereof, then the consequence is denied; for by an eternal act He could from eternity will the creation which He effects in time. If, however, the sense is "He wills in time to create objectively," that is, that to create in time was the object of the divine will, then the consequent is true. To explain this, it is commonly said that it is more true and proper to say, "God willed to create in time," than "God willed in time to create." In the former expression, "in time" joins to the verb "to create"; in the latter, it seems to join to the willing itself. From the true sense no change follows, since the will of that temporal object is eternal. What that eternal will is, and what the free determination to a temporal object adds in the very eternity, will be said below when treating God's attributes; for the present it is irrelevant, since the same difficulty remains even if we suppose God's free determination to be to an eternal creation.

11. It does not repugn creation to be exercised from eternity. The phrase "from nothing" (ex nihilo) in the definition of creation—

how it is to be understood. I say, second: actual novelty of being, that is, that creation not be from eternity, does not belong to the notion of creation. This is proved because neither in the definition of creation when rightly understood is this included, nor is it necessary for any other reason, nor is the opposite repugnant. The first part is proved as follows. When creation is said to be "production from nothing," the "from" does not signify the succession of one thing after another, as when we say evening comes from morning; for besides the fact that such a way of speaking is very improper and unfit for a definition, it also denotes an order per accidens (unless in successives as such). But creation is not of itself a successive emanation; rather, it is momentary, whole at once. Therefore "from nothing," taken negatively, signifies the absence of a material cause; and from that side there is no necessity of novelty of being, because even if creation were eternal it could be independent of a material cause. Or the phrase denotes a relation to the "term from which," which must be simply non-being; and thus it denotes only an order of nature, not of duration, as Avicenna also noted (Metaphysics VI, ch. 2). This order of nature consists in this alone: that the creature of itself has absolutely no being unless being is communicated by another through creation; thus of itself it is nothing negatively, that is, it does not have being from itself. And for this reason, even if it were created from eternity, it would be created from nothing, because from that which does not have being from itself it becomes that which has being from another, so that being itself (which, if it were not made, would be nothing) comes to be by creation. And then, although in no real duration would it be true to say "the creature is not" or "it is nothing," nevertheless it is true to say that it is prior by nature "nothing" rather than "something," because that "prior by nature" does not so exclude existing in some real duration, but is to be explained negatively—namely, that without the causality which is by creation the thing would be nothing. Scotus rightly noted this (In II Sent., dist. 1, q. 2), distinguishing a twofold priority of nature: positive and privative. Just as, in the same instant in which a

form enters matter, the privation is said to be expelled, and is said to have been in matter prior by nature to the introduction of the form—not formally or positively, but causally or negatively, because unless the form were introduced, the privation would be there—so it must be understood in the present case.

12. The second part. The second part is proved because from no other consideration can a repugnance be shown, as will be most easily seen by solving the difficulties stated at the beginning. Briefly: it is not repugnant on God's part, as is clear—since He is omnipotent; nor is it repugnant on the part of created being as such, because even if it were made from eternity, it would truly be created and dependent. For it is not of the essence of such created being that it at some time in the past was not, just as it is not of its essence that at some time in the future it will not be; it belongs only to its essence that it is not from itself and that it lacks an absolute necessity of being. It would have both even if it were produced from eternity, because it would both flow effectively from another and depend upon that other's free determination. Nor does the eternity of the effect repugn the liberty of the cause; for just as the determination of the divine will is eternal, and nonetheless free—since prior by reason to that will being understood as determined in its eternity, it is understood as indifferent to this or that object outside itself—so, even if He should create from eternity and for that very eternity, He would be prior by reason indifferent to creating or not creating. Again, neither from the mode by which creation takes place does it repugn that it be eternal, because it is not made successively but all at once and indivisibly; and therefore, although eternity itself be understood as indivisible, creation can coexist with it.

13. Reply to an objection. Some say that although creation as such is made all at once, conservation is made successively; but eternal creation necessarily has adjoined to it conservation and infinite successive duration. Since, therefore, we suppose that succession is repugnant to eternity, it will also be repugnant that creation be eternal,

at least on account of the conservation adjoined to it. This objection would have force in the opinion of St. Bonaventure and others who think that in the being of incorruptible things, or in their duration or aevum, there is real succession. But that opinion is false, as we shall show below when disputing about durations. Consequently it is also false that in the perpetual conservation of these things there is necessarily any real succession; for they are conserved in the same permanent being and in the same indivisible duration, and by the same indivisible action, as I shall say in the next disputation. Only according to our manner of conceiving is that conservation or duration apprehended after the manner of succession, because we cannot measure or conceive that duration otherwise than by quasi-coexistence with an infinite imaginary succession.

14. A thing created from eternity is not thereby infinitely perfect. Thus it is easy to understand that from eternal creation no real infinity follows in the created thing; for although eternal duration is called infinite insofar as it lacks a beginning, this is only either a kind of extrinsic denomination of coexistence with God's eternity, insofar as it lacks a beginning, or (what seems truer) a certain negation of a beginning in existing. No infinite perfection is added to the creature in the thing itself; rather, it is the same thing always existing. Just as an angel's coexistence or duration for a thousand years of the celestial motion is not in him a greater physical perfection than to exist for a single instant, but is the same whole according to itself enduring without interruption, so from no consideration is it repugnant that creation be eternal.

15. Corruptible permanent things could have been created from eternity. Hence I further gather that the limitation added by Durandus to incorruptible things is not necessary. For even the creation of permanent corruptible things—if it be made all at once without succession, as the condition of permanent things of itself requires—does not by its intrinsic notion require novelty of being, nor does it have any ground from which eternity of being would be

intrinsically repugnant. The whole foregoing discussion can be applied in the same way to such things. But, says Durandus, infinite duration is repugnant to a corruptible thing even in the sense explained, because a corruptible thing cannot endure for an infinite time; yet a thing made from eternity must of necessity endure for an infinite time. The common reply is that the argument proves only that a corruptible thing cannot be created from eternity and then left to its own nature; for from that there follows the contradiction that the thing both endures and does not endure for infinite time. It does not, however, prove absolutely that it is repugnant that such a thing be created from eternity; for God could refrain from leaving it to its nature and could conserve it for an infinite time.

16. I judge, however, that we should answer differently: corruptible things can also endure for an infinite time when left to their nature, if the contrary agent be absent or so disposed that it cannot act upon them; for, strictly speaking, no thing destroys itself. If corruptible things were created from eternity, they could suffer nothing from contrary agents from eternity, because they could suffer only through a successive motion, which it is repugnant to suppose from eternity. I say "from contrary agents," because we are speaking of corruptive action; a perfective action, such as illumination, seeing, understanding, can very well be eternal, because it can be done all at once without resistance, and once done it can of itself endure for an infinite time. Thus St. Augustine says (De Trinitate VI, ch. 1) that the splendor of fire or of the sun would be coeternal if the fire or the sun were eternal. But a corruptive action which is done with contrary resistance requires motion and succession and therefore cannot be from eternity, as Durandus himself teaches and as we presuppose. Thus it happens that corruptible things created from eternity and left to their nature—that is, without any special protection of God beyond the general influx—can endure for infinite time from the defect of the action of a contrary agent, so that, even if fire and tow were created from eternity and placed near each other, fire could not act upon the

tow in eternity, nor consequently for an infinite imaginary time. Proof: if fire were to act upon tow, it would either corrupt it and convert it into itself by a single, indivisible action, or it would alter it successively. The first cannot be said, both because it exceeds the efficacy of fire and because it contradicts the position: if an eternal fire were immediately to generate by an indivisible action another fire, the begotten fire would be as eternal as the begetting fire; but for it to be generated from tow, it is necessary that the tow at some time existed. Thus tow and the fire generated from tow would be together in eternity—plainly repugnant. The second cannot be said either, because (as we suppose) a successive alteration cannot be eternal. This can easily be seen by explaining the argument: a successive alteration is from a contrary, and by it the contrary is removed from a disposition previously existing in the subject; therefore, if a successive alteration is eternal, then the patient existing with the disposition contrary to the alteration is also eternal; therefore, in eternity itself it both had that disposition and was deprived of it by a contrary alteration—an open contradiction. The a priori reason is that a thing created from eternity is created in some real disposition, and therefore it is necessary that it endure in it for an infinite time; hence in all that time no contrary alteration can occur; it must therefore begin in time. For the same reason, if some man were created from eternity—even in pure nature—he could suffer no alteration from within for an infinite time, because the same reasoning applies to the alteration of one part by another, or of natural heat upon the humors or nutriment, as to any other agents or patients. Therefore such a man would not need food for an infinite time, and for the same reason he would not only not die but could not die.

17. You will say: all this is praeternatural for corruptible things and for contrary agents and patients; therefore such things are no longer left to their nature, as was supposed. The reply is that by these and similar arguments and inferences it is shown—at least a posteriori—that eternal creation does not suit the natures of these

things; for every thing by its nature demands to exist and to be made in such measure and state as to be able to exercise its actions in a mode accommodated to its nature. But corruptible things made in eternity could act in nothing accommodated to themselves for that very eternity. Hence neither afterwards could they of themselves initiate action and passion; for that infinite imaginary time—for which they would necessarily endure in the disposition in which they were created—would have no definite terminus on the part of what follows; rather, it could end before any assigned instant, and thus the action of the creature could also be initiated before any assigned instant. Therefore they could not of themselves initiate an action by determining the instant at which it should be initiated; this would pertain to God, which also is praeternatural. Nevertheless, given eternal creation, we say that all these things follow by natural necessity; and from that supposition of eternal creation we say that, although in other respects such things are left to their natures, they will endure for an infinite time.

18. Incorruptible substances would not exist wholly connaturally if created from eternity. I add further that this disproportion or (so to speak) praeternaturalness—though not entirely equal—is found almost the same in the eternal creation of incorruptible things. For it is necessary that any thing created from eternity remain entirely unchanged for an infinite time, both in substance and in all the accidents with which it was created; for all those are eternal and therefore, in that respect, infinite in duration according to the whole reality or real mode in which from eternity they were created. Therefore it is necessary that for an infinite duration they remain unchanged. But every creature, however incorruptible, is mutable with respect to place or other operations; hence it is also praeternatural for it to be brought into a state in which it cannot exercise or vary its natural motions or operations for an infinite time. Nevertheless, this is not simply impossible or repugnant—which is what I intend to establish.

Section V

Replies to the Arguments

19. The first argument made at the beginning has already been sufficiently answered from what has been said. For we have shown that it does not belong to the notion of creation that nothing precede it in real duration, but only in the order of reason and causality. Nor does it stand against this that St. Anselm (Monologion, ch. 8) also approves the following exposition: that what is created from nothing is said to be made because it was previously nothing and by creation becomes something. For earlier he teaches the true interpretation given above—namely, that by that phrase every subject and all matter "from which" creation might be made is denied. Afterwards he adds the other interpretation, not as necessary nor as suited to creation precisely insofar as it is creation, but as explanatory of creation insofar as it in fact occurred.

20. To the second, I reply first that there is no inconvenience in conceding that a thing is created by the same action by which it is conserved, as I shall presently say. Then I add that even in an eternal creation creation can be distinguished from conservation by reason. For insofar as that creation is said to be absolute in eternity itself—as a simple participation in created being—it has the character of creation; but insofar as in it we conceive a certain imaginary succession, so for any instant assigned within that succession it has the character of conservation. We apprehend something similar in the eternal generation of the Word. Insofar as it is in its eternity, it is true production and generation; but insofar as it is understood to coexist with the instants of our time or of an imaginary series, there is (so to speak) a certain permanence in the same generation—though the name "conservation," which denotes imperfection, is not to be attributed. See St. Thomas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 14, ad 10.

21. How the saints prove the divinity of the Word of God from His eternal existence. To the third, I deny the antecedent—

namely, that eternity is repugnant to the nature of a creature. As to the Fathers, it can first be said that they are speaking from the supposition of faith, which teaches that no creature has been created from eternity; from this they rightly infer that, if the Word is eternal, He is not a creature. And when they sometimes say that coeternity with God is repugnant to a creature, this is to be understood according to the earlier conclusion. Thus St. Augustine says (City of God XII, ch. 15) that even if the angels had been created from eternity, they nonetheless would not have been coeternal with their Creator; for He always was with immutable eternity, whereas they were made. To the philosophical reason I reply: what is eternal from its intrinsic nature is intrinsically immutable; but what is made from without in eternity need not be intrinsically immutable; it suffices that for that very eternity—or for the infinite duration conceived in it—it remain unchanged.

22. Hence to the confirmation I concede that, in this very fact that God creates something from eternity, He must of necessity conserve it for an infinite imaginary time, in the sense explained. Nor is this inconvenient, because this is not an absolute necessity but one ex suppositione, which proportionally obtains in every action of God. For if He wills to produce a thing in time, then at least for that time He must conserve it; therefore if He wills to produce in eternity, what wonder is it that He must of necessity conserve it for the eternity? This necessity, however, is only on the part of what precedes, because, ascending toward the beginning, no terminus is ever found in that duration; it is not, however, on the part of what follows, because at any instant you assign within that "eternity" God could cease from conserving that thing; and before any assigned instant, in any assignable instant, He could cease at His good pleasure. For the rest on this matter we remit to Physics VIII.[46]

[46] In the critical edition of De Anima (edited by Castellote), all the works of Suárez that are cited by him are listed, even if they were not published by him.

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